Kant,Oppression, and the Possibility of Nonculpable Failures to Respect Oneself

I argue that Kant's ethical framework cannot countenance a certain kind of failure to respect oneself that can occur within oppressive social contexts. Kant's assumption that any person, qua rational being, has guaranteed epistemic access to the moral law as the standard of good action and the capacity to act upon this standard makes autonomy an achievement within the individual agent's power, but this is contrary to a feminist understanding of autonomy as a relational achievement that can be thwarted by the systematic attack on autonomy that occurs within oppressive social conditions. Insofar as Kant's negative duty of self‐respect is unable to accommodate the ways immersion in oppressive social environments can warp an individual's understanding of what she is owed and capable of as a moral agent, it perpetuates the cruelty of unjust social systems in the guise of respecting individual autonomy. I conclude by considering Carol Hay's argument that those who are oppressed have an obligation to themselves to resist their own oppression, in order to explore how this limitation in how Kant conceives of the duty to respect the self may reach expression in contemporary ethical theory inspired by Kant.     

Dupes of Patriarchy: Feminist Strong Substantive Autonomy's Epistemological Weaknesses

Feminist strong substantive autonomy (FSSA), as presented by Natalie Stoljar and Anita Superson, pronounces judgment on the autonomy status of certain women living under oppression. These women act on deformed desires, Superson explains, and as deformed desires cannot be the agent's own, the women are heteronomous. Stoljar argues that some women's choices violate the Feminist Intuition; by acting on false and oppressive values, these women render themselves heteronomous. I argue against Stoljar and Superson on epistemological grounds. I present six different ways in which agents' choices can be related to deformed desires, with varying results for their autonomy statuses. I show that Stoljar and Superson are not able to distinguish properly among the differing autonomy statuses in these six cases, because doing so requires attention to agents' inner processes of decision‐making, as those processes are enacted in the agents' social and temporal contexts. Stoljar and Superson judge others' autonomy statuses based on abstract generalizations rather than via empirical attention to agents' actual decision‐making processes. Consequently, their judgments are not adequate to the lived self‐direction of real persons. Assessing others' autonomy status requires consideration of agents' inner choice‐making in sociotemporal context, which favors a procedural or weak substantive account of autonomy.     

Religious Belonging,Religious Agency,and Women's Autonomy in Mozambique

Women's autonomy has frequently been linked with women's opportunities and investments, such as education, employment, and reproductive control. The association between women's autonomy and religion in the developing world, however, has received less attention, and the few existing studies make comparisons across major religious traditions. In this study, we focus on variations in levels of female decision‐making autonomy within a single religious tradition—Christianity. Using unique survey data from a predominantly Christian area in Mozambique, we devise an autonomy scale and apply it to compare women affiliated with different Christian denominations as well as unaffiliated women. In addition to affiliation, we examine the relationship between autonomy and women's religious agency both within and outside their churches. Multivariate analyses show that women belonging to more liberal religious traditions (such as Catholicism and mainline Protestantism) tend to have higher autonomy levels, regardless of other factors. These results are situated within the cross‐national scholarship on religion and women's empowerment and are interpreted in the context of gendered religious dynamics in Mozambique and similar developing settings.     

There is a Balm in Gilead

The purpose of this essay is to contribute to the understanding that mental health problems are often endemic to the life experiences of Black women, and that the ways of womanists within the context of therapeutic Black churches can offer healing responses to problems that are occasioned primarily by the oppressive social infrastructures of racism, sexism, and classism. This paper will attempt to draw connections between the political, social, and economic contexts of Black women's lives and "dis-eased" states, and to promote an integrated understanding of the life and mental health experiences of "churched" African American womanists.     

