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We present a theory of truth in fiction that improves on Lewis's [1978] ‘Analysis 2’ in two ways. First, we expand Lewis's possible worlds apparatus by adding non-normal or impossible worlds. Second, we model truth in fiction as (make-believed) belief revision via ideas from dynamic epistemic logic. We explain the major objections raised against Lewis's original view and show that our theory overcomes them. 相似文献
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Graham White 《逻辑史和逻辑哲学》2015,36(3):278-301
We start with a example of assembler programming, and show how even at this low level the structure of the programming language does not directly mirror the structure of the hardware, but that it is also decisively influenced by the human practices surrounding computer use, and that assembly language gives a view of the hardware which is accommodated to human interests and capabilities. We give several historical examples and illustrate the changing pattern of mutual accommodation between human practices and computer technology, and argue for a more explicitly dialectical and critical approach to the history and philosophy of programming. 相似文献
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This paper examines the question of the extensional correctness of Tarskian definitions of logical truth and logical consequence.
I identify a few different informal properties which are necessary for a sentence to be an informal logical truth and look
at whether they are necessary properties of Tarskian logical truths. I examine arguments by John Etchemendy and Vann McGee
to the effect that some of those properties are not necessary properties of some Tarskian logical truths, and find them unconvincing.
I stress the point that since the hypothesis that Tarski's definitions are extensionally correct is deeply entrenched, the
burden of proof is still on the shoulders of Tarski's critics, who have not lifted the burden.
This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
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Ernest Adams 《Pacific Philosophical Quarterly》2002,83(3):207-222
This paper explores the ways in which truth is better than falsehood, and suggests that, among other things, it depends on the kinds of proposition to which these values are attached. Ordinary singular propositions like "It is raining" seem to fit best the bivalent "scheme" of classical logic, the general proposition "It is always raining" is more appropriately rated according to how often it rains, and a "practically vague" proposition like "The lecture will start at 1" is appropriately rated according to its nearness to exactness. Implications for logic of this "rating system" are commented on. 相似文献
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《South African Journal of Philosophy》2013,32(1):63-82
AbstractIn this paper, I show that in order to gain an understanding of the facts about fiction it is more fruitful to pursue an analysis of judgment in fiction than an analysis of truth in fiction. I do so in two steps. First I take the analyses of truth in fiction which David Lewis provides in “Truth in Fiction”, which are formulated in terms of possible worlds, and provide counterpart analyses of judgment in fiction, formulated in terms of (mental) models and rules for the construction of (mental) models. In the course of discussion I identify various problems for Lewis’s account of truth in fiction and solve or dissolve them using the account of judgment in fiction. Second, I show that once we have an analysis of judgment which appeals to rules, we can extend the account of judgment by using Lewis’s account of accommodation and resistance in “Scorekeeping in a Language Game” to explain the evolution of the genres of fiction, construed as systems of rules. The result is to provide a dynamic account of judgment which does justice to modern poststructuralist observations in the philosophy of literature. 相似文献
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Richard Woodward 《Philosophy and phenomenological research》2017,94(3):646-671
Anthony Everett ( 2005 ) argues that those who embrace the reality of fictional entities run into trouble when it comes to specifying criteria of character identity. More specifically, he argues that realists must reject natural principles governing the identity and distinctness of fictional characters due to the existence of fictions which leave it indeterminate whether certain characters are identical and the existence of fictions which say inconsistent things about the identities of their characters. Everett's critique has deservedly drawn much attention and a number of defensive moves have been made by, or on the behalf of, fictional realists. My goal in this paper is to move this debate on a further step. I have three goals: (i) to clarify the importance of Everett's discussion of identity criteria within the context of fictional realism, (ii) to reassess Everett's objections to realism in light of the resultant literature, and (iii) to develop a novel strategy for responding to Everett's concerns. On the approach to be developed, the problems emerge due to an indeterminacy inherent in the concept of a fictional character itself. 相似文献
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David Carr 《International Journal of Philosophical Studies》2013,21(3):331-344
In Consciousness Explained and other works, Daniel Dennett uses the concept of phenomenology (along with his variant, called heterophenomenology) in almost complete disregard of the work of Husserl and his successors in German and French philosophy. Yet it can be argued that many of the most important ideas of Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and others (and not just the idea of intentionality) reappear in Dennett's work in only slightly altered form. In this article I try to show this in two ways, first by talking in a general way about Dennett's phenomenology, and second by examining his treatment of the concept of the self. In both cases I argue that Dennett should have read his Husserl and Merleau-Ponty more carefully, since in the end his (hetero-) phenomenology is methodologically incoherent and suffers from something like a weakness of will. This emerges especially in his use of the notion of fiction. 相似文献
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Whitbeck C 《Science and engineering ethics》1995,1(4):403-416
We have recently reached a watershed in the research community’s consideration of the ethics of research. The way is now open
for a more nuanced discussion than the one of the last decade in which attention to legal and quasi-legal procedures for handling
misconduct dominated. The new discussion of ethical issues focused on trustworthiness takes us beyond consideration of conduct
that is straightforwardly permitted, forbidden or required, to consideration of criteria for responsible behavior.
This paper develops an overview of the subject of trustworthiness among researchers. It illustrates and discusses various
types of betrayal and defections in research conduct, and locates these in relation to many of the situations discussed elsewhere
in this issue.
Beginning with the breaches of trust that constitute major wrongdoing in research (“research misconduct”), I argue that these
are more often examples of negligence or recklessness than they are of “fraud.” Acts of negligence and recklessness figure
not only in misconduct, narrowly defined, but in many lesser betrayals and defections that undermine trust. The presence or
absence of an intentional deception is not a reliable indicator of the seriousness of some moral lapse. Such a lapse, where
it does occur, may be simply a particularly poor response to perennially difficult research responsibility. Finally, I consider
trust and trustworthiness among collaborating researchers and a range of intentional and unintentional behaviors that influence
the character of these trust relationships. The supervisor-supervisee relationship is of particular significance because it
is both a difficult area of responsibility for the supervisor and because this relationship is formative for a new researcher’s
subsequent expectations and behavior.
I review the history of the research community’s discussion of research ethics in the editorial for this issue ofScience and Engineering Ethics
1: 322–328. 相似文献
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I investigate the consequences of Nietzsche's perspectivism for notions of truth and objectivity, and show how the metaphor
of visual perspective motivates an epistemology that avoids self-referential difficulties. Perspectivism's claim that every
view is only one view, applied to itself, is often supposed to preclude the perspectivist's ability to offer reasons for her
epistemology. Nietzsche's arguments for perspectivism depend on “internal reasons”, which have force not only in their own
perspective, but also within the standards of alternative perspectives. Internal reasons allow a perspectivist argument against
dogmatism without presupposing aperspectival criteria for theory choice. Nietzsche also offers “internal” conceptions of truth
and objectivity which reduce them to a matter of meeting our epistemic standards. This view has pluralistic implications,
which conflict with common sense, but it is nevertheless consistent and plausible. Nietzsche's position is similar to Putnam's
recent internalism, and this is due to their common Kantian heritage.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献