Care Ethics and Obligations to Future Generations

A dominant area of inquiry within intergenerational ethics concerns how goods (and bads) ought to be justly distributed between noncontemporaries. Contractualist theories of justice that have broached these discussions have often centered on the concepts of mutual advantage and (indirect) reciprocal cooperation between rational, self‐interested beings. However, another prominent reason that many in the present feel that they have obligations toward future generations is not due to self‐interested reciprocity, but simply because they care about what happens to them. Care ethics promises to be conceptually well‐suited for articulating this latter reason: given that future generations are in a perpetual condition of dependency on present‐day people's actions, this is precisely the kind of relational structure that care theorists should be interested in morally evaluating. Unfortunately, the care literature has been largely silent on intergenerational ethics. This article aims to advance this literature, offering the blueprints of what a care ethic concerning future generations—a “future care ethic”—should look like. The resultant ethic defends a sufficientarian theory of obligation: people in the present ought to ensure the conditions needed to encourage and sustain a world that enables good caring relations to flourish.     

Evolutionary Debunking Arguments

Evolutionary debunking arguments (EDAs) are arguments that appeal to the evolutionary origins of evaluative beliefs to undermine their justification. This paper aims to clarify the premises and presuppositions of EDAs—a form of argument that is increasingly put to use in normative ethics. I argue that such arguments face serious obstacles. It is often overlooked, for example, that they presuppose the truth of metaethical objectivism. More importantly, even if objectivism is assumed, the use of EDAs in normative ethics is incompatible with a parallel and more sweeping global evolutionary debunking argument that has been discussed in recent metaethics. After examining several ways of responding to this global debunking argument, I end by arguing that even if we could resist it, this would still not rehabilitate the current targeted use of EDAs in normative ethics given that, if EDAs work at all, they will in any case lead to a truly radical revision of our evaluative outlook.     

A Whisper Toward Peace: A Theoretical Analysis of the Council for a Parliament of the World Religions

The Council for a Parliament of the World Religions has been meeting since 1993 to foster a global religious ethic toward world peace, based on the premise that major world religions share this ethic in common. Roland Robertson's multidimensional model of globalization is utilized to analyze the Parliament's foundational Declaration, and explore why the Parliament's message is not receiving wider attention. Excerpts from anti-Parliament sources are included. Based on this analysis, the Parliament appears to have a limited conception of globalization, and so offers but a partial knowledge claim on how religion can resolve global problems. Seen in this light, it is not surprising that some oppose the Parliament's agenda, feel alienated by it, or—given its limitations—are not aware of it.     

The nature and scope of global ethics and the relevance of the Earth Charter

This article presents global ethics as critical reflection on the nature, justification and application of a global ethic. Much of the article focuses on the nature of a global ethic as the content of global ethics, e.g. whether it is thick or thin, is about universal values or transnational responsibilities, is a set of values justified by a particular thinker, values widely shared or values universally accepted. Global ethics itself as a process is also examined. In the last part the Earth Charter is examined as an example of a global ethic, and a case is made for regarding it, both in respect to its content and in respect to the senses in which it is and is not a global ethic, as an appropriate subject matter for global ethics.     

Ethics: universal or global? The trends in studies of ethics in the context of globalization

The article discusses how theory and practice in global ethics affect each other. First, the author explores how the study of ethics has changed in the era of globalization and ponders what the role of the field of study of global ethics is in this context. Second, she wants to show how the logical fallacies in widening study field of ethics produce false polarizations between facts and value judgements in social ethics made in various cultural contexts. She further elaborates how these false polarizations prevent constructive cross-cultural and transnational discussions on ethical guidelines and principles that are needed to produce joint action (plans) to deal with serious ethical issues globally and nationally. Finally, the paper argues that in order to find a way to solve our shared complex ethical problems in global context, we need to get back to basics by focusing on the method of ethics, that is, self-critical and logical analysis of sound argumentation and justification of our values and moral principles.     

