Haybron on Mood Propensity and Happiness

Daniel Haybron has made an original contribution to philosophical discussions of happiness. He has put forward a theory that identifies happiness with moods and the propensity to experience moods. Haybron’s contribution deserves a critical examination. The first section of my paper is interpretive. I show how Haybron uses the concepts of ‘central affective states’ and ‘mood propensity’ to define happiness. The second and third sections of the paper are critical. They focus on the inclusion of mood propensity in Haybron’s theory. In the second section I argue that his theory fails because there is an example that shows a subject can be happy even when that subject does not have a positive mood propensity. In the third section of the paper, I consider Haybron’s objection that the case in question is ‘object-specific’ and that it is not ‘emotionally-based’. I discuss both of these technical terms in detail. Moreover, I argue that a modified version of the counter example accommodates these technical terms while retaining the persuasiveness of the original example.

Grounding Recognition: A Rejoinder to Critical Questions

It is always great good fortune for an author to have his writings meet with a receptive circle of readers who take them up in their own work and clarify them further. Indeed, it may even be the secret of all theoretical productivity that one reaches an opportune point in one's own creative process when others' queries, suggestions, and criticisms give one no peace, until one has been forced to come up with new answers and solutions. The four essays collected here, in any event, jointly represent an ideal form of such a challenge: I am now compelled to make further theoretical developments and clarifications that lead me to a whole new stage of my own endeavours, well beyond what I initially had in mind in The Struggle for Recognition . For this reason, I will not concentrate here on interpretative issues regarding my earlier work but will instead take up the problems and challenges that have occasioned several revisions on my part. For this reason, it makes sense to begin (in section I) with the points that Carl-Göran Heidegren makes, in terms of a history of social theory, regarding my proposed theory of recognition. The issues that still motivate me today can best be expressed via an engagement with the conscientious interpretations he offers. The core of this rejoinder is based on Heikki Ikäheimo's and Arto Laitinen's suggestions and corrections, which they have used to develop my initial approach further, to the point where the theoretical outlines of a precise and general concept of recognition come into view. It is primarily these two contributions that helped me develop a productive elaboration of my originally vague intuitions (section II). By way of conclusion (in section III), I take up the penetrating questions raised by Antti Kauppinen regarding the use of the concept of recognition in the broader context of social criticism; he has compelled me to take on several extremely helpful clarifications, and they give me the opportunity, in conclusion, to summarize my overarching intentions.     

Anti-Autonomism Defended: A Reply to Hill

In the current issue of this journal, Scott Hill critiques some of my work on the “is”-“ought” controversy, the Hume-inspired debate over whether an ethical conclusion can be soundly, or even validly, derived from only non-ethical premises. I’ve argued that it can be; Hill is unconvinced. I reply to Hill’s critique, focusing on four key questions to which he and I give different answers.

A Rejoinder to Fischer and Tognazzini

In Otsuka (1998), I endorse an incompatibilist Principle of Avoidable Blame. In this rejoinder to Fischer and Tognazzini (2009), I defend this principle against their charge that it is vulnerable to Frankfurt-type counterexample.     

How Not to Defend Constructive Empiricism: a Rejoinder

Ladyman, Douven, Horsten and van Fraassen have attempted to defend van Fraassen's critique of abductive reasoning against the arguments offered in a recent piece of mine. My short rejoinder shows two things. First, their counter-arguments fail to refute my original arguments. Their arguments casually move from the actuality of 'empirically equivalent rivals' to the possibility of 'equally good rivals'. But pointing to the existence of the former would do nothing to establish that empirically equivalent rivals are 'equally good' or equally well supported by the evidence. Second, I show that a central claim of their paper, one which three of the four authors see as 'possibly raising serious problems for constructive empiricism and for van Fraassen's steps toward a new epistemology', is very close to the conclusion of my original piece: if explanatory considerations are jettisoned, then even common-sense existential claims are in danger of being unfounded.     

Corruption as a Propensity: Personality and Motivational Determinants Among Nigerians

Psychologically oriented studies on corruption are lacking despite the fact that psychology has contributed enormously to the understanding of criminal behaviors over the past decades. Part of this problem relates to the lack of psychological tone in the definition and measurement of corruption. Taking a clue from the extensive psychological discourse on crime, which provides strong evidence for the existence of criminal tendencies, we conceptualized corruption here in terms of propensity. Possible personality and motivation determinants of this propensity were then explored. Results revealed that extraversion and conscientiousness positively and inversely predicted corruption tendencies, respectively. Results further showed that extrinsic motivation positively potentiates corruption tendencies, whereas intrinsic motivation was inversely related to corruption tendencies. Analysis of demographic variables revealed that males were more likely to be corrupt than their female counterparts. In general, findings here are consistent with the criminal behavior literature, which strongly suggests that the study of corruption is indeed amenable to psychological theories and methods and that individual differences variables constitute important explanatory variables in this regard.     

From Affect to Mood: Homophobia as Case in Point

This article reflects on emotion as an internal state caused by external forces that can result in mood disturbance. It traces the shift from affect to feeling to emotion to mood, following Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744–1803) to Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768–1834) to William James (1842–1910) to Donald Capps (1939-) as mileposts. It reflects on the phenomena of homophobia/heterosexism and heteronormativity as ideological climate and concludes with a proposal for healing the unhealed wound of sexual minorities.     

Aversion to Happiness Across Cultures: A Review of Where and Why People are Averse to Happiness

A common view in contemporary Western culture is that personal happiness is one of the most important values in life. For example, in American culture it is believed that failing to appear happy is cause for concern. These cultural notions are also echoed in contemporary Western psychology (including positive psychology and much of the research on subjective well-being). However, some important (often culturally-based) facts about happiness have tended to be overlooked in the psychological research on the topic. One of these cultural phenomena is that, for some individuals, happiness is not a supreme value. In fact, some individuals across cultures are averse to various kinds of happiness for several different reasons. This article presents the first review of the concept of aversion to happiness. Implications of the outcomes are discussed, as are directions for further research.     

The social-psychological study of conflict: Rejoinder to a critique

This paper is a rejoinder to Plon's critique of the social psychology of conflict published in this Journal. The rejoinder reviews the history of American social psychology, the meaning of ‘conflict resolution’, the nature of the dilemma in the Prisoner's Dilemma, and other related matters, which Plon has apparently misconstrued. The rejoinder criticizes Plon's crude ‘economic determinism’ version of Marxist theory and briefly considers the role of power in politics. The characteristics of the present author's social-psychological approach to conflict is outlined, and it is suggested that such an approach has direct relevance to the intellectual concerns of those who seek to bring about social change.