How children know the relevant properties for generalizing object names

Young children’s novel word extensions indicate that their animal categories, like those of adults, are characterized by multiple similarities among instances; whereas their artifact categories, again like those of adults, are characterized more simply by commonalities among instances in shape. Three experiments shed light on the nature and development of a mechanism that enables children to organize novel lexical categories differently for different kinds of objects. Experiment 1 shows that, by adult judgments, animals and artifacts present different category organizations. Experiment 2 shows relations between both age and the number of nouns young children have acquired, and children’s kind‐specific generalizations of newly learned nouns. Experiment 3 is a training study in which even younger children show an ability to learn and then generalize highly abstract relations between different contextual cues and different category structures; and importantly, to learn more than one set of such relations at a time. Together, these three findings indicate one way in which children are able to rapidly and accurately form lexical categories that parallel those of adults in their language community.     

Pabiku and Ga Ti Ga: Two Mechanisms Infants Use to Learn About the World

Some of the things that adults learn about language, and about the world, are very specific, whereas others are more abstract or rulelike. This article reviews evidence showing that infants, too, can very rapidly acquire both specific and abstract information, and considers the mechanisms that infants might use in doing so.     

Generalization of equivalence relations from photos to objects by preschool children

Generalized equivalence classes are stimulus classes that consist of equivalent stimuli and other physically similar class‐member stimuli. The present study evaluated whether preschool children would form equivalence classes among photos of abstract objects (2D) and show equivalence generalization to the corresponding objects (3D), printed photos (2D stimuli), and to black‐and‐white drawn pictures (2D stimuli). Six typically developing children were taught arbitrary relations to establish three 3‐member equivalence classes with 2D stimuli presented on a computer screen. AB‐AC baseline relations (for half of the participants) and AB‐BC relations (for the other half) were taught using a multiple‐probe design to assess taught and tested relations. After class formation, three types of generalization probes were conducted: generalization to 3D stimuli, generalization between 2D (printed photos) and 3D stimuli, and generalization to drawn pictures (2D). All of the participants formed the equivalence classes. Two participants met the criterion for all three generalization probe types. Two participants presented mixed results across tests, and two participants did not exhibit equivalence generalization. The results demonstrated equivalence generalization from 2D to 3D stimuli in preschool children, although the variability across participants suggests that such generalization cannot be assumed a priori.     

Scene perception: Detecting and judging objects undergoing relational violations

Five classes of relations between an object and its setting can characterize the organization of objects into real-world scenes. The relations are (1) Interposition (objects interrupt their background), (2) Support (objects tend to rest on surfaces), (3) Probability (objects tend to be found in some scenes but not others), (4) Position (given an object is probable in a scene, it often is found in some positions and not others), and (5) familiar Size (objects have a limited set of size relations with other objects). In two experiments subjects viewed brief (150 msec) presentations of slides of scenes in which an object in a cued location in the scene was either in a normal relation to its background or violated from one to three of the relations. Such objects appear to (1) have the background pass through them, (2) float in air, (3) be unlikely in that particular scene, (4) be in an inappropriate position, and (5) be too large or too small relative to the other objects in the scene. In Experiment I, subjects attempted to determine whether the cued object corresponded to a target object which had been specified in advance by name. With the exception of the Interposition violation, violation costs were incurred in that the detection of objects undergoing violations was less accurate and slower than when those same objects were in normal relations to their setting. However, the detection of objects in normal relations to their setting (innocent bystanders) was unaffected by the presence of another object undergoing a violation in that same setting. This indicates that the violation costs were incurred not because of an unsuccessful elicitation of a frame or schema for the scene but because properly formed frames interfered with (or did not facilitate) the perceptibility of objects undergoing violations. As the number of violations increased, target detectability generally decreased. Thus, the relations were accessed from the results of a single fixation and were available sufficiently early during the time course of scene perception to affect the perception of the objects in the scene. Contrary to expectations from a bottom-up account of scene perception, violations of the pervasive physical relations of Support and Interposition were not more disruptive on object detection than the semantic violations of Probability, Position and Size. These are termed semantic because they require access to the referential meaning of the object. In Experiment II, subjects attempted to detect the presence of the violations themselves. Violations of the semantic relations were detected more accurately than violations of Interposition and at least as accurately as violations of Support. As the number of violations increased, the detectability of the incongruities between an object and its setting increased. These results provide converging evidence that semantic relations can be accessed from the results of a single fixation. In both experiments information about Position was accessed at least as quickly as information on Probability. Thus in Experiment I, the interference that resulted from placing a fire hydrant in a kitchen was not greater than the interference from placing it on top of a mail ? in a street scene. Similarly, violations of Probability in Experiment II were not more detectable than violations of Position. Thus, the semantic relations which were accessed included information about the detailed interactions among the objects—information which is more specific than what can be inferred from the general setting. Access to the semantic relations among the entities in a scene is not deferred until the completion of spatial and depth processing and object identification. Instead, an object's semantic relations are accessed simultaneously with its physical relations as well as with its own identification.     

