Recurrence

Standard compositionality is the doctrine that the semantic content of a compound expression is a function of the semantic contents of the contentful component expressions. In 1954 Hilary Putnam proposed that standard compositionality be replaced by a stricter version according to which even sentences that are synonymously isomorphic (in the sense of Alonzo Church) are not strictly synonymous unless they have the same logical form. On Putnam??s proposal, the semantic content of a compound expression is a function of: (i) the contentful component expressions; and (ii) the expression??s logical form. Kit Fine recently expanded and modified Putnam??s idea into a sweeping theory in philosophy of language and philosophy of mind. The present paper is a detailed critique of Fine??s ??semantic relationism.?? Fine??s notion of coordination is explained in terms of the familiar pragmatic phenomenon of recognition. A serious error in Fine??s formal disproof of standard Millianism is exposed. It is demonstrated furthermore that Church??s original criticism of Putnam??s proposal can be extended to Fine??s semantic relationism. Finally, it is also demonstrated that the positive position Fine proffers to supplant standard Millianism is in fact exactly equivalent to standard Millianism, so that Fine??s overall position not only does not displace standard Millianism but is in fact inconsistent.     

Compound Nominals,Context, and Compositionality

There are good reasons to think natural languages are compositional. But compound nominals (CNs) are largely productive constructions that have proven highly recalcitrant to compositional semantic analysis. I evaluate existing proposals to treat CNs compositionally and argue that they are unsuccessful. I then articulate an alternative proposal according to which CNs contain covert indexicals. Features of the context allow a variety of relations to be expressed using CNs, but this variety is not expressed in the lexicon or the semantic rules of the language. This proposal accounts for the diversity of contents CNs can be used to express while preserving compositionality. Finally, I defend this proposal against some recent anti-contextualist arguments.     

Compositionality and sandbag semantics

It is a common view that radical contextualism about linguistic meaning is incompatible with a compositional explanation of linguistic comprehension. Recently, some philosophers of language have proposed theories of ‘pragmatic’ compositionality challenging this assumption. This paper takes a close look at a prominent proposal of this kind due to François Recanati. The objective is to give a plausible formulation of the view. The major results are threefold. First, a basic distinction that contextualists make between mandatory and optional pragmatic processes needs to be revised. Second, the pragmatic theory can with stand a Davidsonian objection only by rejecting the importance of a distinction between primitive and non-primitive semantic items. Thirdly, however, the theory is now open to a worry about how it should be understood: either the theory consists in a very broad functionalist generalization about communication, which makes it explanatorily inert, or it boils down to a highly particularist view about linguistic meaning. Finally, I argue that Recanati’s notion of ‘occasion meaning’ is problematic and suggest replacing it with the notion of speaker meaning, which is explanatorily more basic.     

The determination of content

I identify a notion of compositionality at the intersection of the different notions philosophers, linguists, and psychologists are concerned with. The notion is compositionality of expression content: the idea that the content of a complex expression in a context of its utterance is determined by its syntactic structure and the contents of its constituents in the contexts of their respective utterances. Traditional arguments from productivity and systematicity cannot establish that the contents of linguistic expressions are compositionally determined in this sense. I present a novel argument for this thesis.     

Semantic word priming in the absence of eye fixations: Relative contributions of overt and covert attention

In the present study, we investigated the role of covert and overt attention in word identification. In repetition and semantic priming paradigms, prime words were followed by a probe for lexical decision. To make the primes available only to covert attention, we presented them for 150 msec, parafoveally (2.2° away from fixation), and under gaze-contingent foveal masking. To make the primes available to overt attention, we presented them for 150 msec, at fixation, with no masking. Results showed both repetition and semantic priming in the absence of eye fixations on the primes: There was facilitation for identical and semantically related probe words, relative to an unrelated prime-probe condition. This revealed that both word form and meaning can be processed by covert attention alone. The pattern of relative contributions of covert (∼~25%) and overt (∼~75%) attention was similar for repetition and semantic priming.     

