Persons,animals, and identity

The paper is concerned with how neo-Lockean accounts of personal identity should respond to the challenge of animalist accounts. Neo-Lockean accounts that hold that persons can change bodies via brain transplants or cerebrum transplants are committed to the prima facie counterintuitive denial that a person is an (biologically individuated) animal. This counterintuitiveness can be defused by holding that a person is biological animal (on neo-Lockean views) if the “is” is the “is” of constitution rather than the “is” of identity, and that a person is identical with an animal in a sense of “animal” different from that which requires the persistence conditions of animals to be biological. Another challenge is the “too many minds problem”: if persons and their coincident biological animals share the same physical properties, and mental properties supervene on physical properties, the biological animal will share the mental properties of the person, and so should itself be a person. The response to this invokes a distinction between “thin” properties, which are shared by coincident entities, and “thick” properties which are not so shared. Mental properties, and their physical realizers, are thick, not thin, so are not properties persons share with their bodies or biological animals. The paper rebuts the objection that neo-Lockean accounts cannot explain how persons can have physical properties. To meet a further problem it is argued that the biological properties of persons and those of biological animals are different because of differences in their causal profiles.     

Meadow voles, <Emphasis Type="Italic">Microtus pennsylvanicus</Emphasis>, have the capacity to recall the “what”, “where”, and “when” of a single past event

Some non-human animals may possess the ability to recall the “what”, “where”, and “when” of a single past event. We tested the hypothesis that male meadow voles posses the capacity to recall the “what”, “where”, and “when” of a single past event associated with mate selection in two experiments. Briefly, male voles were allowed to explore an apparatus that contained two chambers. One chamber contained a day-20 pregnant female (24 h prepartum). The other chamber contained a sexually mature female that was neither pregnant nor lactating (REF female). Twenty-four hour after the exposure, the males were placed in the same apparatus, which was empty and clean. At this time, the pregnant female would have entered postpartum estrus (PPE), a period of heightened sexual receptivity. Males initially chose and spent significantly more time investigating the chamber that originally housed the pregnant female (now a PPE female) than the chamber that originally housed the REF female. Male voles also explored an apparatus containing a chamber with a PPE female and one chamber containing a REF female. Twenty-four hour later, males were placed into an empty and clean apparatus. The males did not display an initial choice and they spent similar amounts of time investigating the chamber that originally housed the PPE female (now a lactating female) and the chamber that originally housed the REF female. The results of these and additional experiments suggest that male voles may have the capacity to recall the “what”, “where”, and “when” of a single past event, which may allow males to remember the location of females who would currently be in heightened states of sexual receptivity.     

列维纳斯面对康德、黑格尔、海德格尔——当代哲学关于"存在论"的争论

Levinas subverts the traditional “ontology-epistemology,” and creates a “realm of difference,” the realm of “value,” “ethic,” and “religion,” maintaining that ethics is real metaphysics. According to him, it is not that “being” contains the “other” but the other way round. In this way, the issues of ethics are promoted greatly in the realm of philosophy. Nonetheless, he does not intend to deny “ontology” completely, but reversed the relationship between “ontology (theory of truth)” and “ethics (axiology),” placing the former under the “constraint” of the latter. Different from general empirical science, philosophy focuses more on issues irrelevant to ordinary empirical objects; it does have “objects,” though. More often than not, the issues of philosophy cannot be conceptualized into “propositions”; nevertheless, it absolutely has its “theme.” As a discipline, philosophy continuously takes “being” as its “theme” and “object” of thinking. The point is that this “being” should not be understood as an “object” completely. Rather, it is still a “theme-subject.” In addition to an “object,” “being” also manifests itself in an “attribute” and a kind of “meaning” as well. In a word, it is the temporal, historical, and free “being” rather than “various beings” that is the “theme-subject” of philosophy. Translated by Zhang Lin from Wen Shi Zhe 文史哲 (Journal of Literature, History and Philosophy), 2007, (1): 61–70     

Alexithymia,verbal intellectual deficit,and neurological dysfunction in relation to risk-taking behavior

