Abstract coherent categories

Many studies have demonstrated the importance of the knowledge that interrelates features in people's mental representation of categories and that makes our conception of categories coherent. This article focuses on abstract coherent categories, coherent categories that are also abstract because they are defined by relations independently of any features. Four experiments demonstrate that abstract coherent categories are learned more easily than control categories with identical features and statistical structure, and also that participants induced an abstract representation of the category by granting category membership to exemplars with completely novel features. The authors argue that the human conceptual system is heavily populated with abstract coherent concepts, including conceptions of social groups, societal institutions, legal, political, and military scenarios, and many superordinate categories, such as classes of natural kinds.     

Gender-based prototype formation in face recognition

The role of gender categories in prototype formation during face recognition was investigated in 2 experiments. The participants were asked to learn individual faces and then to recognize them. During recognition, individual faces were mixed with faces, which were blended faces of same or different genders. The results of the 2 experiments showed that blended faces made with learned individual faces were recognized, even though they had never been seen before. In Experiment 1, this effect was stronger when faces belonged to the same gender category (same-sex blended faces), but it also emerged across gender categories (cross-sex blended faces). Experiment 2 further showed that this prototype effect was not affected by the presentation order for same-sex blended faces: The effect was equally strong when the faces were presented one after the other during learning or alternated with faces of the opposite gender. By contrast, the prototype effect across gender categories was highly sensitive to the temporal proximity of the faces blended into the blended faces and almost disappeared when other faces were intermixed. These results indicate that distinct neural populations code for female and male faces. However, the formation of a facial representation can also be mediated by both neural populations. The implications for face-space properties and face-encoding processes are discussed.     

Young children use pedagogical cues to modulate the strength of normative inferences

Young children understand pedagogical demonstrations as conveying generic, kind‐relevant information. But, in some contexts, they also see almost any confident, intentional action on a novel artefact as normative and thus generic, regardless of whether this action was pedagogically demonstrated for them. Thus, although pedagogy may not be necessary for inferences to the generic, it may nevertheless be sufficient to produce inductive inferences on which the child relies more strongly. This study addresses this tension by bridging the literature on normative reasoning with that on social learning and inductive inference. Three‐year‐old children learned about a novel artefact from either a pedagogical or non‐pedagogical demonstration, and then, a series of new actors acted on that artefact in novel ways. Although children protested normatively in both conditions (e.g., ‘No, not like that’), they persisted longer in enforcing the learned norms in the face of repeated non‐conformity by the new actors. This finding suggests that not all generic, normative inferences are created equal, but rather they depend – at least for their strength – on the nature of the acquisition process.     

The role of structural consistency between categories and attributes in hierarchical category learning

This study investigated how consistency between categories and attributes determines attribute selection in hierarchical category learning. Participants learned six categories for which number and color were equally relevant attributes, followed by a transfer task, to test which attribute was used. Before that, half of them learned embedding higher-level categories for which numbers were likely to be used. Orthogonal to this factor, the hierarchical structure was made explicit for half of them by category labels. The results showed that participants used numbers in the prior learning, but that the use of numbers was inhibited in the subsequent six-category learning task. However, this inhibitory effect was reduced when the hierarchical structure was explicit. The pattern of results suggests that attribute selection is determined by structural consistency between categories and attributes, not by a prior use of an attribute.     

Take the best versus simultaneous feature matching: probabilistic inferences from memory and effects of representation format

In 4 experiments, the tendency to use the simple heuristic Take The Best (TTB; G. Gigerenzer & D. Goldstein, 1996) was explored for probabilistic multiattribute inferences from memory. In a newly developed procedure, participants first learned attribute patterns that formed the basis for inferences in a second phase. A Bayesian method classified strategies as TTB, compensatory, or guessing. Experiment 1 had a high rate (64%) of participants classified as TTB users when inferences were made from memory. Experiment 2 showed that this was no mere materials effect. In Experiments 3 and 4, the authors examined effects of the representational format of the attribute information. Experiment 4 showed that the representational format may be an important moderating variable for strategy use.     

