How should citizens’ collective liability for state action be grounded?

This paper assesses one type of justification for collective liability – the democratic authorization account – according to which citizens can be held liable for what their state does, because they collectively authorize the state’s actions. I argue that the democratic authorization view, properly understood, has an implausibly narrow scope, which risks leaving many victims of injustice without compensation. Hence, I propose a subsidiary account that is wider in scope, and which applies to most cases of state-inflicted harm. This view picks out liable agents on the basis of (a) their ability to bear the compensatory burdens, (b) the incentives that the prospect of liability give citizens to hold their states in check, and (c) distributive concerns. Lastly, I address the relationship between citizens who are (merely) collectively liable for some harm, and citizens who are to some extent morally responsible (for instance in virtue of having endorsed the state-inflicted harm).     

Deliberative Democracy and Emotional Intelligence: An Internal Mechanism to Regulate the Emotions

Deliberative democracy, it is claimed, is essential for the legitimisation of public policy and law. It is built upon an assumption that citizens will be capable of constructing and defending reasons for their moral and political beliefs. However, critics of deliberative democracy suggest that citizens?? emotions are not properly considered in this process and, if left unconsidered, present a serious problem for this political framework. In response to this, deliberative theorists have increasingly begun to incorporate the emotions into their accounts. However, these accounts have tended to focus only upon the inclusion of emotions in the external-collective exchange of reason between citizens. Little work has been done on how the individual will actually cope with emotions internally within their own minds. There has been no consideration of the capacities that citizens will need to perceive, understand and regulate emotions as they formulate reasons both by themselves and with others. Moreover, there has been little consideration of how these capacities might be educated in children so that emotionally competent deliberative citizens can be created. In this paper, emotional intelligence is presented as an essential capacity that can fulfil this role for the deliberative citizen and deliberative democracy more generally. The ??deliberative school?? is suggested as a potential site for this transformation that can progress from generation to generation, cultivating citizens that are increasingly better equipped to handle emotionally-laden deliberative engagement.     

Reexamining the Calculus of Voting

This study applies social cognitive theory to the study of voter turnout, examining the effects of self‐efficacy on citizens' decisions of whether or not to vote. Consistent with recent arguments in cognitive psychology ( Fenton‐O'Creevy, Nicholson, Soane, & Willman, 2003, 2005 ), I argue that excessive perceptions of self‐efficacy lead some citizens to overestimate their vote's impact in close elections and to vote as a consequence of these perceptions. This illusion of control is further engendered by the features of skill‐based activities such as choice, personal involvement, stimulus familiarity, and exertion of effort ( Langer, 1975 ) that are inherent in the act of voting. Employing both cross‐sectional and panel data, I find that individuals with high levels of self‐efficacy are more likely to be moved to vote by perceptions that an election will be close than are citizens with low levels of self‐efficacy.     

Trust,Respect, and the Psychology of Political Engagement1

Local community involvement has long been regarded as central to citizens’ participation in the political process because it is believed to create attitudes of generalized trust that encourage citizens to become involved in governance. Recently Putnam (1995a) has argued that declining opportunities for community involvement have led to decreased trust in others, and this contributes to declining rates of voting in elections. This paper directly tests the validity of Putnam's argument. It shows that civic participation is related to political participation, but only through the mediating mechanism of generalized trust. The paper further examines why citizens participate in their communities. It finds that people participate more in their communities when they feel that they are respected members of those communities. Implications for psychological theory and political mobilization are discussed.     

Applications of rational-emotive therapy (RET) to love problems

Rational-emotive therapy (RET) can be particularly applied to individuals with serious love problems, such as people possessed by super-romantic love, limerents who are mired in obsessive-compulsive feelings, insensately jealous and possessive lovers, people who needlessly interfere with their encountering suitable partners, and those who suffer anguish and depression when they lose love. It also has important things to teach about keeping alive and enhancing normal love feelings. This paper outlines the RET theory of love and applies it to various amative difficulties.This article is to appear as a chapter inClinical applications of Rational-Emotive Therapy, edited by Albert Ellis and Michael Bernard, New York: Plenum, 1985.     

