Informatics and professional responsibility

Many problems in software development can be traced to a narrow understanding of professional responsibility. The author examines ways in which software developers have tried to avoid accepting responsibility for their work. After cataloguing various types of responsibility avoidance, the author introduces an expanded concept of positive responsibility. It is argued that the adoption of this sense of positive responsibility will reduce many problems in software development. An earlier version of this paper was written for inclusion in S. Rogerson and T. W. Bynum, eds., Computer Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Blackwell, (in press). Prepublished here with permission from the author and the editors.     

European values in bioethics: why,what, and how to be used?

Are there distinctly European values in bioethics, and if there are, what are they? Some Continental philosophers have argued that the principles of dignity, precaution, and solidarity reflect the European ethos better than the liberal concepts of autonomy, harm, and justice. These principles, so the argument goes, elevate prudence over hedonism, communality over individualism, and moral sense over pragmatism. Contrary to what their proponents often believe, however, dignity, precaution, and solidarity can be interpreted in many ways, and it is not clear which reading would, or should, be favored by popular opinion. It is therefore dangerous to think that any one understanding of "European", or any other, values could be legitimately imposed on those who have different ideas about morality in health care and related fields. Bioethical principles should be employed to promote discussion, not to suppress it.     

风险社会的伦理意蕴

“风险社会”已是人类可经验到的事实。风险是一个表明自然终结和传统终结的概念,它是预测和控制人类活动的未来结果,即激进现代化的各种各样、不可预料的后果的现代手段,使一种拓殖未来的企图,一种认识的图谱。。在风险社会,风险是永恒存在的,它只具有有限的可控性,对人类是一个很大的挑战。风险和责任是内在关联的。风险社会赋予了伦理以更加丰富的内涵,加强风险社会的伦理研究,建立风险伦理学,将有利于我们更好地防范风险。     

Biobank research and the right to privacy

What is privacy? What does privacy mean in relation to biobanking, in what way do the participants have an interest in privacy, (why) is there a right to privacy, and how should the privacy issue be regulated when it comes to biobank research? A relational view of privacy is argued for in this article, which takes as its basis a general discussion of several concepts of privacy and attempts at grounding privacy rights. In promoting and protecting the rights that participants in biobank research might have to privacy, it is argued that their interests should be related to the specific context of the provision and reception of health care that participation in biobank research is connected with. Rather than just granting participants an exclusive right to or ownership of their health information, which must be waived in order to make biobank research possible, the privacy aspect of health information should be viewed in light of the moral rights and duties that accompany any involvement in a research based system of health services.     

Human Dignity and the Ethics and Aesthetics of Pain and Suffering

Inasmuch as unmitigated pain and suffering areoften thought to rob human beings of theirdignity, physicians and other care providersincur a special duty to relieve pain andsuffering when they encounter it. When pain andsuffering cannot be controlled it is sometimesthought that human dignity is compromised.Death, it is sometimes argued, would bepreferred to a life without dignity.Reasoning such as this trades on certainpreconceptions of the nature of pain andsuffering, and of their relationships todignity. The purpose of this paper is to laybare these preconceptions. The duties torelieve pain and suffering are clearly mattersof moral obligation, as is the duty to respondappropriately to the dignity of other persons.However, it is argued that our understanding ofthe phenomena of pain and suffering and theirrelationships to human dignity will be expandedwhen we explore the aesthetic dimensions ofthese various concepts. On the view presentedhere the life worth living is both morally goodand aesthetically beautiful. Appropriate``suffering with' another can help to maintainand restore the dignity of the relationshipsinvolved, even as it preserves and enhances thedignity of patient and caregiver alike.     