A Golden Lever for Politics: Feminist Emotion and Women's Agency

Pervasive feminism is a component located in emotionality—feminist emotion—and contains women's primary agency. Because affect and emotions are elusive, an interpretive conceptual tool is necessary and is key to making use of their potential for feminist politics aimed at women's empowerment and well‐being and to build gender equality. This essay builds on contemporary feminist theory and affect theory and draws from multidisciplinary research. It presents a new theoretical framework anchored in hermeneutics and phenomenology to pin down the affective component of women's multifaceted, intersectional emotional experiences of gender. A case study also illustrates how the theoretical premises around the concept of feminist emotion are compatible with and useful for feminist praxis.     

Religious Agency and the Limits of Intersectionality

This article probes the relative absence of religion within discussions of intersectionality, and begins to address this absence by bringing intersectionality studies into conversation with another significant field within feminist theory: the study of religious women's agency. Although feminist literatures on intersectionality and religious women's agency have garnered a great deal of scholarly attention, these two bodies of work have rarely been engaged together. After surveying both fields, I argue that research on religious women's agency not only exposes an ambiguity at the heart of intersectionality between identity and oppression, but also challenges several aspects of intersectionality studies, especially as recent theorists increasingly turn away from identity politics in favor of a structural critique of power. These aspects of intersectionality include its often unsituated critique of power, as well as its reliance on a negatively defined consensus on anti‐oppression.     

In Defense of Experience

This article studies our philosophical understanding of experience in order to question the current political and theoretical dismissal of experiential accounts in feminist theory. The focus is on Joan Scott's critique of experience, but the philosophical issues animating the discussion go beyond Scott's work and concern the future of feminist theory and politics more generally. I ask what it means for feminist theory to redefine experience as a linguistic event the way Scott suggests. I attempt to demonstrate that the consequences that she draws from such a theoretical move are both philosophically and politically problematic. A critical study of the evidence of experience does not have to imply metaphysical or epistemological foundationalism, as Scott claims, but on the contrary, such a study is indispensable for challenging them. We must hold onto experience as an important resource for contesting sexist discourses and oppressive conceptual schemas.     

Comment upon ‘"Poor girl": a case of active psychosis’: how therapeutic schemas may limit our work

The paper explores the effect of group participation on depressed women's ‘doing depression’ and ‘doing pleasure’ in Finland over three time periods. Quantitative data and qualitative data are analysed. To assess statistically the differences between the time periods, the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks z-test is applied to the quantitative data. Coping with emotions through self-focused attention, depressed women are reluctant to initiate instrumental behaviour. They tend to respond to their lives in a ruminative way. Moving towards pleasure rather than depression characterized women's activities as a result of the group process; they learned to embody health, while envisaging hope for the future. Our emphasis on embodiment allows us to consider agency as a contemporary group therapeutic effect as well as to contextualize psychotherapy research within post-modern thinking. While the findings do not provide an indisputable list of the ways women's activities changed over time or all the advantages of group participation, they do suggest areas for future exploration in connection with depressed women's healthy embodiment in a healing group context and advance an understanding of how the experience and duration of depression can be altered if the public and private boundaries of depressed women's embodied routines are broken down and self-isolation is challenged.     

Postmodernism: A Feminist Critique

In this article the author suggests that progress in philosophy can be conceived through contemporary French theories that propose a new, polysemantic way of thinking. Postmodern philosophy has tried to renew the meaning of the subject, of the subject's identity, and of language and communication. The author believes that the postmodern, feminist approach to those concepts represents significant progress in philosophy. It is, in fact, exactly in the context of feminism—conceived of not just as a women's sociopolitical or scientific activity but as a broad theoretical approach to many areas—that Western philosophy has acquired its most explicit and adequate meaning. A crucial example here is the new historicophilosophical analysis of the concept of gender. The author appeals to Lipovetsky, Lacan, Derrida, Kristeva, and other thinkers to show how postmodern feminism helps to overcome the binary vision of the contemporary world and the dichotomic composition of earlier philosophical thought.     