The Puzzle of Metacoherence

I develop a view of the common factor between subjectively indistinguishable perceptions and hallucinations that avoids analyzing experiences as involving awareness relations to abstract entities, sense‐data, or any other peculiar entities. The main thesis is that hallucinating subjects employ concepts (or analogous nonconceptual structures), namely the very same concepts that in a subjectively indistinguishable perception are employed as a consequence of being related to external, mind‐independent objects or property‐instances. These concepts and nonconceptual structures are identified with modes of presentation types. Since a hallucinating subject is not related to any such objects or property‐instances, the concepts she employs remain empty. I argue that the phenomenology of hallucinations and perceptions can be identified with employing concepts and analogous nonconceptual structures. By doing so, I defend an ontologically minimalist view of the phenomenology of experience that (1) vindicates Aristotelianism about types and (2) amounts to a naturalized view of the phenomenology of experience.     

Assessing the concreteness of relational representation

Research has shown that people's ability to transfer abstract relational knowledge across situations can be heavily influenced by the concrete objects that fill relational roles. This article provides evidence that the concreteness of the relations themselves also affects performance. In 3 experiments, participants viewed simple relational patterns of visual objects and then identified these same patterns under a variety of physical transformations. Results show that people have difficulty generalizing to novel concrete forms of abstract relations, even when objects are unchanged. This suggests that stimuli are initially represented as concrete relations by default. In the 2nd and 3rd experiments, the number of distinct concrete relations in the training set was increased to promote more abstract representation. Transfer improved for novel concrete relations but not for other transformations such as object substitution. Results indicate that instead of automatically learning abstract relations, people's relational representations preserve all properties that appear consistently in the learning environment, including concrete objects and concrete relations.     

Just do it? Investigating the gap between prediction and action in toddlers’ causal inferences

Adults’ causal representations integrate information about predictive relations and the possibility of effective intervention; if one event reliably predicts another, adults can represent the possibility that acting to bring about the first event might generate the second. Here we show that although toddlers (mean age: 24 months) readily learn predictive relationships between physically connected events, they do not spontaneously initiate one event to try to generate the second (although older children, mean age: 47 months, do; Experiments 1 and 2). Toddlers succeed only when the events are initiated by a dispositional agent (Experiment 3), when the events involve direct contact between objects (Experiment 4), or when the events are described using causal language (Experiment 5). This suggests that causal language may help children extend their initial causal representations beyond agent-initiated and direct contact events.     

Simplicity and generalization: Short-cutting abstraction in children's object categorizations

Development in any domain is often characterized by increasingly abstract representations. Recent evidence in the domain of shape recognition provides one example; between 18 and 24 months children appear to build increasingly abstract representations of object shape [Smith, L. B. (2003). Learning to recognize objects. Psychological Science, 14, 244-250]. Abstraction is in part simplification because it requires the removal of irrelevant information. At the same time, part of generalization is ignoring irrelevant differences. The resulting prediction is this: simplification may enable generalization. Four experiments asked whether simple training instances could shortcut the process of abstraction and directly promote appropriate generalization. Toddlers were taught novel object categories with either simple or complex training exemplars. We found that children who learned with simple objects were able to generalize according to shape similarity, typically relevant for early object categories, better than those who learned with complex objects. Abstraction is the product of learning; using simplified - already abstracted instances - can short-cut that learning, leading to robust generalization.     

Diversity-Based Reasoning in Children

One of the hallmarks of inductive reasoning by adults is the diversity effect, namely that people draw stronger inferences from a diverse set of evidence than from a more homogenous set of evidence. However, past developmental work has not found consistent diversity effects with children age 9 and younger. We report robust sensitivity to diversity in children as young as 5, using everyday stimuli such as pictures of objects with people. Experiment 1 showed the basic diversity effect in 5- to 9-year-olds. Experiment 2 showed that, like adults, children restrict their use of diversity information when making inferences about remote categories. Experiment 3 used other stimulus sets to overcome an alternate explanation in terms of sample size rather than diversity effects. Finally, Experiment 4 showed that children more readily draw on diversity when reasoning about objects and their relations with people than when reasoning about objects' internal, hidden properties, thus partially explaining the negative findings of previous work. Relations to cross-cultural work and models of induction are discussed.     

