Catholic, Calvinist, and Lutheran Doctrines of Eucharistic Presence: A Brief Note towards a Rapprochement

This article explores Schlatter's doctrine of the Trinity in the light of the contemporary debate, focusing on the relation of the economic and the ontological Trinity. It is shown that Schlatter relates God's triune being and God's trinitarian action through the notion of love – where God's love ad extra as well as ad intra is oriented toward the particular in such a way as to enable true otherness. It will be argued, moreover, that Schlatter's contribution to the contemporary trinitarian debate lies in propounding an applied trinitarian theology which is faithful to its object. When God in himself and in relation to creation is oriented toward and actively seeks the other, then theology cannot talk about God's being apart from the actuality of his actions in this world.     

Omniscience And Pantheism

This article argues that theism entails a species of pantheism on the grounds that there is simply no discernible difference between the God's knowledge of the world and the world that God knows. The case against this thesis begins with the traditional theory of distinctions. But since God is necessarily omniscient there is not even the possibility that these might be considered apart and thus distinguished in that way. But neither is it possible to do this by means of Leibnitz's law, that is, by finding some feature possessed by the one but not the other. Three potential areas of difference are considered but rejected, first, that knowledge unlike the world is representational, and second, that knowledge unlike the world is phenomenal – there is something that it is like to have. Both of these features, though able to distinguish ordinary knowledge from its objects, cease to provide the difference we require when extended to the case of divine knowledge. A final area of potential difference lies in the transcendent nature of God over the world, especially with respect to time, finitude and possibility. But this, in the end, is found no more able to distinguish God's knowledge from its object than the previous two suggestions.     

Grace, Doubt, and Evil: The Constructive Task Of Reformation Theology

The Lutheran vocation is to be a friend of grace; and since the 16th century Lutheran systematic theology has built upon a foundation of grace. Two apparent barriers to grace need addressing. First, doubt in the form of agnosticism and atheism provides a metaphysical argument against God's existence. Second, evil and suffering provide a moral argument against God's existence. From a Lutheran point of view the question of God's graciousness takes precedence over God's existence.     

'Instrument of the union of hearts': The Theology of Personhood and the Bishop

This article explores Schlatter's doctrine of the Trinity in the light of the contemporary debate, focusing on the relation of the economic and the ontological Trinity. It is shown that Schlatter relates God's triune being and God's trinitarian action through the notion of love – where God's love ad extra as well as ad intra is oriented toward the particular in such a way as to enable true otherness. It will be argued, moreover, that Schlatter's contribution to the contemporary trinitarian debate lies in propounding an applied trinitarian theology which is faithful to its object. When God in himself and in relation to creation is oriented toward and actively seeks the other, then theology cannot talk about God's being apart from the actuality of his actions in this world.     

Divine Action and the Trinity: A Brief Exploration of the Grounds of Trinitarian Speech about God in the Theology of Adolf Schlatter

This article explores Schlatter's doctrine of the Trinity in the light of the contemporary debate, focusing on the relation of the economic and the ontological Trinity. It is shown that Schlatter relates God's triune being and God's trinitarian action through the notion of love – where God's love ad extra as well as ad intra is oriented toward the particular in such a way as to enable true otherness. It will be argued, moreover, that Schlatter's contribution to the contemporary trinitarian debate lies in propounding an applied trinitarian theology which is faithful to its object. When God in himself and in relation to creation is oriented toward and actively seeks the other, then theology cannot talk about God's being apart from the actuality of his actions in this world.     

Natural theology: Wit,the electric shock,the aesthetic idea—and a belated acknowledgment of points made by the late MR gershon weiler

The paper concludes the argument that certain aesthetic objects conduce to a feeling of radical contingency, and to an openness to St Thomas's Third Way proof for the existence of God. Much is conceded to the late Mr Gershon Weiler's criticism of an earlier discussion. The upshot is (a) that Necessary Being as converse of radical contingency may be an Aesthetic Idea/Sublime of Kant's kind, and (b) that without the ‘I AM that I am’, it is empty. The ‘inference’ from radical contingency to Necessary Being may function as George Eliot thought Wit to function, intellectually/aesthetically. What is terrifying is that it happens that will not happen, that it will stop happening. J.-F. Lyotard I AM that I am.Genesis, Ch.3, Verse 14.     

The Trinity, Election and God's Ontological Freedom: A Response to Kevin W. Hector

Abstract:  A recent article by Kevin Hector considered the disagreement between Bruce McCormack and me over the relationship between the doctrines of election and the Trinity raising a number of crucial issues such as the proper relation of the immanent and economic Trinity, the nature of God's freedom and the identity of the logos asarkos . In this article I explore how and why Barth's dialectical understanding of the triune God's freedom from and for creatures disallowed equating God's ontological freedom with election in the manner suggested by McCormack and Hector, because that would reduce God's omnipotence to his omnicausality, the immanent to the economic Trinity.     