Roles of egocentric and allocentric spatial representations in locomotion and reorientation

Four experiments investigated the nature of spatial representations used in locomotion. Participants learned the layout of several objects and then pointed to the objects while blindfolded in 3 conditions: before turning (baseline), after turning to a new heading (updating), and after disorientation (disorientation). The internal consistency of pointing in the disorientation condition was relatively high and equivalent to that in the baseline and updating conditions, when the layout had salient intrinsic axes and the participants learned the locations of the objects on the periphery of the layout. The internal consistency of pointing was disrupted by disorientation when participants learned the locations of objects while standing amid them and the layout did not have salient intrinsic axes. It was also observed that many participants retrieved spatial relations after disorientation from the original learning heading. These results indicate that people form an allocentric representation of object-to-object spatial relations when they learn the layout of a novel environment and use that representation to locate objects around them. Egocentric representations may be used to locate objects when allocentric representations are not of high fidelity.     

Young children's automatic encoding of social categories

The present research investigated young children's automatic encoding of two social categories that are highly relevant to adults: gender and race. Three‐ to 6‐year‐old participants learned facts about unfamiliar target children who varied in either gender or race and were asked to remember which facts went with which targets. When participants made mistakes, they were more likely to confuse targets of the same gender than targets of different genders, but they were equally likely to confuse targets within and across racial groups. However, a social preference measure indicated that participants were sensitive to both gender and race information. Participants with more racial diversity in their social environments were more likely to encode race, but did not have stronger racial preferences. These findings provide evidence that young children do not automatically encode all perceptible features of others. Further, gender may be a more fundamental social category than race.     

Children's category‐based inferences affect classification

Children learn many new categories and make inferences about these categories. Much work has examined how children make inferences on the basis of category knowledge. However, inferences may also affect what is learned about a category. Four experiments examine whether category‐based inferences during category learning influence category knowledge and thereby affect later classifications for 5‐ to 7‐year‐olds. The children learned to classify pictures of new types of creatures on the basis of a salient feature (colour) and then answered a question that required them to make an inference on the basis of other features. At test, children classified pictures that included only some features (without colour). Experiment 1 showed that the features relevant to the inference during learning led to better classification than did features irrelevant to the inference. Experiment 2 replicated this finding even when the relevant features were physically close to the irrelevant features. Experiments 3 and 4 found this effect even when the classification was learned prior to the inference task and even when no mention was made of the categories during inference learning. Taken together, these results show that making inferences during category learning can influence category knowledge and suggest a need to integrate the work on category learning and category‐based inferences.     

Sorting out categories: Incremental learning of category structure

Two experiments examine how inferences might promote unsupervised and incremental category learning. Many categories have members related through overall similarity (e.g., a family resemblance structure) rather than by a defining feature. However, when people are asked to sort category members in a category construction task, they often do so by partitioning on a single feature. Starting from an earlier result showing that pairwise inferences increase family resemblance sorting (Lassaline & Murphy, 1996), we examine how these inferences lead to learning the family resemblance structure. Results show that the category structure is learned incrementally. The pairwise inferences influence participants’ weightings of feature pairs that were specifically asked about, which in turn affects their sorting. The sorting then allows further learning of the categorical structure. Thus, the inferences do not directly lead learners to the family resemblance structure, but they do provide a foundation to build on as the participants make additional judgments.     

Learning categories by making predictions: An investigation of indirect category learning

Categories are learned in many ways, but studies of category learning have generally focused on classification learning. This focus may limit the understanding of categorization processes. Two experiments were conducted in which participants learned categories of animals by predicting how much food each animal would eat. We refer to this as indirect category learning, because the task andthe feedback were not directly related to category membership, yet category learning was necessary for good performance in the task. In the first experiment, we compared the performance of participants who learned the categories indirectly with the performance of participants who first learned to classify the objects. In the second experiment, we replicated the basic findings and examined attention to different features during the learning task. In both experiments, participants who learned in the prediction-only condition displayed a broader distribution of attention than participants who learned in the classification-and-prediction condition did. Some participants in the prediction-only group learned the family resemblance structure of the categories, even when a perfect criterial attribute was present. In contrast, participants who first learned to classify the objects tended to learn the criterial attribute.     

