The paradox of global environmental justice: Appealing to the distributive justice framework for the global South

While a relativist view of environmental ethics could be quite difficult to justify, it is also difficult to be so strict about the quest for global environmental justice. At the same time, even though the reality of environmental degradation is plain to see, most African traditional communities, and even their respective states at large, still wallow in poverty such that they remain in need of developing themselves if they are to reach the level of development of the countries in the global North. More so, the majority of indigenous and mostly poor and underrepresented African people in the global South are faced with disproportionate amounts of environmental benefits and burdens compared to their counterparts in the global North. In this article, I therefore seek to examine a normative framework for conceptualising global environmental justice within different environmental, social, political and economic contexts. I consider how best environmental benefits and burdens could be fairly distributed across communities with different environmental, social, political and economic advantages. In the end, I appeal to John Rawls’s conception of distributive justice as a framework for arriving at an acceptable view of global environmental justice that takes into account the circumstances of the global South.     

INFINITE REGRESS ARGUMENTS

Abstract

Gerald Cohen's critique of John Rawls's theory of justice is that it is concerned only with the justice of social institutions, and must thus arbitrarily draw a line between those inequalities excluded and those allowed by the basic structure. Cohen claims that a proper concern with the interests of the least advantaged would rule out ‘incentives’ for ‘talented’ individuals. I argue that Rawls's assumption that the subject of justice is the basic structure of society does not arbitrarily restrict the concerns of political justice, as Cohen claims. Further, I argue that it does not allow ‘deep’ inequalities within a just basic structure. When properly understood, Rawls's theory of justice is strongly egalitarian, taken as a theory of fairness in the way the burdens and benefits of social cooperation are distributed, even if it is not as egalitarian as Cohen wishes.     

How Civil Society Organisations Changed the Regulation of Clinical Trials in India

ABSTRACT

In 2005 India changed its pharmaceutical and innovation policy that facilitated a dramatic increase in international clinical trials involving study sites in India. This policy shift was surrounded by controversies; civil society organisations (CSOs) criticised the Indian government for promoting the commercialisation of pharmaceutical research and development. Health social movements in India fought for social justice through collective action, and engaged in normative reasoning of the benefits, burdens and equality of research. They lobbied to protect trial participants from structural violence that occurred especially in the first 5–6 years of the new policy. CSOs played a major role in the introduction of new regulations in 2013, which accelerated a decline in the number of global trials carried out in India. This activism applied interpretations of global social justice as key ideas in mobilisation, eventually helping to institutionalise stricter ethical regulation on a national level. Like government and industry, activists believed in randomised controlled trials and comparison as key methods for scientific knowledge production. However, they had significant concerns about the global hierarchies of commercial pharmaceutical research, and their impact on the rights of participants and on benefits for India overall. Pointing to ethical malpractices and lobbying for stricter ethical regulations, they aimed to ensure justice for research participants, and developed effective strategies to increase controls over the business side of clinical research.     

Qui bono? Justice in the Distribution of the Benefits and Burdens of Avoided Deforestation

In this paper, I explore the question of how the costs of undertaking an important type of climate change mitigation should be shared amongst states seeking an environmentally effective and equitable response to global climate change. While much of the normative literature on climate mitigation has focused on burden sharing within the context of reductions in emissions of greenhouse gas, I explore the question of how the costs of protecting tropical forests in order to harness their climate mitigation potential should be distributed amongst developing and developed states. In response to this question, I outline and defend a ‘beneficiary pays’ account of forestry mitigation burden sharing that requires affluent states to finance measures supporting avoided deforestation while less affluent states, within whose territory these forests tend to be located, implement these measures. The normative basis for this account, I argue, is a principle of ‘unjust enrichment’ according to which developed states must bear much of the cost of avoided deforestation for its climate mitigation potential because of the huge economic benefits their citizens have accumulated from productive activities that have contributed to climate change.     

Remedial responsibilities beyond nations

David Miller's theory of nationalism and national responsibility offers the leading alternative ‘anticosmopolitan’ theory of global justice. His theory claims that ‘nations’ may be held responsible for the benefits and harms resulting from their collective decisions. Nations may be held remedially responsible to help nations in need even where the former lack causal or moral responsibility, for example. This article critically examines Miller's position that remedial responsibilities – the responsibilities of nations to remedy others in need – can and should only be satisfied by nations. I argue that the characteristics that define and justify a particular understanding of nationalism extend to further constructions of identity, such as religious affiliation and other connections. The problem with Miller's position is that it is overly narrow by focusing solely on our national identities as the characteristic most relevant for determining remedial responsibilities. It is possible and desirable to widen our focus, enriching our understanding of global justice and remedial responsibility. Moreover, this wider perspective is an extension, and not a break from, Miller's position. Our shared identities should have significance for considerations of global justice and they can help us to develop a more robust view of anticosmopolitanism.     

