Sensitivity hasn’t got a Heterogeneity Problem - a Reply to Melchior

Philosophia - In a recent paper, Melchior pursues a novel argumentative strategy against the sensitivity condition. His claim is that sensitivity suffers from a ‘heterogeneity problem:’...     

Why Nature Doesn’t Turn Off Neurosis

This paper develops an integration of psychoanalytic and wisdom tradition concepts to answer the question as to why nature does not turn off neurosis, The proposed answer is that nature wants a person to exploit the neurosis for two gains, one being the increase in adaptive capacity resulting from releasing it and the second involving the difficulty in the release itself, the latter related to gains proffered by the world’s wisdom traditions. These see a movement from the psyche’s creation by passive, unconscious means of finite promise rooted in parental love to creation by active, consciously chosen means of unlimited promise involving a direct relationship with nature and the Cosmos.     

Why We Shouldn’t Reject Conflicts: A Critique of Tadros

Victor Tadros thinks the idea that in a conflict both sides may permissibly use force should (typically) be rejected. Thus, he thinks that two shipwrecked persons should not fight for the only available flotsam (which can only carry one person) but instead toss a coin, and that a bomber justifiably attacking an ammunitions factory must not be counterattacked by the innocent bystanders he endangers. I shall argue that Tadros’s claim rests on unwarranted assumptions and is also mistaken in the light of the moral reasoning that he himself offers in support of his ‘means principle’.     

Why Freud and Jung Can’t Speak: A Neurological Proposal

This article provides a modern neurological explanation for the theoretical differences in psychoanalytic concepts and techniques between Freud and Jung. Specifically, the article contrasts their analytic skills as arising in the left and right brain, respectively. Modern neurological techniques reveal unique brain functions that explain many of the visionary and so-called mystic phenomena discussed by Jung. Many of his psychoanalytic concepts can be traced to right brain function. Modern research and philosophic analyses also provide light on Freud’s research method and its limitations.Barbara Stevens Barnum, RN, PhD, FAAN, former editor of Nursing Leadership Forum and Nursing & Health Care, is presently a writer/consultant. Before retiring, her positions at Columbia University included holding the directorship, Division of Health Services, Sciences and Education at Teachers College, where she also held the Stewart Chair in the Department of Nursing Education. Dr. Barnum has written in areas of nursing management, theory, education, and aspects of spirtuality/holistic nursing. Her books include: Nursing theory: Analysis, application, evaluation, Spirituality in nursing: From traditional to New Age, and The New Healers: Minds and Hands in Complementary Medicine.     

Why doesn’t feedback correct Vierordt’s law?

Vierordt [(1868). Der zeitsinn nach versuchen. Tübingen: Laupp] observed that participants over-reproduce short durations and under-reproduce long durations within a test range of sample durations (Vierordt’s law). Similar phenomena have been reported for sensory and other processing (e.g. [Helson (1964 Helson, H. (1964). Adaptation-level theory. New York, NY: Harper &; Row. [Google Scholar]). Adaptation-level theory. New York: Harper &; Row; Stevens, and Greenbaum (1966). Regression effect in psychophysical judgment. Perception &; Psychophysics, 1, 439–446]. Performance feedback (knowledge of results) does not correct this performance distortion although it does correct other errors. In Experiment 1, I tested the hypothesis that a random presentation order of the standard durations makes feedback on one trial inappropriate for the next trial preventing correction of the Vierordt effect. In Experiment 2, participants performed two consecutive reproductions after each standard duration. Having the opportunity to immediately utilize the feedback from the first reproduction did not eliminate the Vierordt effect, although participants did attempt to correct the error on the first reproduction. In Experiment 3, the Vierordt effect was reduced in a blocked presentation design. Feedback produced more veridical performance. I conclude that the resistance of the Vierordt effect to correction by feedback may result, in part, from feedback on a given trial being misapplied to correcting performance on the next trial. Ironically, the Vierordt effect, which produced the differing directions and magnitudes of performance errors reported by the feedback, may be what prevents feedback from correcting for the Vierordt effect.     

Why don’t synaesthetic colours adapt away?

Synaesthetes persistently perceive certain stimuli as systematically accompanied by illusory colours, even though they know those colours to be illusory. This appears to contrast with cases where a subject??s colour vision adapts to systematic distortions caused by wearing coloured goggles. Given that each case involves longstanding systematic distortion of colour perception that the subjects recognize as such, how can a theory of colour perception explain the fact that perceptual adaptation occurs in one case but not the other? I argue that these cases and the relationship between them can be made sense of in light of an existing view of colour perception. Understanding colours as ways in which objects and surfaces modify light, perceived through grasping patterns and variations in colour appearances, provides a framework from which the cases and their apparent disanalogy can be predicted and explained. This theory??s ability to accommodate these cases constitutes further empirical evidence in its favour.     

Tyrannized Souls: Plato's Depiction of the ‘Tyrannical Man’

In book 9 of Plato's Republic, Socrates describes the nature and origins of the ‘tyrannical man’, whose soul is said to be ‘like’ a tyrannical city. In this paper, I examine the nature of the ‘government’ that exists within the tyrannical man's soul. I begin by demonstrating the inadequacy of three potentially attractive views sometimes found in the literature on Plato: the view that the tyrannical man's soul is ruled by his ‘lawless’ unnecessary appetites, the view that it is ruled by sexual desire, and the view that it is ruled by a lust for power. I then present my own account. On the view I defend, the tyrannical man's soul is to be understood as ruled by a single, persistent, powerful desire for bodily pleasure: as much as he can get, and however he can get it. Finally, I show how understanding the tyrannical man's soul in the way I recommend helps resolve some commonly expressed concerns about this part of the Republic. I suggest, on this basis, that Plato's procedure in constructing his catalogue of corrupt cities and souls in Republic 8 and 9 was more carefully thought out and systematic than has sometimes been supposed.     