This study explored relationships between alexithymia (measured through the Toronto Alexithymia Scale), probable neurological dysfunction (Stroop Color Word Test), and “Verbal” and “Abstraction” IQ scores (Hartford-Shipley Institute for Living Scale) in relation to risk-taking behavior. Subjects were “anti-social” risk-takers (criminal offenders undergoing court-related residential drug treatment), “adventurous” risktakers (college students who regularly engage in such sports as rock-climbing and spelunking), or “normals” (college students who were neither adventurous risk-takers nor criminal offenders). Principal findings reveal that clinically relevant alexithymia is observed among risk-takers of either anti-social or adventurous variety less frequently, but among “normals” more frequently, than chance would predict; that the “verbal deficit pattern” in intellectual functioning is observed more frequently among adventurous risk-takers, less frequently among “normals,” and no more frequently among anti-social risk-takers than chance would predict; and that probable neurological dysfunction is observed more frequently among anti-social risk-takers but less frequently among adventurous risk-takers or “normals” than chance would predict. Results support only in part the Pallone-Hennessy (1999) conceptual model of the genesis and correlates of risk-taking in respect of anti-social, but not in respect of adventurous risk-takers. This study was supported by grants from the Henry Rutgers Scholars Program, Rutgers College, and the Fund for Correctional Psychology, Center of Alcohol Studies. Deep gratitude is expressed to Eric Workowski, Charles Rouse, and Joni Lepore for their invaluable assistance.     

Popper’S Evolutionary Epistemology Revamped

In a paper entitled “Revolution in Permanence”, published in the collection “Karl Popper: Philosophy and Problems”, John Worrall (1995) severely criticised several aspects of Karl Popper’s work before commenting that “I have no doubt that, given suffi-cient motivation, a case could be constructed on the basis of such remarks that Popper had a more sophisticated version of theory production......” (p. 102). Part of Worrall’s criticism is directed at a “strawpopper”: in his “Darwinian Model” emphasising the similarities and differences between genetic mutation, variation in animal behaviour and the gestation of scientific theories, Popper (1975, 1981, 1994) never stated that tentative scientific conjec-tures “while more or less random, are not completely blind.” He was referring to variation in animal species behaviour, and about tentative scientific conjectures he said nothing, although common sense would indicate that presumably he regarded them as being less blind and less random. In Popper (1977, 1983), giving a summary of his “Darwinian Model”, he repaired this omission about tentative scientific conjectures by inserting the sentence “On a level of World 3 theory formation they are of the character of planned gropings into the unknown.” Recent developments in the field of genetics (see for example Raff (1996), Lewis (1999), Korn (2002)) indicate that Popper’s intuitions were along the modern lines while Worrall’s intuitions are old fashioned. Therefore Popper’s “Darwinian Model” remains both viable and fruitful.     

The logic of scientific and religious principles

Summary In every domain, the philosopher finds some principle which is unfalsifiable in so far as all experience is interpreted in accordance with it. This principle is tautologous or analytic-within-its domain in that it defines fundamental terms with which it characterizes experiences: Newton’s Laws define “mass” and “the equality of times”; the Principle of the Rectilinear Propagation of LIght defines “light”; the Principle of Evolution defines “adaptation” and “natural selection”; and the Principle of the Conservation of Energy defines “a closed system.” Moreover, each principle is employed as a methodological rule or a tacit imperative to the investigator to interpret experience or to draw inferences in accordance with it. Nevertheless, each principle has empirical content: not only by virtue of its place within its respective domain but also because there are sufficient rules of correspondence which make the statement-form empirically relevant; not only because the principle itself is taken to be true but also because empirical inferences are drawn in accordance with it. To construe these principles as mere counterfactuals would be clearly incorrect. Counterfactuals, as Rescher would characterize them, are “belief-contravening suppositions” because certain beliefs are excluded if one is to be consistent. Although this is certainly true of these principles, the range of beliefs contravened is far larger than those beliefs excluded in mere laws of nature. For, to give up these principles would be to give up explaining the entire domain of experience to which they are applicable.     