Defining Risk,Motivating Responsibility and Rethinking Global Warming

This paper breaks with the sociological notion of ‘risk society’ and argues in favour of a philosophical view that sees the two planetary threats of late modernity, nuclear weapons and global warming, as ultimate challenges to morality and politics rather than risks that we can take and manage. The paper also raises the question of why we should feel responsible for the effects of these two global challenges on future generations and in this sense elaborates on the transgenerational chain of parenthood rather than on considerations of justice.     

Our obligations to future generations: the limits of intergenerational justice and the necessity of the ethics of metaphysics

Abstract

Theories of intergenerational justice are a very common and popular way to conceptualise the obligations currently living people may have to future generations. After briefly pointing out that these theories presuppose certain views about the existence, number and identity of future people, I argue that the presuppositions must themselves be ethically investigated, and that theories of intergenerational justice lack the theoretical resources to be able to do this. On that basis, I claim it is necessary to do the ‘ethics of metaphysics’ in order to fully comprehend what, if anything, we may owe future generations. I defend these claims against some important objections.     

To Have Life,and Have It Abundantly! Health and Well-Being in Biblical Perspective

Epidemiological studies researching the impact of participation in religious activities on the overall health and well-being of individuals suggest that having faith and practicing religion is good since they represent expense free, non-medical coping mechanisms accessible to everyone. Faith and religion, thus, can serve for a large number of people as potential reservoirs for cultivating well-being and maintaining health, thereby cutting health-care costs significantly. This begs the question if such pragmatic instrumentalization does do justice to faith and religion in the first place. The article investigates this question taking the Christian biblical tradition as an example by, first, identifying texts speaking of ‘health’ across different Bible versions (I), second, by sketching related concepts of ‘health’ (II) and, finally, by assessing the actual extent to which biblical tradition supports the quest for health and well-being (III).     

TO INTERPRET,OR TO BE OMNISCIENT

Abstract

Susan Moller Okin has criticized Michael Sandel's view that the family is an example of an institution that is sometimes ‘above’ or ‘beyond’ justice, and for which justice is not, under the best conditions, a virtue. She argues that he both misses the point of justice as a virtue of social institutions and that he idealizes the family, and after undertaking this ‘ground-clearing’, goes on to argue that families should be just. This paper offers a qualified defense of Sandel. I argue, first, that Sandel has not missed the point of justice as a virtue of social institutions. But I go on to argue, more centrally, that if we distinguish between what I call ‘internal’ and ‘social’ justice of the family, and look carefully at the conclusions of Okin's own arguments, we see that she has really argued for the social justice of the family, and that this can be maintained alongside Sandel's vision of the family as an institution within which considerations of justice are neither central, nor necessarily appropriate. I try to carve out space both for Sandel's vision of the family, and for Okin's substantive feminist conclusions about family-based gender injustice.     

Self-Respect or Self-Delusion? Tomasi and Rawls on the Basic Liberties

A central feature of John Tomasi’s ‘Free Market Fairness’ is the emphasis it places upon the good of self-respect. Like Rawls, Tomasi believes that accounts of justice ought to offer support for the self-respect of citizens. Indeed, this is a key way in which Tomasi aspires to engage with the ‘high-liberal’ tradition. Unlike Rawls however, Tomasi argues that this support is best provided by our treating a broader set of economic liberties as basic liberties. In this paper I raise two concerns about this latter claim. Firstly, I trace a number of significant ways in which Tomasi’s discussion of self-respect differs from that of Rawls. Whilst such divergences are not necessarily problematic, I argue that they serve to limit the purchase his account has on left-liberals. Further, I argue that the ideal of self-respect is more deeply ‘hard-wired’ into Rawls’s account of justice than Tomasi recognises. As such, Tomasi fails to address the full range of additional (and important) ways in which Rawls expects his principles of justice to support citizens’ self-respect. I argue that this also limits the force of Tomasi’s claims. Secondly, and more seriously, I argue that there are significant tensions between Tomasi’s discussion of self-respect and his most forceful argument (the ‘greater wealth thesis’) in favour of the market democratic model he proposes. I argue firstly that Tomasi’s account of when (and why) citizens’ self-respect is jeopardised does not allow us to readily distinguish between economic security born of systems of welfare and redistribution, and economic security born of market forces and historical contingency. And more troubling still, is Tomasi’s belief that self-respecting citizens must view themselves as a ‘central cause’ of their situation. Such self-conceptions, I argue, can only coexist alongside the greater wealth thesis if citizens engage in quite naked self-delusions about their causal power. I argue that theorists of justice have good reason to be suspicious of promulgating such delusions and, as such, that this poses a serious problem for a justification of market democracy which aspires to rest upon an appeal to self-respect.     