Carrot-Eaters and Creature-Believers: The Effects of Lexicalization on Children's Inferences About SocialCategories

This article examines how language affects children's inferences about novel social categories. We hypothesized that lexicalization (using a noun label to refer to someone who possesses a certain property) would influence children's inferences about other people. Specifically, we hypothesized that when a property is lexicalized, it is thought to be more stable over time and over contexts. One hundred fifteen children (5- and 7-year-olds) learned about a characteristic of a hypothetical person (e.g., "Rose eats a lot of carrots"). Half the children were told a noun label for each character (e.g., "She is a carrot-eater"), whereas half heard a verbal predicate (e.g., "She eats carrots whenever she can"). The children judged characteristics as significantly more stable over time and over contexts when the characteristics were referred to by a noun than when they were referred to by a verbal predicate. Lexicalization (in the form of a noun) provides important information to children regarding the stability of personal characteristics.     

What young children think about the relationship between language variation and social difference

Previous work suggests that preschoolers understand that members of some social groups (e.g., based on occupation or gender) speak in distinct ways, but do not understand that members of other social groups (e.g., based on race, culture, or nationality) speak different languages. In these four studies we explored preschool children's inferences about language and social group membership. In Study 1 we found that preschoolers believed that minority race individuals, people wearing unfamiliar clothing, or people living in unfamiliar dwellings were more likely to speak an unfamiliar foreign language than to speak English. Studies 2A and 2B showed that children do not map social group differences to language for all social categories. Specifically, children were more likely to attribute language differences to racial rather than age differences and were more likely to map differences in music preference onto age than racial differences. Results of Study 3 showed children's inferences about language and social group differences were not derived from differences in intelligibility. Study 4 provides insight into why children readily make these language to social kind mappings by identifying a common property that both broad social kinds and distinct languages are thought to share. Together these studies provide evidence that even preschoolers may be coordinating knowledge across content domains in a coherent and meaningful way that underwrites the projection of existing knowledge to unknown instances.     

Virtual Humans and Persuasion: The Effects of Agency and Behavioral Realism

Two studies examined whether participant attitudes would change toward positions advocated by an ingroup member even if the latter was known to be an embodied agent; that is, a human-like representation of a computer algorithm. While immersed in a virtual environment, participants listened to a persuasive communication from a digital representation of another student. The latter was actually an embodied agent (a computer-controlled digital representation of a human). Study 1 examined the extent to which gender of the virtual human, participant gender, and the agent's behavior affected attitude change. Results revealed gender-based ingroup favoritism in the form of greater attitude change for same gender virtual humans. Study 2 examined behavioral realism and agency beliefs; that is, whether participants believed the other to be an agent or an avatar (an online representation of an actual person). Results supported Blascovich and colleague's model of social influence within immersive virtual environments. Specifically, the prediction that virtual humans high in behavioral realism would be more influential than those low in behavioral realism was supported, but this effect was moderated by the gender of the virtual human and the research participant. Implications of these findings for the model are discussed.     

Inducing Knowledgeability From Niceness: Children Use Social Features for Making Epistemic Inferences

In many ways, evaluating informants based on their features is a problem of induction: Children rely on the assumption that observable informant characteristics (e.g., traits, behaviors, social categories) will predict unobservable characteristics (e.g., future behavior, knowledge states, intentions). Yet to make sensible inferences, children must recognize what informant features are relevant for what types of inferences. The current research investigated whether preschoolers use social features (e.g., niceness) for making epistemic inferences and, conversely, whether they use intellectual features (e.g., expertise) for making social inferences. In the study, 96 preschoolers (M_age = 4.96 years) were asked to attribute knowledge and behaviors to a mean informant, a nice informant, and a neutral informant. Between subjects, we varied which informant had expertise. We found that when attributing knowledge, children used both features: attributing more knowledge to nicer informants, but also attributing more knowledge to an informant when he had expertise. In contrast, when making social inferences, children relied primarily on social features.     

The impact of psychiatric diagnosis and family system relationship on problems identified by families coping with a mentally ill member.

The purpose of this study was to explore how psychiatric diagnosis and family relationships relate to problems identified by participants in three one-day public family psychoeducation workshops for families with a member with a serious mental illness. Workshop participants generated lists of problems they had faced, which were coded into eleven categories. Logistic regression models predicting listing of categories were developed based on ill member (diagnosis, sex, treatment compliance) and family member (sex, age, relationship to the ill member) characteristics. For models predicting content category from ill member characteristics, only denial/noncompliance and interpersonal/social categories were significantly predictive as dependent variables. For models predicting content categories from family member characteristics, only the resources/benefits model was predictive. The significant findings, in conjunction with the important negative results, suggest implications for further development of family intervention models. Building on previous research, groups composed of families coping with more than a single diagnosis and including a variety of family member relationships have the potential to reach consensus on curriculum topics.     