Alexithymia, verbal intellectual deficit, and neurological dysfunction in relation to risk-taking behavior

This study explored relationships between alexithymia (measured through the Toronto Alexithymia Scale), probable neurological dysfunction (Stroop Color Word Test), and “Verbal” and “Abstraction” IQ scores (Hartford-Shipley Institute for Living Scale) in relation to risk-taking behavior. Subjects were “anti-social” risk-takers (criminal offenders undergoing court-related residential drug treatment), “adventurous” risktakers (college students who regularly engage in such sports as rock-climbing and spelunking), or “normals” (college students who were neither adventurous risk-takers nor criminal offenders). Principal findings reveal that clinically relevant alexithymia is observed among risk-takers of either anti-social or adventurous variety less frequently, but among “normals” more frequently, than chance would predict; that the “verbal deficit pattern” in intellectual functioning is observed more frequently among adventurous risk-takers, less frequently among “normals,” and no more frequently among anti-social risk-takers than chance would predict; and that probable neurological dysfunction is observed more frequently among anti-social risk-takers but less frequently among adventurous risk-takers or “normals” than chance would predict. Results support only in part the Pallone-Hennessy (1999) conceptual model of the genesis and correlates of risk-taking in respect of anti-social, but not in respect of adventurous risk-takers. This study was supported by grants from the Henry Rutgers Scholars Program, Rutgers College, and the Fund for Correctional Psychology, Center of Alcohol Studies. Deep gratitude is expressed to Eric Workowski, Charles Rouse, and Joni Lepore for their invaluable assistance.     

The “Extended Mind” Approach for a New Paradigm of Psychology

In this paper, I would like to propose the idea of “extended mind” for a new paradigm of psychology. Kohler (Integrative Psychology & Behavioral Science 44:39–57, 2010) correctly pointed out the serious problems of the machine paradigm, and proposed the “organic” view as a new paradigm. But the term “organic” signifying the processes inside the body, is inadequate to express the characteristic of human mind. The recent philosophy of mind suggests that the mind is realized neither only in the brain nor only in the body, but in the whole system of brain-body-environment, namely, in the “extended mind”. The characteristic of human mind resides in the interaction with the mediating tools, artifacts, and the humanized environment. We should propose an “extended mind approach” or an “ecological approach to humanized environment” as a new paradigm for a psychology.     

Pigeons can discriminate “good” and “bad” paintings by children

Humans have the unique ability to create art, but non-human animals may be able to discriminate “good” art from “bad” art. In this study, I investigated whether pigeons could be trained to discriminate between paintings that had been judged by humans as either “bad” or “good”. To do this, adult human observers first classified several children’s paintings as either “good” (beautiful) or “bad” (ugly). Using operant conditioning procedures, pigeons were then reinforced for pecking at “good” paintings. After the pigeons learned the discrimination task, they were presented with novel pictures of both “good” and “bad” children’s paintings to test whether they had successfully learned to discriminate between these two stimulus categories. The results showed that pigeons could discriminate novel “good” and “bad” paintings. Then, to determine which cues the subjects used for the discrimination, I conducted tests of the stimuli when the paintings were of reduced size or grayscale. In addition, I tested their ability to discriminate when the painting stimuli were mosaic and partial occluded. The pigeons maintained discrimination performance when the paintings were reduced in size. However, discrimination performance decreased when stimuli were presented as grayscale images or when a mosaic effect was applied to the original stimuli in order to disrupt spatial frequency. Thus, the pigeons used both color and pattern cues for their discrimination. The partial occlusion did not disrupt the discriminative behavior suggesting that the pigeons did not attend to particular parts, namely upper, lower, left or right half, of the paintings. These results suggest that the pigeons are capable of learning the concept of a stimulus class that humans name “good” pictures. The second experiment showed that pigeons learned to discriminate watercolor paintings from pastel paintings. The subjects showed generalization to novel paintings. Then, as the first experiment, size reduction test, grayscale test, mosaic processing test and partial occlusion test were carried out. The results suggest that the pigeons used both color and pattern cues for the discrimination and show that non-human animals, such as pigeons, can be trained to discriminate abstract visual stimuli, such as pictures and may also have the ability to learn the concept of “beauty” as defined by humans.     

