“道德”探幽

道德既是人之为人的内在规定性,亦是人的自由存在方式,既是人对存在的反思性把握,亦是人的反思性存在方式。     

Evolutionary Biology and Classical Teleological Arguments for God's Existence

Much has been made of how Darwinian thinking destroyed proofs for the existence of God from ‘design’ in the universe. I challenge that prevailing view by looking closely at classical ‘teleological’ arguments for the existence of God. One version championed by Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas stems from how chance is not a sufficient kind of ultimate explanation of the universe. In the course of constructing this argument, I argue that the classical understanding of teleology is no less necessary in modern Darwinian biology than it was in Aristotle's time. In fact, modern biology strengthens the claims that teleological arguments make by vindicating many of their key features. As a consequence, I show how Aristotle and Aquinas' teleological argument for an intelligent First Cause remains valid.     

Towards a theory of the integration of the Other in representation

In this article, the author tries to uncover the elements of a theoretical model which would take into account the psychic transformations necessary to facilitate the emergence of representation. Toward this end, he firstly relies on Jung's notion of the archetype and Freud's idea of hallucinatory wish fulfilment, which he reconsiders in the light of the writings of Fordham (de-integration and re-integration of the primary self), and of Jean Laplanche (primary seduction), and linking it to the model based on chaos theory as developed in physics. He thus concludes that under the influence of primary seduction, the archetype is able to become a veritable, strange psychic attractor, enabling the determining factor of the instinctual axis of the archetype to open up to the possibility of symbolization, a necessary underlying feature for the occurrence of subjectivity. He ends his argument with a brief clinical vignette which illustrates the effect of openness to the psychic unknown constituted by primary seduction in the transference.     

The Life Principle: a (metaethical) rejection

ABSTRACT  In Respect for Nature Paul W. Taylor argues that there is a moral obligation to respect all living things. I argue that there is no such obligation. Taylor presents three basic premises for his position. The first two are shown to be mistaken but not necessary for Taylor's argument. The third, that being a nonsentient teleological centre of life confers moral significance, while necessary, fails to be rationally compelling. I argue: (1) The relevant concept of teleology as readily applies to inanimate objects as it does to nonsentient life forms. (2) The inanimate–nonsentient distinction (at the relevant molecular level) is founded upon a continuum which offers no basis sufficient to justify The Life Principle. (3) The concept of teleology, as used by Taylor, is too unclear and ill-founded to serve as the basis for a rationally compelling argument.     

Leibniz on Natural Teleology and the Laws of Optics

This essay examines one of the cornerstones of Leibniz's defense of teleology within the order of nature. The first section explores Leibniz's contributions to the study of geometrical optics, and argues that his "Most Determined Path Principle" or "MDPP" allows him to bring to the fore philosophical issues concerning the legitimacy of teleological explanations by addressing two technical objections raised by Cartesians to non-mechanistic derivations of the laws of optics. The second section argues that, by drawing on laws such as the MDPP, Leibniz is able to introduce a thin notion of teleology that gives him the resources to respond to the most pressing charges of his day against teleological explanations within natural philosophy. Finally, the third section argues that contemporary philosophers have been overly hasty in their dismissal of Leibniz's account of natural teleology, and indeed that their own generally thin conceptions of teleology have left them with few well-motivated resources for resisting his elegant position.     

Teleological Essentialism: Generalized

Natural/social kind essentialism is the view that natural kind categories, both living and non-living natural kinds, as well as social kinds (e.g., race, gender), are essentialized. On this view, artifactual kinds are not essentialized. Our view—teleological essentialism—is that a broad range of categories are essentialized in terms of teleology, including artifacts. Utilizing the same kinds of experiments typically used to provide evidence of essentialist thinking—involving superficial change (study 1), transformation of insides (study 2), and inferences about offspring (study 3)—we find support for the view that a broad range of categories—living natural kinds, non-living natural kinds, and artifactual kinds—are essentialized in terms of teleology. Study 4 tests a unique prediction of teleological essentialism and also provides evidence that people make inferences about purposes which in turn guide categorization judgments.     

TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGY: WHO COULD ASK FOR ANYTHING MORE?

