Socratic Persuasion in the Crito

Socrates does not use the Laws' Speech in the Crito principally to persuade Crito to accept his coming execution. It is used instead to persuade Crito to examine and work on his inadequate view of justice. Crito's view of justice fails to coordinate one's duties to friends and those to the law. The Laws' Speech accomplishes this persuasive goal by accompanying Crito’s earlier speech. Both start from the same view of justice, one that Crito accepts, but reach opposing conclusions. Crito cannot judge between the two appealing speeches. His understanding of justice is too confused for him to decide well how to help Socrates. His need to explain what happened the morning he visited Socrates will prompt him and others to examine this indeterminate view of justice. Socrates foregoes direct refutation because Crito will not abide that usual way of interrogation. Engaging in short question-and-answer conversation is not the only way to bring a person to aporia and the intention to examine oneself. Socrates does not here undermine his assertions in the Apology about his ignorance, lack of interest in teaching, constant philosophizing, and his belief that what he does is question, examine, and test those he talks to.     

Divine authority and the virtue of religion: a Thomistic response to Murphy

In his book, An Essay on Divine Authority, Mark Murphy argues that God does not have practical authority over created, rational agents. Although Murphy mentions the possibility of an argument for divine authority from justice, he does not consider any. In this paper, I develop such an argument from Aquinas’s treatment of the virtue of religion and other parts of justice. The divine excellence is due honor, and, as Aquinas argues, honoring a ruler requires service and obedience. Thus, a classical conception of God coupled with some of Aquinas’s theses concerning justice show that God has practical authority over all created, rational agents.

     

John W. Hinckley, Jr.: A Case of Narcissistic Personality Disorder

This article is about John W. Hinckley, Jr., whose attempt to assassinate President Ronald Reagan on March 30, 1981 was unsuccessful and whose trial in 1982 resulted in a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. It focuses on the view of psychiatric experts that he has a narcissistic personality disorder and on the fact that this diagnosis is the primary rationale for his continuing confinement to St. Elizabeth’s Hospital in Washington, D.C. I conclude that the question of his release raises the difficult issue of the possible conflict between justice and care.     

A Meditation on Hell: Lessons from Dante

This essay borrows Dante's inspiration in the Inferno to explore a theology of hell. The usual apologies for hell either bank on a retributive paradigm of justice or are content to have hell introduce a note of tragedy into the history of redemption. The theology that is culled from Dante, and especially from his handling of Virgil's place and authority in hell, is neither retributive in its justice nor tragic in its vision. Dante shows us how to make some sense of the idea that hell is originally a part of the created order and as such expresses divine wisdom, justice, and love.     

Crisis and authority in early modern Ashkenaz

The social and intellectual foundations of medieval Judaism were shaken by a series of developments that included the invention of printing, advances in scientific knowledge, humanism, and the commercial revolution. In early modern Ashkenaz, the ensuing crisis centered on questions of ritual transmission and leadership. Minhagbücher composed in seventeenth-century Worms and Frankfurt urged the preservation and reinstatement of medieval customs relating to synagogue worship and rituals practiced in the home, while in some cases newer customs were also incorporated. However, the writings of Rabbi Ya’ir ?ayyim Bacharach were more far-reaching in response to the crisis of authority, as is evident in his forthright independence in matters of ritual and law. Customs could be considered authentic, in his view, provided they were textually based, were proven to be historically reliable, and enjoyed popular consent. His decision to consult kabbalistic sources—a departure from the resistance Kabbalah had encountered in early modern Ashkenaz—rested in part on the theological appeal of mysticism. Reflecting contemporary political philosophy and jurisprudence, Bacharach’s unequivocal endorsement of lay communal authority hinged on its elected status and on the legitimacy of law founded on principles of equity and justice.     

Knowledge and Power in Plato’s Political Thought

Abstract

Plato justifies the concentration and exercise of power for persons endowed with expertise in political governance. This article argues that this justification takes two distinctly different sets of arguments. The first is what I shall call his ‘ideal political philosophy’ described primarily in the Republic as rule by philosopher‐kings wielding absolute authority over their subjects. Their authority stems solely from their comprehension of justice, from which they make political judgements on behalf of their city‐state. I call the second set of arguments Plato’s ‘practical political philosophy’ underlying his later thought, where absolute rule by philosopher‐kings is undermined by the impure character of all political knowledge. Whereas the complete comprehension of justice sanctions the absolute political power of those with this expertise, partial knowledge of justice disallows for such a large investment of power. Plato’s practical political philosophy argues for a mixed theory of governance fusing the institutions of monarchy with democracy in the best practical city‐state. Thus, Plato comes to realize the insurmountable difficulties of his ideal political thought, preferring a more practical political philosophy instead.     

