Ethics,AIDS, and community responsibility

In the discussion of the responsibilities of society to the HIV infected and uninfected, a serious question seems to have been left out of the picture: To what extent are people who are not infected, have no special relationship to the infected and have no professional responsibilities for the care of AIDS patients under an obligation to come to the aid of people with the HIV? In this paper, I shall examine our responsibilities, as members of society, for the welfare of others to whom we may or may not have a special relationship. I shall argue that those responsibilities flow from the conditions that structure our transactions with others; conditions that make such transactions possible.     

A Rawlsian Approach to Distribute Responsibilities in Networks

Due to their non-hierarchical structure, socio-technical networks are prone to the occurrence of the problem of many hands. In the present paper an approach is introduced in which people’s opinions on responsibility are empirically traced. The approach is based on the Rawlsian concept of Wide Reflective Equilibrium (WRE) in which people’s considered judgments on a case are reflectively weighed against moral principles and background theories, ideally leading to a state of equilibrium. Application of the method to a hypothetical case with an artificially constructed network showed that it is possible to uncover the relevant data to assess a consensus amongst people in terms of their individual WRE. It appeared that the moral background theories people endorse are not predictive for their actual distribution of responsibilities but that they indicate ways of reasoning and justifying outcomes. Two ways of ascribing responsibilities were discerned, corresponding to two requirements of a desirable responsibility distribution: fairness and completeness. Applying the method triggered learning effects, both with regard to conceptual clarification and moral considerations, and in the sense that it led to some convergence of opinions. It is recommended to apply the method to a real engineering case in order to see whether this approach leads to an overlapping consensus on a responsibility distribution which is justifiable to all and in which no responsibilities are left unfulfilled, therewith trying to contribute to the solution of the problem of many hands.     

Stop Thinking So Much About ‘Sexual Harassment’

This article explores two related widespread mistakes in thinking about sexual harassment. One is a mistake made by philosophers doing philosophical work on the topic of sexual harassment: an excessive focus on attempting to define the term ‘sexual harassment’. This is a perfectly legitimate topic for discussion and indeed a necessary one, but its dominance of the literature has tended to prevent philosophers from adequately exploring other topics that are of at least equal importance, particularly that of bystanders' responsibilities. The other mistake is one made not just by philosophers but by most people attempting to deal with real‐world behaviour that is either sexual harassment or closely related to sexual harassment: an excessive focus on whether or not formal charges of sexual harassment are possible or appropriate. (This is clearly related to the first mistake in that a part of deciding whether charges are appropriate is deciding whether the behaviour meets the definition of sexual harassment.) I argue that these are not merely unfortunate errors in attempting to conceptualise certain problematic behaviours; they have extremely damaging real world effects.     

Diagnosis by Documentary: Professional Responsibilities in Informal Encounters

Most work addressing clinical workers' professional responsibilities concerns the norms of conduct within established professional–patient relationships, but such responsibilities may extend beyond the clinical context. We explore health workers' professional responsibilities in such “informal” encounters through the example of a doctor witnessing the misdiagnosis and mistreatment of a serious long-term condition in a television documentary, arguing that neither internalist approaches to professional responsibility (such as virtue ethics or care ethics) nor externalist ones (such as the “social contract” model) provide sufficiently clear guidance in such situations. We propose that a mix of both approaches, emphasizing the noncomplacency and practical wisdom of virtue ethics, but grounding the normative authority of virtue in an external source, is able to engage with the health worker's responsibilities in such situations to the individual, the health care system, and the population at large.     

Regulatory Focus Theory: Implications for the Study of Emotions at Work

Previous theory and research have shown that people have two distinct self-regulatory foci. When promotion focused, people are motivated by growth and development needs in which they attempt to bring their actual selves (their behaviors and self-conceptions) in alignment with their ideal selves (self-standards based on wishes and aspirations of how they would like to be). When prevention focused, people are responsive to security needs in which they try to match their actual selves with their ought selves (self-standards based on felt duties and responsibilities). Strategically, eagerness or ensuring gains predominate for promotion-focused persons, whereas vigilance or ensuring nonlosses predominate for prevention-focused persons. People's regulatory focus influences the nature and magnitude of their emotional experience. Promotion-focused people's emotions vary along a cheerful-dejected dimension, whereas prevention-focused people's emotions vary along a quiescent-agitated dimension. We consider the implications of the relationship between regulatory focus and emotions for such topics as person/organization fit, goal-setting theory, expectancy-valence theory, behavioral decision theory, and employee resistance to organizational change. Possible antecedents of employees' regulatory focus also are discussed.     