Contextualizing counterintuitiveness: how context affects comprehension and memorability of counterintuitive concepts

A number of anthropologists have argued that religious concepts are minimally counterintuitive and that this gives them mnemic advantages. This paper addresses the question of why people have the memory architecture that results in such concepts being more memorable than other types of concepts by pointing out the benefits of a memory structure that leads to better recall for minimally counterintuitive concepts and by showing how such benefits emerge in the real-time processing of comprehending narratives such as folk tales. This model suggests that memorability is not an inherent property of a concept; rather it is a property of the concept, the context in which the concept is presented, and the background knowledge that the comprehendor possesses about the concept. The model predicts how memorability of a concept should change if the context containing the concept were changed. The paper also presents the results of experiments carried out to test these predictions.     

Searching for the Ethical: Reply to Commentaries

In replying to the commentaries I challenge the notion that the analyst can remain an apolitical or dehistoricized subject. As relational analysts our work is to keep broadening our reach, and expanding our thinking including addressing the ethical imperatives of our times. I raise the philosophical issue of collective responsibility which deals with moral rather than causal responsibility and the concept of metaphysical guilt, guilt based on who one is rather than what one has done. I also address the need for more innovative forms of writing in psychoanalysis, and my own style of writing in which language attempts to perform the theory. In creating a more narrative driven style of writing I hope that the reader will be able to experience from the inside, rather than solely from a theoretical position, the concepts I am exploring.     

Awareness and authoring: the idea of self in mindfulness and narrative therapy

The author argues that relations between addicts and others are dominated by untruth. Lying is explored with regards to its origin in the primordial desire for love, while it is argued that the addict regards every question posed to them as a question about their lovability. The place of deception in Twelve-Step Fellowship movement is noted and it is also argued that the latter's notion of ‘rock bottom’ can be understood existentially as that place where truth cannot be denied. It is further argued that addiction itself is a form of untruth, which distorts or destroys the ambiguous lived tension of existence. This form of relating leads to the destruction of self-esteem, the development of shame and distrust and the breakdown of relationships. Truth is replaced by false narratives that are individualistic and alienating. Instead of ‘dwelling in truth’, the addict instrumentally alters their moods to suit their own needs. The addict escapes from this position by hitting ‘rock bottom’, accepting the process of truth and by opening up to the other. These notions are relayed through an exploration of phenomenological theorists and a grounded example.     

Role Responsibility

This article is about ‘role responsibility’ as understood by H. L. A. Hart in his taxonomy of responsibility concepts in his book, Punishment and Responsibility. More particularly, it focuses on what I call ‘public, institutional role responsibility’. The main arguments are that (1) such role responsibility is based on authority and power rather than physical and mental capacity; and (2) the foundation of role responsibility in authority has significant implications for what Hart referred to as ‘liability–responsibility’, which I unpack in terms of ‘attribution’, ‘accountability’ and ‘liability’. The article addresses possible objections to the authority-based analysis of role responsibility based on the concept of ‘moral’ responsibility, and on understandings of what types of question are ‘philosophical.’     

Agency, properties and causation

The paper argues against the very commonly held view that whenever a substance may be said to be the cause of something, a fuller and metaphysically more accurate understanding of the situation can always be obtained by looking to the properties in virtue of which that substance was able to bring about the effect in question. Paul Humphreys’ argument that when a substance is said to have produced an effect, it always turns out to be an aspect or property of that substance which brought about the effect in question is examined and criticized; it is argued that it is based on an illegitimate application of Mill’s Methods of Difference and Agreement to the case. Mill’s methods, it is suggested, are methods of empirical, not of ontological enquiry. The paper then turns to examine an argument by Mele which appears to depend on a structurally rather similar assumption that if there is nothing about a subject which could explain why she does one thing rather than another, it cannot really be up to that subject which thing occurs. It is suggested that, too, the inference is faulty, and that once it is rejected, one common objection to libertarianism—the argument from luck—might be more readily met.     

