Applying the intentional forgetting process to forgiveness

The current research tests the hypothesis that the cognitive process of intentional forgetting can be applied to promote forgiveness. In three experiments, participants read stories set in second person point of view sentence by sentence. Each story included a target conflict sentence. After each sentence, participants saw a cue indicating forget or remember (Experiment 1, n = 89) or important or not important (Experiment 2, n = 123) or control cue (Experiment 3, n = 198). Findings revealed that, among participants who remembered the transgression, being told to intentionally forget the transgression led to increased forgiveness (Experiments 1 & 3). However, being told that the transgression was not important had no effect on forgiveness (Experiment 2). Overall, results are consistent with the hypothesis that an active process of intentional forgetting (as opposed to a passive process of disregarding unimportant information) can promote forgiveness. The interpersonal and clinical applications of these findings are discussed.     

Divided attention facilitates intentional forgetting: evidence from item-method directed forgetting

This study examined the effects of post-cue interval and cognitive load on item-method directed forgetting. The results of Experiment 1 (free recall test) and Experiment 2 (cued recall test) showed that forget item retention increased as the post-cue interval increased. Moreover, increasing the cognitive load of participants by asking them to perform a secondary counting task did not impair, but rather facilitated, the intentional forgetting of the studied item under long post-cue interval conditions. These results and analyses of recall gains from the additional use of the independent cue suggest that the improved recall of forget items caused by an increase in the post-cue interval came from an automatic process, and that after receiving the forget cue, participants did not engage a suppression operation that was resource-demanded. The current findings suggest that forgetting is more effective when participants perform a secondary task after receiving the forget cue.     

Emotional constraints on intentional forgetting

One way people control the contents of their minds is intentional forgetting—voluntarily forgetting events after they have happened. The events people would most like to forget are unpleasant and emotional. This study used a directed forgetting procedure with emotional and neutral pictures to examine whether people can intentionally forget emotional events as easily as mundane ones. When the to-be-forgotten list was neutral, participants showed successful intentional forgetting. But when the to-be-forgotten list was emotional, directed forgetting failed. Results contribute to understanding the ways that emotion constrains mental control by capturing mental processes including memory retrieval. Emotion may short-circuit attempts to forget those parts of the past people would most like to forget.     

Rumination and intentional forgetting of emotional material

The tendency to respond to negative life events and negative mood states with ruminative thinking has been linked to emotion dysregulation and to a heightened risk for the onset and maintenance of emotional disorders. To further investigate this maladaptive response style, the present study examined whether rumination is linked to individual differences in the ability to intentionally forget emotional material. In a directed forgetting task, participants were instructed to memorise a list of positive and negative words and were subsequently told to forget these words. Next, participants were told to memorise a new list and, finally, recall was tested for all to-be-forgotten and to-be-remembered words. Our results demonstrate a close relation between rumination and recall in the forget condition but not in the remember condition. Specifically, compared to participants who scored low on the Ruminative Responses Scale (RRS), participants who scored high exhibited reduced forgetting of positive and negative to-be-forgotten words. These results remained stable when depression scores were included as a covariate suggesting that irrespective of depressive symptoms, rumination and intentional forgetting of emotional material are closely related.     

Overcoming the effects of intentional forgetting

The long-term effects of the compartmentalization of task-irrelevant memories were investigated using a directed forgetting procedure. Many models tacitly assume the persistence of the costs and benefits of directed forgetting or otherwise fail to predict what factors might reduce or eliminate them. In contrast, a retrieving effectively from memory model (REM; Lehman & Malmberg, 2009) predicts that intentional forgetting should only be observed for free recall when temporal context is used to probe memory. By manipulating whether study lists were constructed from category exemplars or from a random set of words, and by either providing temporal or category cues at test, we tested the prediction. The effects of directed forgetting were eliminated when categorized lists were studied and category cues were provided. When categorized lists were used but category cues were not provided, the usual costs and benefits of directed forgetting were observed. These results specify the conditions under which the consequences of intentional forgetting can be overcome.     

Positive moods can eliminate intentional forgetting

People can intentionally forget previously studied information if, after study, a forget cue and new material to be encoded are provided. We examined how the affective state people experience during encoding of the new material modulates such directed forgetting. Positive, negative, and neutral moods were induced immediately before the new material was studied. The study materials themselves were neutral. The results showed sustained forgetting of the previously studied materials in negative moods but an elimination of the forgetting in positive moods. These findings agree with the effects of mood found for other cognitive tasks. They suggest that in positive moods, associative networks are activated, which leads to reactivation of List-1 items, and thus to elimination of the directed forgetting effects. These results contrast with recent reports on the role of emotional content in directed forgetting, which have described equivalent effects for neutral and emotional materials. Together, our findings suggest that directed forgetting is mainly affected by mood, and hardly at all by emotional content.     