Emergence of relations and the essence of learning: a review of Sidman's Equivalence relations and behavior: a research story. Book review

The author reviews and comments on the book Equivalence relations and behavior: a research story by Murray Sidman. Sidman's book reports his research about equivalence relations and competencies in children with mental retardation and how it relates to behavior. Sidman used the idea of stimulus-stimulus relations among features of the environment to develop his theories about equivalence relations. Experimental work with children and animals demonstrated their ability to use equivalence relations to learn new tasks. The subject received feedback and reinforcement for specific choices made during training, then was presented with new choices during testing. Results of the tests indicate that subjects were able to establish relations and retrieve them in different situations.     

Children learn words easier when they are interested in the category to which the word belongs

The overall pattern of vocabulary development is relatively similar across children learning different languages. However, there are considerable differences in the words known to individual children. Historically, this variability has been explained in terms of differences in the input. Here, we examine the alternate possibility that children's individual interest in specific natural categories shapes the words they are likely to learn – a child who is more interested in animals will learn a new animal name easier relative to a new vehicle name. Two‐year‐old German‐learning children (N = 39) were exposed to four novel word–object associations for objects from four different categories. Prior to the word learning task, we measured their interest in the categories that the objects belonged to. Our measure was pupillary change following exposure to familiar objects from these four categories, with increased pupillary change interpreted as increased interest in that category. Children showed more robust learning of word–object associations from categories they were more interested in relative to categories they were less interested in. We further found that interest in the novel objects themselves influenced learning, with distinct influences of both category interest and object interest on learning. These results suggest that children's interest in different natural categories shapes their word learning. This provides evidence for the strikingly intuitive possibility that a child who is more interested in animals will learn novel animal names easier than a child who is more interested in vehicles.     

Outline of a general model of measurement

Measurement is a process aimed at acquiring and codifying information about properties of empirical entities. In this paper we provide an interpretation of such a process comparing it with what is nowadays considered the standard measurement theory, i.e., representational theory of measurement. It is maintained here that this theory has its own merits but it is incomplete and too abstract, its main weakness being the scant attention reserved to the empirical side of measurement, i.e., to measurement systems and to the ways in which the interactions of such systems with the entities under measurement provide a structure to an empirical domain. In particular it is claimed that (1) it is on the ground of the interaction with a measurement system that a partition can be induced on the domain of entities under measurement and that relations among such entities can be established, and that (2) it is the usage of measurement systems that guarantees a degree of objectivity and intersubjectivity to measurement results. As modeled in this paper, measurement systems link the abstract theory of measuring, as developed in representational terms, and the practice of measuring, as coded in standard documents such as the International Vocabulary of Metrology.     

Preschool children's ability to visually represent relations

The developmental origins of mapping temporal relations onto space was investigated in N = 122 3- to 5-year-old children and adults. Spontaneous production and comprehension were investigated. Production was investigated in two conditions: an iconic condition (three-dimensional objects depicting the events or objects to be represented) and an abstract condition (plain discs). Consistent with findings by Tversky, Kugelmass and Winter (1991), 5-year-olds performed on an adult-like level. Developmental progress was observed between the ages of 3 and 4 years, with comprehension preceding production. Consistent with DeLoache's findings (2000), 4-year-olds' performance was better in abstract than in iconic conditions, indicating that dual representational demands may have affected task performance in the iconic condition. In sum, abilities to map temporal relations onto spatial relations appear to develop spontaneously, even before children have experience with conventional notational systems.     

The profile of abstract rule learning in infancy: Meta‐analytic and experimental evidence

Everyone agrees that infants possess general mechanisms for learning about the world, but the existence and operation of more specialized mechanisms is controversial. One mechanism—rule learning—has been proposed as potentially specific to speech, based on findings that 7‐month‐olds can learn abstract repetition rules from spoken syllables (e.g. ABB patterns: wo‐fe‐fe, ga‐tu‐tu…) but not from closely matched stimuli, such as tones. Subsequent work has shown that learning of abstract patterns is not simply specific to speech. However, we still lack a parsimonious explanation to tie together the diverse, messy, and occasionally contradictory findings in that literature. We took two routes to creating a new profile of rule learning: meta‐analysis of 20 prior reports on infants’ learning of abstract repetition rules (including 1,318 infants in 63 experiments total), and an experiment on learning of such rules from a natural, non‐speech communicative signal. These complementary approaches revealed that infants were most likely to learn abstract patterns from meaningful stimuli. We argue that the ability to detect and generalize simple patterns supports learning across domains in infancy but chiefly when the signal is meaningfully relevant to infants’ experience with sounds, objects, language, and people.     

