Variation in the anthropomorphization of supernatural beings and its implications for cognitive theories of religion

The cognitive study of religion has been highly influenced by P. Boyer's (2001, 2003) claim that supernatural beings are conceptualized as persons with counterintuitive properties. The present study tests the generality of this claim by exploring how different supernatural beings are conceptualized by the same individual and how different individuals conceptualize the same supernatural beings. In Experiment 1, college undergraduates decided whether three types of human properties (psychological, biological, physical) could or could not be attributed to two types of supernatural beings (religious, fictional). On average, participants attributed more human properties to fictional beings, like fairies and vampires, than to religious beings, like God and Satan, and they attributed more psychological properties than nonpsychological properties to both. In Experiment 2, 5-year-old children and their parents made both open-ended and closed-ended property attributions. Although both groups of participants attributed a majority of human properties to the fictional beings, children attributed a majority of human properties to the religious beings as well. Taken together, these findings suggest that anthropomorphic theories of supernatural-being concepts, though fully predictive of children's concepts, are only partially predictive of adults' concepts.     

Intimations of immortality and omniscience in early childhood

Children aged three, four and five years, drawn equally from one secular and one religious school in Spain, were questioned about the psychological and biological constraints that apply to two different types of person: an ordinary human being (their best friend) and an extraordinary being (God). Children were asked to assess whether: (1) the knowledge available to either being is constrained by perceptual processes and (2) the life cycle of either being is constrained by biological processes. Three year olds provided few signs of distinguishing between the two types of being. Five year olds, on the other hand, were quite systematic in their differentiation. They judged that the knowledge available to a friend—but not to God—would be constrained by the need for perceptual access and they judged that the life cycle of a friend—but not that of God—would be constrained by the biological processes of birth, growth and death. Implications for current accounts of children's conceptual development are discussed.     

Mind perception of God in Japanese children

There is a theoretical debate regarding whether children represent God with reference to a human. Most previous studies have assessed this issue focusing on knowledge/omniscience in western children. This study used a theoretical framework characterising mental capacities in terms of motivational/emotional (experience) and cognitive (agency) mental capacities and tested whether Japanese children discriminated between God, a human, a baby and an invisible agent according to these capacities. Three‐ to 6‐year‐old children were asked about the experience and agency of the agents. The results revealed that children discriminated God from a human in terms of mental capacities including experience and agency in 3‐year‐old children. On the other hand, 4‐ to 6‐year‐old children, but not 3‐year‐old children, discriminated a human from a baby and an invisible person. The results suggest that the Japanese children's representations of God differed from their representation of a human during preschool years.     

Cultural influences on children's understanding of the human body and the concept of life

This study aimed to identify the age by which children begin to demonstrate a biological understanding of the human body and the idea that the purpose of body functioning is to maintain life. The study also explored the influence of education, culturally specific experiences and religion on knowledge acquisition in this domain. Children aged between 4 and 7 years from three different cultural backgrounds (White British, British Muslim, and Pakistani Muslim) were interviewed about the human body and its functioning. At least half of the 4‐ to 5‐year‐olds in each cultural group, and almost all 6‐ to 7‐year‐olds, referred to the maintenance of life when explaining organs' functions and so were classified as ‘life theorizers’. Pakistani Muslim children gave fewer biological responses to questions about organs' functions and the purpose of eating and breathing, but referred to life more than their British counterparts. Irrespective of cultural group, older children understood organ location and function better than younger children. These findings support Jaakkola and Slaughter's (2002, Br. J. Dev. Psychol., 20, 325) view that children's understanding of the body as a ‘life machine’ emerges around the ages of 4–5 years. They also suggest that, despite many similarities in children's ideas cross‐culturally, different educational input and culturally specific experiences influence aspects of their biological understanding.     

