Toward an Ethics of Knowledge

Abstract. Modern science is one form of knowledge, demarcated by its time (modernity) and by other “knowledges.” There is a fair amount of clarity as to what does not count as scientific, but there is a twilight zone of knowledges whose scientific status is ambivalent. In this zone the encounter between science and religion takes place. The particular contribution of religion and theology in this encounter is to call for an ethics of knowledge in the epistemological endeavors of science.     

THE SCIENTIFIC CHARACTER OF PHILIP HEFNER'S “CREATED CO‐CREATOR”

Philip Hefner's understanding of humans as “created co‐creators” has played a key role in the science and religion field, particularly as scholars consider the implications of emerging technologies for the human future. Hefner articulates his “created co‐creator” framework in the form of scientifically testable hypotheses supporting his core understanding of human nature, adopting the structure of Imre Lakatos's scientific research programme. This article provides a brief exposition of Hefner's model, examines his hypotheses in order to assess their scientific character, and evaluates them against the relevant findings of contemporary science. While Hefner's model is largely commensurate with contemporary science, he at times makes claims that cannot be scientifically falsified or corroborated. Hefner's accomplishments in demonstrating the scientific compatibility of many theological notions is admirable; however, his overall position would be strengthened with a more tacit acknowledgment of the limitations of scientific knowledge. His anthropology draws also from extrascientific commitments and is all the richer for it.     

Religious Education and Information Technology: Challenges and Problems

Abstract. With advances in information technology, the velocity of information production on the global level has expanded as well. This acceleration has led to the delegitimizing of knowledge, the equating of information with knowledge, and the giving of predominance to information rather than knowledge. This advance has created epistemological challenges for the process of religious education. At the same time, the growth of the internet has created a “rhizomatic space” possessing new methodological characteristics that create problems for religious education. Information technology generates a “hypertextual learning space,” which weakens the place of traditional texts in the learning process, particularly in a traditional religious education process. This hypertextual development is especially problematic for religious education in conservative or fundamentalist traditions. This article analyzes the epistemological, methodological, and contextual problems and challenges posed by information technology for traditional religious education processes.     

Quantum Mechanics and "Song of Myself": Getting a Grip on Reality

Most recent writing linking science and literature has concerned itself with challenges to the epistemological status of scientific knowledge in an attempt to demonstrate its contingency, arguing in the more radical efforts that the structures of science are no more than useful fictions. This essay also includes an epistemological comparison between science and literature, but instead of making grand or meta–statements about the nature of knowing generally in the two fields, mine is a much narrower aim. My exploration entails two tasks. First, I provide a close–up look at a particular type of experiment, called the delayed–choice experiment, which clearly reveals the strangeness of the quantum world. In connection with this experiment, I discuss wave functions—mathematical expressions used by physicists to describe quantum behavior and predict the outcome of experiments involving quanta. Second, I look at Walt Whitman's “Song of Myself” focusing on the meaning of the “self” in the poem. My aim is to treat the object of study in each field as a “text” and to assert and demonstrate a parallel in the strategies of thought and response between physicists (“readers”) pondering the meaning and status of a wave function and poem readers pondering the meaning and status of the poem's self. In Whitman's “Song” we find an attempt to understand complex aspects of human experience that are said to transcend ordinary reality, an effort for which I believe there are parallels in the attempts of modern physicists to understand complex, nonintuitive aspects of the subatomic world. While not making the kind of broad claims eschewed above, I do suggest that this focused study has interesting implications since both the wave function and the poem's self force their respective sets of “readers” to confront questions of ultimacy—to consider, that is, epistemological and ontological issues of more than passing interest to students of science as well as those of metaphysics and theology.     