Can God Create Abstract Objects? A Reply to Peter van Inwagen

The Platonic theist Peter van Inwagen argues that God cannot create abstract objects. Thus, the quantifier ‘everything’ in traditional statements of the doctrine of creation should be appropriately restricted to things that can enter into causal relations and abstract objects cannot: ‘God is the creator of everything distinct from himself…that can enter into causal relations.’ I respond to van Inwagen arguing that he has provided no good reason for thinking abstract objects must be uncreated. And if this is the case, then there is no good reason to think that God cannot create abstract objects.     

Rapid learning of syllable classes from a perceptually continuous speech stream

To learn a language, speakers must learn its words and rules from fluent speech; in particular, they must learn dependencies among linguistic classes. We show that when familiarized with a short artificial, subliminally bracketed stream, participants can learn relations about the structure of its words, which specify the classes of syllables occurring in first and last word positions. By studying the effect of familiarization length, we compared the general predictions of associative theories of learning and those of models postulating separate mechanisms for quickly extracting the word structure and for tracking the syllable distribution in the stream. As predicted by the dual-mechanism model, the preference for structurally correct items was negatively correlated with the familiarization length. This result is difficult to explain by purely associative schemes; an extensive set of neural network simulations confirmed this difficulty. Still, we show that powerful statistical computations operating on the stream are available to our participants, as they are sensitive to co-occurrence statistics among non-adjacent syllables. We suggest that different learning mechanisms analyze speech on-line: A rapid mechanism extracting structural information about the stream, and a slower mechanism detecting statistical regularities among the items occurring in it.     

Challenging “Early Competence”: a process oriented analysis of children's classifying

In some circumstances, children of 5 produce identical classifications to 10 year olds when asked to sort a collection of objects. This has been interpreted as meaning that the process of constructing classifications is very similar at 5 and 10 years. But this conclusion rests on a comparison of the product of children's sortings, rather than on a study of their activity in producing sortings. The present paper argues that the process of classifying is in fact very different for 5 and 10 year olds: whereas the older children treat the whole classification as a single unit composed of interrelated classes, the younger children proceed as though each class were independent of the others. At around 7 years, there is evidence for a transitional phase, in which children directly work on the relations between classes and so organize their initially “juxtaposed” procedures into more coherent systems. The tendency to work on the relations between elements in the process of classifying is not, however, simply an age-related phenomenon: evidence for a similar effect can be observed in children throughout the age range of 5 to 10 years, during the course of short experimental sessions. Furthermore, the effect is not merely a response to errors or difficulties: the tendency to work on classifying relations can be seen in 5-year-old children in a task in which they are already successful. It seems that children spontaneously discover and use information about their procedures and the relations between them. This process is an end in itself. It occurs whether or not its results yield more successful performance. The approach taken in this paper is not confined to one area of behavior. This analysis of children's classifying fits closely with work in a very different domain, i.e. Karmiloff-Smith's work on children's language and other representational systems. The analysis has implications for computer models of skill acquisition, as well as for psychological theories of development.     

Précis of How children learn the meanings of words

Normal children learn tens of thousands of words, and do so quickly and efficiently, often in highly impoverished environments. In How Children Learn the Meanings of Words, I argue that word learning is the product of certain cognitive and linguistic abilities that include the ability to acquire concepts, an appreciation of syntactic cues to meaning, and a rich understanding of the mental states of other people. These capacities are powerful, early emerging, and to some extent uniquely human, but they are not special to word learning. This proposal is an alternative to the view that word learning is the result of simple associative learning mechanisms, and it rejects as well the notion that children possess constraints, either innate or learned, that are specifically earmarked for word learning. This theory is extended to account for how children learn names for objects, substances, and abstract entities, pronouns and proper names, verbs, determiners, prepositions, and number words. Several related topics are also discussed, including na?ve essentialism, children's understanding of representational art, the nature of numerical and spatial reasoning, and the role of words in the shaping of mental life.