Nobody Puts Baby in the Container: The Foetal Container Model at Work in Medicine and Commercial Surrogacy

This article argues that a particular metaphysical model permeates cultural practices surrounding pregnancy: the foetal container model. Widespread uncritical reliance on this view of pregnancy has been highly detrimental to women's liberty and reproductive autonomy. In this article, I extend existing critiques of the medical treatment of pregnant women to the context of the burgeoning commercial surrogacy industry. In doing so, I aim to show that our philosophical analysis in both spheres is constrained by the presupposition that the foetus and pregnant woman are metaphysically and ethically distinct entities. By exploring the similarities and differences between the expectations placed on pregnant women in these two spheres, I show that the foetal container model is not a homogeneous understanding of pregnancy applied consistently across contexts; rather, it has been used to justify various practices and attitudes toward pregnancy and pregnant women through different moral frameworks, in the service of different overarching aims.     

Reconsidering Relational Autonomy: A Feminist Approach to Selfhood and the Other in the Thinking of Martin Heidegger

This paper examines a convergence between Heidegger's reconceptualization of subjectivity and intersubjectivity and some recent work in feminist philosophy on relational autonomy. Both view the concept of autonomy to be misguided, given that our capacity to be self-directed is dependent upon our ability to enter into and sustain meaningful relationships. Both attempt to overturn the notion of a subject as an isolated, atomistic individual and to show that selfhood requires, and is based upon, one's relation to and dependence upon others. The paper argues that Heidegger's notion of authentic Mitsein (being-with) rejects traditional notions of autonomy and subjectivity in favor of a relational model of selfhood. Ultimately, it provides a new point of entry into contemporary debates within feminist philosophy on Heidegger's thinking and defends Heidegger from certain feminist critiques.     

The Qualitative Revolution and Psychology: Science,Politics, and Ethics

Growing interest in qualitative research methods and methodological pluralism in psychology since the 1990s is placed in the historical contexts of long-standing philosophical and scientific rationales and the more recent “qualitative revolution” in other social sciences that began in the 1970s. An examination of areas in which qualitative methods have become most strongly established—applied, feminist, and multicultural psychologies—suggests practical and social motivations as primary and as energizing renewed expression of previously ignored ontological, epistemological, and scientific reasoning in the turn to qualitative methods. Methodological diversification in the arenas of human suffering, women's issues, and cultural politics is traced to psychologists' deeply rooted ethical obligations. The existential philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas articulates an implicit ethics at the heart psychology's increasing acceptance of qualitative methods and provides an understanding of how the emerging methodological diversity can contribute to social justice and human liberation as well as to an enhancement of rigorous scientific knowledge.     

Catholic Feminist Ethics Reconsidered

Taking Catholic sexual ethics and liberal feminist ethics as points of departure, this essay argues that both frameworks are ill‐prepared to deal with the moral problems raised by sex trafficking: while Catholic sexual ethics is grounded in a normative understanding of sexuality, liberal feminist ethics argues for women's sexual autonomy, resting upon freedom of action and consent. From a perspective that attends both to the phenomenological interpretation of embodied selves and the Kantian normative interpretation of dignity, it becomes possible to critique both the Catholic and the liberal feminist frameworks of ethics. I argue that Catholic sexual ethics requires a reconceptualization as social ethics in order to meet the challenges of our present time, but that the shift is possible without giving up the moral imperatives of both Catholic and feminist ethics to protect human dignity and women's rights.     

The perception of women's status in Israel as a social problem

This study examines the perception of the status of women in Israel as a social problem, its cognitive structure and its correlates. The 994 respondents included a sample of university students, nurses, and female army officers. In general, the results suggest that feminist issues are perceived as less severe than most other social problems and that men perceive feminist issues as significantly less severe than do women. Factor analyses indicate that men and women think about social problems differently and that women have a broader more integrated conception of sex inequality. Sex, religiosity, education, and occupational context were all found to be significant predictors of perceptions of women's issues as social problems.     