组合原则

组合原则是逻辑语义学的基本原则,表现为函项的思想和句法与语义的对应。就构造逻辑系统而言,组合原则是一种方法论。作为延伸到自然语言形式语义学的产物,组合原则起到一种核心灵魂的作用。组合原则在理论层面和应用领域皆获得一些有价值的结果。自然语言违反组合原则的实例主要表现为歧义现象、语用因素和句法与语义不对应的情况,这正是调整组合原则的适用条件从而促进形式语义学发展的契机。     

The multidetermined nature of idiom processing

Models of idiom comprehension differ in their predictions concerning compositionality: Some claim that idiomatic meaning is the result of compositional analysis initiated at the earliest stages of comprehension, whereas others claim that compositional analysis occurs only at late stages, subsequent to direct retrieval--especially for idioms that are highly familiar. We evaluated these alternatives in four experiments by using a variety of online and offline comprehension measures. In Experiment 1, we analyzed the normative characteristics of 219 idioms with respect to these predictions. Dimensions of interest included several measures of decomposability, familiarity, and word frequency of the idioms' verbs and nouns. In Experiments 2 through 4, we determined how these dimensions relate to several online measures of idiom comprehension. High familiarity was associated with good comprehension across all experiments; however, facilitative effects of decomposability were found only for tasks that required an overt semantic judgment. Word frequency, but not semantic decomposability of the idiom-initial verb, was associated with comprehension for some measures. These data support a model of idiom comprehension, according to which figurative meaning arises from the time-dependent availability of multiple linguistic constraints, and in which decomposability plays a limited role in the earliest stages of idiom comprehension. Normative data for 210 of the idiomatic phrases may be downloaded from the Psychonomic Society Web archive at www.psychonomic.org/archive/.     

Automatic syntactic computation and use of semantic information during sentence comprehension

Summary The paper represents a contribution to the issue of the differential effects of syntactic, semantic and pragmatic information in the process of sentence comprehension. The results of four experiments are reported, in which sentences containing syntactic, semantic and pragmatic violations were presented with different tasks to see how these violations affected language comprehension, how easily they were detected and whether they affected sentence comprehension even when they were not explicitly recognized. The main results can be summarized as follows. First, the most relevant cues used to comprehend a sentence are not so much syntactic, but semantic or pragmatic. Second, with difficult or anomalous linguistic input, syntactic cues become more important. Third, even when the reader is not aware of syntactic violations, these seem to affect his processing of the linguistic input. This suggests the hypothesis of an automatic computation of syntactic information, the output of which is, however, used only when evidence coming from other sources, semantic or pragmatic, is insufficient or not clear enough.     

Communication and Strong Compositionality

Ordinary semantic compositionality (meaning of whole determined from meanings of parts plus composition) can serve to explain how a hearer manages to assign an appropriate meaning to a new sentence. But it does not serve to explain how the speaker manages to find an appropriate sentence for expressing a new thought. For this we would need a principle of inverse compositionality, by which the expression of a complex content is determined by the expressions of it parts and the mode of composition. But this presupposes that contents have constituent structure, and this cannot be taken for granted. However, it can be proved that if a certain principle of substitutivity is valid for a particular language, then the meanings expressed by its sentences can justifiably be treated as structured. In its simplest form, this principle says that if in a complex expression a constituent is replaced by another constituent with a different meaning, the new complexhas a meaning different from the original. This principle is again inversely related to the normal compositional principle of substitutivity. The combination of ordinary and inverse compositionality is here called strong compositionality. The proof is carried out in the algebraic framework developed by Wilfrid Hodges and Dag Westerståhl.     