Personality science and personal projects: Six impossible things before breakfast

Personality science pursues the paradoxical project of specializing in comprehensiveness, a pursuit that some may see as an inherently impossible undertaking. Accompanied by one such contrarian, a hypothetical “Reviewer C,” I explore six possible “impossibilities” in personality science. Together we examine our epistemological assumptions, conceptual units of analysis, assessment methodologies, psychometric techniques, social impact, and organizational viability. I focus on “personal projects” (Little, 1972, Little, 1983) as core integrative units of analysis that provide linkages with other integrative units. I propose that personality science will assume increasing importance at the very center of university curricula, as a hub of scientific progress and as a stimulant for a diversity of applied fields. Its paradoxes and perplexities notwithstanding, personality science is an audacious project that is already advancing our understanding of the depth and subtleties of human natures and nurturing attempts to enhance the quality of lives.     

Vilification of the “batterer”: How blame shapes domestic violence policy and interventions

This article explores ways in which the vilification of the “batterer” — the popular, policy, and “scientific” legitimization of the dismissive and degrading categorization of perpetrators — has influenced research, policy, and intervention in the field of domestic violence. The historical, political, ideological, legal, and theoretical bases of this process are reviewed. Factors behind the convergence of feminist and law enforcement perspectives are discussed. Current policies and practices are described as being unnecessarily constrained and unresponsive to a wide range of families and relationships. Vilification exerts its impact on policy through a rhetoric of blame, portraying perpetrators as undeserving of a broader range of interventions and services.     

Negative theology and science in the thought of Semyon Frank

Semën Frank (1877–1950) considered the Universe as the “all-unity.” According to him, everything is a part of the all-unity, which has a divine character. God is present in the world, but his nature is incomprehensible. In this article I analyze two consequences of Frank’s panentheistic view of the relation between science and theology. Firstly, the limits of scientific knowledge allow recognition of the mystery of the world and the transcendence of God. Secondly, Frank claimed that nature is a “trace” of God and the manifestation of the absolute reality, i.e. the all-unity. As a result, both science and theology lead to the knowledge of God, although we cannot understand His essence.     

Theology and the Crisis in Darwinism

In the past decade, the scientific challenges to “orthodox Darwinism” have multiplied rapidly, such that it is no longer unthinkable that natural selection’s days as a universal law are numbered. But if this is the case, theologians have their work cut out for them. If Darwin’s law proves to be historically and scientifically false, a new horizon appears for the discourse between theology and natural science. What will orthodox Christianity make of the crisis in Darwinism? This article, which follows the methodological imperative of “Radical Orthodoxy”, employs Aquinas and contemporary “post‐Darwinian” science to trace a space for a theological discourse beyond both natural selection and natural theology.     

DIVINE DNA? “SECULAR” AND “RELIGIOUS” REPRESENTATIONS OF SCIENCE IN NONFICTION SCIENCE TELEVISION PROGRAMS

Through analysis of film sequences focusing on DNA in two British Broadcasting Corporation nonfiction science television programs, Wonders of Life and Bang! Goes the Theory, first broadcast in 2013, contrasting “religious” and “secular” representations of science are identified. In the “religious” portrayal, immutable scientific knowledge is revealed to humanity by nature with minimal human intervention. Science provides a creation story, “explanatory omnicompetence,” and makes life existentially meaningful. In the “secular” portrayal, scientific knowledge is changeable; is produced through technical skill in expert communities; and is ambiguous, potentially positive and negative for society. Television representations of science affect audience understandings, and this is particularly the case for nonfiction representations of science, as they are likely to be “taken more seriously” than fictional representations. The consequences of the “religious” representation of science are discussed, and it is argued that a widespread understanding of science as presented in the religious portrayal would negatively impact democracy.     

