The mind's best trick: how we experience conscious will

We often consciously will our own actions. This experience is so profound that it tempts us to believe that our actions are caused by consciousness. It could also be a trick, however - the mind's way of estimating its own apparent authorship by drawing causal inferences about relationships between thoughts and actions. Cognitive, social, and neuropsychological studies of apparent mental causation suggest that experiences of conscious will frequently depart from actual causal processes and so might not reflect direct perceptions of conscious thought causing action.     

The face‐mind link: Why we see minds behind faces,and how others' minds change how we see their face

Understanding others' minds has puzzled philosophers for centuries. Psychologists, too, have recently begun asking questions about what causes us to see another person as having complex or simple mental faculties. Here, we review recent evidence linking how we perceive others' faces with how we perceive others' minds—the face‐mind link. We first discuss research demonstrating a face‐to‐mind effect, showing that both certain facial features (e.g., eyes) and face perception processes (e.g., configural processing) can trigger the perception that a face has a mind. We then discuss recent evidence demonstrating a mind‐to‐face effect, showing that believing a person is inhumane (i.e., their mind) leads their face to be processed less like a face and more like an object. Finally, we consider both the consequences of this bidirectional face‐mind link, and what the next steps may be in understanding how and why we infer minds from faces, and how and why beliefs about others' minds affects how we see their face.     

At the core: how we steer our course

"The force that through the green fuse drives the flower drives my green age..."--Dylan Thomas (1952). The beautiful evocative words of Dylan Thomas speak to the driving life force that pulses through all creation. So what, then, drives our organization, the American Group Psychotherapy Association (AGPA)? What underlying stream can we tap into to provide the energy, power, and vitality we need to go on being in a meaningful and productive fashion? And, what internal compass can we rely on to steer us in the right direction, to guide us in how we function as an organization? My purpose here is to consider how we formulate our objectives, determine our priorities, make decisions, and insure, as best we can, that we are pursuing that which is meaningful and essential, not veering drastically off course. To do this, I would like to focus briefly on the current organizational structure of AGPA, then examine the use of a strategic planning process, review our accomplishments, and lastly explore hopes and dreams for our future as the premier group psychotherapy organization in the United States.     

What we remember affects how we see: Spatial working memory steers saccade programming

Relationships between visual attention, saccade programming, and visual working memory have been hypothesized for over a decade. Awh, Jonides, and Reuter-Lorenz (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 24(3):780–90, 1998) and Awh et al. (Psychological Science 10(5):433–437, 1999) proposed that rehearsing a location in memory also leads to enhanced attentional processing at that location. In regard to eye movements, Belopolsky and Theeuwes (Attention, Perception & Psychophysics 71(3):620–631, 2009) found that holding a location in working memory affects saccade programming, albeit negatively. In three experiments, we attempted to replicate the findings of Belopolsky and Theeuwes (Attention, Perception & Psychophysics 71(3):620–631, 2009) and determine whether the spatial memory effect can occur in other saccade-cuing paradigms, including endogenous central arrow cues and exogenous irrelevant singletons. In the first experiment, our results were the opposite of those in Belopolsky and Theeuwes (Attention, Perception & Psychophysics 71(3):620–631, 2009), in that we found facilitation (shorter saccade latencies) instead of inhibition when the saccade target matched the region in spatial working memory. In Experiment 2, we sought to determine whether the spatial working memory effect would generalize to other endogenous cuing tasks, such as a central arrow that pointed to one of six possible peripheral locations. As in Experiment 1, we found that saccade programming was facilitated when the cued location coincided with the saccade target. In Experiment 3, we explored how spatial memory interacts with other types of cues, such as a peripheral color singleton target or irrelevant onset. In both cases, the eyes were more likely to go to either singleton when it coincided with the location held in spatial working memory. On the basis of these results, we conclude that spatial working memory and saccade programming are likely to share common overlapping circuitry.     