The role of epistemic and social characteristics in children’s selective trust: Three meta‐analyses

Over the last 15 years, researchers have been increasingly interested in understanding the nature and development of children’s selective trust. Three meta‐analyses were conducted on a total of 51 unique studies (88 experiments) to provide a quantitative overview of 3‐ to 6‐year‐old children’s selective trust in an informant based on the informant’s epistemic or social characteristics, and to examine the relation between age and children’s selective trust decisions. The first and second meta‐analyses found that children displayed medium‐to‐large pooled effects in favor of trusting the informant who was knowledgeable or the informant with positive social characteristics. Moderator analyses revealed that 4‐year‐olds were more likely to endorse knowledgeable informants than 3‐year‐olds. The third meta‐analysis examined cases where two informants simultaneously differed in their epistemic and social characteristics. The results revealed that 3‐year‐old children did not selectively endorse informants who were more knowledgeable but had negative social characteristics over informants who were less knowledgeable but had positive social characteristics. However, 4‐ to 6‐year‐olds consistently prioritized epistemic cues over social characteristics when deciding who to trust. Together, these meta‐analyses suggest that epistemic and social characteristics are both valuable to children when they evaluate the reliability of informants. Moreover, with age, children place greater value on epistemic characteristics when deciding whether to endorse an informant’s testimony. Implications for the development of epistemic trust and the design of studies of children’s selective trust are discussed.     

Traces of the artist: Sensitivity to the role of the artist in children's pictorial reasoning

In three studies we investigated the question of whether children consider the attributes of the artist (sentience, age level, affective style, emotion) when making judgments about the traces (drawings) made by that artist. In Study 1, 2–5‐year‐old children were asked to find pictures drawn by a machine, an adult, an older and a younger child. Results indicated that children younger than 4 years do not consider the artists' attributes when making judgments, but 4‐ and 5‐year‐olds do. Furthermore, whereas the oldest children were adept at both machine‐person (sentience) and person‐person (age) contrasts, 4‐year‐olds succeeded only with person‐person contrasts. In Study 2, videotaped artists displayed differences in degree of agitation (affective style) while drawing, and this attribute was manipulated in the drawing by varying line density, asymmetry, line overlap and line gap, or all four features, across stimuli. Three‐ and five‐year‐old children judged whether a calm or agitated person drew the stimuli. Findings showed that five‐year‐old, but not 3‐year‐old, children easily completed the task. In Study 3, 3‐, 5‐ and 7‐year‐old children judged whether happy or sad artists made paintings of matching emotional tone. Performance on this picture judgment task was contrasted with performance on three theory of mind tasks (false belief, emotion and interpretative). The results indicated that 5‐ and 7‐year‐olds successfully judged the impact of artists' emotions on paintings, but 3‐year‐olds did not. Performance on the picture task was related to that on the false belief task, but not to the emotion or interpretive tasks. Taken together, the results suggest that children's view of visual symbols includes a consideration of the qualities of the artist beginning around 5 years, and there appears to be a common link between judgments of the mind behind the visual symbol in the picture task and judgments of mental state reasoning in the false belief task.     

Uniquely human self‐control begins at school age

Human beings have remarkable skills of self‐control, but the evolutionary origins of these skills are unknown. Here we compare children at 3 and 6 years of age with one of humans’ two nearest relatives, chimpanzees, on a battery of reactivity and self‐control tasks. Three‐year‐old children and chimpanzees were very similar in their abilities to resist an impulse for immediate gratification, repeat a previously successful action, attend to a distracting noise, and quit in the face of repeated failure. Six‐year‐old children were more skillful than either 3‐year‐olds or chimpanzees at controlling their impulses. These results suggest that humans’ most fundamental skills of self‐control – as part of the overall decision‐making process – are a part of their general great ape heritage, and that their species‐unique skills of self‐control begin at around the age at which many children begin formal schooling.     

The Development of the Ability to Semantically Integrate Information in Speech and Iconic Gesture in Comprehension

We examined whether children's ability to integrate speech and gesture follows the pattern of a broader developmental shift between 3‐ and 5‐year‐old children (Ramscar & Gitcho, 2007) regarding the ability to process two pieces of information simultaneously. In Experiment 1, 3‐year‐olds, 5‐year‐olds, and adults were presented with either an iconic gesture or a spoken sentence or a combination of the two on a computer screen, and they were instructed to select a photograph that best matched the message. The 3‐year‐olds did not integrate information in speech and gesture, but 5‐year‐olds and adults did. In Experiment 2, 3‐year‐old children were presented with the same speech and gesture as in Experiment 1 that were produced live by an experimenter. When presented live, 3‐year‐olds could integrate speech and gesture. We concluded that development of the integration ability is a part of the broader developmental shift; however, live‐presentation facilitates the nascent integration ability in 3‐year‐olds.     