Abstract. Teleological thinking permeates biology and is useful in pondering unanswered biological questions. Such thinking differs from the usual sense of teleology in that “purpose” in biology carries no imputation of causation. A few examples are given. The teleological system of biology is every bit as elegant a construct of the human mind as any other teleological system and in no way precludes spirituality. I argue that it provides a firmer foundation for moral guidance than supernatural systems.     

British and American children's preferences for teleo-functional explanations of the natural world

Teleological-functional explanations account for objects by reference to their purpose. They are a fundamental aspect of adults' explanatory repertoire. They also play a significant role in children's reasoning although prior findings indicate that, in contrast to adults, young children broadly extend teleological explanation beyond artifacts (e.g. chairs) and biological properties (e.g. eyes) to the properties of non-living natural phenomena (e.g. clouds, rocks). The present study extends earlier work with American children to explore British children's application of teleological explanation. The motivation is that while Britain and America are, culturally, as close to a minimal pair as the global context affords, there are differences in the religiosity of the two nations such that British children might be less inclined to endorse purpose-based explanation. Results reveal that young British children also possess a promiscuous teleology although they differ in the kinds of purposes that they attribute. Additional findings include a replication of earlier effects using a modified task with young American children.     

Teleology and the intentions of supernatural agents

Teleological beliefs about the natural world often exist implicitly, and there is a positive relationship between teleological endorsement and belief in supernatural agents. In the current study, participants judged a series of scientifically unwarranted teleological explanations of biological organisms and natural non-living objects, under speeded or un-speeded instructions. After controlling for belief in the existence of supernatural agents, rates of implicit (speeded) and explicit (un-speeded) teleological endorsement were moderated by the belief that supernatural agents intentionally interact with the world. Amongst non-religious individuals, rates of implicit endorsement were significantly higher than explicit endorsement, whereas for highly religious individuals the difference was non-significant. This interaction was driven predominantly by explanations of natural non-living objects. These results are consistent with an intention-based theory of teleology, and help to reconcile the finding of a positive relationship between teleological endorsement and belief in supernatural agents, with the those of an enduring teleological bias.     

Maria Montessori's metaphysics of life

This paper elucidates the core principles of Maria Montessori's metaphysics. Her attention to embryological, evolutionary, and educational development led to her teleological metaphysics of life. Individual organisms are governed by internally driven, perfectionist, discontinuous teleology. And this individual teleology is integrated into a holistic, ecological context whereby individuals' striving towards perfection works for the increased ordered complexity of the systems of which they are parts. Moreover, Montessori extends this metaphysics of life to include nonliving components of nature, such that atoms, planets, and inorganic molecules are governed by the same general teleological structure.     

On the Contradiction in Conception Test of the Categorical Imperative

Abstract

The author argues against Christine Korsgaard’s influential interpretation of Kant’s contradiction in conception test of the categorical imperative. Korsgaard’s rejection of the ‘teleological’ interpretation is shown to be based on a misunderstanding of the role that teleology plays for Kant in ruling out immoral maxims, and her defence of the ‘practical’ interpretation is shown to be less faithful to the text than the competing ‘logical’ interpretation. The works of Barbara Herman and Allen Wood are also discussed and evaluated.     

Inferring design: evidence of a preference for teleological explanations in patients with Alzheimer's disease

Unlike educated adults, young children demonstrate a "promiscuous" tendency to explain objects and phenomena by reference to functions, endorsing what are called teleological explanations. This tendency becomes more selective as children acquire increasingly coherent beliefs about causal mechanisms, but it is unknown whether a widespread preference for teleology is ever truly outgrown. The study reported here investigated this question by examining explanatory judgments in patients with Alzheimer's disease (AD), whose dementia affects the rich causal beliefs adults typically consult in evaluating explanations. The results indicate that unlike healthy adults, AD patients systematically and promiscuously prefer teleological explanations, suggesting that an underlying tendency to construe the world in terms of functions persists throughout life. This finding has broad relevance not only to understanding conceptual impairments in AD, but also to theories of development, learning, and conceptual change. Moreover, this finding sheds light on the intuitive appeal of creationism.     