Framing how we think about disagreement

Disagreement is a hot topic right now in epistemology, where there is spirited debate between epistemologists who argue that we should be moved by the fact that we disagree and those who argue that we need not. Both sides to this debate often use what is commonly called “the method of cases,” designing hypothetical cases involving peer disagreement and using what we think about those cases as evidence that specific normative theories are true or false, and as reasons for believing as such. With so much weight being given in the epistemology of disagreement to what people think about cases of peer disagreement, our goal in this paper is to examine what kinds of things might shape how people think about these kinds of cases. We will show that two different kinds of framing effect shape how people think about cases of peer disagreement, and examine both what this means for how the method of cases is used in the epistemology of disagreement and what this might tell us about the role that motivated cognition is playing in debates about which normative positions about peer disagreement are right and wrong.     

Relationship quality and potentially harmful behaviors by spousal caregivers: how we were then, how we are now. The Family Relationships in Late Life Project

Structured interview data from 142 caregivers (98 wives, 44 husbands) indicate that more depressed caregivers are more likely to treat their spouses in potentially harmful ways. However, consistent with hypotheses derived from communal relationships theory, when the preillness relationship between caregiver and care recipient was characterized by mutual responsiveness to each other's needs (i.e., was more communal), caregivers were less depressed and less frequently engaged in potentially harmful behaviors. These effects were not attributable to demographic factors, amount of care provided, care recipient dementia status, or length of time in the caregiving role. Rather, multivariate analyses suggest that the extent to which premorbid relationships were communal in nature determines whether caregivers perceive their current relationships as rewarding, which, in turn, predicts caregiver depression and potentially harmful behaviors.     

The fruits of irony: gaining insight into how we make meaning of the world

Many philosophers of education emphasise the impossibility to really ‘solve’ philosophical—and with that, educational—problems these days. Philosophers have been trying to give philosophy a new, constructive turn in the face of this insolvability. This paper focuses on irony-based approaches that try to exploit the very uncertainty of philosophical issues to further philosophical understanding. We will first briefly discuss a few highlights of historical uses of irony as a philosophical tool. Then we concentrate on two different interpretations of irony, formulated by Bransen and Rorty, that aim at gaining insight into how we make meaning of the world, while at the same time recognising that such an understanding would be impossible. After discussing some problematic aspects of these interpretations a third interpretation of irony is developed, based on a third view of the nature of meaning-making. Following these three interpretations, we will discuss their philosophical merits and the different kinds of insight they can produce for philosophy of education.     

The ecology of eating: smaller portion sizes in France Than in the United States help explain the French paradox

Part of the "French paradox" can be explained by the fact that the French eat less than Americans. We document that French portion sizes are smaller in comparable restaurants, in the sizes of individual portions of foods (but not other items) in supermarkets, in portions specified in cookbooks, and in the prominence of "all you can eat" restaurants in dining guides. We also present data, from observations at McDonald's, that the French take longer to eat than Americans. Our results suggest that in the domain of eating, and more generally, more attention should be paid to ecological factors, even though their mechanism of operation is transparent, and hence less revealing of fundamental psychological processes. Ironically, although the French eat less than Americans, they seem to eat for a longer period of time, and hence have more food experience. The French can have their cake and eat it as well.     

Activating attachment representations impact how we retrieve autobiographical memories

Although much research indicates that proximity to attachment figures confers many psychological benefits, there is little evidence pertaining to how attachment activation may impact autobiographical memory retrieval. Following a negative mood induction to elicit overgeneral autobiographical retrieval, participants (N?=?70) were administered an induction in which they imagined a person who is a strong attachment figure or an acquaintance. Participants then completed an autobiographical memory task to retrieve memories in response to neutral and negative cue words. Attachment priming resulted in less distress, increased retrieval of specific memories, and reduced retrieval of categoric memories. These findings indicate that activation of mental representations of attachment figures can impact on the specificity of autobiographical memory retrieval, and extends prevailing models of autobiographical memory by integrating them with attachment theory.     