Biblical and Theological Perspectives on Children,Parents, and ‘Best Practices' for Faith Formation: Resources for Child,Youth, and Family Ministry Today

Abstract : One of the most important ways to strengthen the faith formation of children and young people, and child, youth, and family ministries is by engaging and supporting parents or primary care‐givers. This article seeks to address this challenge by mining resources from the Bible and Christian theology about the roles and responsibilities of parents, the complexity and dignity of children, and ways to pass on the faith. By taking into account theological perspectives on parents, children, and faith formation, church leaders can better engage both children and parents, and they can strengthen all areas of their work with or on behalf of children and young people, whether in children's ministry, youth and family ministry, religious education, or child advocacy.     

Enterprising behaviour of ordinary people

Starting out with the idea that everybody is in principle capable of enterprising behaviour, the concept of enterprise is applied to non-business people as well as business people. A random sample of people is asked to furnish an example of enterprising behaviour that they have shown themselves. Further, they are asked what is enterprising about this behaviour. The results show that in different realms of enterprising behaviour different dimensions of enterprise are mentioned. For example, people giving an example from their leisure time regard merely being active as enterprising, employees mention risky elements in their work, business owners emphasize autonomy, and students regard it as enterprising that they work for their professional or personal development. So people can be enterprising in different areas of life and in different manners. Obtaining a domain of enterprising behaviours and dimensions is a first step in constructing a scale of ''enterprising behaviour of ordinary people''.     

The compatibility of hunting and mothering among the agta hunter-gatherers of the Philippines

Women's hunting is widely held biologically impracticable in foraging societies, chiefly because hunting is presumed incompatible with maternal responsibilities. A three-year study of hunting practices among the Agta Negrito people of northern Luzon reveals women's active participation in hunting, singly and in groups, without detriment to normal fertility and child care.     

Remedial responsibilities beyond nations

David Miller's theory of nationalism and national responsibility offers the leading alternative ‘anticosmopolitan’ theory of global justice. His theory claims that ‘nations’ may be held responsible for the benefits and harms resulting from their collective decisions. Nations may be held remedially responsible to help nations in need even where the former lack causal or moral responsibility, for example. This article critically examines Miller's position that remedial responsibilities – the responsibilities of nations to remedy others in need – can and should only be satisfied by nations. I argue that the characteristics that define and justify a particular understanding of nationalism extend to further constructions of identity, such as religious affiliation and other connections. The problem with Miller's position is that it is overly narrow by focusing solely on our national identities as the characteristic most relevant for determining remedial responsibilities. It is possible and desirable to widen our focus, enriching our understanding of global justice and remedial responsibility. Moreover, this wider perspective is an extension, and not a break from, Miller's position. Our shared identities should have significance for considerations of global justice and they can help us to develop a more robust view of anticosmopolitanism.     

Militarism,Human Welfare,and the APA Ethical Principles of Psychologists

A case study is presented of the American Psychological Association (APA), as a health care organization that promotes human welfare. APA includes policies on human welfare in its Ethical Principles of Psychologists and even lists the advancement of psychology "as a means of promoting human welfare" on its letterhead. Nevertheless, APA has other policies and activities based on military and weapons work that appear to conflict with its promotion of human welfare. Although military work in and of itself may not necessarily be problematic, work that contributes to people purposely being harmed or killed should be squared with the association's ethical guidelines. The results presented here show that this may not be the case: There currently appears to be little justification in the Ethical Principles for work intended to harm people. APA's active lobbying, research, and development for the military are documented here, in relation to an analysis of the Ethical Principles. APA's uncritical support for Operation Desert Storm is examined specifically, with regard to weapons technology and therapeutic treatment of U.S. soldiers on the battlefield. This one-sided support for victims of the war is not in keeping with a Hippocratic health care ethic to treat patients needing care, and to do so with neutrality and impartiality. Similarities to a historical example of nationalistic mental health ethics are discussed, with a review of the development of the German Institute for Psychological Research and Psychotherapy and of the German Society for Psychology in the Nazi wartime effort and the Holocaust. The results here show similar deficiencies in APA's ethical standards, not the least of which is that the code applies to individual members but not to APA policies, committees, or activities. This article concludes with suggested criteria for the Ethical Principles that would at least (a) recognize the ambiguities in systematically developing and using weapons to hurt people and (b) provide an initial rationale of potential justifications.     

The better-than-my-average effect: The relative impact of peak and average performances in assessments of the self and others

We examine whether people call to mind different manifestations of various traits when considering what they are like than when considering what others are like. Specifically, do people think that peak manifestations of their traits and abilities best capture who they are themselves, but that other people are better captured by their average performances or trait expressions? In Studies 1a and 1b, participants were more likely to believe that their own most attractive photographs best represent their typical appearance than others' do. In Study 2, participants' estimates of where they stand on various trait dimensions coincided with their highest possible standing, whereas their estimates of an acquaintance's standing coincided with the midpoint between the latter's highest and lowest possible standing. In Study 3, regression analyses revealed that students' predictions of their own final exam score were based most heavily on their highest score received to that point, but their predictions of someone else's final exam score was based most heavily on that student's average score. We discuss how this tendency fits in the broader literature on self-other differences in evaluation and how it contributes to above-average effect.     