Explorations on the Notion of Legal Tolerance

This article builds on the notion of legal tolerance and analyzes the scope of its definition. It situates the notion in the complex set of relations occurring between the major systems of society. Generally, legal tolerance, as a concept, is understood in light of the possibilities of the legal system of influencing other major systems’ responses. On the other hand, tolerance is also the response of the legal system in respect to other major systems’ communications. Although there is a common understanding of tolerance as “under punishing bias” in criminology or as political tolerance in political science, ¹ 1. There is also a distinct field in political science, where the issue is political tolerance. In this view, political tolerance is defined as “Political tolerance typically refers to individual-level attitudes that permit groups to express opinions or maintain practices that a majority finds objectionable.” See Allison Harrell, The limits of tolerance in diverse societies: Hate speech and political tolerance norms among youth. Canadian Journal of Political Science 43 (2010), 407–432. See also C. W. Collier, A legal theory of tolerance and perspective. ARSP. Archiv. für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 84(1) (1998), 59–86. Still within criminology, an antonym for legal tolerance would be the notion of “Rationalité Pénale Moderne”; see Pires, Alvaro Pires, “Beccaria, l’utilitarisme et la rationalité pénale moderne,” in Christian Debuyst, Françoise Digneffe, Jean-Michel Labadie, and Alvaro P. Pires, eds., Histoire des savoirs sur le crime et la peine. Tome II : La rationalité pénale et la naissance de la criminologie, Première partie: “La formation de la rationalité pénale moderne au XVIIIe siècle,” (Les Presses de l’Université de Montréal, Les Presses de l’Université d’Ottawa, De Boeck Université, 1998), chapter 3, 83–143. Collection: Perspectives criminologiques. the focus of this article is different. The central points here are, first, the analysis of legal tolerance as part of systemic communications and, second, the historicity of the transformations of the nation-state in its ability to cope with the growth of separate, distinct and partial systems of society. Tolerance seems relational and raises questions such as: “How much can the legal system tolerate?” And also, “Which societal topics belong to the social system's domain-matter?” These questions are relevant given that the concept of legal tolerance depends on the possibilities of a given system to steer, to direct or to influence other major systems’ behavior, or to resist, respond or to address other systems, which are in its environment.

The concept of legal tolerance requires an analysis of a cluster of related definitions to assess the implications of the concept. These definitions are the following: (1) The concepts that result from the historical process of structuration and that explain the emergence of social systems. (2) The definition of reflexivity and its relation with the “second order cybernetics dilemma.” This is the place where heuristic and epistemological problems are found. Such problems result from both the problem of representation and from the ontological status of the real. This analysis will show why reflexivity is a key concept to explaining the transformations suffered by such systems. Then, legal tolerance is a newer development in respect to the idea of planning. As an alternative to hard planning, legal tolerance creates a fostering environment. Instead of a single system directing other systems, legal tolerance is relational and created collectively by the organizational national state using its (limited) power of legal creation. Legal tolerance also stems from the concerned subsystems of the society (economy, law, politics, science, along with others) by means of a variety of legislative products, public policies, alliances, and legal and other scientific communications that emerge as coordinating mechanisms among the alluded major subsystems.     

GENOCIDAL MUTATION AND THE CHALLENGE OF DEFINITION

Abstract: The optimum definition of the term “genocide” has been hotly contested almost since the term was coined. Definitional boundaries determine which acts are covered and excluded and thus to a great extent which cases will benefit from international attention, intervention, prosecution, and reparation. The extensive legal, political, and scholarly discussions prior to this article have typically (1) assumed “genocide” to be a fixed social object and attempted to define it as precisely as possible or (2) assumed the need for a fixed convention and sought to stipulate the range of events that should be denoted by the term. Even if its meaning is a matter of convention, however, “genocide” is not a fixed object but varies by context and evolves in methods and forms over time. In fact, as relevant laws, legal interpretations, and political commitments develop, so do would‐be perpetrators modify what genocide is in order to avoid political and legal consequences. This article advances an approach to a definition of “genocide” that allows even legal definitions to keep pace with this evolutionary process.     

Durkheim's sociology of scientific knowledge

Durkheim's thinking on scientific knowledge reveals several contradictions, resulting from the relativist implications of his substantive theory of culture and the positivist assumptions of his metatheoretical definition of scientific methods in sociology. In his explanations of historical and cross-cultural differences in „truthful”︁ representations of reality, Durkheim suggests that logical and conceptual structures of knowledge are determined by social morphology, and that the validity of any truth-claim is limited to cultural contexts in which designated criteria of validation are normatively maintained. However, in epistemological works such as The Rules, Durkheim suggests that social factors are of little importance in constructing scientific knowledge, and that truths of science mirror external reality and so their validity transcends cultural boundaries.     

