‘I bet you know more and are nicer too!’: what children infer from others’ accuracy

Research has shown that preschoolers monitor others’ prior accuracy and prefer to learn from individuals who have the best track record. We investigated the scope of preschoolers’ attributions based on an individual’s prior accuracy. Experiment 1 revealed that 5‐year‐olds (but not 4‐year‐olds) used an individual’s prior accuracy at labelling to predict her knowledge of words and broader facts; they also showed a ‘halo effect’ predicting she would be more prosocial. Experiment 2 confirmed that, overall, 4‐year‐olds did not make explicit generalizations of knowledge. These findings suggest that an individual’s prior accuracy influences older preschoolers’ expectations of that individual’s broader knowledge as well as their impressions of how she will behave in social interactions.     

Children's judgments about their own self‐knowledge: The role of disclosure to other

Previous research has suggested that children of 5/6 years fail to understand that they are the authority on their own self‐knowledge. That is, when asked questions like, ‘Who knows best when you are feeling tired?’, they tend to cite their mother rather than themselves. Here we report a study that, rather than asking about generalities (‘Who knows best what you are thinking?’), presented 5‐, 7‐ 9‐ and 11‐year‐children with hypothetical vignettes about specific circumstances in which they were described as either disclosing or not disclosing a specified state to their mother. Children were subsequently asked to judge who would best know the state. Over all age groups children were significantly more likely to identify themselves as authorities on their own self‐knowledge when states had not been disclosed to mother than when they had. However, in the case of disclosed states, young children (though not older ones) asserted that, ‘mum knows best’. These findings are interpreted as suggesting not that young children entirely fail to understand first person authority, but instead that they make the relatively sophisticated assumption that mothers' interpretive competence is greater than their own.     

Gaining knowledge via other minds: Children's flexible trust in others as sources of information

In five experiments, we examined 3‐ to 6‐year‐olds’ understanding that they could gain knowledge indirectly from someone who had seen something they had not. Consistent with previous research, children judged that an informant, who had seen inside a box, knew its contents. Similarly, when an informant marked a picture to indicate her suggestion as to the content of the box, 3‐ to 4‐year‐olds trusted this more frequently when the informant had seen inside the box than when she had not. Going beyond previous research, 3‐ to 4‐year‐olds were also sensitive to informants’ relevant experience when they had to look over a barrier to see the marked picture, or ask for the barrier to be raised. Yet when children had to elicit the informant's suggestion, rather than just consult a suggestion already present, even 4‐ to 5‐year‐olds were no more likely to do so when the informant had seen the box's content than when she had not, and no more likely to trust the well‐informed suggestion than the uninformed one. We conclude that young children who can ask questions may not yet fully understand the process by which they can gain accurate information from someone who has the experience they lack.     

Children's working understanding of the knowledge gained from seeing and feeling

In three experiments (N = 48 3‐ to 4‐year olds; 100 3‐ to 5‐year olds; 54 4‐year‐olds), children who could see or feel a target toy, recognized when they had sufficient information to answer ‘Which one is it?’ and when they needed additional access. They were weaker at taking the informative modality of access when the choice was between seeing more of a partially visible toy and feeling it; at doing so when the target was completely hidden; and at reporting seeing or feeling as their source of knowledge of the target's identity having experienced both. Working understanding of the knowledge gained from seeing and feeling (identifying the target efficiently) was not necessarily in advance of explicit understanding (reporting the informative source).     

Self‐knowledge in childhood: Relations with children's imaginary companions and understanding of mind

Relations between interior self‐knowledge and (a) imaginary companion (IC) status and (b) theory of mind (ToM) abilities were investigated in a sample (N= 80) of 4‐ to 7‐year‐olds. Interior self‐knowledge was assessed in terms of the extent to which children acknowledged that they (rather than an adult) were the authority on unobservable aspects of themselves (e.g., dreaming, thinking, hunger). Compared with children without an IC, those who possessed a parentally corroborated IC ascribed less interior self‐knowledge to an adult, with a trend for them to assign more interior self‐knowledge to themselves. Children's interior self‐knowledge judgments were not associated with their ToM performance. IC status was also unrelated to ToM performance. We consider how having an IC may provide children with opportunities to distinguish between knowledge that is inaccessible to an external observer and that which an external observer may glean without being told.     

Early humour production

The current studies explored early humour as a complex socio‐cognitive phenomenon by examining 2‐ and 3‐year‐olds’ humour production with their parents. We examined whether children produced novel humour, whether they cued their humour, and the types of humour produced. Forty‐seven parents were interviewed, and videotaped joking with their children. Other parents (N= 113) completed a survey. Parents reported children copy jokes during the first year of life, and produce novel jokes from 2 years. In play sessions, 3‐year‐olds produced mostly novel humorous acts; 2‐year‐olds produced novel and copied humorous acts equally frequently. Parents reported children smile, laugh, and look for a reaction when joking. In play sessions, 2‐ and 3‐year‐olds produced these behaviours more when producing humorous versus non‐humorous acts. In both parent reports and play sessions, they produced novel object‐based (e.g., underwear on head) and conceptual humour (e.g., ‘pig says moo’) and used wrong labels humorously (e.g., calling a cat a dog). Thus, parent report and child behaviour both confirm that young children produce novel humorous acts, and share their humour by smiling, laughing, and looking for a reaction.     

