On Philosophy

In this article the author holds that progress in philosophy is a vague concept. Its criteria are not universally acknowledged. All that is clear is that philosophy does not develop in a linear way. Philosophy is polydiscoursive. As for the past fifty years, the author believes three important things happened in philosophy. (1) It has been shown that consciousness exists not within one individual but spreads within a community of people; (2) philosophy has discovered autism, a result that helps us to understand a human being as neither a biological nor a social individual but a third thing—a dreaming being who is not only asocial but also tongueless, where speech and consciousness are separated; and (3) contemporary philosophy has learned to distinguish between sign and symbol. And it has been realized that the human mind is neither an instinct nor a computer but an objectified suffering, a transformed emotion.     

Object recognition and object segregation in 4.5-month-old infants

Six experiments investigated how 4.5-month-old infants' perception of a display is affected by an immediate prior experience with an object similar to part of the test display. Prior research (A. Needham & R. Baillargeon, 1998) showed that when infants see an object alone and then see it next to a novel object, this prior experience allows them to determine the location of a boundary between the two objects. The present experiments investigated whether infants would also use an object similar, but not identical, to a test object in the same kind of task. The results indicate that infants' use of a prior experience is disrupted by changes in the features of the object, but not by a change in its spatial orientation. These findings suggest that, like adults, infants may expect that changes in the features of an object are associated with a change in the identity of the object, but do not have the same expectation for changes in spatial orientation.     

Knowledge,adequacy, and approximate truth

Approximation involves representing things in ways that might be close to the truth but are nevertheless false. Given the widespread reliance on approximations in science and everyday life, here we ask whether it is conceptually possible for false approximations to qualify as knowledge. According to the factivity account, it is impossible to know false approximations, because knowledge requires truth. According to the representational adequacy account, it is possible to know false approximations, if they are close enough to the truth for present purposes. In this paper, we adopt an experimental methodology to begin testing these two theories. When an agent provides a false and practically inadequate answer, both theories predict that people will deny knowledge. But the theories disagree about an agent who provides a false but practically adequate answer: the factivity hypothesis again predicts knowledge denial, whereas the representational adequacy hypothesis predicts knowledge attribution. Across two experiments, our principal finding was that people tended to attribute knowledge for false but practically adequate answers, which supports the representational adequacy account. We propose an interpretation of existing findings that preserves a conceptual link between knowledge and truth. According to this proposal, truth is not necessary for knowledge, but it is a feature of prototypical knowledge.     

Jen,love and universality—Three arguments concerning jen in Confucianism

Universality, rather than partiality, is the characteristic of Confucian jen. This article puts forward three arguments to clarify confusion of interpretation: (1) that jen, rather than shu, is the main thread running through the whole system of Confucianism, and that by its two procedures of chung and shu, it presents itself as an integration of one's self with others; (2) that jen, as love, does not signify a natural preference, but an ethical refinement of an ordinary feeling of fondness, that it derives from such a feeling but goes beyond it, and that it functions as a universal commitment which begins with family affection but is not limited to it; (3) that jen, as universal love, is deontological in motive, not only in contrast to a mutuality of love but also in opposition to a utilitarianism of love.     

The Adam and Eve story as exemplar of an early-life variant of the oedipus complex

The Adam and Eve story is construed as having an organizing function that facilitates the analytic understanding of certain patients. In this interpretation, the story epitomizes a psychodynamic in which progressive growth, with separation and individuation, of the young is experienced as perilous--not only to them, but also correspondingly to their procreators. In the myth, the increasing psychic and physical maturation of Adam and Eve produced a crisis. Not only was divine authority flouted, but also apprehensions were aroused that God might be humbled or diminished. This threatened him, evoking his wrath and leading to the punishment by abandonment of his youthful wards. It is suggested that the story depicts an emotional complex of widespread application and is an archaic version of the oedipus complex, continuous with the oedipus complex proper, but from an earlier stage of development. This archaic complex is delineated with clinical vignettes, and a clinical explication of its various components is provided. Clinical management is considered, particularly with reference to the challenge that a closed-system perspective (Fairbairn 1958) presents to a patient's development.     