An alternative for counselor education

What is it that makes the counselor a professional? Is it possible to separate the personal and political responsibilities of the professional counselor in today's world? In this article, David Island tries to answer these questions and provides an alternative model for approaching counseling and counselor education in a period of rapid cultural change.     

Urbanization and Changing Perceptions of Responsibilities Among African Fathers

This study examined the effect of urbanization on 102 South African fathers' perceptions of their paternal responsibilities. Fathers were categorized as rural, transitional, or urban on the basis of a standardized interval measure of urbanization. Perceptions of paternal responsibilities were rank-ordered into three basic anthropologically sequential categories: breadwinner, governor, and family. Results indicated that rural, transitional, and urban fathers all viewed breadwinner responsibilities as most important but that urbanization had a significant effect on fathers' perceptions of their responsibilities.     

Moral Taint: On the Transfer of the Implications of Moral Culpability

Suppose two people are about to drown. We are in a position to save only one, so the other will have to die. One of the two has just culpably killed an innocent person, but has no intention of killing anybody else and there is no reason to expect that he will. Everything else being equal, should we give them an equal chance of being saved by flipping a coin? In this paper I argue that we should not. I argue that the implications of a person's moral culpability for (recent or prospective) harm to a particular victim should transfer to other conflict situations in which the wrongdoer might find him or herself. This requires establishing the extent to which a person's contributing to harming another person — and his moral culpability for that harm — impinges on our decision making in situations where it is possible only to assist either the wrongdoer or some other person that is not his victim.     

PHILOSOPHERS,THEIR CONTEXT,AND THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES

Abstract: It has at various times been said, both before and since the fall of apartheid, that philosophers in South Africa are neglecting to do certain sorts of work. Behind this accusation lies a general claim that philosophers have responsibilities to their contexts. This essay is dedicated to (i) defending this claim against objections, and (ii) offering a positive argument for there being moral pressure on philosophers to increase understanding. My aim is not to accuse any philosopher or community of philosophers of neglect. It is rather to defend an understanding of both philosophy and ethical responsibilities that makes room for philosophers to have moral responsibilities. Whether or not it has ever in fact been appropriate to accuse philosophers in South Africa, or indeed anywhere else, of neglect, philosophers do indeed have responsibilities to their contexts.     

Online Responsibility: Bad Samaritanism and the Influence of Internet Mediation

In 2008 a young man committed suicide while his webcam was running. 1,500 people apparently watched as the young man lay dying: when people finally made an effort to call the police, it was too late. This closely resembles the case of Kitty Genovese in 1964, where 39 neighbours supposedly watched an attacker assault and did not call until it was too late. This paper examines the role of internet mediation in cases where people may or may not have been good Samaritans and what their responsibilities were. The method is an intuitive one: intuitions on the various potentially morally relevant differences when it comes to responsibility between offline and online situations are examined. The number of onlookers, their physical nearness and their anonymity have no moral relevance when it comes to holding them responsible. Their perceived reality of the situation and ability to act do have an effect on whether we can hold people responsible, but this doesn’t seem to be unique to internet mediation. However the way in which those factors are intrinsically connected to internet mediation does seem to have a diminishing effect on responsibility in online situations.     

‘I don't think racism is that bad any more’: Exploring the ‘end of racism’ discourse among students in English schools

In this paper, we present findings on lay constructions of racism from a focus group study (11 groups, n = 72) with a mixed sample of secondary‐school students in England. We show that racism was, on the whole, ‘othered’: It was located in other times, places, and people or was denied altogether. We show that this way of talking about racism had different uses depending on the identity stakes involved in different interactional contexts. Even in the cases where racism was constructed as common, participants worked hard to make an ‘irrefutable’ argument, which suggests that they were anticipating reputational damage by making a claim for the persistence of racism. We discuss these findings with regard to the different levels of analysis involved in constructions of racism (micro‐interactional, local and broader normative context) and with regard to an ‘end of racism’ discourse that appeared to provide the normative framework for participants' accounts.     

The Virtue of Being Supportive

I develop an account of the nature and value of being supportive in interpersonal relationships. In particular, I argue that the virtue of being supportive, construed as a modally demanding value, facilitates the autonomy of one's intimate and promotes a sense of unity in one's relationship. Moreover, the practice of being supportive plays an important role with regard to the familiar need to reconcile the normative demands of one's own projects with one's responsibilities to intimates.