A New Conventionalist Theory of Promising

Conventionalists about promising believe that it is wrong to break a promise because the promisor takes advantage of a useful social convention only to fail to do his part in maintaining it. Anti-conventionalists claim that the wrong of breaking a promise has nothing essentially to do with a social convention. Anti-conventionalists are right that the social convention is not necessary to explain the wrong of breaking most promises. But conventionalists are right that the convention plays an essential role in any satisfactory account of promising. A new conventionalism can explain this by appealing to special features of social conventions. Two of these special features have important implications for any moral requirements they mediate, such as the requirement to keep one's promises and the moral requirements attached to social or occupational roles. First, these requirements will not depend on features of a situation that are inaccessible to typical participants in the convention. Second, these requirements often cannot be tailored to fit the overly unusual circumstances of participants.     

Coordination,Triangulation, and Language Use

In this paper, I explore two contrasting conceptions of the social character of language. The first takes language to be grounded in social convention. The second, famously developed by Donald Davidson, takes language to be grounded in a social relation called triangulation. I aim both to clarify and to evaluate these two conceptions of language. First, I propose that Davidson’s triangulation-based story can be understood as the result of relaxing core features of conventionalism pertaining to both common-interest and diachronic stability—specifically, Davidson does not require uses of language to be self-perpetuating, in the way required by conventionalism, in order to be bona fide components of linguistic systems. Second, I argue that Davidson’s objections to conventionalism from language innovation and language variation fail, and that certain kinds of negative data in language use require an appeal to diachronic social relations. However, I also argue that recent work on communication in the absence of common interests and common knowledge highlights the need for broader non-conventional social relations like triangulation. In short, I suggest that the choice between coordination and triangulation is not either/or: that we need to appeal to both if we are adequately to explain the nature of language and its use.     

Logical structuralism and Benacerraf’s problem

There are two general questions which many views in the philosophy of mathematics can be seen as addressing: what are mathematical objects, and how do we have knowledge of them? Naturally, the answers given to these questions are linked, since whatever account we give of how we have knowledge of mathematical objects surely has to take into account what sorts of things we claim they are; conversely, whatever account we give of the nature of mathematical objects must be accompanied by a corresponding account of how it is that we acquire knowledge of those objects. The connection between these problems results in what is often called “Benacerraf’s Problem”, which is a dilemma that many philosophical views about mathematical objects face. It will be my goal here to present a view, attributed to Richard Dedekind, which approaches the initial questions in a different way than many other philosophical views do, and in doing so, avoids the dilemma given by Benacerraf’s problem.     

On convention

Summary If my main criticism of Lewis is sound, we must conclude that there are at least two distinct types of convention: co-ordination conventions and conventions constituting autonomous practices. It is only possible in the case of the former, but not the latter, to specify the agents' structure of preferences, and the problem the convention is there to solve, antecedently and independently of the content of the conventions themselves. Conventions constituting an autonomous practice are constitutive of the point of, and the values inherent in the practice itself and hence they are not explicable in terms of solutions to co-ordination problems. Thus, from the vantage point of practical reasoning, Lewis' theory of conventions is partial and limited. It is superior, however, to the alternative offered by Gilbert, as it provides a good answer, albeit limited in scope, to the question of the normativity of conventions. Gilbert's analysis is more fundamentally flawed. She has failed to undermine Lewis' insight that conventions are arbitrary rules, due to her misconstrual of what arbitrariness consists in. Consequently, Gilbert's analysis of the normativity of social conventions in terms of joint acceptance is doubly inadequate: it fails to distinguish conventions from many other types of rule people follow, and it fails to answer the question of the normativity of conventions in terms of reasons for action.In the course of this discussion, I have side-stepped all the difficult questions concerning the conventionality of language, judging them to be far too complex issues to be dealt with within the confines of this article. I do hope, however, that an awareness of the distinction between co-ordination conventions and conventions of autonomous practices, will facilitate the arguments over the conventionality of language as well.I am indebted to Timothy Williamson and Joseph Raz with whom I have discussed these matters at length, and I am grateful for their invaluable comments on a draft of this paper. I am also indebted to Brian Bix, Ruth Gavison, Alon Harel, Edna Ullmann-Margalit, and the editors of Synthese for their helpful comments and suggestions.     