G.A.T.S. and universities: Implications for research

The likely impact of applying the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) to higher education are examined. GATS aims to “open up” services to competition: no preference can be shown to national or government providers. The consequences for teaching are likely to be that private companies, with degree-awarding powers, would be eligible for the same subsidies as public providers. Appealing to the inadequate recently introduced “benchmark” statements as proof of quality, they would provide a “bare bones” service at lower cost. Public subsidies would go: education being reduced to that minimum which could be packaged in terms of verifiable “learning outcomes”. The loss of “higher” aspirations, such education of critically-minded citizens of a democratic and civilised society would impoverish the university’s research culture which demands honesty and openness to public scrutiny. Most university research is substantially supported by public subsidy. Under GATS discipline, commercial providers of research services could be entitled to similar public subsidies. Publicly funded fundamental research would fade, leaving university research totally dependent for funds upon the good will of industry and commerce. Present problems, such as the suppression of unwelcome results and the use of questionable results to manipulate public opinion, would considerably increase. The public would lose a prime source of trustworthy knowledge, needed in political discourse, legal disputation, consumer protection and in many other contexts.     

Society’s Symbolic Order and Political Trials: Toward Sacrificing the Self for the “Big Other”

The need to establish a borderline between legitimate and illegitimate political trial is one of the central societal discourses. In this paper the author claims that the issues are complex and that a political trial can remain legitimate as long as it is not dealing with a confrontation with the symbolic order on which the society (and the court itself) is founded and as long as the subject (or action) it is dealing with does not threaten the symbolic order’s (or the “Big Other”) existence. When the symbolic order’s existence is in danger, the court is bound to participate in an act of “sacrifice” that is intended to protect the “order.” The author uses Jacques Lacan’s psychoanalytic theory of the “Big Other” (and its development to ideological-political terms) in examining three categories of sacrifice. Through these categories the author claims that in extreme cases of confrontation with the existence of the symbolic order, the court cannot remain objective and it would be difficult to justify the trial as legitimate (especially in historical perspective).     

Fixing broken masculinity: Viagra asa technology for the production of gender and sexuality

In the twenty-first century, technology is not so easily divorced from the human body. Viagra, the blockbuster drug hailed as the “magic erection pill,” exemplifies the increasingly accepted technologically-enhanced body. After a history of medical experts applying technology to women’s bodies in times of weakness, male bodies are now deemed in need of treatment. As male bodies digress from “normal” (erect and penetrating) sexuality, techno-scientific advances promise to “fix” the problem, and thus the patriarchal “machine.” Thus, Viagra is both a material and cultural technology producing and reshaping gender and sexuality under the guise of techno-scientific progress. Drawing on my own ethnographic data, I explore the use and circulation of techno-scientific advancement and inevitability discourses and the ways in which masculinity and heterosexuality are reproduced, as well as contested, critiqued, and reshaped by those who prescribe, dispense, market, and/or use Viagra. Finally, I argue that Viagra is currently being understood and employed as a “tool” to avert or treat masculinity “in crisis” in the contemporary America. This research would not be possible without help from kind medical practitioners, consumers, and participants in the feminist writing group at UCSB.     

Animal Disenhancement and the Non-Identity Problem: A Response to Thompson

In his paper “The Opposite of Human Enhancement: Nanotechnology and the Blind Chicken problem” (Nanoethics 2:305–316, 2008) Paul Thompson argues that the possibility of “disenhancing” animals in order to improve animal welfare poses a philosophical conundrum. Although many people intuitively think such disenhancement would be morally impermissible, it’s difficult to find good arguments to support such intuitions. In this brief response to Thompson, I accept that there’s a conundrum here. But I argue that if we seriously consider whether creating beings can harm or benefit them, and introduce the non-identity problem to discussions of animal disehancement, the conundrum is even deeper than Thompson suggests.     