Manipulation and mitigation

Manipulation arguments are commonly deployed to raise problems for compatibilist theories of responsibility. These arguments proceed by asking us to reflect on an agent who has been manipulated to perform some (typically bad) action but who still meets the compatibilist conditions of responsibility. The incompatibilist argues that it is intuitive that the agent in such a case is not responsible even though she met the compatibilist conditions. Thus, it is argued, the compatibilist has not provided conditions sufficient for responsibility. Patrick Todd has recently argued that incompatibilists have taken on a heavier dialectical burden than is necessary. Todd argues that incompatibilists need not argue that an agent in a manipulation case is not at all responsible, but only that her responsibility is mitigated in order to refute compatibilism. Hannah Tierney has responded to Todd’s argument by arguing that a compatibilist can admit that manipulation mitigates responsibility without eliminating it. I argue that Tierney’s response is unsuccessful on its own terms. But, I argue, Todd’s argument can be resisted by way of a parallel counter-argument for compatibilism. I argue that Todd’s argument for incompatibilism is no more powerful than my argument for compatibilism. And since Todd’s manipulation argument is offered as an objection to compatibilism, this amounts to a victory for the compatibilist; the objection is defused.     

Ethics in Long-Term Care: Are the Principles Different?

It has become common in medical ethics to discuss difficult cases in terms of the principles of respect for autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice. These moral concepts or principles serve as maxims that are suggestive of appropriate clinical behavior. Because this language evolved primarily in the acute care setting, I consider whether it is in need of supplementation in order to be useful in the long-term care setting. Through analysis of two typical cases involving residents of long-term care facilities, I argue for the additional principles of candor and responsibility for narrative integrity.     

LYING TO THE NAZI AT THE DOOR

Moral philosophers and theologians have long debated the classic moral dilemma of lying to an intruder in order to save a refugee. This dilemma presents an especially difficult challenge to those who reject consequentialist reasoning. Many contemporary defenders of Thomas Aquinas have argued that lying is never permissible under any circumstances, but none has offered a satisfactory answer to the question of what one ought to do when facing such a dilemma. I argue that there can be no morally satisfying answer to this question, because every possible action will involve some degree of sin, even if lying is the least sinful action. This should not lead us to redefine what it means to tell a lie, nor to say that lying to the intruder is a good or right action; rather, it should lead us to acknowledge the tragic dimension of life in a fallen world.     

Care for one's own future experiences

We care for our own future experiences. Most of us, trivially, would rather have them pleasurable than painful. When we care for our own future experiences we do so in a way that is different from the way we care for those of others (which is not to say that we necessarily care more about our own experience). Prereflectively, one would think this is because these experiences will be ours and no one else's. But then, of course, we need to explain what it means to say that a future experience will be mine and how knowledge of this fact renders it rational for me to care for this experience in a special way. Indeed most philosophers take this route. But in doing so, they quickly stumble on insuperable problems. I shall argue that the problem of egocentric care, as it is sometimes called, can be solved by turning things upside down: it is much more fruitful to think that the special kind of care we feel for some future experiences (and not others) is part of what makes them ours should they occur. This requires an explanation of egocentric care for future experiences that does not draw in a theory of personal identity, but rather contributes to one. I will attempt to provide this explanation by making use of the idea of a diachronic mental holism.     

The Facts and Practices of Moral Responsibility

Strawsonians about moral responsibility often claim that our practices of holding morally responsible fix the facts of moral responsibility, rather than the other way round. Many have argued that such ‘reversal’ claims have an unwelcome consequence: If our practices of holding morally responsible fix the facts of moral responsibility, does this not imply, absurdly, that if we held severely mentally ill people responsible, they would be responsible? We provide a new Strawsonian answer to this question, and we explore the relation between reversal claims and (in)compatibilism.     

