“SECOND-GUESSING”

Messages received from other social actors cannot always be taken at face value. When people have reason to question such messages, it is hypothesized that they engage in a cognitive process called “second-guessing,” wherein they reevaluate the literal interpretation of the message to determine its veridicality. Should they determine that it is not veridical, they generate an alternative, potentially more plausible interpretation. We assessed the frequency and importance of situations that might provoke reinterpretation of messages. Such situations were seen as occurring frequently and were of some importance. Social actors revealed sophisticated knowledge concerning the strengths and weaknesses of information obtained about people or events outside their direct experience. They also claimed to be able to “debias”such information, winnowing a “correct” interpretation from one judged to be “incorrect.” Preliminary data suggest that naive social actors are quite good at delecting scientifically documented sources of bias and making reasonable adjustments in their judgments to correct for those biases when plausibly present.     

Discrimination of “W” and “V” shapes by goldfish

Goldfish were trained to discriminate between “W” and “V” shapes; different groups were trained with the shapes in different orientations. Transfer tests were given after training and the following conclusions were drawn. Animals learned to discriminate between the training shapes by detecting the difference in the number of points present in each; they learned the difference in the relative number of points rather than the absolute number present in each shape; the subjects transferred well to pairs of shapes bearing points facing in different directions from those on the training shapes; knobs were treated as practically equivalent to points; animals relied more heavily on differences at the tops of the shapes than on differences in the bottom halves.     

“Consistency” and “contradiction” in the development of gender role characteristics

There is currently an increasing amount of theoretical and empirical work arguing that stereotyped sex role behavior is maladaptive in our culture and that “androgyny” or “sex role transcendence” is a preferred mode of being. The latter, however, seems to require individual inconsistency and self-contradiction in behaviors and attitudes (since the individual is both active and passive, both independent and dependent, etc.). Theories of cognitive consistency maintain that individuals avoid self-contradiction and inconsistency, and therefore that androgyny runs counter to important motivational principles. This article examines this issue in some detail, and concludes that theories of cognitive dissonance and consistency reflect particular socio-cultural conditions rather than universal motivation principles. There is nothing inherently uncomfortable or “inconsistent” about androgyny and sex role transcendence.     

“SCIENCE,” “RELIGION,” AND “SCIENCE‐AND‐RELIGION” IN THE LATE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

Many intellectuals wrote texts on the relations between Islam and science in the nineteenth‐century Ottoman Empire. These texts not only addressed the massive social and cultural changes the Empire was going through, but responded to European authors’ claims about the extent to which Islam was compatible with the modern world. Focusing on several texts written in the second half of the nineteenth century by the influential Muslim Ottoman authors Namik Kemal, Ahmed Midhat, and ?emseddin Sami, this article shows the influence of these exigencies on arguments on Islam and science. In order to represent Islam as a respectable religion in harmony with science, these intellectuals defined a “pure Islam” that was a set of basic principles that could be found in the Qur'an. Rather than an embedded way of life, Islam in these texts was an objectified, delimitable entity that could be imagined as having relations with other entities, such as science.     

“Handedness” and skill

The variability of handedness with different tasks is discussed. Experiments are described which show under what conditions handedness becomes evident. Tasks involving three different levels of complexity were used. The simplest task measured the accuracy with which a particular pressure could be reproduced in isometric contraction of the flexors of the index finger on each side in 21 female subjects. In the second situation, the maximum speed of making an attempted tapping movement under the same conditions, was measured in ten of the same subjects using the same muscle group alternating with its antagonists. The same ten subjects were also tested on an aiming task which provided the third level of complexity. The results suggest that differences in performance between the two sides only occur where “timing” or the serial organization of muscle activity is required and that such differences may be due to training.

Whether handedness is inherited or acquired is briefly discussed, and a second series of experiments using the same tasks as before were carried out on one female and nine male subjects. In this instance, the first two tests were used on the big toe of each side as well as the index finger. The results confirm that differences in performance between the two sides on these tasks can be adequately explained in terms of usage or training.

The hypothesis that “timing” is therefore important in the learning of any movement where serial muscle contractions arc involved was tested and confirmed in a third experimental series. The consistency of timing of the application of force in turning a crank handle at maximum speed was measured in five male subjects before and after training. The implications of the results are discussed in relation to other researches on skills.     

THE “NEGATIVE” AND “POSITIVE” ARGUMENTS OF MORAL MODERATES

According to Shelly Kagan, “ordinary” or “moderate” moralists must establish the existence of “options.” Kagan considers a “negative” and a “positive” argument, which he regards as the most promising means by which moral moderates might establish their position. He offers objections to both, and he concludes that the moderate position is indefensible. I argue that Kagan fails in his attempt to discredit the negative argument. I also argue that the positive argument is so implausible that Kagan's elaborate criticism of it is unnecessary. The positive argument is interesting nevertheless, because of why it cannot serve the moderate's purposes.