国内外药品不合理使用的类型、程度及原因分析

不合理用药是在全世界所有国家都存在的问题,已经日益引起各国关注,导致不合理用药主要原因是药品供需双方面的.本文通过文献分析,综述了国内外合理用药促进措施以及目前开展的关于不合理用药的研究,从供需双方分析了不合理用药的类型,程度以及其影响因素.     

国内外药品不合理使用的类型、程度及原因分析

不合理用药是在全世界所有国家都存在的问题,已经日益引起各国关注,导致不合理用药主要原因是药品供需双方面的。本文通过文献分析,综述了国内外合理用药促进措施以及目前开展的关于不合理用药的研究,从供需双方分析了不合理用药的类型,程度以及其影响因素。     

Mellor and Dennett on the Perception of Temporal Order

I discuss theories about the way in which we determine the precedence ofperceived events. I examine Mellor's account, which claims that it is thetiming of our perceptions of events that enables us to determine their order,and Dennett's criticism of this. Dennett cites psychological experimentswhich suggest that it is the content of our perceptions, rather than theirtiming, which allows us to determine the order of the events perceived. Iargue that by distinguishing between two different ways of construing'perception' we can see not only that the two accounts are compatible, but that Dennett's account presupposes Mellor's.     

Chances, Individuals and Toxic Torts

We currently live in a world of silent risks caused by invisible agents acting through mechanisms poorly understood. It is not surprising that the resulting harms have led to litigation. Playing a visible role in all these cases is the 'causation problem'; plaintiffs face sometimes insurmountable hurdles in providing evidence for causation. However, the fact that mechanisms are hidden does not mean that one cannot have reliable evidence and information about them.
In this paper I argue that the law has taken an ill-founded, skeptical stance towards statistical evidence for causation in toxic tort cases, making the task of plaintiffs unjustly difficult. I address two frequently cited skeptical claims about statistical evidence and argue that they are unfounded as applied in tort law. I conclude that the skeptical stance results from a failure to distinguish physical chances from epistemic probabilities, and that such a distinction is necessary if plaintiffs are to have a chance of prevailing.     

Transition Chances and Causation

Abstract: The general claims of this paper are as follows. As a result of chaotic dynamics we can usually not know what the deterministic causes of events are. There will, however, be invariant forwards transition chances from earlier types of events, which we typically call the causes, to later types of events, which we typically call the effects. There will be no invariant backwards transition chances between these types of events. This asymmetry has the same origin and explanation as the arrow of time of thermodynamics.     

When Equal Chances = Good Chances: Verbal Probabilities and the Equiprobability Effect

When six equally qualified candidates compete for the same position, p = 1/6 for each. People seem to accept this principle more readily for numerical than for verbal probabilities. Equal chances with three to six alternatives are often verbally described in a positive vein as "entirely possible" or "a good chance" and rarely negatively as "doubtful" or "improbable." This equiprobability effect of verbal probabilities is demonstrated in five studies describing job applicants, lottery players, competing athletes, and examination candidates. The equiprobability effect is consistent with a causal (propensity) view of probabilities, where chances are believed to reflect the relative strength of facilitating and preventive causes. If important conditions in support of the target outcome are present (the candidate is qualified for the position), and there is little to prevent it from occurring (no stronger candidates), chances appear to be good. In the presence of obstacles (one stronger candidate), or in the absence of facilitating conditions (the candidate is poorly qualified), chances appear to be poor, even when numerical p values remain constant. The findings indicate that verbal and numerical probability estimates can reflect different intuitions. Copyright 2001 Academic Press.     

Akrasia, Dispositions And Degrees

It is argued that the recent revival of theakrasia problem in the philosophy of mind is adirect, albeit unforeseen result of the debate onaction explanation in the philosophy of science. Asolution of the problem is put forward that takesaccount of the intimate links between the problem ofakrasia and this debate. This solution is basedon the idea that beliefs and desires have degrees ofstrength, and it suggests a way of giving a precisemeaning to that idea. Finally, it is pointed out thatthe solution captures certain intuitions of bothSocrates and Aristotle.     

Kripke Models,Distributive Lattices,and Medvedev Degrees

We define a variant of the standard Kripke semantics for intuitionistic logic, motivated by the connection between constructive logic and the Medvedev lattice. We show that while the new semantics is still complete, it gives a simple and direct correspondence between Kripke models and algebraic structures such as factors of the Medvedev lattice. Presented by Daniele Mundici     

Estimating Conditional Chances and Evaluating Counterfactuals

The paper addresses a puzzle about the probabilistic evaluation of counterfactuals, raised by Ernest Adams as a problem for his own theory. I discuss Brian Skyrms’s response to the puzzle. I compare this puzzle with other puzzles about counterfactuals that have arisen more recently. And I attempt to solve the puzzle in a way that is consistent with Adams’s proposal about counterfactuals.     

Manipulation and Degrees of Blameworthiness

We propose an original response to Derk Pereboom’s four-case manipulation argument. This response combines a hard-line and a soft-line. Like hard-liners, we insist that the manipulated agent is blameworthy for his wrongdoing. However, like soft-liners, we maintain that there is a difference in blameworthiness between the manipulated agent and the non-manipulated one. The former is less blameworthy than the latter. This difference is due to the fact that it is more difficult for the manipulated agent to do the right thing. We explain how we can make sense of this notion of difficulty in terms of Fischer and Ravizza’s notion of reasons-responsiveness.