Can we perceive mental states?

Synthese - In this paper, I defend Non-Inferentialism about mental states, the view that we can perceive some mental states in a direct, non-inferential way. First, I discuss how the question of...     

Attacked by the gods or by mental illness? Hybridizing mental and spiritual health in Okinawa

In 1972, the reversion to Japanese rule brought with it many changes for Okinawans, among them the widespread introduction of psychiatry. Psychiatry was not well received at first due to the extensive presence of shamans, who had traditionally dealt with Okinawans’ spiritual and psychological afflictions. Both psychiatrists and shamans claimed to be able to heal those who were labelled ‘mentally ill’ or ‘mentally disordered’ by psychiatrists. This conflict between systems over the body of the patient/client is relevant to debates today about both the perceived value of generic mental health diagnosis and treatment regimes compared with indigenous healing,1 See Kleinman (, ); WHO (2001).  [Google Scholar] and the question of isolating how markers or symbols of identity are employed in patients’ help-seeking choices. We examine three cases from the 1970s of patients who were diagnosed as suffering from both schizophrenia and an indigenous condition known as kami daarii.     

What is ‘mental action’?

There has been a resurgence of interest lately within the philosophy of mind and action in the category of mental action. Against this background, the present paper aims to question the very possibility, or at least the theoretical significance, of teasing apart mental and bodily acts. After raising some doubts over the viability of various possible ways of drawing the mental-act–bodily-act distinction, the paper draws some lessons from debates over embodied cognition which, arguably, further undermine the credibility of the distinction. The insignificance of the distinction is demonstrated in part by showing how the focus on “inner” acts hampers fruitful discussion of Galen Strawson’s skepticism of mental agency. Finally, the possibility is discussed that a distinction between covert and overt action should supplant the one between mental and bodily action.     

The end of mental illness thinking?

Mental health theory and practice are in a state of significant flux. This theoretical article places the position taken by the British Psychological Society Division of Clinical Psychology (DCP) in the context of current practice and seeks to critically examine some of the key factors that are driving these transformations. The impetus for a complete overhaul of existing thinking comes from the manifestly poor performance of mental health services in which those with serious mental health problems have reduced life expectancy. It advocates using the advances in our understanding of the psychological, social and physical mechanisms that underpin psychological wellbeing and mental distress, and rejecting the disease model of mental distress as part of an outdated paradigm. Innovative research in genetics, neuroscience, psychological and social theory provide the platform for changing the way we conceptualise, formulate and respond to psychological distress at both community and individual levels.     

Evolutionary economics of mental time travel?

What is the function of our capacity for 'mental time travel'? Evolutionary considerations suggest that vivid memory and imaginative foresight may be crucial cognitive devices for human decision making. Our emotional engagement with past or future events gives them great motivational force, which may counter a natural tendency towards time discounting and impulsive, opportunistic behavior. In this view, whereas simple episodic memory provides us with a store of relevant, case-based information to guide decisions, mental time travel nudges us towards more restrained choices, which in the long term are advantageous, especially so given human dependence on cooperation and coordination.     

Some myths about ‘mental illness’

Radical psychiatrists and others assert that mental illness is a myth. The opening and closing portions of the paper deal with the impact such argument has had in law and psychiatry. The body of the paper discusses the five versions of the myth argument prevalent in radical psychiatry: (A) that there is no such thing as mental illness; (B) that those called ‘mentally ill’ are really as rational as everyone else, only with different aims; that the only reasons anyone ever thought differently was (C) because of unsophisticated category mistakes or (D) because of an adherence to the epistemology of a sick society; and (E) that the phrase ‘mental illness’ is used to mask value judgments about others’ behavior in pseudo‐scientific respectability. Reasons are given for rejecting each of these versions of the argument that mental illness is a myth.     

Is mental rotation controlled or automatic?

