判断预测的心理偏差及产生机制

心理学对判断预测的研究主要关注预测的偏差及产生机制。判断预测中的偏差有两类：偏见和不一致。偏见主要表现：趋势阻尼;提高效应;给预测结果增加随机噪音。不一致包括：信息获得导致的不一致;信息加工导致的不一致。偏差的出现一是与信息加工过程有关,二是与序列的特征与呈现方式有关。研究发现提供反馈、分解、组合和建议采纳等策略可以增进判断预测的准确性。     

Taking perspective in conversation: the role of mutual knowledge in comprehension

When people interpret language, they can reduce the ambiguity of linguistic expressions by using information about perspective: the speaker's, their own, or a shared perspective. In order to investigate the mental processes that underlie such perspective taking, we tracked people's eye movements while they were following instructions to manipulate objects. The eye fixation data in two experiments demonstrate that people do not restrict the search for referents to mutually known objects. Eye movements indicated that addressees considered objects as potential referents even when the speaker could not see those objects, requiring addressees to use mutual knowledge to correct their interpretation. Thus, people occasionally use an egocentric heuristic when they comprehend. We argue that this egocentric heuristic is successful in reducing ambiguity, though it could lead to a systematic error.     

The Projective Way of Knowing: A Useful Heuristic That Sometimes Misleads

For many purposes, people need a reasonably good idea of what other people know. This article presents an argument and considers evidence that people use their own knowledge as a basis for developing models of what specific other people know in particular, that they tend to assume that other people know what they know. This is a generally useful heuristic, but the assumption is often made uncritically, with the consequence that people end up assuming that others have knowledge that they do not have.     

Adaptive Anchoring Model: How Static and Dynamic Presentations of Time Series Influence Judgments and Predictions

When attempting to predict future events, people commonly rely on historical data. One psychological characteristic of judgmental forecasting of time series, established by research, is that when people make forecasts from series, they tend to underestimate future values for upward trends and overestimate them for downward ones, so‐called trend‐damping (modeled by anchoring on, and insufficient adjustment from, the average of recent time series values). Events in a time series can be experienced sequentially (dynamic mode), or they can also be retrospectively viewed simultaneously (static mode), not experienced individually in real time. In one experiment, we studied the influence of presentation mode (dynamic and static) on two sorts of judgment: (a) predictions of the next event (forecast) and (b) estimation of the average value of all the events in the presented series (average estimation). Participants' responses in dynamic mode were anchored on more recent events than in static mode for all types of judgment but with different consequences; hence, dynamic presentation improved prediction accuracy, but not estimation. These results are not anticipated by existing theoretical accounts; we develop and present an agent‐based model—the adaptive anchoring model (ADAM)—to account for the difference between processing sequences of dynamically and statically presented stimuli (visually presented data). ADAM captures how variation in presentation mode produces variation in responses (and the accuracy of these responses) in both forecasting and judgment tasks. ADAM's model predictions for the forecasting and judgment tasks fit better with the response data than a linear‐regression time series model. Moreover, ADAM outperformed autoregressive‐integrated‐moving‐average (ARIMA) and exponential‐smoothing models, while neither of these models accounts for people's responses on the average estimation task.     

Judgmental forecasting of univariate time series

To forecast numbers appearing in sequence, do people just take some sort of average of past items or do they use temporal pattern information that they have extracted from the sequence? In an experiment, subjects forecast successive numbers generated by a first-order auto regressive algorithm. Afterwards, they were asked to generate their own series of numbers to simulate the sequence they had been forecasting. It was found that (1) generation performance was good—subjects acquired an internal representation of the pattern in the sequence while forecasting it; (2) generation and forecasting performance were uncorrelated—this internal representation was not used for forecasting; (3) learnt ability to forecast a sequence did not transfer to another sequence that was of the same type but that subjects believed to come from another source; (4) subjects were good at estimating the probability that their forecasts would be correct but this ability declined with practice.     