Eye gaze patterns reveal how we reason about fractions

ABSTRACT

Fractions are defined by numerical relationships, and comparing two fractions’ magnitudes requires within-fraction (holistic) and/or between-fraction (componential) relational comparisons. To better understand how individuals spontaneously reason about fractions, we collected eye-tracking data while they performed a fraction comparison task with conditions that promoted or obstructed different types of comparisons. We found evidence for both componential and holistic processing in this mixed-pairs task, consistent with the hybrid theory of fraction representation. Additionally, making within-fraction eye movements on trials that promoted a between-fraction comparison strategy was associated with slower responses. Finally, participants who performed better on a non-numerical test of reasoning took longer to respond to the most difficult fraction trials, which suggests that those who had greater facility with non-numerical reasoning attended more to numerical relationships. These findings extend prior research and support the continued investigation into the mechanistic links between numerical and non-numerical reasoning.     

Prescribed spatial prepositions influence how we think about time

Prepositions combine with nouns flexibly when describing concrete locative relations (e.g. at/on/in the school) but are rigidly prescribed when paired with abstract concepts (e.g. at risk; on Wednesday; in trouble). In the former case they do linguistic work based on their discrete semantic qualities, and in the latter they appear to serve a primarily grammatical function. We used the abstract concept of time as a test case to see if specific grammatically prescribed prepositions retain semantic content. Using ambiguous questions designed to interrogate one’s meaningful representation of temporal relations, we found that the semantics of prescribed prepositions modulate how we think about time. Although prescribed preposition use is unlikely to be based on a core representational organization shared between space and time, results demonstrate that the semantics of particular locative prepositions do constrain how we think about paired temporal concepts.     

When food is more than nutrition: Understanding emotional eating and overconsumption

This research examines how more proximal or immediate goals of affect regulation impact goals of weight loss and maintenance. Findings suggest that both psychological and social factors play a role in eating behavior and food overconsumption. Specifically, the narratives of self‐identified emotional eaters reveal that negative emotion, prefactual thinking, and ruminative propensities play major roles in contributing to food‐related consumption. Additionally, emotional eating informants' consumption behavior is greatly impacted by the attitudes and behaviors of others. Several approaches for developing interventions for emotional eaters and furthering transformative research in obesity and overconsumption are discussed. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Resistance to satiation: Reinforcing effects of food and eating under satiation

It has been shown previously that rats which have learned a response when hungry will continue to make that response when tested satiated, a phenomenon labeled resistance to satiation. Here we showed that rats which were previously trained hungry will learn a new response for the opportunity to consume pellets in a new situation when tested satiated. In four experiments various groups received each of the components of the training given when rats learn an instrumental response when hungry. Rats were placed in the goalbox of a straight alley and given food pellets when hungry or were hungry only in their home cages prior to running a straight alley in the satiated test in Experiment 1. In Experiments 2, 3, and 4 learning of a differential conditioning problem for pellets in S+ (nonreward in S?) was measured in the satiated test. Groups given pellets in their home cages when hungry with or without alley exposure learned to run more rapidly in S+ than in S? in the satiated test phase. The tendency to eat pellets in the apparatus and the reinforcing effect of eating the pellets was larger for rats which ate the pellets when hungry in their home cage than for rats which ate the pellets when satiated in their home cage. Being hungry in the home cage with no pellets was not sufficient to produce eating or running for pellets in the satiated test, indicating that any inherent reinforcing effect of the pellets is not sufficient to produce eating or running, and that incomplete satiation cannot account for the learning. These data indicate that a reinforcing effect of eating pellets under satiation is an important determiner of resistance to satiation.     

Don't take another bite: how sociocultural norms for appearance affect women's eating behavior

Four studies tested the impact of exposure to thin images on women's eating behavior. In Study 1, women who were exposed to commercials containing thin models ate less in a taste test than women exposed to neutral commercials. The next two studies revealed that the impact of the thin images could be reduced by challenging the sociocultural norms for appearance. In Study 2, including images of relatively heavier women who have been successful in life (an indirect challenge to the norm) attenuated the impact of the thin images on women's eating behavior. Study 3 demonstrated that convincing women that their peers do not endorse the sociocultural norms also reduced the impact of the thin images. In Study 4, we found that exposure to thin images led to activation of an association between heaviness and rejection and that the more this association was activated, the less participants ate.