Infants' physical knowledge affects their change detection

Prior research suggests that infants attend to a variable in an event category when they have identified it as relevant for predicting outcomes in the category, and that the age at which infants identify a variable depends largely on the age at which they are exposed to appropriate observations. Thus, depending on age of exposure, infants may identify the same variable at different ages in different event categories. A good case in point is the variable height, which is identified at about 3.5 months in occlusion events, but only at about 12 months in covering events and 14 months in tube events. In the present experiments, 11-month-olds detected a change to an object's height in an occlusion but not a covering event, and 12.5-month-olds detected a similar change in a covering but not a tube event. Thus, infants succeeded in detecting a change to an object's height in an event where height had been identified as a relevant variable, but failed to detect the exact same change in another event where height had not yet been identified as a relevant variable. These findings provide evidence that infants' physical knowledge affects which changes they detect in physical events. Possible mechanisms underlying these findings are also discussed, in light of recent accounts of change detection in adults.     

Three Laws of Behavior Genetics and What They Mean

Behavior genetics has demonstrated that genetic variance is an important component of variation for all behavioral outcomes, but variation among families is not. These results have led some critics of behavior genetics to conclude that heritability is so ubiquitous as to have few consequences for scientific understanding of development, while some behavior genetic partisans have concluded that family environment is not an important cause of developmental outcomes. Both views are incorrect. Genotype is in fact a more systematic source of variability than environment, but for reasons that are methodological rather than substantive. Development is fundamentally nonlinear, interactive, and difficult to control experimentally. Twin studies offer a useful methodological shortcut, but do not show that genes are more fundamental than environments.     

Varieties of graded forgetting

Forgetting is typically viewed as counterproductive in everyday life. However, it may mainly be harmful when it is complete, that is, all-encompassing and permanent, and not when it is graded, that is, partial and fluctuating. I propose that forgetting is in fact mostly graded, and that this is an essential reason that it is often helpful. I delineate three ways in which forgetting may be graded. First, it may occur with respect to one, but not another, part of a memory. Second, it may occur in one context, but not in another. Third, forgetting may be present at one point in time, but not at another. Also, I propose that different levels of forgetting are possible, based on whether an engram or a context is unavailable, silent, restricted, latent, or potent. Overall, I hypothesize that forgetting is often helpful because it can be flexible and tailored to the circumstances.     

Prospective memory in the rat

The content of prospective memory is comprised of representations of an action to perform in the future. When people form prospective memories, they temporarily put the memory representation in an inactive state while engaging in other activities, and then activate the representation in the future. Ultimately, successful activation of the memory representation yields an action at an appropriate, but temporally distant, time. A hallmark of prospective memory is that activation of the memory representation has a deleterious effect on current ongoing activity. Recent evidence suggests that scrub jays and non-human primates, but not other species, are capable of future planning. We hypothesized that prospective memory produces a selective deficit in performance at the time when rats access a memory representation but not when the memory representation is inactive. Rats were trained in a temporal bisection task (90 min/day). Immediately after the bisection task, half of the rats received an 8-g meal (meal group) and the other rats received no additional food (no-meal group). Sensitivity to time in the bisection task was reduced as the 90-min interval elapsed for the meal group but not for the no-meal group. This time-based prospective-memory effect was not based on response competition, an attentional limit, anticipatory contrast, or fatigue. Our results suggest that rats form prospective memories, which produces a negative side effect on ongoing activity.     