Conventions and Moral Norms: The Legacy of Lewis

David Lewis’ Convention has been a major source of inspiration for philosophers and social scientists alike for the analysis of norms. In this essay, I demonstrate its usefulness for the analysis of some moral norms. At the same time, conventionalism with regards to moral norms has attracted sustained criticism. I discuss three major strands of criticism and propose how these can be met. First, I discuss the criticism that Lewis conventions analyze norms in situations with no conflict of interest, whereas most, if not all, moral norms deal with situations with conflicting interests. This criticism can be answered by showing that conventions can emerge in those contexts as well. Secondly, I discuss the objection that this type of conventionalism, inspired by Lewis, presents moral norms as fundamentally contingent, whereas most, if not all, moral norms are not. However, such critics fail to appreciate that conventions are not radically contingent. Moreover, if one distinguishes the question as to why an individual should comply with a norm from the question whether the norm in question itself can be justified, a core element of the complaint of contingency disappears. The third objection to conventionalism concerns the way in which conventionalists justify norms. I argue that reflection upon the way in which according to Lewis norms are justified reveals a fundamental tension in his theory. Possible solutions to this tension all have in common that the complaint of contingency returns in some form. Therefore, this third complaint cannot be avoided altogether.     

Establishing conventional communication systems: Is common knowledge necessary?

How do communities establish shared communication systems? The Common Knowledge view assumes that symbolic conventions develop through the accumulation of common knowledge regarding communication practices among the members of a community. In contrast with this view, it is proposed that coordinated communication emerges a by‐product of local interactions among dyads. A set of multi‐agent computer simulations show that a population of “egocentric” agents can establish and maintain symbolic conventions without common knowledge. In the simulations, convergence to a single conventional system was most likely and most efficient when agents updated their behavior on the basis of local rather than global, system‐level information. The massive feedback and parallelism present in the simulations gave rise to phenomena that are often assumed to result from complex strategic processing on the part of individual agents. The implications of these findings for the development of theories of language use are discussed.     

Are people's estimates of what other people know influenced by what they themselves know?

An exploratory experiment was done to investigate how estimates of what other people know are influenced by what one knows oneself. Three hypotheses were of interest: (1) that people are more likely to impute a bit of knowledge to other people if they have it themselves than if they do not, (2) that people are likely to overestimate the commonality of their own knowledge, and (3) that people who are unusually knowledgeable with respect to a particular topic are likely to bias their estimates of what other people know in the direction of their personal knowledge store. Subjects answered questions selected from the set for which Nelson and Narens (1980) have provided norms. They also estimated the percentage of other people who would be likely to know the answers to these questions. The results supported the first two hypotheses, but were inconclusive with respect to the third.     

The gender puzzles

What is gender and how do we know what our gender is? These are the questions I propose to answer here. I review and reject several hypotheses: gender as sex or—a more careful version of the view—as subjective experiences that arise from sexual characteristics; gender as brain configuration; and gender as a historical kind. I express sympathy with an existentialist conception of gender but argue that such a conception, even according to its proponents, cannot help solve the problems of what gender is and how we know what our gender is. I then advance a new view.     

Constitutive Rules: Games,Language, and Assertion

Many philosophers think that games like chess, languages like English, and speech acts like assertion are constituted by rules. Lots of others disagree. To argue over this productively, it would be first useful to know what it would be for these things to be rule-constituted. Searle famously claimed in Speech Acts that rules constitute things in the sense that they make possible the performance of actions related to those things (Searle 1969). On this view, rules constitute games, languages, and speech acts in the sense that they make possible playing them, speaking them and performing them. This raises the question what it is to perform rule-constituted actions (e. g. play, speak, assert) and the question what makes constitutive rules distinctive such that only they make possible the performance of new actions (e. g. playing). In this paper I will criticize Searle's answers to these questions. However, my main aim is to develop a better view, explain how it works in the case of each of games, language, and assertion and illustrate its appeal by showing how it enables rule-based views of these things to respond to various objections.     

Kant’s Solution to the Euthyphro Dilemma

Are our actions morally good because we approve of them or are they good independently of our approval? Are we projecting moral values onto the world or do we detect values that are already there? For many these questions don’t state a real alternative but a secular variant of the Euthyphro dilemma: If our actions are good because we approve of them moral goodness appears to be arbitrary. If they are good independently of our approval, it is unclear how we come to know their moral quality and how moral knowledge can be motivating. None of these options seems attractive; the source of moral goodness unclear. Despite the growing literature on Kant’s moral epistemology and moral epistemology the question remains open what Kant’s answer to this apparent dilemma is. The Kantian view I attempt to lay out in this paper is supposed to dissolve the secular version of the Euthyphro dilemma. In responding to this dilemma we need to get clear about the source or the origin of our moral knowledge: Voluntary approval or mind-independent moral facts? Projectivism or detectivism? Construction or given? I believe that all these ways of articulating the problem turn out, on closer inspection, to be false alternatives.     