Evidence for mixed feelings of happiness and sadness from brief moments in time

Theorists disagree about whether valence is a basic building block of affective experience or whether the positive and negative substrates underlying valence are separable in experience. If positivity and negativity are separable in experience, people should be able to feel happy and sad at the same time. We addressed limitations of earlier evidence for mixed feelings by collecting moment-to-moment measures of happiness and sadness that required participants to monitor their feelings only occasionally. In Study 1, participants were occasionally cued to press one button if they felt happy and another if they felt sad. Participants spent more time reporting mixed feelings (i.e., simultaneously pressing both buttons) during bittersweet scenes than non-bittersweet scenes. In Study 2, participants reported their feelings only once. Participants spent more time reporting mixed feelings when cued during a bittersweet, as opposed to non-bittersweet, scene. These results extend earlier evidence that happiness and sadness can co-occur.     

Rawls’s Principle of Justice as Fairness and Its Application to the Issue of Same-Sex Marriage

Abstract

This essay applies the principle of justice as fairness to the issue of same-sex marriage. I will outline Rawls’s theory of justice, including the original position and the veil of ignorance as the means by which choosers craft a just state. In considering whether same-sex marriage should be permissible, I argue that a just society, formulated in the Rawlsian context of justice as fairness, should allow them. I assert that gays and lesbians do count as equal citizens because they possess the minimum requirements of the capacity for a sense of justice, a conception of the good, and the ability to be cooperating members of society. Furthermore, within the original position gays and lesbians will be represented because choosers do not know their sexual orientation because it is one of the individual characteristics that are withheld behind the veil. Since the choosers do not know their sexual orientation, they will be unable to use that information in their construction of what counts as a just state comprised of free and equal citizens. Because the family, and the institution of marriage as a primary manifestation of the family, is one of the major social institutions within the basic structure, limitations must be carefully scrutinized.     

“Here we're all in the same boat” – a qualitative study of group based rehabilitation for sick‐listed citizens with chronic pain

Musculoskeletal pain impacts upon everyday life. A degree of chronicity may pose an increased risk of sickness absence. One of two rehabilitative interventions, “Tailored Physical Activity” or “Chronic Pain Self‐Management Program”, was offered to sick‐listed citizens who experienced pain. The objectives of this paper were to: (1) Assess what factors are experienced as problematic for sick‐listed citizens in everyday life with chronic pain, and (2) Evaluate the significance of two distinct rehabilitative interventions on the future everyday lives of sick‐listed citizens. Seven semi‐structured interviews with sick‐listed citizens were analyzed using a phenomenological‐hermeneutical approach. Results were discussed by applying the theoretical framework of Antonovsky's salutogenetic model and Yaloms principles for group psychology. The potential for development of citizen's coping is evaluated based on Roessler's notion of progression. The analysis revealed four main themes: (1) Living with pain and unemployment; (2) “Putting my foot down” and “asking for help”; (3) Significance of the group, including instructors, and; (4) Aspects significant to progression. Unemployment is a major life event that promotes stress and can be accompanied by problems related to depressed mood, acceptance of the life situation, feelings of not being useful, feelings of losing control and identity conflicts. Group characteristics that gave a significant basis for progression in the self‐management program are both emotional and instrumental, while the physical training program offers a “here‐and‐now”‐experience and motivation to participate. This study indicates that the self‐management program could potentially improve coping while the physical activity program revealed one example of a means of progression.     

What Peeping Tom Did Wrong

Voyeurism seems creepy. This paper considers whether these feelings are well-founded. It identifies a variety of ethically troubling features, including harmful consequences, deceit, and the violation of various religious, legal, and conventional norms. Voyeurism is something of a moral misdemeanor that seems worrisome when associated with these other failings. However, because voyeurism remains troubling even in the absence of harm or deceit, we must pay special attention to the ways complex social conventions can be used to show disrespect for others. The discussion centers on the famous case of Lady Godiva and Peeping Tom, but much of the analysis applies to voyeurism more generally.     

National Identity and Attitude Toward Foreigners in a Multinational State: A Replication

An analysis of the 1995 Belgian General Election Survey indicates that the bipolar national identity variable, which contrasts citizens who identify exclusively with the Belgian nation with those who identify exclusively with the Flemish or Walloon subnation, measures not only the direction but also the intensity of national feelings. Respondents who are located at the middle of the scale tend to have a weak identification with both the nation and the subnation. On the basis of a structural equations modeling approach involving a test of the construct equivalence in the two regions and a control for agreeing-response bias, it is shown that the bipolar national identity variable and attitude toward foreigners are inversely related in Flanders and Wallonia. In Flanders, citizens with a strong subnational identification tend to have a negative attitude toward foreigners; those with a strong Belgian identification are more positive. This relationship became more pronounced after controlling for the respondents' level of education. In Wallonia, a reverse but less pronounced relationship was found. These findings support the hypothesis that the relationship between the variables of national identity and attitude toward foreigners is not intrinsic, but is at least partly determined by the social representation of the nation.     