Responsibility as Answerability

ABSTRACT

It has recently become fashionable among those who write on questions of moral responsibility to distinguish two different concepts, or senses, of moral responsibility via the labels ‘responsibility as attributability’ and ‘responsibility as accountability’. Gary Watson was perhaps the first to introduce this distinction in his influential 1996 article ‘Two Faces of Responsibility’ (in Agency and Answerability, 260–86. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), but it has since been taken up by many other philosophers. My aim in this study is to raise some questions and doubts about this distinction and to argue that it has led to confusion rather than clarification in debates over moral responsibility. In place of the attributability/accountability distinction, I propose that there is a single (and unified) concept of moral responsibility underlying our actual moral practices. This core notion of moral responsibility, which I call ‘responsibility as answerability’, is well positioned to explain those aspects of our moral practice that Watson associates with the ‘attributability’ face of moral responsibility as well as those aspects of our moral practice he associates with the ‘accountability’ face. But it does so in a way that does not require us to multiply senses of moral responsibility and that allows us to continue to have meaningful disagreements over the basic conditions of moral responsibility.     

Psychodynamic counselling in an educational setting: Containing,transference and clientele

Abstract

The concepts of containing and transference, as well as the specific nature of the clientele, may, on a first approach, be used to differentiate psychodynamic counselling in an educational setting (PES) from the ‘pure gold’ of psychoanalysis. Further, it is argued that a realistic understanding of PES, given the constraints in which it operates, demands that the psychodynamic practitioner be prepared to cut her procedural cloth in accordance with the demands her clients place upon her. This makes PES a pragmatical practice rather than some lesser cousin of ‘orthodox’ psychoanalysis.     

Medical Ethics Research Between Theory and Practice

The main object of criticism of present-day medical ethics is the standard view of the relationship between theory and practice. Medical ethics is more than the application of moral theories and principles, and health care is more than the domain of application of moral theories. Moral theories and principles are necessarily abstract, and therefore fail to take account of the sometimes idiosyncratic reality of clinical work and the actual experiences of practitioners. Suggestions to remedy the illnesses of contemporary medical ethics focus on re-establishing the connection between the internal and external morality of medicine. This article discusses the question how to develop a theoretical perspective on medical ethical issues that connects philosophical reflection with the everyday realities of medical practice. Four steps in a comprehensive approach of medical ethics research are distinguished: (1) examine health care contexts in order to obtain a better understanding of the internal morality of these practices; this requires empirical research; (2) analyze and interpret the external morality governing health care practices; sociological study of prevalent values, norms, and attitudes concerning medical-ethical issues is required; (3) creation of new theoretical perspectives on health care practices; Jensen's theory of healthcare practices will be useful here; (4) develop a new conception of bioethics that illuminates and clarifies the complex interaction between the internal and external morality of health care practices. Hermeneutical ethics can be helpful for integrating the experiences disclosed in the empirical ethical studies, as well as utilizing the insights gained from describing the value-contexts of health care practices. For a critical and normative perspective, hermeneutical ethics has to examine and explain the moral experiences uncovered, in order to understand what they tell us.     

Situationism and the problem of moral improvement

A wealth of research in social psychology indicates that various ethically arbitrary situational factors exert a surprisingly powerful influence on moral conduct. Empirically-minded philosophers have argued over the last two decades that this evidence challenges Aristotelian virtue ethics. John Doris, Gilbert Harman, and Maria Merritt have argued that situationist moral psychology – as opposed to Aristotelian moral psychology – is better suited to the practical aim of helping agents act better. The Aristotelian account, with its emphasis on individual factors, invites too much risk of morally bad conduct insofar as it ignores the power of situational factors which lead us astray. Moral agents are often better off detecting and intervening on situational factors to help themselves act better. This paper offers an argument against the claim that situationism enjoys practical advantages over Aristotelian virtue ethics. There is empirical evidence suggesting that people can improve their behavior via Aristotelian strategies of deliberate self-improvement. This evidence also suggests that focusing our ethical attention on morally trivial factors may result in worse overall conduct. Accordingly, Aristotelianism may fare better than situationism on the practical issue of moral improvement.