Knowing what to remember and forget: A developmental study of cue memory in intentional forgetting

These experiments are the first to investigate children’s encoding and use of information about a memory cue in Bjork’s (1972) intentional forgetting task. In Experiment 1, children in Grades 2, 4, and 6 and college students were given cues to either remember or forget after the presentation of each picture. Recall and recognition tests of pictures and cues followed. The procedure in Experiment 2 was identical to that in Experiment 1 except that the list of presentation pictures was altered for some children (Grades 3 and 4) and adolescents (Grades 8 and 9) so that remember and forget cues were associated with particular taxonomic categories. In Experiment 3, the testing component was modified so that children (Grades 2, 3, and 4) and college students were asked to recall only the cue associated with each picture. The results indicated that (1) children as young as second graders encode the cue associated with each picture, although to a lesser extent than do college students, (2) much improvement in intentional forgetting is still occurring during adolescence, (3) only adults adequately cluster their recall by cue, (4) associating remember and forget cues with items from different categories does not increase the differentiation between cues, and (5) eliminating picture recall and recognition has minimal effects on the magnitude of cue judgments. These results suggest that children’s difficulties on intentional forgetting tasks stem, at least in part, from their poorer encoding of information about whether an item should be remembered or forgotten.     

Remembering the good, forgetting the bad: intentional forgetting of emotional material in depression

The authors examined intentional forgetting of negative material in depression. Participants were instructed to not think about emotional nouns that they had learned to associate with a neutral cue word. The authors provided participants with multiple occasions to suppress the unwanted words. Overall, depressed participants successfully forgot negative words. Moreover, the authors obtained a clear practice effect. However, forgetting came at a cost: Compared with the nondepressed participants and with the depressed participants who were instructed to forget positive words, depressed participants who were instructed to forget negative words showed significantly worse recall of the baseline words. These results indicate that training depressed individuals in intentional forgetting could prove to be an effective strategy to counteract automatic ruminative tendencies and mood-congruent biases.     

Influences of intentional and unintentional forgetting on false memories

In 2 experiments, we examined the interplay of 2 types of memory errors: forgetting and false memory--errors of omission and commission, respectively. We examined the effects of 2 manipulations known to inhibit retrieval of studied words--directed forgetting and part-list cuing--on the false recall of an unstudied "critical" word following study of its 15 strongest associates. Participants cued to forget the 1st of 2 studied lists before studying the 2nd recalled fewer List 1 words but intruded the missing critical word more often than did participants cued to remember both lists. By contrast, providing some studied words as cues during recall reduced both recall of the remaining studied words and intrusions of the critical word. The results suggest that forgetting can increase or decrease false memories, depending on whether such forgetting reflects impaired access to an entire episode or retrieval competition among elements of an episode.     

The role of intentional forgetting in employee selection

The authors examined the effects of forbidden information on the employee-selection process. They presented the participants with 4 applicants for the position of cashier-stockperson. One of the applicants (the Target Applicant) provided a mixture of forbidden and job-relevant information; the remaining applicants gave no forbidden information. Some of the participants were told before they reviewed the applicants what types of information were to be considered as forbidden, and they were instructed to disregard any such information in the applications. The remaining participants were not aware of the presence of the forbidden information, nor were they instructed to disregard such information. The participants who were instructed to disregard the forbidden information rated the Target Applicant more favorably than did those who were not aware of its presence. Moreover, those in the disregard condition recalled less of the forbidden information and more of the job-relevant information about the Target Applicant than did those in the no-instruction condition. These data patterns support laboratory-based studies on intentional forgetting.     

Personality correlates of retrieval processes in intentional and unintentional forgetting

Early accounts of intentional forgetting relied exclusively on mechanisms that operate at encoding. The results of more recent experiments indicate that memory-retrieval inhibition also is involved, thus linking waking intentional forgetting with hypnotic amnesia. The present Experiment 1 was designed to provide further support for the retrieval-inhibition hypothesis by testing four alternative explanations for some of the recent results. Experiment 2 examined the role of word affect in both intentional forgetting and unintentional forgetting to evaluate theoretical interpretations of the retrieval mechanisms thought to be involved. Unintentional forgetting of negative words was consistent with a repression-like interpretation, whereas intentional forgetting of negative words appeared to be limited by sensitization. Personality correlates of the recall results were identified and were found to be in support of these interpretations.     

