Duties to the Distant: Aid, Assistance, and Intervention in the Developing World

In his classic article, Famine, Affluence, and Morality (Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (1972), pp. 229–243), Peter Singer claimed that affluent people in the developed world are morally obligated to transfer large amounts of resources to poor people in the developing world. For present purposes I will not call Singers argument into question. While people can reasonably disagree about exactly how demanding morality is with respect to duties to the desperate, there is little question in my mind that it is much more demanding than common sense morality or our everyday behavior suggests. Even someone who disagrees with this might still find some interest in seeing what a demanding morality would imply for well-off residents of the rich countries of the world. I proceed in the following way. First, I survey humanitarian aid, development assistance, and intervention to protect human rights as ways of discharging duties to the desperate. I claim that we should be more cautious about such policies than is often thought. I go on to suggest two principles that should guide our actions, based on an appreciation of our roles, relationships, and the social and political context in which we find ourselves.     

Foreign Aid and the Moral Value of Freedom

Peter Singer has famously argued that people living in affluent western countries are morally obligated to donate money to famine relief. The central premise in his argument is that, If it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do so. The present paper offers an argument to the effect that affluent people ought to support foreign aid projects based on a much weaker ethical premise. The new premise states that, If it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of moral importance, we ought, morally, to do so. This premise, supplemented with a notion of final value drawing on Amartya Sen's concept of freedom as capabilities and functionings, is conceived as a special version of a weak, egalitarian Pareto principle.     

Changing One’s Mind on Moral Matters

Contemporary moral philosophy assumes an account of what it means to legitimately change one’s mind in ethics, and I wish to challenge this account by enlarging the category of the legitimate. I am just as eager to avoid illegitimate mind-changing brought on by deceit or brainwashing, but I claim that legitimacy should be defined in terms of transparency of method. A social reformer should not be embarrassed to admit that he acquired many beliefs about justice while reading Dickens. As such, appeals to the heart and the imagination are just as legitimate, within limits, as appeals to the mind; and showing can be as legitimate as telling. To demonstrate this, I consider the example of a vegetarian trying to ‘convert’ a carnivore. I then ask what it means when the carnivore claims to have been previously mistaken.     

Is Global Poverty a Philosophical Problem?

Peter Singer’s groundbreaking call to action in 1972, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” drew philosophical attention to the topic of famine and the associated suffering or preventable death of many throughout the world. Yet despite the volume of philosophical work Singer’s paper inspired, it would still be easy to suppose that global poverty is not a problem for philosophers to take seriously in itself but is rather a particularly stark illustration or instance of a more general problem, whether in ethics or in political philosophy. The aim of this paper is to argue that the philosophical landscape of global poverty is both sui generis and sufficiently complex that the topic should be considered not as an instance of a more general philosophical problem but as a distinct area of normative inquiry.     

On the regress argument for infinitism

This paper critically evaluates the regress argument for infinitism. The dialectic is essentially this. Peter Klein argues that only an infinitist can, without being dogmatic, enhance the credibility of a questioned non-evident proposition. In response, I demonstrate that a foundationalist can do this equally well. Furthermore, I explain how foundationalism can provide for infinite chains of justification. I conclude that the regress argument for infinitism should not convince us.     

Selling Yourself: Titmuss's Argument Against a Market in Blood

This article defends Richard Titmuss's argument, and PeterSinger's sympathetic support for it, against orthodoxphilosophical criticism. The article specifies thesense in which a market in blood is ``dehumanising' ashaving to do with a loss of ``imagined community' orsocial ``integration', and not with a loss of valued or``deeper' liberty. It separates two ``domino arguments'– the ``contamination of meaning' argument and the``erosion of motivation' argument which support, indifferent but interrelated ways, the claim that amarket in blood is ``imperialistic.' Concentrating onthe first domino argument the article considers theview that monetary and non-monetary meanings of thesame good can co-exist given the robustness of certainkinds of relationship and joint undertakings withinwhich gifts can figure. It argues that societalrelationships are vulnerable or permeable to theeffects of the market in a way that those constitutiveof the personal sphere are not.General, more broadly political questions remainunanswered but the core of Titmuss's original andchallenging argument remains and can be presented ina defensible form.     

‘Fides mater virtutum est’

Abstract

Peter Martyr Vermigli’s elevation of faith over charity displays similarities and differences with Thomas Aquinas and other medieval authors. For Thomas, faith does not perceive its object and thus denotes an uncertain assent to imperfectly revealed truths. Aquinas posits a reordering of will and intellect in order to explain how faith is more certain than ‘scientia.’ Vermigli on the other hand attempts to maintain the natural order between intellect and will in virtuous action (that is, natural law) even for the theological virtues. He likens faith to vision and practical wisdom arguing that God illuminates the mind to make the object of faith apprehensible to the judgment of reason. This perspective presents a more optimistic account of temporal, intellectual perfection via grace.     

转基因技术安全性的生态伦理浅析

以转基因技术为基础的生物技术是本世纪最具影响力的高新技术产业带。转基因技术在农业、食品、医药、环保等方面有广泛应用,它给人类社会的发展带来巨大的经济效益和社会效益的同时,也存在着潜在危险,即有可能影响生态环境,危害人类健康。本文试图从生态伦理的角度来思考转基因技术的安全性问题。     

儒家传统伦理与现实生活的分化

儒家传统伦理与现实生活的分离已是不争的事实,这既使儒家传统伦理因离开现实生活的支持而显得空乏,又使现实生活因离开传统伦理的规范而零乱失序。对此,必须创建新的道德体系来进行规范引导。新的道德体系应当是现实适应性、合理超越性与世界开放性的内在统一。     

范式转换与道德生活史的研究

伦理学就是一种生活观。伦理思想史的研究需要范式的转换,即由思想史转向道德生活史,研究社会变迁视野中的道德变迁,研究具体历史条件下的社会伦理关系,研究民众层面的日常道德生活。     

政治伦理：“以德治国”的本体定位

德治本体问题是对“以德治国”的形而上追问,我们必须时“政治伦理”作为德治的本体定位进行探究,才能为“以德治国”提供理论资源。     

A New Argument for Pragmatism?

Shah, N. The Philosophical Quarterly, 56, 481–498 (2006) has defended evidentialism on the premise that only it (and not pragmatism) is consistent with both (a) the deliberative constraint on reasons and (b) the transparency feature of belief. I show, however, that the deliberative constraint on reasons is also problematic for evidentialism. I also suggest a way for pragmatism to be construed so as to make it consistent with both (a) and (b) and argue that a similar move is not available to the evidentialist. Thus, far from settling the debate in favour of evidentialism, considerations concerning the deliberative constraint on reasons support pragmatism.