Discourse bootstrapping: preschoolers use linguistic discourse to learn new words

When children acquire language, they often learn words in the absence of direct instruction (e.g. ‘This is a ball!’) or even social cues to reference (e.g. eye gaze, pointing). However, there are few accounts of how children do this, especially in cases where the referent of a new word is ambiguous. Across two experiments, we test whether preschoolers (2‐ to 4‐year‐olds; n = 239) can learn new words by inferring the referent of a new word from the surrounding linguistic discourse. Across two experiments, we show that children as young as 2 can learn a new word from the linguistic discourse in which it appears. This suggests that children use the linguistic discourse in which a word appears to learn new words.     

Who knows best? Preschoolers sometimes prefer child informants over adult informants

Do preschoolers think adults know more about everything than children? Or do they recognize that there are some things that children might know more about than adults? Three‐, four‐, and five‐year olds (N=65) were asked to decide whether an adult or child informant would better be able to answer a variety of questions about the nutritional value of foods and about toys. Children at all ages chose to direct the food questions to the adult and the toy questions to the child. Thus, there are some kinds of information for which preschoolers expect that a child would be a better informant than an adult. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Indicating when you do not know the answer: The effect of question format and interviewer knowledge on children's ‘don't know’ responses

Children are interviewed in a variety of contexts, for example, in the legal setting and in experimental research. In these situations, it is often very important that children indicate when they do not know the answer to a question, rather than guess. In the present experiment, one hundred and forty‐nine 5‐ to 9‐year‐olds witnessed a staged event in one of two conditions. The interviewer was either present at the event (knowledgeable interviewer) or absent from the event (uninformed interviewer). Children were then interviewed using yes/no questions and wh‐questions. Within each type of question, half were answerable based on the information provided; the other half were not answerable (i. e. the correct answer was ‘don't know’). The children performed consistently well with the answerable questions. With the unanswerable questions, there was an effect of format and interviewer knowledge. Children were more likely correctly to indicate that they did not know the answer to an unanswerable wh‐question than an unanswerable yes/no question. Also, children were more likely correctly to say ‘don't know’ to unanswerable questions when the interviewer had been absent from the event.     

Cultural influences on children's understanding of the human body and the concept of life

This study aimed to identify the age by which children begin to demonstrate a biological understanding of the human body and the idea that the purpose of body functioning is to maintain life. The study also explored the influence of education, culturally specific experiences and religion on knowledge acquisition in this domain. Children aged between 4 and 7 years from three different cultural backgrounds (White British, British Muslim, and Pakistani Muslim) were interviewed about the human body and its functioning. At least half of the 4‐ to 5‐year‐olds in each cultural group, and almost all 6‐ to 7‐year‐olds, referred to the maintenance of life when explaining organs' functions and so were classified as ‘life theorizers’. Pakistani Muslim children gave fewer biological responses to questions about organs' functions and the purpose of eating and breathing, but referred to life more than their British counterparts. Irrespective of cultural group, older children understood organ location and function better than younger children. These findings support Jaakkola and Slaughter's (2002, Br. J. Dev. Psychol., 20, 325) view that children's understanding of the body as a ‘life machine’ emerges around the ages of 4–5 years. They also suggest that, despite many similarities in children's ideas cross‐culturally, different educational input and culturally specific experiences influence aspects of their biological understanding.     

To be or not to be a galaprock: Preschoolers' intuitions about the importance of knowledge and action for pretending

Can someone pretend to be a galaprock without knowing what a galaprock is? Do children recognize that such knowledge is required for pretending? Three studies focusing on the relations among action, knowledge and pretending suggest that children have this understanding by age 4 years. In Study 1, 4‐year‐olds and adults willingly pretended to be moving and unmoving objects but had trouble pretending to be objects that were difficult to represent physically. In Study 2, 3‐ and 4‐year‐olds claimed they could not pretend to be an unknown thing, justifying their refusals with mentalistic language indicating their ignorance of the object or its typical actions. In Study 3, 3‐ to 5‐year‐olds predicted that other children who have knowledge of an object unfamiliar to the subjects themselves can nevertheless pretend to be it, whereas those lacking that knowledge cannot. The results add support to the growing literature showing that preschoolers conceptualize pretense as involving mental activity.     