Why is Ethics First Philosophy? Levinas in Phenomenological Context

This paper explores, from a phenomenological perspective, the conditions necessary for the possession of intentional content, i.e., for being intentionally directed toward the world. It argues that Levinas's concept of ethics as first philosophy makes an important contribution to this task. Intentional directedness, as understood here, is normatively structured. Levinas's ‘ethics’ can be understood as a phenomenological account of how our experience of the other subject as another subject takes place in the recognition of the normative force of a command. This supplies a condition that—as the paper shows by examining Husserl and Sartre on how our experience of the Other constitutes an ‘objective’ world—earlier phenomenologists have misunderstood, because they have treated ethical experience as ‘founded’ on a prior theory of representation (‘ontology’ in Levinas's language). Ethics is first philosophy because it is only by acknowledging the command in the ‘face’ of the Other that we can account for the sensitivity to the normative distinctions that structure intentional content. Throughout, the paper shows how Levinas's analyses, in Totality and Infinity, draw upon and develop the analyses of Husserl and Sartre.     

Five Elements of Normative Ethics - A General Theory of Normative Individualism

The article tries to inquire a third way in normative ethics between consequentialism or utilitarianism and deontology or Kantianism. To find such a third way in normative ethics, one has to analyze the elements of these classical theories and to look if they are justified. In this article it is argued that an adequate normative ethics has to contain the following five elements: (1) normative individualism, i. e., the view that in the last instance moral norms and values can only be justified by reference to the individuals concerned, as its basis; (2) consideration of the individuals’ concerns and interests—aims, desires, needs, strivings—insofar as they have a justificatory function; (3) a pluralism of references of these concerns and hence of moral norms and values to all possible elements of actions; (4) the necessity of a principle of aggregation and weighing with regard to these concerns; (5) finally, as a central principle of aggregation and weighing, the principle of relative reference to self and others, operating as a generalizing meta-principle that guides the application of concrete principles and decisions.     

The Ethic of Care vis-â-vis the Ethic of Rights: A Problem for Contemporary Moral Theory

Carol Gilligan has delineated two ethics, the ethic of rights and the ethic of care. In this article I argue that the two ethics are part of one overall system, the ethic of care functioning as a necessary base for the ethic of rights. 1 also argue that the system is seriously flawed. Because women are held accountable to both ethics and because the two ethics frequently conflict, women recurrently find themselves in a moral double bind.     

Islamic Education,Eco-ethics and Community

Amid the growing coalescence between the religion and ecology movements, the voice of Muslims who care for the earth and its people is rising. While the Islamic position on the environment is not well-represented in the ecotheology discourse, it advances an environmental imaginary which shows how faith can be harnessed as a vehicle for social change. This article will draw upon doctoral research which synthesised the Islamic ecological ethic (eco-ethic) from sacred texts, traditions and contemporary thought, and illustrated how this ethic is enlivened in the educational landscape of Islam. Knowledge of the relationship between human beings and the natural world, of the creative order upon which the world was created, and of right living, is essential in this educational project and the global ecoIslamic movement employs a range of institutes, from the masjid to the maktab, to impart the environmental message of Islam. Despite the manifestation of environmental education activities across the educational establishment, much of what passes as Islamic education today is not representative of the holistic, integrated and comprehensive educational philosophy of Islam. Contemporary social concerns, such as the environmental question, can, in my view, act as an impetus to develop a pedagogy which endeavours to be true to the religious traditions, values and ethics of Islam, while also displaying the transformative force of this faith. Muslims, at more than one-fifth of the world population, own a fair share of global concern around the earth’s health and well-being. Across the world, many continue to base their life and lifestyle decisions on the teachings of Islam, and are showing the relevance of traditional resources and institutions in meeting one of the greatest challenges facing humanity—the health of our planet.     

CONFUCIAN ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS,CLIMATE ENGINEERING,AND THE “PLAYING GOD” ARGUMENT

The burgeoning literature on the ethical issues raised by climate engineering has explored various normative questions associated with the research and deployment of climate engineering, and has examined a number of responses to them. While researchers have noted the ethical issues from climate engineering are global in nature, much of the discussion proceeds predominately with ethical framework in the Anglo‐American and European traditions, which presume particular normative standpoints and understandings of human–nature relationship. The current discussion on the ethical issues, therefore, is far from being a genuine global dialogue. The aim of this article is to address the lack of intercultural exchange by exploring the ethics of climate engineering from a perspective of Confucian environmental ethics. Drawing from the existing discussion on Confucian environmental ethics and Confucian ethics of technology, I discuss what Confucian ethics can contribute to the ethical debate on climate engineering.     