IN DEFENCE OF THE AGENT-CENTRED PERSPECTIVE

Abstract: This article explores certain issues that arise at the borderline between conceptual analysis and metaphysics, where answers to questions of a conceptual nature compete with answers to questions of an ontological or metaphysical nature. I focus on the way in which three philosophers, Kant, Collingwood and Davidson, articulate the relationship between the conceptual question “What are actions?” and the metaphysical question “How is agency possible?” I argue that the way in which one handles the relationship between the conceptual and the ontological question has important implications for one's conception of the nature of philosophy, and that thinking hard about what it takes to defend the autonomy of the mental and of the agent‐centred perspective should force us to think about our underlying conception of philosophy and to choose between one that understands it as first science and one that understands it as the under‐labourer of science.     

Expertise-related differences in conceptual and ontological knowledge in the legal domain

Little research has been conducted on expertise-related differences in conceptual and ontological knowledge in law, even though this type of knowledge is prerequisite for correctly interpreting and reasoning about legal cases, and differences in conceptual and ontological knowledge structures between students and between students and teachers, might lead to miscommunication. This study investigated the extent and organisation of conceptual and ontological knowledge of novices, advanced students, and experts in law, using a card-sorting task and a concept-elaboration task. The results showed that novices used more everyday examples and were less accurate in their elaborations of concepts than advanced students and experts, on top of that, the organisation of their knowledge did not overlap within their group (i.e., no “shared” ontology). Experts gave more judicial examples based on the lawbook and were more accurate in their elaborations than advanced students, and their knowledge was strongly overlapping within their group (i.e., strong ontology). Incorrect conceptual knowledge seems to impede the correct understanding of cases and the correct application of precise and formal rules in law.     

What Exactly Is It All About? Puzzled Comments from a French Legal Scholar on the NBIC Convergence

The techno-scientific development has no frontier, but the legal systems still take roots in local and cultural references. French Law is built on a continental model and conveys values and preferences of the French population, including an essential role given to the State and to textual requirements. Until now, French law has been modified to cope with new and emerging technologies issues with the idea that they can be taken one after the other, on the fringes of the classic legal problems. Do the announcement of a convergence between Nanotechnologies, Biotechnologies, the sciences of Information and Cognition (NBIC) change the situation? According to “converging technologies” partisans, a lot of other deep perturbations may occur. Therefore, it could be pertinent to assess the legal implications of NBIC convergence. But trying to do so, a French legal scholar may first feel (and express) perplexity. What is the “convergence NBIC”? To answer, do we have to wonder which reality hides behind the expression or is it necessary to admit that the speeches are here more important to analyze than a hypothetical realization? Does it imply new legal questions? Do we need new methods to enlighten what is at stake? Is it a new challenge, stimulating the imagination of lawyers and legal scholars, or, on the contrary, is it a new illustration of the Economy of the promises, revealing big risks of vain (or inappropriate) intellectual and normative production? This article is dedicated to enlighten the important difficulties which mark out the road towards the answers to the legal questions raised by the “NBIC convergence”.     

KANT ON RELIGION AND SCIENCE: INDEPENDENCE OR INTEGRATION?

Abstract. Immanuel Kant's theoretical knowledge and practical knowledge tempt conclusion that natural science and religion are two independent discourses of a dualistic system. To be sure, knowledge is anchored in two kinds of causality. Theoretical knowledge is governed by physical causality. Practical knowledge is concerned with the human capacity to initiate a sequence of events that nature could not accomplish on its own—although in conformity with, not independent of, natural causality. Furthermore, the two realms presuppose a common totality of order not of humanity's creation. Without these presuppositions, we could not experience the world as we do, and it would never occur to us to engage in a scientific investigation of the natural world. Hence, we should first exhaust our attempts at explanation on the basis of physical causality before turning to the aid of teleology. The anomalous becomes an occasion to seek a physical law not yet known whereas the miraculous hinders search for a natural law. However, higher than knowledge of “what is” is our capacity to discern “what should be.” This is an inclusive moral capacity that establishes what it means to be human and unites all moral agents in an invisible kingdom of ends that constitutes a moral culture in the physical world uniting religion and science.     