Rawls, Animals and Justice: New Literature, Same Response

This article seeks to revisit the relationship between Rawls’s contractarianism and the moral status of animals, paying particular attention to the recent literature. Despite Rawls’s own reluctance to include animals as recipients of justice, and my own initial scepticism, a number of scholars have argued that his theory does provide resources that are useful for the animal advocate. The first type takes Rawls’s exclusion of animals from his theory of justice at face value but argues that animals can still be protected within a moral realm independently of justice, or indirectly through the motivations of human contractors. The second type adapts his theory in a way that enables animals to be included within a contractarian theory of justice. It is argued, though, that none of the responses offered is successful in providing a sphere of protection for animals from within Rawls’s contractarian theory. It is doubtful if Rawls’s intention was for animals to receive a significant degree of protection within a moral realm independently of justice, and equally doubtful if the contractors in the original position would be motivated to act on behalf of animals. In the case of the second, whilst Rawlsian resources can be utilised to justify the attempt to amend the veil of ignorance so as to include animals, these are not dependent on a contractural agreement. Similarly, placing emphasis on social-co-operation as a means of incorporating animals into a theory of justice is flawed, not least because, paradoxically, it works for domesticated animals whilst they are being exploited.     

同事公正氛围：构念、测量、效能与展望

以往对公正氛围的探讨主要集中于源自权威的公正氛围上,而对来自同事的公正氛围关注较少。同事公正氛围是指团队成员对团队内同事之间相互对待公正性的共同知觉。本文首先对比总结界定了同事公正氛围的概念,明晰了其结构维度与测量工具,然后着重梳理评价了同事公正氛围的影响效能。未来研究应致力于：加强探讨同事公正氛围的前因变量,探讨同事公正氛围影响效能的内在机制和边界条件,运用纵向设计研究同事公正氛围的形成机制及影响效能,以及探索同事公正氛围研究的本土化。     

Kierkegaard,Repetition and Ethical Constancy

How can a person forge a stable ethical identity over time? On one view, ethical constancy means reapplying the same moral rules. On a rival view, it means continually adapting to one's ethical context in a way that allows one to be recognized as the same practical agent. Focusing on his thinking about repetition, I show how Kierkegaard offers a critical perspective on both these views. From this perspective, neither view can do justice to our vulnerability to certain kinds of crisis, in which our ethical self‐understanding is radically undermined. I further examine his alternative account of ethical constancy, by clarifying Kierkegaard's idea of a ‘second ethics’, as addressed to those who feel ethically powerless and as requiring an ongoing process of self‐transformation.     

National responsibility,global justice and exploitation: a preliminary analysis

This article addresses the problem of filling in a missing component of David Miller's non-cosmopolitan theory of global justice, as elaborated in his recent National responsibility and global justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). Miller originally included non-exploitation as one of the norms of global justice, but he does not provide a theory of exploitation in his recent book. This article is a preliminary attempt to suggest how Miller might fill in this gap. This article identifies the problems Miller faces in coming up with a theory of exploitation, given the limits imposed by the other parts of his theory of global justice. It examines and criticises several possible theories of exploitation that Miller might use. Finally, it argues that a modified version of Hillel Steiner's liberal theory of exploitation fits into Miller's overall theory of global justice.     

再论分配正义——答段忠桥教授

<正>我在《哲学研究》2011年第3期发表《分配正义:从弱势群体的观点看》一文(下引仅注页码),表达了关于分配正义问题的一些观点,特别是提出了分配正义的原则。这篇文章的论证逻辑如下:首先,一种分配只有得到弱势群体的同意,它才能是正义的;其次,分配正义的原则应该把弱势     

A Response to G. Scott Davis

This defense of my essay on Vitoria and Suárez argues that my use of the term “religious war” is based on religious authority at least as much as religious cause, and that Davis’s decision to discuss only Vitoria limits his ability to come to terms with my thesis. To Davis’s argument that for Vitoria war was justified against the Indians only as a necessity of simple justice and to protect the innocent, I argue that his disjunction between simple justice and religious cause is a false one that fails to come to term with the church’s primary reason for approaching Indians, with the Thomistic understanding of the relation between nature and grace and between reason and revelation, and with the distinction between what justice requires in relation to the church and Christians and what it requires for others. I explain finally that my claim is not that the Catholic political rulers readily responded to papal calls for war except when it was in their interest, but that papal war was central to the normative just‐war tradition of the church in canon law and among major theologians like Vitoria and Suárez.     

The aesthetic realism of Mikhail Lifshits: art,history and the communist ideal

The aesthetics of Mikhail Lifshits may be characterised as a quest for pravda (truth/justice) in art. The article discusses his assessment of the fate of art in the communist revolution and his view on revolution through the prism of classical art. Pondering the metaphysical foundations of his realist aesthetics, Lifshits offered a naturalistic version of the theory of reflection based on the contradistinction of “big” and “small” being.     