Uncertainty,Indeterminacy, and Agent-Centred Constraints

Common-sense morality includes various agent-centred constraints, including ones against killing unnecessarily and breaking a promise. However, it's not always clear whether, had an agent ?-ed, she would have violated a constraint. And sometimes the reason for this is not that we lack knowledge of the relevant facts, but that there is no fact about whether her ?-ing would have constituted a constraint-violation. What, then, is a constraint-accepting theory (that is, a theory that includes such constraints) to say about whether it would have been permissible for her to have ?-ed? In this paper, I canvass various possible approaches to answering this question and I argue that teleology offers the most plausible approach—teleology being the view that every act has its deontic status in virtue of how its outcome (or prospect) ranks, relative to those of its alternatives. So although, until recently, it had been thought that only deontological theories can accommodate constraints, it turns out that teleological theories not only can accommodate constraints, but can do so more plausibly than deontological theories can.     

Existentialism,Self Theory and the Existential Self

Self theory is reductionistic: it brackets off “real” reality and leaves it in metaphysical realms. Existentialism views both subjective and external reality as contained in existence. Rogers' theory is deterministic to the extent that it is built on causal constructs. The non-deterministic, holistic, and teleological assumptions of the existentialists may help strengthen self theories. For example the term existential self would combine self-as-doer and self-as-object, making such constructs as self-concept, self structure, individual, and organism unnecessary. The individual's experience or perception would not have to be caused by a self-definition, but would be for the purpose of something, i.e., his intentions or goals.     

Nietzsche Was No Darwinian

John Richardson (2002, 2004) argues that Nietzsche's use of teleological notions, such as the "will to power" and psychological "drives," can be naturalized within the Darwinian framework of natural selection. Although this ambitious project has merit, the Darwinian framework does not provide the strong teleology necessary to interpret Nietzsche's explanatory project. Examining the logic of selection, the conceptual limitations on biological functions, and the evidential demands that must be met to deploy evolutionary theory show that Nietzsche's explanatory project does not cohere with the Darwinian framework. Thus, coherence with currently accepted evolutionary theory should not constrain the philosophical project of interpretation in this case.     

The scope of teleological thinking in preschool children

These studies explore the scope of young children's teleological tendency to view entities as ‘designed for purposes'. One view (‘Selective Teleology') argues that teleology is an innate, basic mode of thinking that, throughout development, is selectively applied by children and adults to artifacts and biological properties. An alternative proposal (‘Promiscuous Teleology') argues that teleological reasoning derives from children's knowledge of intentionality and is not restricted to any particular category of phenomena until later in development. Two studies explored the predictions of these two hypotheses regarding the scope of children's functional intuitions. Using different methods, both studies found that, unlike adults, preschoolers tend to attribute functions to all kinds of objects – clocks, tigers, clouds and their parts. A third study then explored this finding further by examining whether the developmental effect was due to differences in children's and adults' concept of function. It found that both children and adults predominantly view an object's function as the activity it was designed to perform. Possible explanations for the developmental differences found in the first two studies, and implications for notions of a teleological stance are discussed.     

论五种宗教对话观

宗教对话是国际宗教学界的一个热门话题、一个前沿领域。本文概要评述了五种最有影响的宗教对话观,即排他论、兼并论、多元论、兼容论和实践论,并力求对它们加以比较性的方法论反思。作者认为,这五种宗教对话观不仅各有不可忽视的理论根据,而且均有值得深思的理论得失。因此,从神哲学方法论上反省它们之间的学术论争,并权衡它们之间的理论张力,将有助于我们进而探索宗教对话领域的疑难问题及其理论突破点。     

A Buddhist contribution to the psychoanalytic psychology of self

The author attempts to integrate the concepts of self used in psychoanalytic theory with the understanding of the nature of self as explained within the Buddhist meditative tradition. He divides different concepts of self in psychoanalytic theory into three major levels of consciousness and abstraction: self as experience, representational self and self as system. The representational level is defined as consisting of unconscious organizing structures of interaction: the system level is a hierarchically higher organization of representations, while the experiential level consists of the moment-to-moment flow of consciousness. He argues that for the sake of theoretical clarity these levels should be differentiated in discussions of self. He then describes the Buddhist psychology of self and tries to show how this perspective can enrich psychoanalytic understanding of the experiential self and of narcissism, which in Buddhist language would be described as clinging to (seeking or avoiding) images of self that arise in the mind. Last, he describes a model of therapeutic development using different levels of self and the interrelationship between them, showing how psychoanalytic psychotherapy and Buddhist insight meditation emphasize different levels of self using complementary rather than mutually exclusive methods.