Taking Stock of the Diversity and Sense of Community Debate

Over the past couple of years, a debate has played out in the pages of the American Journal of Community Psychology concerning the relationship between two of Community Psychology's core values: promoting diversity and promoting a sense of community. This special section is to continue a discussion about diversity and community, both among the debate's initial contributors (Alex Stivala, Greg Townley, and Zachary Neal), as well as among others whose own work has touched on these issues (Anne Brodsky, Richard Florida, Jean Hill, and Roderick Watts). In this essay, I address some broad questions that have emerged through this discussion. First, because much has been written on the relationship between diversity and community, both in community psychology and in other disciplines, what do we know, or at least think we know? Second, since the constructs of diversity and sense of community are complex and multi‐faceted, how can definitions get in the way and how can we avoid talking past one another in this discussion? Finally, looking across the original papers that initiated this discussion, as well as the contributions in this special section, what path(s) forward do we have?     

What Do Easy Inferences Get Us?

In Ontology Made Easy (2015), I defend the idea that there are ‘easy’ inferences that begin from uncontroversial premises and end with answers to disputed ontological questions. But what do easy inferences really get us? Bueno and Cumpa (this journal, 2020) argue that easy inferences don’t tell us about the natures of properties—they don’t tell us what properties are. Moreover, they argue, by accepting an ontologically neutral quantifier we can also resist the conclusion that properties or numbers exist. Here I address these two issues in turn—in ways that help clarify both the scope and results of easy ontology. First, it is important to see that easy inferences were never intended to address modal questions. Modal questions are addressed by a different part of the total deflationary view—modal normativism. So understood, metaphysical modal questions nonetheless do not provide a remaining area for serious metaphysical inquiry. Second, I argue that we have reason to resist adopting an ontologically neutral quantifier, if we aim to answer ontological questions (without begging the question). Addressing these issues helps to clarify both what does (and does not) follow from easy inferences, and how they form part of a larger deflationary metametaphysical view.     

Conventions and Rules in Literature

Views of what role convention plays in the creation and appreciation of art works gravitate towards two extremes. One view holds that works of art can be apprehended and appreciated as well as created with no reference to convention. The other claims that conventions fully determine how works of art are apprehended and are therefore necessary conditions for the creation of works of art as well as constitutive of appreciation. The former is a version of the Romantic view of art as something that appeals spontaneously to man's most profound emotions, to man's sentient nature, without making use of or needing mediating conventions. The conventionalist view denies that it is possible to respond spontaneously to art. All apprehension and appreciation of art are structured by conventions, and the reader/audience cannot go beyond these conventions because they constitute , the experience of the work of art. This paper explains the sense in which the constitutive view may be best understood.     

Developmental change and the nature of learning in childhood

How do children acquire humankind's remarkable cognitive skills? Why are the abilities children acquire readily, such as native-language fluency, harder for adults? Although attitudes to these questions span the continuum from nativism to learning theory, answers remain elusive. We relate a recent model of language acquisition in childhood to advances in the neuroscience of adult cognitive control, to propose a domain-general shift in the architecture of learning in childhood. The timing of this supports children's imitative, unsupervised learning of social and linguistic conventions before the maturation of cognitive control gives individuals greater self-direction, which causes learning to become less conventionalized and more idiosyncratic. These changes might represent an important adaptation supporting the development and learning of cultural and linguistic conventions.     

Disagreeing about who we are

ABSTRACT

One argument that has been suggested for conventionalism about personal identity is that it captures that certain disagreements about personal identity seem irresolvable, without being committed to the view that these disagreements are merely verbal. In this paper, I will take the considerations about disagreement used to motivate conventionalism seriously. However, I will use them to motivate a very different, novel, and as yet unexplored view about personal identity. This is the view that personal identity is a non-representational concept, the nature of which isn’t to be accounted for in terms of what entity it represents, but its non-representational role. I highlight that we find structurally very similar concerns about disagreement in another philosophical debate, namely in meta-ethics. But, in meta-ethics, such sorts of considerations are, traditionally, thought to support one distinctive view: meta-ethical expressivism, a non-representational view about normative thought and discourse. This suggests that we should take a similar view seriously for personal identity. I also develop what such an unfamiliar view might look like, using expressivism as a template. On this view, judgements about personal identity are plans that regulate who to hold accountable.     