A task requiring the mental rotation of letters was performed either alone or during the retention interval of two short-term memory tasks. The retention of eight digits or random configurations of eight dots slowed overall reaction time on the mental-rotation task, but did not significantly alter the estimated rate of mental rotation. Conversely, performance on the memory tasks did not vary with the angle of mental rotation. These results support the view that attentional control is required to set up the mental structures required in mental rotation, but that the actual execution of the mental-rotation component can be relegated to subordinate systems that do not compete for attentional resources.     

Can mental rotation begin before perception finishes?

We conducted six experiments to determine if mental rotation can begin before perception finishes, as allowed by continuous flow models but not discrete stage models of information processing. The results of Experiments 1–3 showed that the effect of shape discriminability on RT was underadditive with the effect of stimulus orientation, suggesting that mental rotation began before shape discrimination had finished and that the two processes overlapped in time. The results of Experiments 4–6 indicated that mental rotation can overlap with color discriminations as well. In both sets of experiments, however, the amount of underadditivity tended to be much less than predicted by models allowing interference-free overlap. This suggests that mental rotation can overlap with perceptual analysis, contrary to fully discrete models, but that little rotation is carried out during this overlap due to interference between simultaneous discrimination and rotation processes.     

What’s up in mental rotation?

We report two experiments on the influence of head tilt on mental rotation. In Experiment I, subjects decided whether dot patterns were or were not repeated about a line. Their reaction times (RTs) were consistent with the interpretation that they mentally rotated the patterns so that the line was subjectively vertical before making their decisions. When the subjects tilted their heads, the RT functions shifted in the direction of the tilt, indicating that the subjective vertical lay closer to the retinal than to the gravitational vertical. In Experiment II, subjects decided whether singly presented alphanumeric characters in various orientations were standard or backward (mirror-reversed). Again, analysis of their RTs suggested mental rotation to the standard upright, but the function was unaffected by head tilt; in this case, the subjects operated in subjective gravitational rather than retinal coordinates. The choice of retinal or gravitational coordinates may depend on whether the stimuli are interpreted egocentrically or as part of the external world.     

Do infants bind mental states to agents?

Recent findings suggest that infants understand others’ preferential choice and can use the perspectives and beliefs of others to interpret their actions. The standard interpretation in the field is that infants understand preferential choice as a dispositional state of the agent. It is possible, however, that these social situations trigger the acquisition of more general, not person-specific knowledge. In a looking-time study we showed an Agent A demonstrating a choice, that only could have been interpreted as preferential based on the perspective (and thus the belief) of the agent, not the observer. Then we introduced a new agent (Agent B), who chose consistently or inconsistently with Agent A; also varying whether Agent B was an adult or a child. Results show that infants expected Agent B (both the adult and the child) to choose as Agent A, but only in the condition where according to Agent A’s knowledge two objects were present in familiarization(confirming previous evidence on the importance of contrastive choice). We interpret these results in the following way: (1) infants do not encode the perspectives of other agents as person-specific sources of knowledge and (2) they learn about the object, rather than the agent’s disposition towards that object. We propose that early theory of mind processes lack the binding of belief content to the belief holder. However, such limitation may in fact serve an important function, allowing infants to acquire information through the perspectives of others in the form of universal access to general information.     

Does mental rotation ability depend on sensory-specific experience?

No study has investigated the link between vision and touch with respect to spatial abilities using a within-subjects design. With this design, we compared participants’ tactile and visual mental rotation abilities, as measured by the Mental Rotations Test (Vandenberg & Kuse, 1978). Participants in four groups completed two consecutive sessions under no-switch (visual-visual or tactile-tactile) or switch conditions (visual-tactile or tactile-visual) to determine whether mental rotation abilities assessed in Session 2 depend on previous sensory-specific experiences (Session 1). Analysis of response accuracy revealed that all groups improved their performance in Session 2. Analysis of response time showed an improvement in visual and tactile performance during Session 2 for participants who first performed the task with the same modality. No effect of task repetition appeared for participants who performed in two different sensory conditions. These results reveal that mental rotation ability partly depends on sensory-specific conditions and that ability developed in a sensory-specific condition does not necessarily transfer to another sensory condition.     