Counting distinctions: on the conceptual foundations of Shannon’s information theory

Categorical logic has shown that modern logic is essentially the logic of subsets (or “subobjects”). In “subset logic,” predicates are modeled as subsets of a universe and a predicate applies to an individual if the individual is in the subset. Partitions are dual to subsets so there is a dual logic of partitions where a “distinction” [an ordered pair of distinct elements (u, u′) from the universe U] is dual to an “element”. A predicate modeled by a partition π on U would apply to a distinction if the pair of elements was distinguished by the partition π, i.e., if u and u′ were in different blocks of π. Subset logic leads to finite probability theory by taking the (Laplacian) probability as the normalized size of each subset-event of a finite universe. The analogous step in the logic of partitions is to assign to a partition the number of distinctions made by a partition normalized by the total number of ordered |U|² pairs from the finite universe. That yields a notion of “logical entropy” for partitions and a “logical information theory.” The logical theory directly counts the (normalized) number of distinctions in a partition while Shannon’s theory gives the average number of binary partitions needed to make those same distinctions. Thus the logical theory is seen as providing a conceptual underpinning for Shannon’s theory based on the logical notion of “distinctions.” This paper is dedicated to the memory of Gian-Carlo Rota—mathematician, philosopher, mentor, and friend.     

Animal Mind: Science,Philosophy, and Ethics

Although 20^th-century empiricists were agnostic about animal mind and consciousness, this was not the case for their historical ancestors – John Locke, David Hume, Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and, of course, Charles Darwin and George John Romanes. Given the dominance of the Darwinian paradigm of evolutionary continuity, one would not expect belief in animal mind to disappear. That it did demonstrates that standard accounts of how scientific hypotheses are overturned – i.e., by empirical disconfirmation or by exposure of logical flaws – is inadequate. In fact, it can be demonstrated that belief in animal mind disappeared as a result of a change of values, a mechanism also apparent in the Scientific Revolution. The “valuational revolution” responsible for denying animal mind is examined in terms of the rise of Behaviorism and its flawed account of the historical inevitability of denying animal mentation. The effects of the denial of animal consciousness included profound moral implications for the major uses of animals in agriculture and scientific research. The latter is particularly notable for the denial of felt pain in animals. The rise of societal moral concern for animals, however, has driven the “reappropriation of common sense” about animal thought and feeling.     

Friend or foe: A brief examination of the ethics of corporate sponsored research at universities

In his paper entitled “Ethics and the Funding of Research and Development at Universities”¹ Spier examines some of the potential problems of the relationship between 1) corporate sponsors of research and 2) the universities (and faculty) that receive that funding. Citing “He who pays the piper, calls the tune,” Spier suggests that a better way of funding research would be to “set up a dedicated publicly sponsored research establishment” with the stated goal of achieving particular technical or engineering objectives. (Spier cited the successful Animal Virus Research of the UK as an example). Spier states that researchers at these establishments are “not subjected to the triple requirement to teach, research and administer as are university members, so they do not have to face the same ethical challenges of the academics.” This paper will examine the stated dangers of public/corporate research partnerships and whether the proposed alternative shares equally troubling ethical issues.     

How new is the new philosophy of psychiatry?

In their recent paper, Natalie Banner and Tim Thornton evaluate seven volumes of the Oxford University Press series “International Perspectives in Philosophy and Psychiatry,” an international book series begun in 2003 focusing on the emerging interdisciplinary field at the interface of philosophy and psychiatry. According to Natalie Banner and Tim Thornton, the series represents a clear indication that the interdisciplinary field of philosophy of psychiatry has been flourishing lately. Philosophers and psychiatrists face a “new philosophy of psychiatry”. However, the optimism which the “new” philosophy of psychiatry celebrates is precisely the exiling of philosophy from the foundations of psychiatry. The 150 year old belief that psychopathology cannot do without philosophical reflection has virtually disappeared from common psychiatric education and daily clinical practice. Though the discipline of psychiatry is particularly suited to contributions from philosophy, the impact of philosophy on psychiatry nowadays remains limited. With some exceptions, philosophical papers are embedded in a philosophical context inscrutable to ordinary psychiatrists. Much current philosophical work is perceived by psychiatrists as negativistic. I would encourage the field of psychiatry to incorporate once again basic philosophical attitudes which render possible true dialogue with philosophy and enrich both disciplines. The views developed here should not discredit the value and importance of Natalie Banner and Tim Thornton’s paper and the excellent series “International Perspectives in Philosophy and Psychiatry.” As Jaspers said “Everybody inclined to disregard philosophy will be overwhelmed by philosophy in an unperceived way”.     