Why can’t I change Bruckner’s Eighth Symphony?

Philosophical Studies - Musical works change. Bruckner revised his Eighth Symphony. Ella Fitzgerald and many other artists have made it acceptable to sing the jazz standard “All the Things...     

Why Richard Swinburne Won’t ‘Rot in Hell’: A Defense of Tough-minded Theodicy

In his recent paper in Sophia, ‘Theodicy: The Solution to the Problem of Evil, or Part of the Problem?’ Nick Trakakis endorses the position that theodicy, whether intellectually successful or not, is a morally obnoxious enterprise. My aim in this paper is to defend theodicy from this accusation. I concede that God the Creator is a moral monster by human standards and neither to be likened to a loving parent nor imitated. Nonetheless, God is morally perfect. What is abhorrent is not tough-minded theodicy but the hubris of imitating God. I further claim that it is no accident that the same sort of objection is made to act utilitarianism as to tough-minded theodicy if the latter is misinterpreted as implying a guide for human action.     

“Non-Symmetric Awe: Why it Matters Even if We Don’t”

Philosophia - The universe is enormous, perhaps unimaginably so. In comparison, we are very small. Does this suggest that humanity has little if any cosmic significance? And if we don’t...     

It’s all about Extraversion: Why Facebook friend count doesn’t count towards well-being

Social relationships are assumed to be among the most important sources of well-being. However, previous studies showing that objectively measured social network size contributes to well-being have not included personality traits. We investigated, in a sample of Facebook users (N = 4701), whether the effects of Extraversion on well-being are mediated by a larger network. Although network size was initially associated with heightened well-being, this association was rendered insignificant when Extraversion was controlled for. Extraversion had a direct positive effect on ratings of Life Satisfaction and Happiness, but none of this effect was mediated by Facebook network size. The previously reported on associations between social network size and well-being could, at least in some contexts, be an artifact of Extraversion.     

Why ‘What Works’ Still Won’t Work: From Evidence-Based Education to Value-Based Education

The idea that professional practices such as education should be based upon or at least be informed by evidence continues to capture the imagination of many politicians, policy makers, practitioners and researchers. There is growing evidence of the influence of this line of thought. At the same time there is a growing body of work that has raised fundamental questions about the feasibility of the idea of evidence-based or evidence-informed practice. In this paper I make a further contribution to this discussion through an analysis of a number of assumptions that inform the discussion. I focus on the epistemological, ontological and praxeological dimensions of the discussion and in each domain identify a deficit. In the epistemological domain there is a knowledge deficit, in the ontological domain an effectiveness or efficacy deficit and in the practice domain an application deficit. Taken together these deficits not only raise some important questions about the very idea of evidence-based practice but also highlight the role of normativity, power and values. Against this background I outline the case for the idea of value-based education as an alternative for evidence-based education. As I am generally concerned about the expectations policy makers hold about what evidence can and should achieve in professional practices such as education, my contribution is primarily meant to provide educators and other professionals with arguments that can help them to resist unwarranted expectations about the role of evidence in their practices and even more so of unwarranted interventions in their practices.     

Why conceptual competence won’t help the non-naturalist epistemologist

Abstract

Non-naturalist normative realists face an epistemological objection: They must explain how their preferred route of justification ensures a non-accidental connection between justified moral beliefs and the normative truths. One strategy for meeting this challenge begins by pointing out that we are semantically or conceptually competent in our use of the normative terms, and then argues that this competence guarantees the non-accidental truth of some of our first-order normative beliefs. In this paper, I argue against this strategy by illustrating that this competence based strategy undermines the non-naturalist’s ability to capture the robustly normative content of our moral beliefs.     

Why pragmatic justifications of epistemic norms don’t work

Abstract

Pragmatic justifications of epistemic norms tell us to observe these norms as the best means to attaining the things we value. I argue that such justifications do not work, because they harbour an irresolvable tension: their non-alethic character intrinsically conflicts with the truth-aiming character of the epistemic norms they are justifying. We should abandon, then, either epistemic norms or pragmatic justifications of these norms. I therefore argue that we should abandon pragmatic justifications.     

Why ‘non-mental’ won’t work: on Hempel’s dilemma and the characterization of the ‘physical’

Recent discussions of physicalism have focused on the question how the physical ought to be characterized. Many have argued that any characterization of the physical should include the stipulation that the physical is non-mental, and others have claimed that a systematic substitution of ‘non-mental’ for ‘physical’ is all that is needed for philosophical purposes. I argue here that both claims are incorrect: substituting ‘non-mental’ for ‘physical’ in the causal argument for physicalism does not deliver the physicalist conclusion, and the specification that the physical is non-mental is irrelevant to the task of formulating physicalism as a substantive, controversial thesis.

Why it doesn’t matter to metaphysics what Mary learns

The Knowledge Argument of Frank Jackson has not persuaded physicalists, but their replies have not dispelled the intuition that someone raised in a black and white environment gains genuinely new knowledge when she sees colors for the first time. In what follows, we propose an explanation of this particular kind of knowledge gain that displays it as genuinely new, but orthogonal to both physicalism and phenomenology. We argue that Mary’s case is an instance of a common phenomenon in which something new is learned as the result of exploiting representational resources that were not previously exploited, and that this results in gaining genuinely new information.