The mother’s mental representation of her infant

Abstract

The mother’s intrapsychic mental representation of her infant begins before pregnancy and is modified during pregnancy and thereafter. Parents have conscious expectations and unconscious fantasies about their infant, which are all too often not consistent with reality. Early intervention in infant–parent disturbances is important for repair of the relationship and prevention of later pathogenic development. A clinical example of a mother’s unconscious ambivalent mental representations of her infant is presented.     

Does Kantian mental content externalism help metaphysical realists?

Standard interpretations of Kant’s transcendental idealism take it as a commitment to the view that the objects of cognition are structured or made by conditions imposed by the mind, and therefore to what Van Cleve calls “honest-to-God idealism”. Against this view, many more recent investigations of Kant’s theory of representation and cognitive significance have been able to show that Kant is committed to a certain form of Mental Content Externalism, and therefore to the realist view that the objects involved in experience and empirical knowledge are mind-independent particulars. Some of these recent interpreters have taken this result to demonstrate an internal incompatibility between Kant‘s transcendental idealism and his own model of cognitive content and the environmental conditions of empirical knowledge. Against this suggestion, this article argues that, while Kant’s theory of content is indeed best construed as externalist, an adequately adjusted form of transcendental idealism is not only compatible with this externalism, but in fact supports it. More generally, the article develops the position that mental content externalism cannot force the adoption of metaphysical realism.     

Do automatic mental associations detect a flashbulb memory?

Flashbulb memories (FBMs) are defined as detailed memories for the reception context in which people first heard of a public and emotionally relevant event. For many years researchers have been debating whether FBMs can be considered a special class of emotional memories, or whether they suffer the same fate as ordinary autobiographical formations. The debate on the real existence of this special class of memories reflects the difficulty of establishing their accuracy. Three indices have been defined as proxies for FBM accuracy: specificity of recalled details, individuals’ confidence in their memory, and memory consistency over time. However, all approaches to FBM assessment have been based on explicit self-report measures. In two studies we aimed to detect FBMs for two emotional public events, by simultaneously employing explicit traditional FBM measures and implicit measures based on the autobiographical Implicit Association Test (aIAT). Jointly considered, the results from the two studies showed that the implicit measures were able to discriminate a FBM, and appeared significantly associated with explicit traditional measures of FBM Specificity, Confidence, and Consistency. Both explicit and implicit assessments concurred to correctly estimate a FBM. Implications for the FBM debate are discussed.     

Coventry university students’ experience of mental health problems

Growing numbers of university students are reporting mental health problems and using counselling services. The purpose of this study was to examine Coventry University students’ experience of mental health problems. The Department of Health (DoH) Mental Health Survey questionnaire (2003) was used to examine the experience of mental health problems and help seeking behaviour. Within the last 12 months nearly three quarters of students had experienced anxious or depressed moods, or, personal, mental, nervous or emotional problems, with a third of students failing to seek help. Ethnic minority students were more likely to report problems and less likely to seek help when compared to white students. Male students were less likely to seek help compared to female students. There are few existing studies that have focused on the mental health of students at universities established after 1992 from existing polytechnics. Coventry University exceeds the Government benchmark targets for recruiting students from non-traditional backgrounds. Our results show that it is these groups of students who are more likely to experience mental health problems.     

When can we introspect accurately about mental processes?

Some theorists have suggested that the cognitive processes determining a person’s perforance in a given task are unconscious, making introspection a poor research tool for studying these processes. Others have argued that the relevant processes usually are consciously conrolled and can be detailed by asking the person to introspect. Here, a synthesis of these two positions, a dual-factor approach, is proposed. Some of the processes involved in achieving a cognitive goal, such as learning a new concept, are viewed as unconscious and automatic; howver, other processes are intentionally allocated conscious attention, in certain tasks, to accomlish othe goal. To illustrate this dual-factor position, evidence is presented in support of the view that when concept learning occurs solely by automatic frequency processing, introspective reports are inaccurate, but when the nature of the task prompts intentional hypothesis testing, introspective reports are accurate, revealing clues that subjects engage in a conscious hypothesisesting strategy.