Dimension integration: Testing models without trade-offs

This paper tests a behavioral property called dimension integration. The test evaluates models, such as lexicographic semi-orders and the priority heuristic, which assume that a person uses only one dimension at a time. It provides a way to compare such models against those that assume a person combines information from different dimensions. The test allows one to test the hypothesis that different people use different lexicographic semi-orders with different threshold parameters. In addition, by use of a “true and error” model, it is possible to “correct” for unreliability of choice in order to estimate the proportions of participants who show different response patterns that can be classified as integrative or not integrative. An experiment with 260 participants was conducted in which people made choices between two-branch gambles. The aggregate results violate the priority heuristic and six lexicographic semi-orders. The data also refute the theory that people use a mixture of these lexicographic semi-orders. In addition, few individuals appear to show response patterns consistent with non-integrative models. Instead, they show that most individuals show patterns consistent with the hypothesis that they combine information between dimensions.     

内在锚与外在锚对锚定效应及其双加工机制的影响

通过2（外在锚类型：高锚VS低锚）×2（内在锚类型：有VS无）被试间设计,考察不同锚定信息来源：由外部世界提供的外在锚与个体自身内部产生的内在锚信息对锚定效应及其加工机制的影响。结果发现：（1）当内在锚不存在时,外在高低锚组的估计值有显著差异,当内在锚存在时此种差异变得不显著;（2）当内在锚存在时,外在高低锚组被试的答题反应时有显著差异,内在锚与外在锚一致时反应时比不一致时更快,当内在锚不存在时,此种差异变得不显著。实验结果表明,当锚定调整机制与选择通达机制同时存在时,前者更占优势;锚定信息一致性会影响不同加工机制的启动,一致的信息会激活选择通达机制,不一致的信息则会激活锚定调整机制。     

Reconciling Compensatory and Noncompensatory Strategies of Cue Weighting: A Causal Model Approach

When forming a judgment about any unknown item, people must draw inferences from information that is already known. This paper examines causal relationships between cues as a relevant factor influencing how people determine the amount of weight to place on each piece of available evidence. We propose that people draw from their beliefs about specific causal relationships between cues when determining how much weight to place on those cues, and that understanding this process can help reconcile differences between predictions of compensatory and lexicographic heuristic strategies. As causal relationships change, different cues become more or less important. Across three experiments, we find support for the use of causal models in determining cue weights, but leave open the possibility that they work in concert with other strategies as well. We conclude by discussing relative strengths and weaknesses of the causal model approach relative to existing models, and suggest areas for future research. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effect of increasing the memorability of category instances on estimates of category size

According to Tversky and Kahneman’s (1973) availability heuristic, people sometimes make use of the ease with which instances are retrieved when they have to estimate proportions or frequencies. One implication of this availability heuristic is that any factor that affects memorability of instances from a category should also affect the estimated category size. In one of their experiments, Tversky and Kahneman found that, after being presented with a list of names, people judged the more famous names to be more frequent. Similarly, recall was found to be greater for the more famous names. Three experiments that used Tversky and Kahneman’s paradigm are reported. Repeating nonfamous names resulted in their increased recallability and a corresponding increase in estimates of their frequency (Experiments 1 and 3). Making nonfamous names more salient (Experiment 3) also had parallel effects on recallability and frequency estimates, indicating that different memory manipulations affected availability in a similar fashion. Furthermore, reliance on the heuristic was not changed as a function of prior knowledge (Experiment 2) or practice (Experiment 3)     

Self–other differences in multiattribute decision making: Compensatory versus noncompensatory decision strategies

When making decisions where options involve multiple attributes, a person can choose to use a compensatory, utility maximizing strategy, which involves consideration and integration of all available attributes. Alternatively, a person can choose a noncompensatory strategy that extracts only the most important and reliable attributes. The present research examined whether other‐oriented decisions would involve greater reliance on a noncompensatory, lexicographic decision strategy than self‐oriented decisions. In three studies (Mturk workers and college students), the difference in other‐oriented versus self‐oriented decisions in a medical decision context was explained by a subsample of participants that chose the death minimizing operation on all 10 decisions (Study 1) and a subsample of participants who self‐reported that they used a strategy that minimized the chance of death on every decision (i.e., a lexicographic mortality heuristic; Study 2). In Study 2, tests of mediation found that self‐reported use of the mortality heuristic completely accounted for the self–other effect on decisions. In Study 3, participants were more likely to report prospectively that they would adopt the mortality heuristic when making decisions for others than for themselves, suggesting that participants were not mistakenly inferring a lexicographic decision strategy from their past behavior. The results suggest that self–other effects in multiattribute choice involve differential use of compensatory versus noncompensatory decision strategies and that beyond this group difference, individual differences in the use of these strategies also exist within self‐oriented and other‐oriented decisions.     

