PERSONS IN NATURE: TOWARD AN APPLICABLE AND UNIFIED ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS

Abstract. Two major contenders for the role of robust environmental ethics claim our allegiance. One is Baird Callicott's, based on the land ethic formulated by Aldo Leopold; the other is that of Holmes Rolston, 111, sharply distinguishing environmental from social (human) ethics. Despite their many strengths, neither gives us the vision we need. Callicott's ethic leaves too much out of his picture; Rolston's leaves too much disconnected between nature and humankind. A really usable environmental ethic needs to be both comprehensive and integrated. For that, we need a worldview that includes the human in nature but also affirms the unique values of personhood.     

RELATIVISM AND NORMATIVE NONREALISM: BASING MORALITY ON RATIONALITY

Normative nonrealism denies (a) that some things are good or bad or right or wrong independently of facts about the attitudes of moral agents, and (b) that attitude-independent normative facts determine what is rational. An influential nonrealist approach to rationality comes from Richard Brandt's account of rationality in terms of “full information.” Using Brandt's account as illustrative, this paper identifies a serious problem for nonrealist normative theories based on theories of rationality. The paper argues that nonrealist accounts of rationality that oppose relativism cannot successfully handle the most serious threat from relativists: namely, a threat from a ‘Why care?’ open-question argument that stems from the question why one should care about being rational in a certain respect or sense. The paper identifies the bearing of ‘Why care?’ questions on the conflict between internalism and externalism regarding practical reasons. The main lesson is that ‘Why care?’ questions wreak havoc for nonrelativist nonrealist approaches to rationality and reason-based morality.     

SEX-ROLE IDENTITY, GENDER IDENTITY, AND SELF-SCHEMATA

Forty females and 40 males were shown slides of masculine and feminine phrases controlled for social desirability, sex-linked content, syllable length, and negative semantic construction to evaluate schematic processing on the dimensions of masculinity and femininity. Their responses to the phrases were timed. The BSRI, PAQ, and SSR1Q administered subsequent to the slide presentation were used to categorize subjects into groups of masculine, feminine, androgynous, and undifferentiated. Comparisons between the groups evaluated by the different scales indicated that the PAQ was the best predictor of schematic processing and that the SSRIQ and gender were not predictors of schematic processing. Correlations between the SSRIQ and the masculine and feminine scales of the BSRI and PAQ provided evidence partially supportive of Storms's (1979) theory that sex-role identity influences the development of same-sex-typed attributes but does not influence opposite-sex-typed attributes.     

SEXUALITY, RATIONALITY, AND SPIRITUALITY

Abstract. Historical progress has largely been described in terms of the power to order social and ecological realities according to the interests of a few. Their concepts, images, and metaphors have transmitted knowledge (both explicit and tacit) that has come to be regarded as received wisdom. This kind of power, which has shaped (as well as described) history, has belonged primarily to men; whereas women's nature and, accordingly, their power have been defined primarily in terms of sexuality. Men's control of women's sexuality is therefore the source of the disqualification of women as free agents-that is, as significant participants in, say, scientific and religious meaning-giving processes. Thus morality requires reevaluation of our assumptions about human nature. Most importantly, it demands that female sexuality be considered within the context of rationality and spirituality.     

MARGOLIS ON HISTORY AND NATURE

Abstract: In his philosophy of culture, Joseph Margolis maintains that, although human beings and human societies have a history, there is no human nature in the sense of a fixed essence. I consider objections to Margolis's thesis, beginning with the possibility that nonhuman intelligent species might be in a position to study human behavior from its origins to its demise with the proper distance from our own situation in order to arrive at an understanding of what is essential to human nature, perhaps as a Kantian regulative rather than constitutive principle, and involving abstractions from particular cases and idealizations, as in other branches of science. Finally, I examine the historical-past orientation of Margolis's concept of humanity's self-understanding and its dependence on the intentionality of human thought, and I conclude that it provides an inadequate reason for denying that there can be such a thing as human nature.     

IDENTITY SUPPORT, IDENTITY DEVALUATION, AND WELL-BEING AMONG LESBIANS

This research tested predictions about the association of identity support and identity devaluation with psychological well-being (self-esteem, life satisfaction, and depression). Lesbian women completed baseline surveys ( N = 42), then provided daily experience reports during a 2-week period ( n = 38), and completed a 2-month follow-up survey ( n = 34). Several types of evidence consistently demonstrated the importance of identity support for well-being. Lesbians who reported more identity support scored higher on measures of well-being at initial assessment, during the daily phase of the study, and at the follow-up. Comparable results were found for the negative association between identity devaluation and well-being. Identity measures proved to be significant predictors of lesbians' well-being even after controlling for other types of support and social stress. Both identity support and identity devaluation contributed independently to the prediction of daily self-esteem and life satisfaction. Strengths and limitations of this study are discussed.     

MACHINES, BRAINS, AND PERSONS

Abstract. This paper explores the suggestion that our conscious experience is embodied in, rather than interactive with, our brain activity, and that the distinctive brain correlate of conscious experience lies at the level of global functional organization. To speak of either brains or computers as thinking is categorically inept, but whether stochastic mechanisms using internal experimentation rather than rule-following to determine behavior could embody conscious agency is argued to be an open question, even in light of the Christian doctrine of man. Mechanistic brain science does nothing to discredit Christian experience in dialogue with God or the Christian hope of eternal life.