Priming third‐party ostracism increases affiliative imitation in children

Human beings are intensely social creatures and, as such, devote significant time and energy to creating and maintaining affiliative bonds with group members. Nevertheless, social relations sometimes collapse and individuals experience exclusion from the group. Fortunately for adults, they are able to use behavioral strategies such as mimicry to reduce their social exclusion. Here we test whether children, too, increase their imitation following an experience of ostracism. Given humans’ profound need to belong, we predicted that the mere hint of social exclusion – even third‐party social exclusion – would be sufficient to increase affiliative imitation in 5‐year‐olds. As predicted, children primed with videos in which one shape was ostracized by a group of other shapes subsequently imitated the actions of a model more closely than children in a control condition. These findings highlight just how sensitive humans are to social exclusion and demonstrate that children, like adults, modify their social behavior in response to ostracism.     

Developmental changes in automatic rule‐learning mechanisms across early childhood

Infants’ ability to learn complex linguistic regularities from early on has been revealed by electrophysiological studies indicating that 3‐month‐olds, but not adults, can automatically detect non‐adjacent dependencies between syllables. While different ERP responses in adults and infants suggest that both linguistic rule learning and its link to basic auditory processing undergo developmental changes, systematic investigations of the developmental trajectories are scarce. In the present study, we assessed 2‐ and 4‐year‐olds’ ERP indicators of pitch discrimination and linguistic rule learning in a syllable‐based oddball design. To test for the relation between auditory discrimination and rule learning, ERP responses to pitch changes were used as predictor for potential linguistic rule‐learning effects. Results revealed that 2‐year‐olds, but not 4‐year‐olds, showed ERP markers of rule learning. Although, 2‐year‐olds’ rule learning was not dependent on differences in pitch perception, 4‐year‐old children demonstrated a dependency, such that those children who showed more pronounced responses to pitch changes still showed an effect of rule learning. These results narrow down the developmental decline of the ability for automatic linguistic rule learning to the age between 2 and 4 years, and, moreover, point towards a strong modification of this change by auditory processes. At an age when the ability of automatic linguistic rule learning phases out, rule learning can still be observed in children with enhanced auditory responses. The observed interrelations are plausible causes for age‐of‐acquisition effects and inter‐individual differences in language learning.     

One‐year‐old infants use teleological representations of actions productively

Two experiments investigated whether infants represent goal‐directed actions of others in a way that allows them to draw inferences to unobserved states of affairs (such as unseen goal states or occluded obstacles). We measured looking times to assess violation of infants' expectations upon perceiving either a change in the actions of computer‐animated figures or in the context of such actions. The first experiment tested whether infants would attribute a goal to an action that they had not seen completed. The second experiment tested whether infants would infer from an observed action the presence of an occluded object that functions as an obstacle. The looking time patterns of 12‐month‐olds indicated that they were able to make both types of inferences, while 9‐month‐olds failed in both tasks. These results demonstrate that, by the end of the first year of life, infants use the principle of rational action not only for the interpretation and prediction of goal‐directed actions, but also for making productive inferences about unseen aspects of their context. We discuss the underlying mechanisms that may be involved in the developmental change from 9 to 12 months of age in the ability to infer hypothetical (unseen) states of affairs in teleological action representations.     

