The Return of Ethnocentrism

The concept of ethnocentrism was introduced by Gumplowicz in the 1870s, popularized by Sumner in the 1900s, and first investigated psychometrically by Adorno and colleagues in the 1940s. It has become a fundamental concept in the social sciences, but over the last several decades, its popularity and usage in political and social psychology have decreased. Recent events, such as the growing popularity of ethno-nationalist and populist leaders and policies, show that ethnocentrism as a phenomenon has been resurging around the world. In addition, given its important explanatory power, an increasing number of political psychologists have started again to use the concept. This article presents an analysis of ethnocentrism reconceptualized as a hierarchical construct emanating from a strong sense of ethnic group self-centeredness and self-importance. It discusses the prevalence of ethnocentrism around the world, its conceptualization and measurement, and its theoretical underpinnings, supporting them with novel empirical research conducted with two abbreviated measures of ethnocentrism. The article argues that ethnocentrism ultimately stems from the need to strengthen one's own ethnic group at the expense of anyone who and anything that can weaken it.     

Some Myths about Ethnocentrism

Ethnocentrism, it is said, involves believing certain things to be true: that one's culture is superior to others, more deserving of respect, or at the ‘centre’ of things. On the alternative view defended in this article, ethnocentrism is a type of bias, not a set of beliefs. If this is correct, it challenges conventional wisdom about the scope, danger, and avoidance of ethnocentrism.     

Decoding effects of cognitive complexity,tolerance of ambiguity,and verbal–nonverbal inconsistency1

The effects of inconsistency between the verbal and nonverbal components of a message were investigated. Subjects were 72 females who rated the attitudes of encoding confederates who communicated either consistent or inconsistent messages. Verbal and nonverbal components were varied as either positive or negative and each of the four possible combinations served as an experimental condition. The nonverbal cues of amount of eye contact, postural orientation, forward–backward lean, and head nodding were found to influence the judgment of the total message. Verbal and nonverbal components were found to have interactive rather than additive effects. Inconsistent nonverbal cues had a stronger effect when accompanying a positive verbal message than when accompanying a negative verbal component. The effects of decoders' levels of cognitive complexity and tolerance of ambiguity were also assessed. Evidence suggests that both complexity and ambiguity tolerance have effects on the utilization of inconsistent nonverbal cues. Low complexity/low tolerance subjects were less influenced by nonverbal cues in the positive verbal–negative nonverbal condition. These subjects were also found to differentiate less between supplied rating dimensions than other groups.     

Incommensurability and inconsistency of languages

Incommensurable theories are said to be both incompatible and incomparable. This is paradoxical, because, being incompatible, these theories must have the same subject-matter, yet incomparability implies that their subject-matter is different. This paper's proposed resolution of the paradox makes use of the distinction between internal subject-matter and external subject-matter for languages (frameworks) as outlined by W. Sellars. Incommensurability arises when two languages share the same external subject-matter but differ in internal subject-matter. When they share the same external subject-matter, they can be inconsistent (hence incompatible), and yet incomparable (because they are about distinct internal subject-matter). A substantial part of the paper is devoted to the technical development of the notion of inconsistency as a relationship between languages in contrast to the traditional notion of inconsistency between statements.An earlier abridged version of this paper was read to the 1983 Annual Conference of New Zealand Division of the Australasian Association of Philosophy. I owe my gratitude to various people for their criticisms, especially to Andrew Holster.     

Personality variables and cognitive inconsistency

The present research studied the relationships between personality variables and cognitive inconsistency. Cognitive inconsistency was defined on the basis of the cognitive orientation theory of Kreitler and Kreitler (1972, 1976) as inconsistency and three personality variables: Extraversion, Cattell's factor “Independence” and Cattell's factor “Radicalism- Conservatism”. The implications of these results to Eysenck's and Cattell's theories were discussed.     

The inconsistency of inconsistency scales: a comparison of two widely used measures

This study compared the inconsistent responding validity scales of the Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI) and the Psychopathic Personality Inventory (PPI)/PPI-Revised (PPI-R) in two correctional samples to determine the extent to which they overlap in identifying invalid profiles. Results revealed substantial differences in the way the inconsistent responding validity scales of these measures performed. In particular, the PAI identified far fewer participants as having responded inconsistently compared with the PPI/PPI-R. We discuss the implications of our findings for clinical practice, and potential concerns with the use of a single measure to identify inconsistent responding in clinical practice and research.