Constructive Interaction and the Iterative Process of Understanding

When people try to understand complex physical devices (e.g., a sewing machine), they proceed in an iterative fashion. They seem to reach several points at which they claim to “understand” the device. Each point of understanding is incomplete and requires a new level of understanding. As a result, they cycle between understanding and non-understanding as they traverse different levels. The present study provides a framework to capture the iterative nature of understanding. These points are discussed and illustrated through observations of three pairs of people constructively interacting to understand how a sewing machine works. In addition to the iterative search for understanding, the conceptual point in space from which the speaker appeared to be viewing the machine was important. This conceptual point of view (C-POV) was reflected in their use of language. The C-POV appeared to be stable during points of understanding and to shift frequently at points of non-understanding.     

对整合模型和占优启发式模型的检验：基于信息加工过程的眼动研究证据

基于信息加工过程视角, 本研究采用眼动技术检验风险决策整合模型和占优启发式模型。结果表明, 自主决策任务条件下决策过程反应时及信息搜索模式均不同于期望价值(EV)迫选任务条件下的决策过程反应时及信息搜索模式; 自主决策任务条件下决策过程反应时并未随着选项间整体值(CPT值)差值的变大而变快, 且基于特征(attribute-based)的信息搜索多于基于选项(option-based)的信息搜索, 不符合整合模型预期。此外, 决策者亦未按照占优启发式模型所假定的决策步骤进行决策。基于信息加工过程的检验结果既不利于以累积预期理论为代表的整合模型, 亦不利于占优启发式模型。文章建议从决策过程视角检验已有决策模型及建立新的启发式决策过程模型(process model)。     

Overconfidence in estimation: Testing the anchoring-and-adjustment hypothesis

People are frequently overconfident in the accuracy of their estimates of uncertain quantities. The present study requested 50%- or 90%-confidence ranges. Overconfidence is shown when less than the target percentage of ranges include the true value. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) proposed that people use an anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic: They begin with a starting value, one supplied to them or generated by them, and insufficiently adjust their estimates around this anchor. The present data support the proposed anchoring process. If subjects receive another person's point estimates, their own implicit point estimates are correlated with these values. However, anchoring- and-adjustment processes do not invariably produce overconfidence. Subjects who receive anchors are no more overconfident than are those who do not receive anchors. If subjects are required to produce a point estimate first, overconfidence decreases; processes involved in explicitly displaying the point estimate are implicated. Overconfidence may occur because people do not realistically assess their estimation ability.     

Judgmental forecasts of time series affected by special events: does providing a statistical forecast improve accuracy?

Time series found in areas such as marketing and sales often have regular established patterns which are occasionally affected by exogenous influences, such as sales promotions. While statistical forecasting methods are adept at extrapolating regular patterns in series, judgmental forecasters have a potential advantage in that they can take into account the effect of these external influences, which may occur too infrequently for reliable statistical estimation. This suggests that a combination of statistical method and judgment is appropriate. An experiment was conducted to examine how judgmental forecasters make use of statistical time series forecasts when series are subject to sporadic special events. This was investigated under different conditions which were created by varying the complexity of the time series signal, the level of noise in the series, the salience of the cue, the predictive power of the cue information and the availability and presentation of the statistical forecast. Although the availability of a statistical forecast improved judgment under some conditions, the use the judgmental forecasters made of these forecasts was far from optimal. They changed the statistical forecasts when they were highly reliable and ignored them when they would have formed an ideal base‐line for adjustment. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Does easily learned mean easily remembered?: it depends on your beliefs about intelligence