Effects of post‐cue interval on intentional forgetting

This study examined the effect of post‐cue interval on directed forgetting and suppression. Experiments 1 and 2 used the item method of directed forgetting. The interval between the cue to remember/forget (R/F) and the presence of the next item was manipulated. As the post‐cue interval increased, the rates of hits and ‘remember’ responses on the recognition test also increased not only for R items but also for F items, suggesting that participants did not stop processing F items after the F cue. Experiment 3 manipulated both the number of response/suppression attempts and the duration of response/suppression for each word pair during the response/suppression phase. The results showed that increasing the number of suppression attempts led to worse recall in the subsequent memory test. However, increasing the duration of suppression reduced the suppression effect. These results provide insights into a key factor for successful intentional forgetting and suppression.     

Withdrawal of spatial overt attention following intentional forgetting: evidence from eye movements

Eye movements were measured to examine whether item-method directed forgetting involved a spatial overt attention shift. Experiment 1 showed that participants’ eyes were moved away from the study word following the forget and ignore cues, but not the remember cue. Experiment 2 revealed that the eyes were moved away from the area that covered by the study word even when the study word disappeared upon the presentation of the memory cue. Both the study word and memory cue were presented auditorily in Experiment 3. In all experiments, the to-be-remembered words were recalled better than both to-be-forgotten and to-be-ignored words. More importantly, mental effort, as indexed by the pupil size, increased following the remember, as compared with the forget and ignore cues. These findings are discussed in terms of controlling spatial overt attention after encoding to withdraw attention from irrelevant information and to allocate cognitive resources to relevant information for long-term retention.     

The role of intentional forgetting in reducing children's retroactive interference.

Preschool and kindergarten children's retention of stories was examined in the presence of interfering information and instructions to forget. Children learned 2 stories and, 24 hr later, were asked to recall the 1st or 2nd story learned. Some of the children were instructed, either following acquisition or just prior to the retention test, to forget the 2nd, or interfering, story. A model was used to isolate storage and retrieval effects, and the results showed that (a) retroactive interference affected both storage- and retrieval-based forgetting rates for the younger children but only storage-based forgetting rates for the older children, (b) intentional forgetting reduced retroactive interference primarily by attenuating storage-based forgetting regardless of age, (c) intentional forgetting instructions were effective only at acquisition for preschoolers but at both acquisition and retention for kindergarteners, and (d) all children recalled the to-be-forgotten story as well as they recalled the to-be-remembered story. These results are interpreted in terms of reorganization and distinctiveness effects in storage.     

Self-deception and self-knowledge

The aim of this paper is to provide an account of a certain variety of self-deception based on a model of self-knowledge. According to this model, one thinks that one has a belief on the basis of one’s grounds for that belief. If this model is correct, then our thoughts about which beliefs we have should be in accordance with our grounds for those beliefs. I suggest that the relevant variety of self-deception is a failure of self-knowledge wherein the subject violates this epistemic obligation. I argue that construing this type of self-deception as a failure of self-knowledge explains two important aspects of it: The tension that we observe between the subject’s speech and her actions, and our inclination to hold the subject responsible for her condition. I compare this proposal with two other approaches to self-deception in the literature; intentionalism and motivationalism. Intentionalism explains the two aspects of self-deception but it runs into the so-called ‘paradoxes’ of self-deception. Motivationalism avoids those paradoxes but it cannot explain the two aspects of self-deception.     

The control of working memory resources in intentional forgetting: evidence from incidental probe word recognition

We combined an item-method directed forgetting paradigm with a secondary task requiring a response to discriminate the color of probe words presented 1400 ms, 1800 ms or 2600 ms following each study phase memory instruction. The speed to make the color discrimination was used to assess the cognitive demands associated with instantiating Remember (R) and Forget (F) instructions; incidental memory for probe words was used to assess whether instantiating an F instruction also affects items presented in close temporal proximity. Discrimination responses were slower following F than R instructions at the two longest intervals. Critically, at the 1800 ms interval, incidental probe word recognition was worse following F than R instructions, particularly when the study word was successfully forgotten (as opposed to unintentionally remembered). We suggest that intentional forgetting is an active cognitive process associated with establishing control over the contents of working memory.     

Self-deception and selectivity

Philosophical Studies - This article explores the alleged “selectivity problem” for Alfred Mele’s deflationary position on self-deception, a problem that can allegedly be solved...     

Self-deception and discrepancies in self-evaluation

Self-deception is an intricate psychological construct, grounded in relatively little empirical evidence as an individual difference variable. The present research offers a direct test of one of the central scales of self-deception—the Self-Deception Enhancement (SDE) scale—by comparing explicit and implicit self-evaluations. Using the Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP), participants (N = 150) reported about their implicit self-evaluation. These ratings were compared to explicit self-reports about self-evaluation. Results showed that higher self-deception was associated with a larger discrepancy between explicit and implicit self-evaluations. Specifically, higher self-deception was associated with a more positive explicit self-evaluation but with a more negative implicit self-evaluation. These findings offer one of the first direct tests of the SDE, supporting its viability.