Vulnerability of Individuals With Mental Disorders to Epistemic Injustice in Both Clinical and Social Domains

Many individuals who have mental disorders often report negative experiences of a distinctively epistemic sort, such as not being listened to, not being taken seriously, or not being considered credible because of their psychiatric conditions. In an attempt to articulate and interpret these reports we present Fricker’s concepts of epistemic injustice (Fricker, 2007, p. 1) and then focus on testimonial injustice and hermeneutic injustice as it applies to individuals with mental disorders. The clinical impact of these concepts on quality of care is discussed. Within the clinical domain, we contrast epistemic injustice with epistemic privilege and authority. We then argue that testimonial and hermeneutic injustices also affect individuals with mental disorders not only when communicating with their caregivers but also in the social context as they attempt to reintegrate into the general society and assume responsibilities as productive citizens. Following the trend of the movement of mental health care to the community, the testimonies of people with mental disorders should not be restricted to issues involving their own personal mental states.     

Political Authority,Practical Identity,and Binding Citizens

Abstract

Allen Buchanan (2002) argues that it doesn’t matter whether a state has authority in the sense of being able to create binding obligations for its citizens, so long as it is morally justified in wielding political power. In this paper, I look at this issue from a slightly different angle. I argue that it matters a great deal whether citizens relate to their state in an obligatory fashion. This is for two reasons. First, a fully morally justified state must be an efficacious state; it must be able to realise its values and make its rules stick. My contention will be that enduring stability can only be secured when citizens, or at least a significant proportion of citizens, are tangibly bound to regulate their conduct in accordance with a principle of obedience to just states. Second, it is only when individuals interact in the right way with the justification for state power that the state itself as a pervasive and coercive entity does not pose a problem for them as reason-responsive agents. In fact, under the right circumstances, submission to state authority can greatly enhance autonomy as it facilitates collective responses to challenges that individuals would struggle to overcome alone.     

The Motive of Society: Aristotle on Civic Friendship, Justice, and Concord

My aim in this paper is to demonstrate the relevance of the Aristotelian notion of civic friendship to contemporary political discussion by arguing that it can function as a social good. Contrary to some dominant interpretations of the ancient conception of friendship according to which it can only be understood as an obligatory reciprocity, I argue that friendship between fellow citizens is important because it contributes to the unity of both state and community by transmitting feelings of intimacy and solidarity. In that sense, it can be understood as an important relationship predicated on affection and generosity, virtues lacking from both contemporary politics and society that seem to be merely dominated by Post-Enlightenment ideals. For Aristotle, friendship is important for society because it generates concord, articulating thus a basis for social unity and political agreement.     

Reasons for Entering Treatment Reported by Initially Treatment-Resistant Patients with Substance Use Disorders

Many individuals with substance use disorders are resistant to entering formal treatment, despite the negative consequences that plague their own lives and the lives of concerned significant others (CSOs). Community Reinforcement and Family Training (CRAFT) has been developed as an effective strategy for helping family members who are concerned about the alcohol/drug use of a loved one who refuses to seek treatment. The present study explored reasons and feelings that played a part in these resistant individuals' (identified patients [IPs]) decision to begin treatment. Written statements and feelings of 36 initially treatment-refusing IPs, who were engaged into treatment via their CRAFT-trained CSOs, were examined upon entering treatment. Self-report forms assessed three complementary domains about entering treatment: (1) feelings about coming for treatment, (2) important reasons for entering treatment, and (3) reasons for entering treatment narratives. It was shown that the occurrences of self-reported positive emotions and statements that expressed a positive wish for change outweighed negative feelings and statements. Although conceivably these CRAFT-exposed IPs may have provided different responses than other treatment-seeking populations, the current study's strong IP reports of positive feelings, reasons, and narrative statements regarding treatment entry nonetheless address potential concerns that treatment-refusing IPs might only enter treatment if felt coerced by family members and while experiencing salient negative feelings overall.     