Contra Fraser on Feminism and Neoliberalism

This article is a critical examination of Nancy Fraser's contrast of early second‐wave feminism and contemporary global feminism in “Feminism, Capitalism and the Cunning of History,” (Fraser 2009 ). Fraser contrasts emancipatory early second‐wave feminism, strongly critical of capitalism, with feminism in the age of neoliberalism as being in a “dangerous liaison” with neoliberalism. I argue that Fraser's historical account of 1970s mainstream second‐wave feminism is inaccurate, that it was not generally anti‐capitalist, critical of the welfare system, or challenging the priority of paid labor. I claim Fraser mistakenly takes a minority feminist position as mainstream. I further argue that Fraser's account of feminism today echoes arguments from James Petras and Henry Veltmeyer (2001) to Hester Eisenstein ( 2009 ), but such arguments ignore contemporary feminist minority positions. I challenge Fraser's arguments that feminism legitimates neoliberalism to women, that women's NGOs are simply service‐providers enabling the state to withdraw services, and that criticisms of microcredit lending programs can be generalized into criticisms of women's feminism and women's NGOs today. I argue that these claims are vast over‐generalizations and ignore countertrends. I give empirical evidence to support my objections by considering women's activities in post‐communist European countries, which Fraser discusses.     

A Contextualized Approach to Patient Autonomy Within the Therapeutic Relationship

Some authors have advanced a contractual model to protect patient autonomy within the therapeutic relationship. Such a conception of the physician–patient relationship is intended to serve both parties by respecting patients' choices and preserving physician integrity. I critique this contractual view and offer an alternative, feminist contextualized approach to autonomy within the therapeutic relationship. This approach places the physician-patient relationship within a larger social context, and indicates the many social inequalities that render insupportable the notion of physicians and patients as contracting equals.     

Resilience and Post-Traumatic Recovery in Cultural and Political Context

Abstract

Violence against women has been conceptualized in terms of controlling female sexuality, restricting women's autonomy, humiliating and keeping women out of sight, maintaining male control and dominance, and dishonoring other [male] enemies. This paper discusses situations where the violation of women's bodies becomes the site for political rivalries and thus incurring masculine/national honor. The etching of political rivalries onto women's bodies for national honor or to inflict dishonor has a long history and is not unique to Pakistan. Within the theoretical frameworks of ecological psychology and cultural anthropology, this paper highlights the resiliency shown by two Pakistani women in their efforts toward posttraumatic recovery as they situate their traumatic experiences within their immediate structural, political, and cultural contexts, which in turn influence their behavior and shape the specific choices they make.     

Islamist Women's Agency and Relational Autonomy

Mainstream conceptions of autonomy have been surreptitiously gender‐specific and masculinist. Feminist philosophers have reclaimed autonomy as a feminist value, while retaining its core ideal as self‐government, by reconceptualizing it as “relational autonomy.” This article examines whether feminist theories of relational autonomy can adequately illuminate the agency of Islamist women who defend their nonliberal religious values and practices and assiduously attempt to enact them in their daily lives. I focus on two notable feminist theories of relational autonomy advanced by Marina Oshana and Andrea Westlund and apply them to the case of Women's Mosque Movement participants in Egypt. I argue that feminist conceptions of relational autonomy, centered around the ideal of self‐government, cannot elucidate the agency of Women's Mosque Movement participants whose normative ideal involves perfecting their moral capacity.     

Agency without autonomy: valuational agency

National minority women's defense of non-liberal minority cultures that encompass sexist customs and rules has greatly perplexed liberal theorists. Many attempted to resolve this puzzle by attributing constrained agency to such women and dismissing their defense as unreasonable. This article argues that this liberal assessment of minority women's position is philosophically indefensible and that the failure of mainstream liberalism to make sense of these women's response indicates not that these women's agency is compromised but rather that the liberal conception of agency as autonomy has limits in its cross-cultural applicability. An alternative conception of agency, valuational agency, that illuminates minority women's agency is proposed as a more plausible alternative for radically pluralistic societies.