IMMIGRATION, NATIONALISM, AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Abstract: Michael Walzer and David Miller defend the authority of democratic states to determine who will be allowed entry and membership. In support of this view they have claimed that the domestic solidarity necessary for social justice is threatened by the unregulated influx of outsiders. This empirical thesis proves to be false when applied to the United States, where heavy Latino and Latina immigration is more likely to increase civic solidarity than to diminish it. Seen in this light, the positions of Jürgen Habermas and Carol Gould, giving human rights priority over democratic sovereignty in decisions about membership, cannot be criticized as utopian. Liberal philosophers can also defend open borders as a way to give oppressed peoples representation inside powerful countries where state decisions often threaten access to essential resources and basic freedoms in their home countries.     

Rawlsian Justice and non-Human Animals

ABSTRACT In his book, A Theory of Justice , John Rawls argues against the inclusion of non-human animals within the scope of the principles of justice developed therein. However, the reasons Rawls, and certain commentators, have advanced in support of this view do not adequately support it. Against Rawls' view that 'we are not required to give strict justice' to creatures lacking the capacity for a sense of justice, it is initially argued that (i) de facto inclusion should be accorded non-human animals since their exclusion strains just institutions, and (ii) Rawls' account of the sense of justice has implicit and undefended human chauvinist elements. Two further counter-arguments are then developed in more detail. First, the suggestion that some non-human animals do have a capacity for a sense of justice is explored. Second, the suggestion that the capacity for a sense of justice is unrealised in so many human beings that Rawls' basis for marking out a special place for them is undermined is explored. Attention is next given to Rawls' characterisation of the participants in the original position. It is claimed that there are no good reasons for disallowing the possibility that these individuals turn out to be non-human animals in the real world. If sound, this claim brings non-human animals directly within the scope of Rawlsian principles of justice. The claim is defended against three objections.     

Two Senses of Justice: Confucianism,Rawls, and Comparative Political Philosophy

This paper argues that a comparative study of the idea of a sense of justice in the work of John Rawls and the early Chinese philosopher Kongzi is mutually beneficial to our understanding of the thought of both figures. It also aims to provide an example of the relevance of moral psychology for basic questions in political philosophy. The paper offers an analysis of Rawls’s account of a sense of justice and its place within his theory of justice, focusing on the features of this capacity and how it develops. It then provides an account of the sense of justice in Kongzi’s thought as it is seen in the Analects. Finally, it shows how examining the similarities and differences between the two accounts can deepen our understanding of both views, as well as our appreciation for the importance of understanding how a sense of justice develops.     

On Editing Luther's Writings on Scripture

Much of Martin Luther's prodigious output consisted of exposition and editing Scripture. While a series in English cannot do justice to his greatest achievement, his Bible in German, much can be learned from his prefaces and commentaries, which are selected in volume 6 of The Annotated Luther. Luther's attitude to interpreting Scripture evolved in a constant dialogue with his theology of justification. While he held to the absolute authority of Scripture, his approach was pre‐critical but not uncritical. His exposition constantly balanced the consolation of grace and warnings against complacent trusting in our own works. His relentless emphasis on seeing Christ everywhere in the Bible, praised in past generations, poses problems today insofar as it determined his stance against Judaism.     

"明正以治国":管子行政理念初探

管子“明正以治国”的行政理念中渗透着强烈的民本意识。他相齐四十年一直坚守着“操民之命,朝不可以无政”的信条,并且将政府组织结构的同一性定位在“操民之命”所反映的民众对政府的正当要求上。倘若说管子对“顺民心”的强调是在思虑政府应当如何正当地运用权威的话,那么,管子关于“操民之命,朝不可以无政”的告诫,就是在申明政府权威的必要性。然而,需要引起注意的是,管子对于政府权威结构的设计始终无法消除其高度中央集权、强化政府管制主张的统治色彩。     

Davidson on First-Person Authority

Davidson's explanation of first-person authority in utterance of sentences of the form 'I V that p ' derives first-person authority from the requirements of interpretation of speech. His account is committed to the view that utterance sentences are truth-bearers, that believing that p is a matter of holding true an utterance sentence, and that a speaker's knowledge of what he means gives him knowledge of what belief he expresses by his utterance. These claims are here faulted. His explanation of first-person authority by reference to the requirements of interpretability is committed to the view that all understanding involves interpretation. This is argued to be a misconception of understanding and of speaker's meaning. Davidson's account involves acceptance of the cognitive assumption that normally when a person V s that p , he knows that he does. This assumption is challenged. Throughout, Davidson's conception is compared and contrasted with Wittgenstein's.