Semantic analysis of natural kind terms

This paper develops a model theoretic semantics for so called natural kind terms that reflects the viewpoint of (Kripke, 1980) and (Putnam, 1975). The semantics generates a formal counterpart of the K-mechanism investigated in (Salmon, 1981) and in unpublished work by Keith Donnellan.I would like to thank David Anderson, Bernard Linsky, Hilary Putnam, Nathan Salmon, Edward Zalta, and the participants of the 1992 SEP conference for much helpful discussion and encouragement regarding the project of this paper.     

The Port-Royal semantics of terms

Conclusion It is tempting to say from the contemporary point of view that thePort-Royal Logic is full of confusions as well as insights. I have focused on several of these confusions and their relations, in particular the confusions between complex idea and proposition, between proposition and judgment, and especially between name and predicate. In particular I have tried to emphasize the instability of the Port-Royal semantics — the ways in which their theory of terms vacillates between earlier views and something closer to a modern analysis. It may, however, be more profitable to regard this work as incorporating several logics, and to view the confusions as the inevitable results of the dynamical tensions among these different views.     

Against natural kind eliminativism

Synthese - It has recently been argued that the concept of natural kinds should be eliminated because it does not play a productive theoretical role and even harms philosophical research on...     

Free actions as a natural kind

Synthese - Do we have free will? Understanding free will as the ability to act freely, and free actions as exercises of this ability, I maintain that the default answer to this question is...     

Innateness as a natural cognitive kind

Innate cognitive capacities are widely posited in cognitive science, yet both philosophers and scientists have criticized the concept of innateness as being hopelessly confused. Despite a number of recent attempts to define or characterize innateness, critics have charged that it is associated with a diverse set of properties and encourages unwarranted inferences among properties that are frequently unrelated. This criticism can be countered by showing that the properties associated with innateness cluster together in reliable ways, at least in the context of the study of cognition (though perhaps not in other scientific domains). Even though the causal connections between these cognitive properties are not always strict, they are robust enough to warrant considering innateness to be a natural kind as used in contemporary cognitive science.