A convention or (tacit) agreement betwixt us: on reliance and its normative consequences

The aim of this paper is to clarify what kind of normativity characterizes a convention. First, we argue that conventions have normative consequences because they always involve a form of trust and reliance. We contend that it is by reference to a moral principle impinging on these aspects (i.e. the principle of Reliability) that interpersonal obligations and rights originate from conventional regularities. Second, we argue that the system of mutual expectations presupposed by conventions is a source of agreements. Agreements stemming from conventions are “tacit” in the sense that they are implicated by what agents do (or forbear from doing) and without that any communication between them is necessary. To justify this conclusion, we assume that: (1) there is a salient interpretation, in some contexts, of everyone’s silence as confirmatory of the others’ expectations (an epistemic assumption), and (2) the participating agents share a value of not being motivated by hostile attitudes (a motivational assumption). By clarifying the relation between conventions and agreements, the peculiar normativity of conventions is analyzed.     

Convention as correlated equilibrium

Aconvention is a state in which agents coordinate their activity, not as the result of an explicit agreement, but because their expectations are aligned so that each individual believes that all will act so as to achieve coordination for mutual benefit. Since agents are said to follow a convention if they coordinate without explicit agreement, the notion raises fundamental questions: (1) Why do certain conventions remain stable over time?, and (2) How does a convention emerge in the first place? In a pioneering study, Lewis (1969) addresses these questions by applyingnoncooperative game theory. Lewis defines a convention as aNash coordination equilibrium of a noncooperative game that issalient, that is, it is somehow conspicuous to the agents so that all expect one another to conform with the equilibrium. This paper presents a new game theoretic definition of conventions, which formalizes the notion of salience and which also generalizes the class of conventions Lewis discusses in his work. I define a convention as acorrelated equilibrium (Aumann 1974, 1987) satisfying apublic intentions criterion: Every agent wants his intended action to becommon knowledge. I argue that many conventions correspond to correlated equilibria that are not Nash equilibria, and that this is consistent with Lewis' general viewpoint. Finally, I argue that game theoretic characterizations of convention, such as Lewis' and my own, help to explain a convention's stability, but that a fully satisfactory account of the emergence of convention requires a theory of equilibrium selection beyond the scope of Lewis' work.I thank Cristina Bicchieri, Vince Crawford, Greg Kavka, Brian Skyrms, and an anonymous referee for their many helpful comments on earlier versions of this essay. I would also like to express my gratitude to the U. C. Irvine Focused Research Programs in Public Choice and Scientific Explanation and the Sarah Scaife Foundation for funding the research leading to this essay.[T]his may properly enough be call'd a convention or agreement betwixt us, tho' without the interposition of a promise; since the actions of each of us have a reference to those of the other, and are perform'd upon the supposition, that something is to be perform'd on the other part. Two men, who pull the oars of a boat, do it by an agreement or convention, tho' they have never given promises to each other. In like manner are languages gradually establish'd by human conventions without any promise. In like manner do gold and silver become the common measures of exchange, and are esteem'd sufficient payment for what is of a hundred times their value.David Hume,A Treatise of Human Nature. Hume (1888, p. 490).     

Crossing No Man's Land: Cooperation From the Trenches

This paper represents an attempt to bridge the gap between rational and psychological models of choice, as represented by expected utility theory and prospect theory, and to show how researchers from different traditions can start to work together on problems of interest to both. A central issue for both models concerns the origin of preferences and how they might be predicted. Two questions of interest to all social scientists are related to the formation of preferences: What determines what people want, and what determines what people do once they know what they want? The incorporation of emotion into models of decision‐making may help users of divergent models find common ground for exploration and investigation.     

Knowledge of Objective ‘Oughts’: Monotonicity and the New Miners Puzzle

In the classic Miners case, an agent subjectively ought to do what they know is objectively wrong. This case shows that the subjective and objective ‘oughts’ are somewhat independent. But there remains a powerful intuition that the guidance of objective ‘oughts’ is more authoritative—so long as we know what they tell us. We argue that this intuition must be given up in light of a monotonicity principle, which undercuts the rationale for saying that objective ‘oughts’ are an authoritative guide for agents and advisors.     

The “Rituals” of the Relational Perspective: Theoretical Shifts and Clinical Implications

This paper attempts a closer look at the theoretical foundations for some of the clinical shifts that underlie a relational psychoanalytic approach. It also posits that what unites relational writers who come from different psychoanalytic traditions—that is, Freudian, Kleinian, Object Relations, Self Psychology—has more to do with the kinds of questions asked than with the particular answers that are offered. Specifically these questions have to do with the epistemological basis for how we know what we know as analysts, the model of mind we employ to understand our patients, and the mode of therapeutic action that evolves from these two earlier shifts. Several clinical examples are offered.