Children’s attention to sample composition in learning,teaching and discovery

Two studies compared children’s attention to sample composition – whether a sample provides a diverse representation of a category of interest – during teacher‐led and learner‐driven learning contexts. In Study 1 (n = 48), 5‐year‐olds attended to sample composition to make inferences about biological properties only when samples were presented by a knowledgeable teacher. In contrast, adults attended to sample composition in both teacher‐led and learner‐driven contexts. In Study 2 (n = 51), 6‐year‐olds chose to create diverse samples to teach information about biological kinds to another child, but not to discover new information for themselves, whereas adults chose to create diverse samples for both teaching and information discovery. Results suggest that how children approach the interpretation and selection of evidence varies depending on whether learning occurs in a pedagogical or a non‐pedagogical context.     

Sensory Discrimination,Working Memory and Intelligence in 9‐Year‐Old and 11‐Year‐Old Children

More than a century ago, Galton and Spearman suggested that there was a functional relationship between sensory discrimination ability and intelligence. Studies have since been able to confirm a close relationship between general discrimination ability (GDA) and IQ. The aim of the present study was to assess whether this strong relationship between GDA and IQ could be due to working memory (WM) demands of GDA tasks. A sample of 140 children (seventy 9‐year‐olds and seventy 11‐year‐olds) was studied. Results showed that there was a significant overlap between WM, GDA and fluid intelligence. Furthermore, results also revealed that WM could not explain the relationship between GDA and fluid intelligence as such, but that it acted as a bottleneck of information processing, limiting the influence of GDA on the prediction of fluid intelligence. Specifically, GDA's influence on the prediction of intelligence was only visible when WM capacity was above a certain level. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Two‐year‐olds are vigilant of others’ non‐verbal cues to credibility

Data from three experiments provide the first evidence that children, at least as young as age two, are vigilant of others’ non‐verbal cues to credibility, and flexibly use these cues to facilitate learning. Experiment 1 revealed that 2‐ and 3‐year‐olds prefer to learn about objects from someone who appears, through non‐verbal cues, to be confident in performing actions on those objects than from someone who appears uncertain when performing actions on those objects. Experiment 2 revealed that when 2‐year‐olds observe only one model perform a single action, either confidently or unconfidently, they do not use the model’s level of confidence in this single instance to influence their learning. Experiment 3 revealed that 2‐year‐olds will use a single model’s level of confidence to guide their learning if they have observed that the model has a history of being either consistently confident or consistently uncertain. These findings reveal that young children selectively alter their learning based on others’ non‐verbal cues of credibility, and underscore the importance of an early sensitivity to socio‐cognitive cues for human learning and development.     

Children infer affiliative and status relations from watching others imitate

We investigated whether young children are able to infer affiliative relations and relative status from observing others' imitative interactions. Children watched videos showing one individual imitating another and were asked about the relationship between those individuals. Experiment 1 showed that 5‐year‐olds assume that individuals imitate people they like. Experiment 2 showed that children of the same age assume that an individual who imitates is relatively lower in status. Thus, although there are many advantages to imitating others, there may also be reputational costs. Younger children, 4‐year‐olds, did not reliably make either inference. Taken together, these experiments demonstrate that imitation conveys valuable information about third party relationships and that, at least by the age of 5, children are able to use this information in order to infer who is allied with whom and who is dominant over whom. In doing so, they add a new dimension to our understanding of the role of imitation in human social life.     

Developing cognitions about race: White 5‐ to 10‐year‐olds' perceptions of hardship and pain

White American adults assume that Blacks feel less pain than do Whites, but only if they believe that Blacks have faced greater economic hardship than Whites. The current study investigates when in development children first recognize racial group differences in economic hardship and examines whether perceptions of hardship inform children's racial bias in pain perception. Five‐ to 10‐year‐olds (N = 178) guessed which of two items (low versus high value) belonged to a Black and a White child and rated the amount of pain a Black and a White child would feel in 10 painful situations. By age 5, White American children attributed lower‐value possessions to Blacks than Whites, indicating a recognition of racial group differences in economic hardship. The results also replicated the emergence of a racial bias in pain perception between 5 and 10. However, unlike adults', children's perceptions of hardship do not account for racial bias in pain perception.     