Cognitive and Emotional Processes in Individuals and Commercial Web sites

This research reports how banner ads are responded to in Web sites that emphasize either emotion or cognition. It also looks at the moderating effects of individuals’ own levels of need for cognition and need for emotion on banner responsiveness in the two kinds of Web sites. Recall and attitude toward banners are consistently better when their context is an emotion-based Web site. Need for cognition, but not need for emotion moderates this effect. For ad recall, it is better to be lower in need for cognition in a cognitive Web site, but higher in need for cognition on an emotional Web site. For attitude toward the banner and purchase intention, however, it is better to be higher in need for cognition in a cognitive Web site, but lower in need for cognition on an emotional Web site. The results are discussed in terms of advertising context theory that has been developed in applications to the traditional media like print and broadcast, but here is shown to be applicable to the Web.     

The Trouble with Infinitism

One way to solve the epistemic regress problem would be to show that we can acquire justification by means of an infinite regress. This is infinitism. This view has not been popular, but Peter Klein has developed a sophisticated version of infinitism according to which all justified beliefs depend upon an infinite regress of reasons. Klein's argument for infinitism is unpersuasive, but he successfully responds to the most compelling extant objections to the view. A key component of his position is his claim that an infinite regress is necessary, but not sufficient, for justified belief. This enables infinitism to avoid a number of otherwise compelling objections. However, it commits infinitism to the existence of an additional feature of reasons that is necessary and, together with the regress condition, sufficient for justified belief. The trouble with infinitism is that any such condition could account for the connection between justification and truth only by undermining the rationale for the regress condition itself.     

Consciousness: The transcendentalist manifesto

Phenomenal consciousness, what it is like to have or undergo an experience, is typically understood as an empirical item – an actual or possible object of consciousness. Accordingly, the problem posed by phenomenal consciousness for materialist accounts of the mind is usually understood as an empirical problem: a problem of showing how one sort of empirical item – a conscious state – is produced or constituted by another – a neural process. The development of this problem, therefore, has usually consisted in the articulation of an intuition: no matter how much we know about the brain, this will not allow us to see how it produces or constitutes phenomenal consciousness. Developing a theme first explored by Kant, and then later by Sartre, this paper argues that the real problem posed by phenomenal consciousness is quite different. Consciousness, it will be argued, is not an empirical but a transcendental feature of the world. That is, what it is like to have an experience is not something of which we are aware in the having of that experience, but an item in virtue of which the genuine (non-phenomenal) objects of our consciousness are revealed as being the way they are. Phenomenal consciousness, that is, is not an empirical object of awareness but a transcendental condition of the possibility of there being empirical objects of awareness.     

EXILE FROM PERFECTION IN IRIS MURDOCH'S PHILOSOPHICAL TEXTS

Iris Murdoch's philosophical texts set out the egocentric dangers of guilt but still endorse an account of original sin. This might seem like an unstable combination as these two are in tension, but I argue that Murdoch manages to use this tension in a productive manner. The human condition is treated as one of fallenness, in the sense of an exile from perfection. We are aware of moral failure and also aware of the standard by which we fail. Guilt is reined in, however, by the fact that such failure is a matter of commonplace flawed moral vision and not an Augustinian perversity of the will. This reining in of guilt is still accompanied by a recognition of our unbridgeable remoteness from perfection.     

Manipulations of start and food locations affect navigation on a foraging task

Rats were able to search multiple food cups in a foraging task and successfully return to a fixed, but not a variable, start location. Reducing the number of food cups to be searched resulted in an improvement in performance in the variable start condition. Performance was better when only one or two food cups had to be visited but was still impaired if the food was not found in the first cup searched. Variable start locations impaired performance when only one food cup had to be searched, if that cup was moved over the table. These findings suggest that there is an interaction between memory processes and the navigational processes that allows an animal to return to its start location after a foraging trip. It appears that a fixed location for the food or the start point of a foraging trip is a necessary precondition for accurate performance.     