The Immortality Requirement for Life's meaning

Many religious thinkers hold the immortality requirement, the view that immortality of some kind is necessary for life to have meaning. After clarifying the nature of the immortality requirement, this essay examines three central arguments for it. The article establishes that existing versions of these arguments fail to entail the immortality requirement. The essay then reconstructs the arguments, and it shows that once they do plausibly support the immortality requirement, they equally support the God-centred requirement, the view that God's existence is a necessary condition for life to be meaningful. The paper concludes by explaining why we should expect any argument for the immortality requirement also to constitute an argument for the God-centred requirement.     

What is so Good about Moral Freedom?

Many Christian philosophers believe that it is a great good that human beings are free to choose between good and evil, so good indeed that God is justified in putting up with a great many evil choices for the sake of it. But many of the same Christian philosophers also believe that God is essentially good – good in every possible world. Unlike his sinful human creatures, God cannot choose between good and evil. In that sense, he is not 'morallyFree'. It is not easy to see how to fit these two theses into a single coherent package. If moral freedom is such a great good in human beings, why is it not a grave defect in God that he lacks it? And if the lack of moral freedom does not detract in any way from God's greatness, would it not have been better for us not to have it? I develop, but ultimately reject, what I take to be the most initially promising strategy for resolving this dilemma.     

Aquinas, the Trinity and the Limits of Understanding

Abstract:   Thomas's trinitarian doctrine is commonly criticized as being abstract and unbiblical; several writers have offered defences against this charge, but these perhaps ignore too much the genuinely reticent and apophatic aspects of Thomas's thought. In three particular places, it is argued, Thomas can be read as deliberately saying things that are unexplained and unexplainable. The areas considered are: the notion of processions in God; the presentation of the persons as subsistent relations; and the relationship between the subsistent relations and the divine essence.     

The Argument from Design: What Is at Stake Theologically?

This article offers a brief overview of the argument for God's existence grounded in the evidence of design. It gives particular attention to the way the argument has evolved over time and in relation to changing scientific perspectives. The argument from de-sign has in fact been formulated and reformulated in response to the discoveries and challenges it has encountered from the field of science. The conclusion of the article explores the theological importance of this argument—its extent and its limits.     

Ontological Parsimony,Erosion, and Conservatism

This article presents a novel argument against a common principle of parsimony in philosophy. First, it identifies a widely employed principle of positive ontological parsimony, according to which we should, ceteris paribus, prefer smaller ontologies to larger ontologies. Next, it shows how this principle is used as part of a strategy by which to argue for antirealist positions in many subfields of philosophy: the ockhamistic antirealist strategy. Third, it argues that this principle commits its adherents to an implausible epistemological thesis—the Eroding Ontology Thesis—according to which evidence for the existence of some entity is at least prima facie evidence against the existence of all other entities. Antirealists might decide to adopt a related position, ontological conservatism, according to which we should simply resist changing our ontology, but the article shows that it is independently unjustified. Therefore, it concludes, philosophers have good reason to cease employing one very common antirealist strategy.     

The Limits of Virtue Jurisprudence

In response to Lawrence Solum's advocacy of a 'virtue–centred theory of judging', I argue that there is indeed important work to be done in identifying and characterising those qualities of character that constitute judicial virtues – those qualities that a person needs if she is to judge well (though I criticise Solum's account of one of the five pairs of judicial vices and virtues that he identifies – avarice and temperance). However, Solum's more ambitious claims – that a judge's vice necessarily corrupts her decisions, and that in at least some contexts we must define a legally correct decision as one that would be reached by a virtuous judge – should be rejected: we can undermine the former by attending to the requirements of due process, and the latter by attending to the ways in which a judge would try to justify her decision.     

The Limits of Virtue Jurisprudence

In response to Lawrence Solum's advocacy of a 'virtue–centred theory of judging', I argue that there is indeed important work to be done in identifying and characterising those qualities of character that constitute judicial virtues – those qualities that a person needs if she is to judge well (though I criticise Solum's account of one of the five pairs of judicial vices and virtues that he identifies – avarice and temperance). However, Solum's more ambitious claims – that a judge's vice necessarily corrupts her decisions, and that in at least some contexts we must define a legally correct decision as one that would be reached by a virtuous judge – should be rejected: we can undermine the former by attending to the requirements of due process, and the latter by attending to the ways in which a judge would try to justify her decision.     