On‐line ostracism affects children differently from adolescents and adults

This research examines adults', and for the first time, children's and adolescents' reaction to being ostracized and included, using an on‐line game, ‘Cyberball’ with same and opposite sex players. Ostracism strongly threatened four primary needs (esteem, belonging, meaning, and control) and lowered mood among 8‐ to 9‐year‐olds, 13‐ to 14‐year‐olds, and adults. However, it did so in different ways. Ostracism threatened self‐esteem needs more among 8‐ to 9‐year‐olds than older participants. Among 13‐ to 14‐year‐olds, ostracism threatened belonging more than other needs. Belonging was threatened most when ostracism was participants' first experience in the game. Moreover, when participants had been included beforehand, ostracism threatened meaning needs most strongly. Gender of other players had no effect. Practical and developmental implications for social inclusion and on‐line experiences among children and young people are discussed.     

The development of bodily self‐consciousness: changing responses to the Full Body Illusion in childhood

The present work investigates the development of bodily self‐consciousness and its relation to multisensory bodily information, by measuring for the first time the development of responses to the full body illusion in childhood. We tested three age groups of children: 6‐ to 7‐year‐olds (n = 28); 8‐ to 9‐year‐olds (n = 21); 10‐ to 11‐year‐olds (n = 19), and a group of adults (n = 31). Each participant wore a head‐mounted display (HMD) which displayed a view from a video camera positioned 2 metres behind their own back. Thus, they could view a virtual body from behind. We manipulated visuo‐tactile synchrony by showing the participants a view of their virtual back being stroked with a stick at the same time and same place as their real back (synchronous condition), or at different times and places (asynchronous condition). After each period of stroking, we measured three aspects of bodily self‐consciousness: drift in perceived self‐location, self‐identification with the virtual body, and touch referral to the virtual body. Results show that self‐identification with the virtual body was significantly stronger in the synchronous condition than in the asynchronous condition even in the youngest group tested; however, the size of this effect increased with age. Touch referral to the virtual body was greater in the synchronous condition than in the asynchronous condition only for 10‐ to 11‐year‐olds and adults. Drift in perceived self‐location was greater in the synchronous condition than in the asynchronous condition only for adults. Thus, the youngest age tested can self‐identify with a virtual body, but the links between multisensory signals and bodily self‐consciousness develop significantly across childhood. This suggests a long period of development of the bodily self and exciting potential for the use of virtual reality technologies with children.     

Event report training: An examination of the efficacy of a new intervention to improve children's eyewitness reports

This study tested the efficacy of Event Report Training (ERT), a training procedure designed to improve children's memory reports and decrease suggestibility. Children (N = 58) participated in two forensically relevant play events. Two weeks later, children received ERT or participated in control procedures, after which they received a memory interview. Results indicated that ERT decreased suggestibility to abuse‐related questions in preschoolers; their responses were highly accurate and age differences were eliminated. ERT did not increase the amount of information preschoolers provided in response to open‐ended questions. However, with ERT 7‐ to 8‐year‐olds reported 32% more information which included a 32% increase in actions, without an accompanying increase in incorrect information. Due to school‐aged children's high accuracy rates, it was impossible to gauge the effectiveness of ERT in reducing suggestibility. The failure to obtain an effect of ERT in preschoolers' open‐ended recall is discussed in terms of their cognitive‐developmental limitations. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Interviewing children and adults: the effect of question format on the tendency to speculate

In formal interviews it is important that interviewees indicate when they do not know the answer, rather than speculate. In this study we investigated whether question format affected the tendency to speculate. One hundred and twenty‐eight 5‐ to 9‐year‐olds, and 23 adults, were told two short stories, and were then asked questions about the stories. Half of the questions were answerable based on the information provided; the other half were not answerable. Within these categories, half of the questions were closed questions (i.e. only required a yes/no response), and half were wh‐questions (i.e. requested particular details to be provided). All participants performed at ceiling with the answerable questions. With the unanswerable questions, there was an effect of format. The majority of children and adults correctly indicated that they did not know the answer when asked unanswerable wh‐questions. However, the majority of children, and just over one‐fifth of adults, provided a response (i.e. ‘yes’ or ‘no’) to the closed unanswerable questions. The implications for interviews, particularly within a forensic context, are discussed. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

When do children trust the expert? Benevolence information influences children's trust more than expertise

How do children use informant niceness, meanness, and expertise when choosing between informant claims and crediting informants with knowledge? In Experiment 1, preschoolers met two experts providing conflicting claims for which only one had relevant expertise. Five‐year‐olds endorsed the relevant expert's claim and credited him with knowledge more often than 3‐year‐olds. In Experiment 2, niceness/meanness information was added. Although children most strongly preferred the nice relevant expert, the children often chose the nice irrelevant expert when the relevant one was mean. In Experiment 3, a mean expert was paired with a nice non‐expert. Although this nice informant had no expertise, preschoolers continued to endorse his claims and credit him with knowledge. Also noteworthy, children in all three experiments seemed to struggle more to choose the relevant expert's claim than to credit him with knowledge. Together, these experiments demonstrate that niceness/meanness information can powerfully influence how children evaluate informants.