Unifying Moral Methodology

This article argues that the best way to pursue systematic normative ethical theorizing involves metaethical enquiry. My argument builds upon two central claims. First, I argue that plausible metaethical accounts can have implications that can help to resolve the methodological controversies facing normative ethics. Second, I argue that metaethical research is at least roughly as well supported as normative ethical research. I conclude by examining the implications of my thesis. Inter alia, it shows that the common practice of engaging in systematic normative theorizing uninformed by metaethical commitments offers a significant and troubling hostage to metaethical fortune.     

Four tasks for forward-looking global ethics

Our challenge for the twenty-first century consists in showing how to construct a global ethics and in trying to discover a rational foundation for it, which may be used as guidance for action and as a norm for the criticism of specific situations. I argue that four tasks must be accomplished to construct a global ethics: (1) Construct that global governance or that world government that makes cosmopolitan citizenship possible. (2) Foster the joint work of bioethics, economic and business ethics, and development ethics – areas of applied ethics, each one of which on its own has reached the global level. (3) Discover a rational basis for a global ethics, which has a universal normative force, but assumes cultural differences. (4) Develop and promote a dilaogical ethics of cordial reason, which renders one capable of compassion and care.     

From Normative Spheres to Normative Practices: New Prospects for Normative Theory after Habermas

Abstract

In this paper I argue against Jürgen Habermas’s theoretical dualism between ethics and morality. I do this by showing how his account of normativity is vitiated by an unnecessary superposition of a social-evolutionary and a theoretical-linguistic account of normativity, and that this brings about theoretical problems that in the end cannot be overcome. I also show that Rainer Forst’s attempt at salvaging Habermas’s distinction is equally doomed to failure, but that his attempt nevertheless invites new and more fruitful avenues for normative theory that are worth exploring. The conclusion of this paper is that traditional notions of ethics and morality can be preserved provided we heavily redefine their meanings and release them from some of the theoretical work they have been expected to accomplish, but that to complete this transition we also need to supersede Forst’s pluralization of normative contexts toward a theory of normative practices that in the end makes the distinction between ethics and morality workable but useless. I begin by first locating the debate about ethics and morality within the context of recent normative theory (§1), and proceed to examine the two main strategies through which Habermas has elaborated his idea of a sharp dualism between ethics and morality (§2). I then introduce a theoretical distinction between what I call a horizontal and a vertical integration of ethics and morality (§3) and contend that whilst only the horizontal is viable, Habermas decidedly prefers the idea of a vertical integration (§4). With this work done, I proceed to complete my critique of Habermas’s argument and show how, by recovering the pragmatist roots of his thought, an alternative solution based on a functionalist understanding of morality could be envisaged (§5). I then conclude by examining Rainer Forst’s attempt at salvaging Habermas’s account, and show that the failure of Forst’s attempts opens the way for new and more fruitful approaches to normative theory which are more likely to recover the pragmatist roots of Habermas’s thought (§6).     

Afro-communal virtue ethic as a foundation for environmental sustainability in Africa and beyond

This paper addresses the question: Can an Afro-communal virtue ethic provide a plausible foundation for environmental sustainability? Drawing on Thaddeus Metz’s perspective and contributions to the Afro-communal ethic tradition, this paper examines the extent to which his proposal provides plausible grounds for environmental sustainability. Metz, in several essays, advances the need for an ethic of communion, which rests on the ubuntu (humanness) virtue principles of shared identity, solidarity, and participative empathy. This paper argues that Metz’s view is a version of virtue ethics, of which flourishing, care and goodwill are important aspects. While this African ethical construct has some limitations, this paper nevertheless maintains that it entails some virtues that have promising normative implications for environmental sustainability. Metz’s views on an Afro-communal virtue ethic is relevant to motivating behavioural changes in the environmental sustainability quest through its capacity to provoke salient virtuous attitudes and values of responsible inter-generational and intra-generational Earth stewardship. Though an African ethical construct, this paper argues that the potential foundational import of Metz’s proposal for environmental sustainability reaches far beyond the geopolitical boundaries of Africa.     