Psychophysiological components of imagery

McGuigan’s neuromuscular model of information processing (1978a, 1978b, and 1989) was investigated by electrically recording eye movements (electro-oculograms), covert lip and preferred arm responses (electromyograms), and electroencephalograms. This model predicts that codes are generated as the lips are uniquely activated when processing words beginning with bilabial sounds like “p” or “b,” as is the right arm to words like “pencil” that refer to its use. Twelve adult female participants selected for their high imagery ratings were asked to form images to three orally presented linguistic stimuli: the letter “p,” the words “pencil” and “pasture,” and to a control stimulus, the words “go blank.” The following findings were significant beyond the 0.05 level: an increased covert lip response only to the letter “p,” increased vertical eye activity to “p” and to the word “pencil,” right arm response only to the word “pencil,” and a decreased percentage of alpha waves from the right 02 lead only to the word “pasture.” Since these covert responses uniquely occurred during specific imagery processes, it is inferred that they are components of neuromuscular circuits that function in accord with the model of information processing tested.     

Do birds (pigeons and bantams) know how confident they are of their perceptual decisions?

Rhesus monkeys are known to recognize confidence about their immediate perceptual and cognitive decisions by using a betting procedure (Son and Kornell in The missing link in cognition: origins of self-reflective consciousness. Oxford University Press, New York, pp 296–320, 2005; Kornell et al. in Psychol Sci 18:64–71, 2007). In this report, we examined whether this ability is shared in two avian species (pigeons and bantams) in order to know how widespread this metacognitive ability is among animals. We trained pigeons and bantams to search for a differently colored disk (target) among others (distracters) displayed on a touch-sensitive monitor. In test, the subjects were required to choose one of two confidence icons, “risk” and “safe”, after the visual search. A peck at the “risk” icon after a correct response in the visual search (i.e., a peck at the target) was reinforced by food and light, while that after an incorrect response (i.e., a peck at a distracter) resulted in a timeout. A peck at the “safe” icon was always reinforced by food and light, or by light only, regardless of the visual search result. The percentages of “safe” choices after incorrect responses were higher than after correct responses in all six pigeons and two of three bantams. This behavior generalized to novel stimuli in some subjects, and even to a novel line-classification task in a pigeon. These results suggest that these two distantly related avian species have in common a metacognitive ability that allows them to recognize confidence about their immediate perceptual decisions.     

What is it like to be nonconscious? A defense of Julian Jaynes

I respond to Ned Block’s claim that it is “ridiculous” to suppose that consciousness is a cultural construction based on language and learned in childhood. Block is wrong to dismiss social constructivist theories of consciousness on account of it being “ludicrous” that conscious experience is anything but a biological feature of our animal heritage, characterized by sensory experience, evolved over millions of years. By defending social constructivism in terms of both Julian Jaynes’ behaviorism and J.J. Gibson’s ecological psychology, I draw a distinction between the experience or “what-it-is-like” of nonhuman animals engaging with the environment and the “secret theater of speechless monologue” that is familiar to a linguistically competent human adult. This distinction grounds the argument that consciousness proper should be seen as learned rather than innate and shared with nonhuman animals. Upon establishing this claim, I defend the Jaynesian definition of consciousness as a social–linguistic construct learned in childhood, structured in terms of lexical metaphors and narrative practice. Finally, I employ the Jaynesian distinction between cognition and consciousness to bridge the explanatory gap and deflate the supposed “hard” problem of consciousness.