Allocentric coding of object-to-object relations in overlearned and novel environments

R. F. Wang and E. S. Spelke's (2000) finding that disorientation disrupts knowledge is consistent with egocentric but not allocentric coding of object location. The present experiments tested the hypothesis that egocentric coding may dominate early on but that once an allocentric representation is established, then target location is retrieved from it. This hypothesis predicts that disorientation will disrupt configuration knowledge in a novel environment, such as that used by Wang and Spelke, but not in an overlearned environment. Experiments 1 and 2 tested whether disorientation disrupted configuration knowledge of an overlearned environment, and Experiments 3-7 tested whether disorientation disrupted configuration knowledge of a novel, room-sized environment. In none of the experiments did disorientation disrupt configuration knowledge. Hence, in addition to showing allocentric coding of overlearned interlandmark relations, the present findings are consistent with the immediate availability of allocentric location codes in a novel, room-sized environment.     

PASTORAL COUNSEL FOR THE ANXIOUS NATURALIST: DANIEL DENNETT'S FREEDOM EVOLVES

Abstract: Daniel Dennett's Freedom Evolves is a rhetorically powerful but philosophically unconvincing attempt to show that a deterministic and ontologically reductionist, but epistemologically pluralist, outlook may peacefully coexist with a robust acceptance of human freedom and moral responsibility. The key to understanding the harmony rests in recognizing that freedom is not a metaphysical or physical condition but is instead a product of deeply embedded social practices. I argue that Dennett's project rests on an unargued and implausible deflationary stance toward basic metaphysics.     

When You and I Share Perspectives: Pronouns Modulate Perspective Taking During Narrative Comprehension

ABSTRACT— Readers mentally simulate the objects and events described in narratives. One common assumption is that readers mentally embody an actor's perspective; alternatively, readers might mentally simulate events from an external "onlooker" perspective. Two experiments examined the role of pronouns in modulating a reader's adopted perspective when comprehending simple event sentences. Experiment 1 demonstrated that readers embody an actor's perspective when the pronoun you or I is used, but take an external perspective when he is used. Experiment 2 , however, found that a short discourse context preceding the event sentence led readers to adopt an external perspective with the pronoun I . These experiments demonstrate that pronoun variation and discourse context mediate the degree of embodiment experienced during narrative comprehension: In all cases, readers mentally simulate objects and events, but they embody an actor's perspective only when directly addressed as the subject of a sentence.     

Roman Catholic Approaches to the Qur'an since Vatican II

Vatican II opposes polemical attitudes to Islam but gives no specific guidance on the Qur'an. Modern Roman Catholic writing on the Qur'an includes a considerable variety of approaches. At the positive end of the spectrum: for Christian members of GRIC (Groupe de Recherche Islamo-Chrétien) the Qur'an is “an authentic Word of God, but one in part essentially different from the one in Jesus Christ”; George Dardess affirms that the Qur'an and the Eucharist are both means through which “God shares with us God's self through the word”; for Giulio Basetti-Sani the Qur'an is divine revelation but it does not contradict Christian doctrine; Jacques Dupuis sees the Qur'an as a real but imperfect revelation. More cautious approaches are found in the writings of Jacques Jomier and Christian Troll, for whom the biblical testimony to Christ is the decisive word of God, and not just one divine revelation alongside another in the Qur'an.     

Touched by genius: on animals and madmen

Abstract

The paper starts with the question, posed by Wittgenstein, whether animals can feign or act as if they are performing in a theatre. It is argued that the idea that they cannot is widespread, not only in philosophy but also in biology or poetry. Animals are generally considered to be too honest for that. A second question is whether there are people who are too honest for feigning or acting. Foucault’s famous discussion about madmen sheds some light on this question. Two concepts play an important role in his discussion: ‘innocence’ and ‘genius’. These concepts are not only discussed in relationship to Foucault but also in relationship to Lorenz and Nietzsche. It will be argued that both concepts play an important role in combating an overly rationalist or logocentric ethics. According to the thinkers discussed in this article, an ethics which denies the animality in man is nothing else but dangerous.