Investors versus Workers: A Class-Based Critique of International Investment Treaties

Bilateral investment treaties constitute an important instrument to facilitate global investment. Recent discussions in political theory have highlighted several normative concerns raised by bilateral investment treaties. One worry is that investment treaties undermine national self-determination as they grant investors far-reaching protections that can be legally enforced. Another worry is that the benefits and burdens entailed in bilateral investment treaties are distributed unfairly in a way that benefits investors at the expense of states and disadvantaged groups within states. Instead of critiquing bilateral investment treaties from a perspective of global (distributive) justice, in this article I develop a class-based critique. This involves a twofold departure. First, the article shifts the focus from distributions to the power relations that are built into the global capitalist economy and that come into sharp relief in the practice of global investment. Second, rather than focusing on the relation between states and investors, I claim that in a class-based critique the relation between workers and investors should take centre stage. I argue that bilateral investment treaties are effectively an instrument of class domination, insofar as they reproduce and increase the power of transnational corporations while at the same time decreasing the power of workers.     

Political reconciliation at the level of global governance1

This article applies the idea of political reconciliation to current debates on the role and legitimacy of global governance. My underlying thesis is that the idea of reconciliation fits better with the non-ideal circumstances of global injustice. To this end, I will first of all develop a three-tiered model of political reconciliation and introduce the related concept of restorative justice. I will then look at some of the most obvious forms of international and global injustice – historical injustice, economic exploitation, and political domination – and argue that a normative theory of political reconciliation provides better proposals for feasible global governance reforms than do theories of corrective, retributive, or distributive justice. Finally, I will make a few comments on the role of political philosophy as a medium of ‘narrative reconciliation’.     

What Does Society Owe Me If I Am Responsible for Being Worse Off?

Luck egalitarians need to address the question of cost‐responsibility: If an individual is responsible for being worse off than others, then what benefits, if any, is that individual uniquely cost‐responsible for? By applying luck egalitarianism to justice in health I discuss different answers to this question inspired by two different interpretations of luck egalitarianism, namely ‘standard luck egalitarianism’ and ‘all luck egalitarianism’, respectively. Even though I argue that the latter is more plausible than the former, I ultimately suggest and defend a third interpretation of luck egalitarianism, which I label ‘universal luck egalitarianism’. Finally, I adjust my findings to a (all things considered) more plausible currency, namely welfare.     

Quo Vadis? The Capability Space and New Directions for the Philosophy of Educational Research

Amartya Sen’s capability approach creates an evaluative space within which individual well-being is considered in ways that diverge from dominant utilitarian views. Instead of measuring well-being based on the accumulation of wealth and resources by individuals and nations, the capability approach focuses on the opportunities (capabilities) an individual has to choose and pursue a life they have reason to value. The capability space is introduced with an explanation of Sen’s evaluative framework. It is claimed that conceptions of well-being are inextricably linked to our values and views of what constitutes justice, the ‘good life’ and notions of human flourishing. The paper invites philosophical reflection on how the capability approach can inform the development of a research paradigm that furthers our understandings of individual well-being and human flourishing. A specific focus is given to what more can be done to assist children and young people in making the best of their situation in negotiating a valued life for themselves in which they can flourish.     

Commentary on Rosefeldt: Should Metaphysics Care About Ontological Commitment from Casual Utterances?

Tobias Rosefeldt argues that in order to reconcile a physics-based fundamental ontology with the ontological implications of our everyday utterances, philosophers should pursue a ‘linguistics-based conciliatory’ strategy: They should refer to the results of linguistic research in order to avoid ontological commitment to problematic entities. Whereas Rosefeldt is not an advocate of radical forms of naturalized metaphysics, his argument is driven by the motivation behind pleas for a naturalization of the discipline. I claim that although there is a need for reconciliation, Rosefeldt’s favored account falls short of this goal. More generally, I argue that so-called ‘conciliatory accounts’ fail to do justice to the motivation that necessitated them in the first place, as the role they assign to analyses of everyday speech in search of ontological commitments is at odds with said motivation. ‘Conciliatory accounts’, hence, sit uneasily between radically naturalistic and traditional armchair approaches to metaphysics.     