Thinking Sexual Difference with (and against) Adriana Cavarero: On the Ethics and Politics of Care

This article engages with Adriana Cavarero's framing of sexual difference, specifically in terms of how this displaces “bodies that queer” (Volcano 2013). For Cavarero, the narratable self is inescapably relational and characterized by vulnerability, which is how ethics arises in the form of a decision between caring and wounding. At the same time, Cavarero's deconstructive method of appropriating stereotypes restricts the scope of sexual difference to dimorphism. In examining the implications of this, I build on the work of Michel Foucault and Judith Butler by looking to the intersexed life of Adélaïde Herculine Barbin, whose suicide in 1868 at the age of twenty‐nine was precipitated not through malice or cruelty, but through concerted care. This mode of care is anchored in the apparent self‐evidence of how we see and how we think with and through narratives that sediment in orders of power/knowledge. While agreeing with Cavarero's critique of the autonomous “I,” the article nevertheless argues for authorial audacity—the courage to name oneself—as a way of subverting asymmetrical power relations, including those that make it possible to inadvertently generate suffering through care.     

Designing Robots for Care: Care Centered Value-Sensitive Design

The prospective robots in healthcare intended to be included within the conclave of the nurse-patient relationship—what I refer to as care robots—require rigorous ethical reflection to ensure their design and introduction do not impede the promotion of values and the dignity of patients at such a vulnerable and sensitive time in their lives. The ethical evaluation of care robots requires insight into the values at stake in the healthcare tradition. What’s more, given the stage of their development and lack of standards provided by the International Organization for Standardization to guide their development, ethics ought to be included into the design process of such robots. The manner in which this may be accomplished, as presented here, uses the blueprint of the Value-sensitive design approach as a means for creating a framework tailored to care contexts. Using care values as the foundational values to be integrated into a technology and using the elements in care, from the care ethics perspective, as the normative criteria, the resulting approach may be referred to as care centered value-sensitive design. The framework proposed here allows for the ethical evaluation of care robots both retrospectively and prospectively. By evaluating care robots in this way, we may ultimately ask what kind of care we, as a society, want to provide in the future.     

Beliefs and Values of Successful Scientists

This article discusses a construction of academic work ethic among 16 gifted Finnish scientists. It highlights theoretical assumptions and practical implications of values and beliefs in the context of scientific work. Following the work of Kolhberg (1969, 1984) and Gilligan (1982), we build our theoretical pre-understandings on the ethics of justice and care. However, these orientations are insufficient to explain all the beliefs and values associated with academic work. Various forms and levels of negotiations help us to construct a new structural illustration of scientists' moral orientations, which include an additional, previously less recognized ethical component--the ethic of empowerment. Those negotiations between different data sets, existing theoretical frameworks and researchers' differing epistemological assumptions characterize our research process and guide the creation of an ethic of empowerment, which describes scientists' beliefs and values established and practiced by individual and independent academics.     

关于全球伦理的哲学审思

全球化过程有两个基本方面：一是科学技术的发展,一是资本主义的发展。迄今为止的全球化过程是资本主义利用不断更新的科学技术来实现自己发展的过程,此过程的社会实质在于资本主义全球化——包括资本主义经济全球化和与之相适应的资本主义伦理全球化。然而,诸如反全球化浪潮之美的国际现象和国际事件表明,原来作为全球化之推动力量的资本主义,如今正在走向其反面,愈来愈成为全球化的阻碍力量了;而日益严重的全球性生态危机,更其表明资本主义再也不能按其固有的方式存在和发展了。因此,客观上要求变革现存的资本主义经济制度及其伦理——包括资本主义经济理性、人理性和科学理性。适应解决当今全球性生态危机的需要,一种新伦理——生态伦理正在形成之中,它有望最终演变为取代传统资本主义伦理的全球伦理。