National Security,Self-rule,and Democratic Action

Most discussions of the relationship between liberty and security focus on the idea that enhancing citizens’ security may require imposing constraints on their civil liberties (e.g., freedom of association, of movement, of communication, and so on). This paper explores the question of how measures to enhance security stand vis à vis the idea of political liberty, i.e. the idea of citizens’ collectively directing the power of their state. It distinguishes two models whereby citizens might enact that ideal of self-rule and argues that with respect to issues of national security, the less direct model, which entrusts political agents to make decisions beyond direct democratic input, will often be more appropriate. It argues as well that various practices often seen as fundamentally at odds with the ideal of rule by the people (e.g., government deception, lack of transparency, covert action) are in fact consistent with a reasonable construal of that ideal. It concludes by outlining various criteria that would have to be met for such practices to be morally permissible in democratic states.

     

THE CONCEPT OF OBJECTIVE COUNTERTRANSFERENCE AND ITS ROLE IN A TWO-PERSON PSYCHOLOGY

Objective countertransference comprises those feelings the analyst experiences with the patient that are repetitions of feelings from the patient's life outside the analysis. It is viewed as being induced by the patient and is understood in the context of the patient's life, not the analyst's. The concept is used to understand the relationship of some of the analyst's feelings to recurrent interpersonal patterns in the patient's life. It has often been viewed as being incompatible with a two-person psychology. Here, in contrast, it is argued that objective countertransference is only one current within the analyst's total emotional response to the patient, and that it should be conceptualized as a component of a broader two-person psychology. However, the use of objective countertransference as a conceptual tool highlights aspects of the analytic relationship that differ from those emphasized in current two-person models. A case example is analyzed from both perspectives to illustrate their similarities and differences. Although the concept of objective countertransference can enrich the analyst's understanding of certain dimensions of the analytic relationship, it is not a theory of technique and it is not wedded to any particular style of psychoanalytic intervention.     

Making Attentive Citizens: The Ethics of Democratic Engagement,Political Equality,and Social Justice

Much discussion of the ethics of participation focuses on electoral participation and whether citizens are obligated or can be coerced to vote. Yet these debates have ignored that citizens must first pay attention to politics and make up their minds about where they stand before they can engage in any form of participation. This article considers the importance for liberal democracy of citizens paying attention to politics, or attentive citizenship. It argues that the democratic state has an obligation to cultivate interest in politics and that this obligation authorizes means up to and including some forms of coercion. The argument is that when citizens are inattentive to politics, it undermines political equality and social justice because it undermines what John Rawls called the fair value of the political liberties. The importance of these ends for liberal democratic states requires them to take steps to promote attentive citizenship.     

Should I follow my feelings? How individual differences in following feelings influence affective well-being,experience, and responsiveness

Individuals high in the propensity to follow their feelings notice their feelings and use the information provided by their feelings. We investigate the hypothesis that following feelings is a multidimensional, rather than a unidimensional, construct. We reasoned that people follow their positive feelings because these feelings signal the presence of rewards that should be approached and follow their negative feelings because these feelings signal the presence of threats that should be avoided. Because approach and avoidance stem from independent motivational systems, we hypothesized and found that following positive feelings and following negative feelings are separable dimensions. In part 1, we developed a measure, called the Following Affective States Test (FAST), to assess these dimensions and provided psychometric data supporting its adequacy. In part 2, we continued to validate the scale and found that this new conceptualization clarifies the debate concerning whether following feelings is psychologically beneficial. In part 3, we tested the utility of the FAST by demonstrating that it predicts the degree to which individuals notice, react to, and use positive and negative affective information.     

The Case of Guest Workers: Exploitation,Citizenship and Economic Rights

Working from a ``capitalist' theory of exploitation, based on a neo-classical account of economic value, I argue that guest workers are exploited. It may be objected, however, that since they are not citizens, any inequality that stems from their status as non-citizens is morally unobjectionable. Although host countries are under no moral obligation to admit guest workers as citizens, thereare independent reasons that call for the extension of economicrights – the freedom of occupation in particular – to guestworkers. Since the cause of unequal exchange rests in the factthat guest workers are deprived of these rights, rather than in their exclusion from citizenship per se, I concludethat they are exploited even if their exclusion from citizenshipmay be justified.