Phenomenology and Critical Social Psychology: Directions and Debates in Theory and Research

There has been significant growth in critical approaches to social psychology in recent years. Phenomenological, discursive and psychoanalytically informed perspectives, amongst others, have become increasingly popular alternatives to ‘mainstream’ cognitive social psychology. This paper describes the fundamental philosophy and methodology underpinning phenomenological psychology along with discussion of a number of key issues in qualitative research in social psychology. In particular, I discuss the role of interpretation, the turn to language and need for political engagement within critical social psychology. More recently, there has been a growth in phenomenologically informed narrative theories and methodologies and in this paper I introduce my own development of a critical narrative analysis. In the process I discuss some of the most pressing debates about research within the phenomenological tradition and provide rebuttals, solutions and possible future directions for phenomenological theory and research that may lead to yet greater recognition for this social psychological perspective.     

Justice as the Practice of Non-Coercive Action: A Study of John Dewey and Classical Daoism

In this essay, I will argue for an understanding of justice that is grounded in our imperfect world by drawing upon the works of John Dewey and the Classical Daoist philosophers. It will require a reconstructed understanding of persons as a field/continuum of interrelations and an updated understanding of human action and agency. This understanding of justice takes the form of non-coercive action, interaction that respects the particularity of each lived situation. The practice culminates in an ability to respond to the environment considered to be ziran (自然) or ‘self-so’ by the Daoist Philosophers. As described in the Dao De Jing, it is the cultivation of the ‘Three Jewels of the Dao’, the most central of them being compassion making, this practice of justice as non-coercive action also understandable as the practice of compassion as described by the Classical Daoist philosophers.     

Justice without Solidarity? Collective Identity and the Fate of the ‘Ethical’ in Habermas' Recent Political Theory

In past work, Habermas has claimed that justice and solidarity stand in a complementary relationship—that ‘ethical’ relations of solidarity are the ‘reverse side’ of justice. Yet in a recent address to the World Congress of Philosophy, he rejects this idea. This paper argues against this rejection. After explaining the idea, arguing for its centrality to Habermas' thought, and evaluating Habermas' scant reflections on this major transformation, I argue that his rejection of the idea is a result of a newfound skepticism about the power of secular reason, and should thus be understood in terms of his corresponding turn to religious traditions as alternative sources of solidarity. I argue against this ‘religious turn’ by developing an alternative advocated by Habermas himself in earlier reflections—attention to real sociopolitical movements. In particular, I analyze feminist and black liberation movements to demonstrate that Habermas' pessimism about secular sources of justice‐producing solidarity is unwarranted, and that, while ‘postsecular’ sources may provide one avenue for actionable solidarity, they are not the only one. I conclude by identifying a conceptual commonality in these two alternatives: an inclusive conception of what it means to be human.     

Justice Beliefs,Personal Well-Being and Harsh Social Attitudes: Initial Demonstration of a Polynomial Regression and Response Surface Methodology

Tendencies to believe in justice are multidimensional and include beliefs that the world is fair to one’s self (personal justice beliefs) as well as to others (general justice beliefs). Previous research suggests that personal and general justice beliefs are divergently linked to well-being and harsh social attitudes, respectively. However, whether and how these justice tendencies conjointly affect well-being and harsh social attitudes is less well known. Guided by equity theory, the current study used polynomial regression and surface response methodology to demonstrate how specific discrepancies between justice beliefs for self and others predict personal well-being and harsh social attitudes. Participants (N?=?1079) completed measures of tendencies to believe in personal and general justice, as well as measures of physical symptoms associated with illness and attitudes towards the poor. Results suggested that discrepancy between personal and general justice beliefs had detrimental effects on these outcomes (i.e., higher number of illness symptoms and harsher attitudes towards the poor). Moreover, discrepancy resulting from a strong belief in general justice and a weak belief in personal justice (i.e., other-favorable discrepancy) was more strongly negatively associated with well-being and positively associated with harsh attitudes towards the poor than discrepancy resulting from a strong personal justice belief and a weak general justice belief (i.e., self-favorable discrepancy). The current research highlights the potential for personal and general justice beliefs to conjointly predict well-being and social attitudes, while simultaneously demonstrating the capacity to better understand these interactive relationships through the use of surface response methodology.