Calvin's View of Natural Knowledge of God

For Calvin, the relation between God's revelation in the sensus divinitatis and God's revelation in his works is not reducible to the distinction between internal and external revelation. Adams' contextual interpretation of Calvin's treatment of the natural knowledge of God in the Institutes illumines some the subtle complexity of Calvin's argument – an argument which is informed both philosophically and biblically. Both Calvin's positive evaluation of natural revelation and his pessimistic stance vis-à-vis the ability of humanity to appropriate it emerge from Adams' analysis.     

Temporal necessity; Hard facts/soft facts

Conclusion In conclusion, then, the notion of temporal necessity is certainly queer and perhaps a misnomer. It really has little to do with temporality per se and everything to do with counterfactual openness or closedness. We have seen that the future is as unalterable as the past, but that this purely logical truth is not antithetical to freedom or contingency. Moreover, we have found certain past facts are counterfactually open in that were future events or actualities to be other than they will be, these past facts would have been different as a consequence. God's beliefs about the future are such past facts. Moreover, the effects of actions which God would have taken had He believed differently are also such past facts. Oddly enough, then, virtually any past fact is potentially counterfactually open, and the only necessity that remains is purely de facto. We, of course, do not in general know which events of the past depend counterfactually on present actions, and those cases we do know about seem rather trivial. Our intuitions of the necessity, unalterability, and unpreventability of the past as opposed to the future stem from the impossibility of backward causation, which is precluded by the dynamic nature of time and becoming. But the counterfactual dependence of God's beliefs on future events or actualities is not a case of backward causation: rather future-tense propositions are true in virtue of what will happen, given a view of truth as correspondence, and God simply has the essential property of knowing all and only true propositions. With regard to the future, virtually all facts are counterfactually open, and therefore future-tense propositions are not temporally necessary. Propositions thus move from being temporally contingent to being temporally necessary when all the opportunities to affect things counterfactually have slipped by. Hence, the mere fact that an event is past is no indication that it is counterfactually closed. This is especially evident in the case of God's foreknowledge. If we say that God foreknows that I shall do x and therefore I cannot refrain from doing x, lest I change God's past foreknowledge, we are being deceived by a modality which has nothing to do with my power or freedom. All that is impossible is the conjunction of God's foreknowledge that p and of ~ p; but this modality in sensu composito has no bearing on my ability to act such that ~ p would be true and God would have foreknown differently. Temporal necessity, then, turns out to be only obliquely temporal and modally weak, certainly no threat to freedom or divine foreknowledge.     

The Internal Logic of Holy Saturday in the Theology of Hans Urs von Balthasar

Abstract:  While consensus reigns that Balthasar's theology of Christ's descent into hell on Holy Saturday constitutes both the center of his theology and his most significant innovation on the tradition, the question remains open whether that innovation marks a true development on this theologoumenon or a radical departure from it. This article argues for the former alternative by drawing on all those elements in the history of theology, both Catholic and Protestant, that point to an increasing – indeed inevitable – radicalization of this doctrine. Then, using the norms set forth by Cardinal Newman's Essay on Development , it shows how Balthasar's 'innovations' meet Newman's criteria for authentic development.     

On disagreement about perception

In this article I have tried to rebut certain types of arguments which purport to show not merely that God does not exist but that the notion of necessary existence is itself either self‐contradictory or senseless. In showing that it is not self‐contradictory I have allowed myself the luxury of a negative and a positive approach. Negatively, I have had to show that when the accusation of self‐contradiction is made, it is often accompanied, not by an argument but by a sheer assertion. On the rare occasions when an argument is forthcoming, the arguments, I have tried to show, have been invalid, not even, inconclusive. And to the extent that Kant may be said to have argued not simply the impossibility of a genuine proof of the existence of God, but indeed the impossibility of the concept of necessary existence, I have argued out the weakness of Kant's arguments, the most notable of which I have discussed in some detail. Finally, to establish the genuineness of the concept of necessary existence, positively, I have paradoxically made use of a notion from Russell's logic.     

MORAL APES, HUMAN UNIQUENESS, AND THE IMAGE OF GOD

Recent advances in evolutionary biology and ethology suggest that humans are not the only species capable of empathy and possibly morality. These findings are of no little consequence for theology, given that a nonhuman animal as a free moral agent would beg the question if human beings are indeed uniquely created in God's image. I argue that apes and some other mammals have moral agency and that a traditional interpretation of the imago Dei is incorrectly equating specialness with exclusivity. By framing the problem in terms of metaphor, following the work of Paul Ricoeur and Sallie McFague, I propose that the concept of the imago Dei could be extended to accommodate moral species other than our own.