Knowing about not remembering: developmental dissociations in lack‐of‐memory monitoring

Children aged 7 and younger encounter great difficulty in assessing whether lack of memory for an event indicates that the event was not experienced. The present research investigated whether this difficulty results from a general inability to evaluate memory absence or from a specific inability to monitor one feature of memory absence that has been examined in previous studies, namely expected memorability. Seven‐, 8‐ and 9‐year‐olds, and adults (N = 72) enacted, imagined and confabulated about bizarre and common actions. Two weeks later, participants were asked to recognize the actions that had been enacted. Even 7‐year‐olds monitored the relative familiarity of rejected distracters (i.e. reported higher confidence for the rejection of novel versus imagined and confabulated distracters). However, only older children and adults exhibited the ability to monitor expected memorability (e.g. reported higher confidence for the rejection of bizarre versus common distracters). These results suggest that young children exhibit specific, rather than general, deficits in monitoring memory absence, and provide an indication of the specific domains in which lack‐of‐memory monitoring improves during childhood.     

On‐line ostracism affects children differently from adolescents and adults

This research examines adults', and for the first time, children's and adolescents' reaction to being ostracized and included, using an on‐line game, ‘Cyberball’ with same and opposite sex players. Ostracism strongly threatened four primary needs (esteem, belonging, meaning, and control) and lowered mood among 8‐ to 9‐year‐olds, 13‐ to 14‐year‐olds, and adults. However, it did so in different ways. Ostracism threatened self‐esteem needs more among 8‐ to 9‐year‐olds than older participants. Among 13‐ to 14‐year‐olds, ostracism threatened belonging more than other needs. Belonging was threatened most when ostracism was participants' first experience in the game. Moreover, when participants had been included beforehand, ostracism threatened meaning needs most strongly. Gender of other players had no effect. Practical and developmental implications for social inclusion and on‐line experiences among children and young people are discussed.     

Self‐Creation? On the Dignity of Human Beings

It was not through biotechnological possibilities that human beings first discovered “self‐creation” as a question. Rather, the question fits into the horizon of the primordial human desire to be like God. Against this hamartiological insight, a soteriological expectation related to technology has arisen. The latter expectation must be rejected, but not in all respects. Rather, one has to stress the inventive and constructive aspect of the dignity to rule, which is implied in human linguistic reason (λογοσ). There are, however, boundaries to be perceived and to be set. This becomes evident when embryo‐consuming research is at stake. In this context, the main question is: Wherein lies human “dignity”? This is the same question as: wherein lies the “being‐as‐person”? The author sees the fewest difficulties in attributing personhood to the beginning of life, which occurs with the fusion of ovum and sperm. This attribution is not justified by the material substrate as such. Rather, it is the result of intertwining the element, namely the lump of cells, and the word of institution, which “speaks together” the lump of cells and the person: This lump of cells is a person. Human beings are honored and enabled to use this instituting word, a φυσ?ι, because according to Gen 2:7 and 19f, God granted unto human beings linguistic reason (λογοσ), and thus the power to define. In this intertwining of element and instituting word lies the human dignity, which is undeservedly conferred on humans as a categorical gift. This absolute gratuity implies the unconditional acknowledgment of the dignity and the personhood of human beings—before one can speak of any characteristics or abilities. Psalm 8 underscores the elementary human dependency on unconditional acknowledgment as an inviolable person, an acknowledgment preceding all human characteristics and achievements. The psalm further intertwines this acknowledgment and the commission to rule, which is conferred on human beings, as an insoluble unity. What at first appear to be opposites is in fact a synopsis and inseparable connection of creaturely human determinations that correspond to God's simultaneously being the almighty creator and the compassionate, merciful father. By using “dignity” and “person” as critical terms of negotiation, theology can engage in a conversation with the societal and political public. In rejecting the dominant determination of the “person” as an autonomous, self‐determinately active, individual rational being, theology finds an ally in juridical thinking, which also acknowledges the dignity even of persons unable to act. Two consequences are to be drawn concerning biotechnology: perceiving the remaining dependency, vulnerability and vanity of human beings forces us to abandon illusions of “self‐creation” and immortality. Second, priorities are required that determine the goals and limits of research—especially in protecting the personal dignity of embryos—in the light of our accountability before God the creator and judge.