The Role of Inference in Attribute Framing Effects

Previous research has shown that a speaker's choice between logically equivalent frames is influenced by reference point information, and that listeners draw accurate inferences based on the frame. Less clear, however, is whether these inferences play a causal role in generating attribute framing effects. Two experiments are reported, which suggest that frame‐dependent inferences are sufficient to generate attribute framing effects, and that blocking such inferences may block framing effects. Experiment 1 decomposed the typical framing design into two parts: One group of participants saw a target described in one of two attribute frames and reported their estimates (inferences) of the typical attribute value. These estimates were then given to a second group of yoked participants, who evaluated the target. Although this latter group was not exposed to different attribute frames, they nevertheless exhibited a “framing effect” as a result of receiving systematically different inferences. In contrast, Experiment 2 shows that experts—who are familiar with an attribute's distribution and are therefore less likely to draw strong frame‐based inferences—exhibit a diminished framing effect. Together, these findings underscore the role of inferences in the generation and attenuation of attribute framing effects. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Feature inference with uncertain categorization: Re-assessing Anderson’s rational model

A key function of categories is to help predictions about unobserved features of objects. At the same time, humans are often in situations where the categories of the objects they perceive are uncertain. In an influential paper, Anderson (Psychological Review, 98(3), 409–429, 1991) proposed a rational model for feature inferences with uncertain categorization. A crucial feature of this model is the conditional independence assumption—it assumes that the within category feature correlation is zero. In prior research, this model has been found to provide a poor fit to participants’ inferences. This evidence is restricted to task environments inconsistent with the conditional independence assumption. Currently available evidence thus provides little information about how this model would fit participants’ inferences in a setting with conditional independence. In four experiments based on a novel paradigm and one experiment based on an existing paradigm, we assess the performance of Anderson’s model under conditional independence. We find that this model predicts participants’ inferences better than competing models. One model assumes that inferences are based on just the most likely category. The second model is insensitive to categories but sensitive to overall feature correlation. The performance of Anderson’s model is evidence that inferences were influenced not only by the more likely category but also by the other candidate category. Our findings suggest that a version of Anderson’s model which relaxes the conditional independence assumption will likely perform well in environments characterized by within-category feature correlation.     

Children's Use of Social Categories in Thinking About People and Social Relationships

A series of studies investigated White U.S. 3- and 4-year-old children's use of gender and race information to reason about their own and others’ relationships and attributes. Three-year-old children used gender- but not race-based similarity between themselves and others to decide with whom they wanted to be friends, as well as to determine which children shared their own preferences for various social activities. Four-year-old (but not younger) children attended to gender and racial category membership to guide inferences about others’ relationships but did not use these categories to reason about others’ shared activity preferences. Taken together, the findings provide evidence for three suggestions about these children's social category-based reasoning. First, gender is a more potent category than race. Second, social categories are initially recruited for first-person reasoning but later become broad enough to support third-person inferences. Finally, at least for third-person reasoning, thinking about social categories is more attuned to social relationships than to shared attributes.     

How Children and Adults Name Broken Objects: Inferences and Reasoning About Design Intentions in the Categorization of Artifacts

If inferences about the functions intended by object designers guide the way artifacts are categorized, a broken object should still be considered a member of its original category even though it is currently dysfunctional; however, an object that appears to be dysfunctional by design should not be. Such a comparison was arranged in four studies of lexical categorization. Even with novel categories, 10-year-olds and adults preferentially included broken objects, and they did so spontaneously (Study 1). Younger children did not (Studies 1 and 2). However, when probed about the design intentions behind novel objects, 6-year-olds often inferred them correctly and then took intentions into account to categorize (Study 3). In fact, when 4-year-olds named objects derived from familiar categories, even they spontaneously used design intentions to categorize (Study 4). Accordingly, even young children provided some evidence of categorizing artifacts by inferring and reasoning about intended functions.