Two Ways to Smoke a Cigarette

In the early part of the paper, I attempt to explain a dispute between two parties who endorse the compositionality of language but disagree about its implications: Paul Horwich, and Jerry Fodor and Ernest Lepore. In the remainder of the paper, I challenge the thesis on which they are agreed, that compositionality can be taken for granted. I suggest that it is not clear what compositionality involves nor whether it obtains. I consider some kinds of apparent counterexamples, and compositionalist responses to them in terms of covert indexicality and unspecific meanings. I argue that the last option is the best for most of the cases I consider. I conclude by stressing, as against Horwich and Fodor and Lepore, that the appropriate question concerns the extent to which compositionality obtains in a natural language, rather than whether it obtains or not, so that the answer is essentially messy, requiring detailed consideration of a wide range of examples.     

Development of covert and overt hostility scales from the Buss-Durkee Inventory

The purpose of this study was to develop covert and overt hostility scales from the Buss-Durkee Inventory. First, 22 covert hostility and 29 overt hostility items were identified by the authors. Second, an item analysis was done to assess the content saturation of the individual items on these scales. This analysis yielded the final form for 7 items for covert hostility and 14 for overt hostility. Cronbach alphas for the covert and overt scales were .67 and .77, respectively, and their intercorrelation was .08. Correlations for these Buss-Durkee scales with several existing measures of anger expression were consistent with expectations.     

Linguistic communication and the semantics/pragmatics distinction

Most people working on linguistic meaning or communication assume that semantics and pragmatics are distinct domains, yet there is still little consensus on how the distinction is to be drawn. The position defended in this paper is that the semantics/pragmatics distinction holds between (context-invariant) encoded linguistic meaning and speaker meaning. Two other ‘minimalist’ positions on semantics are explored and found wanting: Kent Bach’s view that there is a narrow semantic notion of context which is responsible for providing semantic values for a small number of indexicals, and Herman Cappelen and Ernie Lepore’s view that semantics includes the provision of values for all indexicals, even though these depend on the speaker’s communicative intentions. Finally, some implications are considered for the favoured semantics/pragmatics distinction of the fact that there are linguistic elements (lexical and syntactic) which do not contribute to truth-conditional content but rather provide guidance on pragmatic inference.     

Processing of unattended emotional visual scenes

Prime pictures of emotional scenes appeared in parafoveal vision, followed by probe pictures either congruent or incongruent in affective valence. Participants responded whether the probe was pleasant or unpleasant (or whether it portrayed people or animals). Shorter latencies for congruent than for incongruent prime-probe pairs revealed affective priming. This occurred even when visual attention was focused on a concurrent verbal task and when foveal gaze-contingent masking prevented overt attention to the primes but only if these had been preexposed and appeared in the left visual field. The preexposure and laterality patterns were different for affective priming and semantic category priming. Affective priming was independent of the nature of the task (i.e., affective or category judgment), whereas semantic priming was not. The authors conclude that affective processing occurs without overt attention--although it is dependent on resources available for covert attention--and that prior experience of the stimulus is required and right-hemisphere dominance is involved.     

Forward inference in risky choice: Mapping gaze and decision processes

The study of cognitive processes is built on a close mapping between three components: overt gaze behavior, overt choice, and covert processes. To validate this overt–covert mapping in the domain of decision‐making, we collected eye‐movement data during decisions between risky gamble problems. Applying a forward inference paradigm, participants were instructed to use specific decision strategies to solve those gamble problems (maximizing expected values or applying different choice heuristics) during which gaze behavior was recorded. We revealed differences between overt behavior, as indicated by eye movements, and covert decision processes, instructed by the experimenter. However, our results show that the overt–covert mapping is for some eye‐movement measures not as close as expected by current decision theory, and hence question reverse inference as being prone to fallacies due to a violation of its prerequisite, that is, a close overt–covert mapping. We propose a framework to rehabilitate reverse inference.     

What happens between an external stimulus and an overt response?