Because numerous studies have shown that feelings of encoding fluency are positively correlated with judgments of learning, a single dominant heuristic, easily learned = easily remembered (ELER), has been posited to explain how people interpret encoding fluency when assessing their own memory. However, the inferences people draw from feelings of encoding fluency may vary with their beliefs about why information is easy or effortful to encode. We conducted two experiments in which participants studied word lists and then predicted their future recall of those items. Results revealed that subjects who viewed intelligence as fixed, and who tended to interpret effortful encoding as indicating that they had reached the limits of their ability, used the ELER heuristic to make judgments of learning. However, subjects who viewed intelligence as malleable, and who tended to interpret effortful encoding as indicating greater engagement in learning, did not use the ELER heuristic and at times predicted greater memory for items that they found more effortful to learn.     

Empathic forecasting: How do we predict other people's feelings?

When making affective forecasts, people commit the impact bias. They overestimate the impact an emotional event has on their affective experience. In three studies we show that people also commit the impact bias when making empathic forecasts, affective forecasts for someone else. They overestimate the impact an emotional event has on someone else's affective experience (Study 1), they do so for friends and strangers (Study 2), and they do so when other sources of information are available (Study 3). Empathic forecasting accuracy, the correlation between one person's empathic forecast and another person's actual affective experience, was lower than between-person forecasting correspondence, the correlation between one person's empathic forecast and another person's affective forecast. Empathic forecasts do not capture other people's actual experience very well but are similar to what other people forecast for themselves. This may enhance understanding between people.     

The effects of errors on children's performance on a circle-ellipse discrimination

Children first learned by means of a teaching program to discriminate a circle from relatively flat ellipses. Children in the control group then proceeded into a program which gradually reduced the difference between the circle and the ellipses. They advanced to a finer discrimination when they made a correct choice, and reversed to an easier discrimination after making errors ("backup" procedure). The children made relatively few errors until they approached the region of their difference threshold (empirically determined under the conditions described). When they could no longer discriminate the forms, they learned other bases for responding that could be classified as specifiable error patterns. Children in the experimental group, having learned the preliminary circle-ellipse discrimination, were started at the upper end of the ellipse series, where it was impossible for them to discriminate the forms. The backup procedure returned them to an easier discrimination after they made errors. They made many errors and reversed down through the ellipse series. Eventually, most of the children reached a point in the ellipse series where they abandoned their systematic errors and began to make correct first choices; then they advanced upward through the program. All of the children advanced to ellipse sizes that were much larger than the ellipse size at the point of their furthest descent.     

行为决策理论在能源节约管理中的应用

能源短缺是人类面临的重要课题,节约能源是人类需要采取的刻不容缓的行动。仅仅依赖金钱刺激很难解决能源浪费问题,而心理与行为科学可以发挥重要作用。本文梳理了应用行为决策的经典理论(如,安于现状偏差、决策双系统模型、参照点效应、框架效应和社会规范等)促进节能行为的研究成果,同时总结了诸如情绪、认知对象特点、信息呈现等影响个体节能行为的因素,最后从开展本土化研究、研究方式改进和拓展应对措施的角度对未来研究提出建议。希望本文能给心理学研究者一定的借鉴和启发,在节能管理领域做出更有价值的研究,以最终提高民众节能意识、增加民众节能行为。     

What is it like to trust a rock? A functionalist perspective on trust and trustworthiness in artificial intelligence

The trustworthiness (or otherwise) of AI has been much in discussion of late, not least because of the recent publication of the EU Guidelines for Trustworthy AI. Discussions range from how we might make people trust AI to AI being not possible to trust, with many points inbetween. In this article, we question whether or not these discussions somewhat miss the point, which is that people are going ahead and basically doing their own thing anyway, and that we should probably help them. Acknowledging that trust is a heuristic that is widely used by humans in a range of situations, we lean on the literature concerning how humans make trust decisions, to arrive at a general model of how people might consider trust in AI (and other artefacts) for specific purposes in a human world. We then use a series of thought experiments and observations of trust and trustworthiness, to illustrate the use of the model in taking a functionalist perspective on trust decisions, including with machines. Our hope is that this forms a useful basis upon which to develop intelligent systems in a way that considers how and when people may trust them, and in doing so empowers people to make better trust decisions about AI.