THE ATHENS/JERUSALEM TEMPLATE AND THE TECHNO‐SECULARISM THESIS—KICKING THE CAN DOWN THE ROAD

Abstract. The publication of my article “Athens, Jerusalem, and the Arrival of Techno‐secularism” (2005) in Zygon was followed by twenty‐one responses, most of them critical. In this essay I reply by clarifying the earlier one, separating out its two major theses: the Athens/Jerusalem template and the techno‐secularism thesis. The Athens/Jerusalem template is a typology that provides a historical basis for understanding why religion/science conflicts persist by showing that the contrasts between intellectual knowledge and revealed knowledge are permanent features of Western cultural history. Postmodern criticisms often have a negative edge, rejecting “canonical” accounts but not presenting alternative explanations. Historical context is helpful in understanding religion/science conflicts, which continue to exist. The present cultural situation is that technology is replacing religion—and science—as the dominant condition and theory of our culture. Evidence for the techno‐secularism thesis can be seen in the nature of electronic entertainment, which invades the silence required for religious contemplation and obscures the scientific laws that are the basis for the new technology.     

Assembling Upstream Engagement: the Case of the Portuguese Deliberative Forum on Nanotechnologies

This article analyzes a deliberative forum on nanotechnologies, organized in Portugal within the scope of the research project DEEPEN—Deepening Ethical Engagement and Participation in Emerging Nanotechnologies. This event included scientists, science communicators and members of the “lay public”, and resulted in a position document which summarizes collective aspirations and concerns related to nano. Drawing upon our previous experience with focus groups on nanotechnologies—characterized by methodological innovations that aimed at suspending epistemological inequalities between participants—this paper delves into the performativity of the deliberative event, exploring some of the tensions and power/knowledge asymmetries generated by the forum. Recognizing that the design of participatory assemblages matters, we reflect on our role as facilitators and explore the difficulties in organizing exercises of upstream engagement with emerging technologies.     

Explanatory disunities and the unity of science

According to John Dupré, the metaphysics underpinning modern science posits a deterministic, fully law‐governed and potentially fully intelligible structure that pervades the entire universe. To reject such a metaphysical framework for science is to subscribe to “the disorder of things”, and the latter, according to Dupré, entails the impossibility of a unified science. Dupré's argument rests crucially upon purported disunities evident in the explanatory practices of science. I critically examine the implied project of drawing metaphysical conclusions from epistemological premisses concerning the nature of our explanatory practices. I then argue that Dupré fails to answer a particular argument for the ontological unity of science that rests upon assumptions about the causal structure of the world. This “causal” argument for the unity of science might be countered by a more radical metaphysical revisionism. The latter, however, seems unable to account for features of our explanatory practices that testify to a measure of explanatory unity in science. I conclude by sketching a strategy that might enable the revisionist to overcome such difficulties.     

The convergence of Kuhn and cognitive psychology

Although psychology has been criticized for adhering to outmoded conceptions of knowledge (e.g. logical positivism), the assertion is made that at least one branch of psychology, namely cognitive psychology, is in the position to corroborate and extend contemporary philosophy of science. Kuhn's “learned perception of similarity” and the related notion of exemplar, which serve to exemplify more adequate conceptions of knowledge within the philosophy of science, are shown to converge with cognitive psychology's schema theory. In this way, the schema theory's empirical offspring provide a validation mechanism for Kuhn's notions and thus provide a richer understanding of the scientific enterprise. This convergence is seen as instantiating an epistemological trend towards understanding of limitations and validity of scientific evidence through an understanding of the limitations and validity of the scientist.