Peripheral components of feedthrough loops were psychophysiologically measured from the brain, both forelimbs, the tongue and the eyes during simple and choice reaction time tasks using linguistic and non-linguistic stimuli. Closing a microswitch with the little finger was the overt response. Covert electromyographic (EMG) responses were computer identified in the following average temporal order: generally, the earliest covert reactions were in the tongue, brain, eyes, and passive arm-hand region. Next were complex EMG events in the active limb. These covert reactions may function in feedthrough loops to generate and transmit codes during internal information processing. The passive armhand responses occurred significantly earlier than the onset of the covert EMG burst for closing the microswitch; perhaps there is an inhibitory response “commanding” the passive arm not to respond, before the other (active) limb can overtly respond. Mean response patterns to linguistic and non-linguistic stimuli were almost identical. Reaction time to the onset of the EMG burst for switch closing was from 40 to 95 milliseconds earlier than the usual overt reaction time measure (that to switch closing), suggesting that reaction time studies might be improved by using the onset of EMG increase as the more sensitive and precise measure.     

Processing idiomatic expressions: effects of semantic compositionality

Three experiments tested the main claims of the idiom decomposition hypothesis: People have clear intuitions on the semantic compositionality of idiomatic expressions, which determines the syntactic behavior of these expressions and how they are recognized. Experiment 1 showed that intuitions are clear only for a very restricted number of expressions, but for the majority of idioms, they are not consistent across speakers. Experiment 2 failed to support the claim that semantic compositionality influences the syntactic flexibility of idioms. Finally, Experiment 3 showed that idioms are more quickly recognized than their literal counterparts, regardless of compositionality and syntactic flexibility. All of the findings were at odds with the tenets of the idiom decomposition hypothesis. The theoretical implications of the results with respect to idiom processing and the notion of compositionality are discussed.     

Can Compositionality Solve the Thought-or-Language Problem?

Abstract

Jerry Fodor has claimed to have a solution to the traditional problem of what comes first, thought or language. Compositionality, he says, will give us the answer, for at least one must be compositional, and if only one of them is, that is the one that has underived semantic content. He argues that natural languages are not compositional, and therefore that the content of language is derived from the content of thought. I will argue that the idea that language is not compositional conflicts with his productivity and systematicity arguments for the existence of a language of thought. I will also show that Fodor’s solution to the problem fails, as his main argument is circular. Finally, I suggest that Fodor’s argument against the compositionality of language is not decisive, and that we can still attribute at least some degree of compositionality to language.     

The Structure of Content is Not Transparent

Sentences in context have semantic contents determined by a range of factors both internal and external to speakers. I argue against the thesis that semantic content is transparent to speakers in the sense of being immediately accessible to speakers in virtue of their linguistic competence.

     

Compositionality and the Prospect of a Pluralistic Semantic Theory

A semantic theory is committed to semantic monism just in case every particular semantic property posited by the theory is a member of the same kind. The commitment to semantic monism appears to draw some support from the need to provide a compositional semantics, since taking a single kind of semantic property as key to a semantic theory affords a uniform pattern on the basis of which the meaning of any given sentence can be compositionally determined. This line of support highlights a tension between the principle of compositionality and taking a more pluralistic approach to semantic theorizing. In this essay, that tension is relieved, leaving open the prospect of a pluralistic semantic theory that observes the principle of compositionality.     

Grammatical Morphemes and Conceptual Structure in Discourse Processing

The present paper analyzes how the semantic and pragmatic functions of closed class categories, or grammatical morphemes (i.e., inflections and function words), organize discourse processing. Grammatical morphemes tend to express a small set of conceptual distinctions that organize a wide range of objects and relations, usually expressed by content or open class words (i.e., nouns and verbs), into situations anchored to a discourse context. Therefore, grammatical morphemes and content words cooperate in guiding the construction of a situation model during discourse comprehension by specifying complementary aspects of described situations. The paper reviews and extends analytical and empirical evidence for this grammatical-conceptual correspondence, and suggests that the correspondence developed in response to the cognitive demands of discourse processing. Thus the distinction between open and closed linguistic categories is interpreted in terms of a fundamental correspondence between conceptual and linguistic structure that helps organize discourse processing.