Why I remember that: The influence of contextual factors on beliefs about everyday memory

In the present study, we examined the role of contextual factors in beliefs about remembering personal experiences. Specifically, we examined why individuals think that they remember experiences in everyday life and whether the reasons for remembering varied as a function of recall context, memory theme, and culture. In Experiment 1, we examined young adults’ reported memories in two hypothetical contexts. In Experiment 2, memories were reported in response to cue words in European American and Chinese young adults. The results indicated that social sharing contexts appeared to favor social functions, whereas private reminiscence contexts tended to favor nonfunctional reasons for remembering and, to a lesser extent, directive functions. The European Americans reported more functional reasons for remembering, whereas the Chinese were more likely to report external cues as a reason for remembering. Finally, self functions were rarely reported. The results are interpreted in light of theories of memory functions and the role of contextual factors on remembering.     

The Role of the Self in False Memory Creation

Summary

People will create false memories of childhood experiences. In this article, the research that demonstrates the creation of false memories is first described. Three processes that may be involved in memory creation are then outlined. First, individuals must accept a suggested event as plausible. Second, they construct an image and narrative of the false event. Third, they incorrectly attribute the source of the event to personal memory rather than external suggestion. We argue that the self plays a role in each of these processes. In addition, because memories are important components of the self, when memories change, the self changes as well.     

Event plausibility does not determine children's false memories

In this paper we ask how the plausibility of an event affects the likelihood that children will develop a false memory for it. Over three interviews 6-year-olds and 10-year-olds were shown two true photos and two false photos—a plausible and less plausible event—and reported what they could remember about those events. Children also rated their confidence that the events happened, and how much they could remember about the events. By the final interview, within each age group, there were no differences in children's confidence ratings for the two false events. In addition, within each age group, the rate of false memories was the same for each event; across age groups, younger children developed more false memories than older children.     

Remembering,imagining, false memories & personal meanings

The Self-Memory System encompasses the working self, autobiographical memory and episodic memory. Specific autobiographical memories are patterns of activation over knowledge structures in autobiographical and episodic memory brought about by the activating effect of cues. The working self can elaborate cues based on the knowledge they initially activate and so control the construction of memories of the past and the future. It is proposed that such construction takes place in the remembering–imagining system – a window of highly accessible recent memories and simulations of near future events. How this malfunctions in various disorders is considered as are the implication of what we term the modern view of human memory for notions of memory accuracy. We show how all memories are to some degree false and that the main role of memories lies in generating personal meanings.     

Culture and language in the emergence of autobiographical memory

Current conceptualizations of childhood amnesia assume that there is a "barrier" to remembering early experiences that must be overcome in order for one to begin to accumulate autobiographical memories. In contrast, we present a social-cultural-developmental perspective on the emergence of autobiographical memory. We first demonstrate the gradual emergence of autobiographical memories across the preschool years and then relate this developmental process to specific developments in language, narrative, and understanding of self and other that vary among individuals, as well as by culture and gender.     

Autobiographical memory distributions for negative self-images: Memories are organised around negative as well as positive aspects of identity

The relationship between developmental experiences, and an individual's emerging beliefs about themselves and the world, is central to many forms of psychotherapy. People suffering from a variety of mental health problems have been shown to use negative memories when defining the self; however, little is known about how these negative memories might be organised and relate to negative self-images. In two online studies with middle-aged (N = 18; study 1) and young (N = 56; study 2) adults, we found that participants' negative self-images (e.g., I am a failure) were associated with sets of autobiographical memories that formed clustered distributions around times of self-formation, in much the same pattern as for positive self-images (e.g., I am talented). This novel result shows that highly organised sets of salient memories may be responsible for perpetuating negative beliefs about the self. Implications for therapy are discussed.     

Reasons for withdrawing belief in vivid autobiographical memories

Previous studies have shown that many people hold personal memories for events that they no longer believe occurred. This study examines the reasons that people provide for choosing to reduce autobiographical belief in vividly recollected autobiographical memories. A body of non-believed memories provided by 374 individuals was reviewed to develop a qualitatively derived categorisation system. The final scheme consisted of 8 major categories (in descending order of mention): social feedback, event plausibility, alternative attributions, general memory beliefs, internal event features, consistency with external evidence, views of self/others, personal motivation and numerous sub-categories. Independent raters coded the reports and judged the primary reason that each person provided for withdrawing belief. The nature of each category, frequency of category endorsement, category overlap and phenomenological ratings are presented, following which links to related literature and implications are discussed. This study documents that a wide variety of recollective and non-recollective sources of information influence decision-making about the occurrence of autobiographical events.     

The identity function of autobiographical memory: time is on our side

Autobiographical memory plays an important role in the construction of personal identity. We review evidence of the bi-directional link between memory and identity. Individuals' current self-views, beliefs, and goals influence their recollections and appraisals of former selves. In turn, people's current self-views are influenced by what they remember about their personal past, as well as how they recall earlier selves and episodes. People's reconstructed evaluations of memories, their perceived distance from past experiences, and the point of view of their recollections have implications for how the past affects the present. We focus on how people's constructions of themselves through time serve the function of creating a coherent--and largely favourable--view of their present selves and circumstances.     

Relationship between frequency of involuntary autobiographical memories and cognitive failure

Involuntary autobiographical memories are memories of personal experiences that pop into mind without a conscious attempt at their retrieval. This study investigated individual differences in the number of involuntary autobiographical memories, and explored the relationship between the frequency of occurrence in involuntary autobiographical memory and cognitive failures in everyday memory, as indexed by metamemory questionnaires. A total of 24 undergraduate students reported involuntary autobiographical memories in controlled field interviews, and completed the Everyday Memory Questionnaire and the Cognitive Failures Questionnaire. The results showed that, despite controlled conditions, considerable individual differences were observed in the number of involuntary autobiographical memories reported while walking along a prescribed route on the campus, and that reported memories were predominantly serving self function. In addition, the number of involuntary autobiographical memories was positively related to cognitive failures in everyday memory: participants who acknowledged more problems in everyday memory had a higher frequency of involuntary memories. The implications of these results are discussed in terms of the complementary function of involuntary autobiographical memory in everyday life.     

Not all semantics: Similarities and differences in reminiscing function and content between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians

This study explored why and how Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians remember the past. Indigenous Australians traditionally share a strong oral tradition in which customs, personal and cultural histories, and other narratives are passed across groups and between generations by word of mouth. Drawing on this tradition, in which inherent value is placed on sharing knowledge and maintaining connectedness with others, we hypothesised that Indigenous Australians would be more likely than non-Indigenous Australians to report reminiscing to fulfil social functions (but not self or directive functions). Furthermore, we hypothesised that Indigenous Australians would recall personal past experiences more elaborately than would non-Indigenous Australians. In Study 1, 33 Indigenous Australians and 76 non-Indigenous Australians completed Webster's Reminiscence Functions Scale. As predicted, Indigenous participants reported higher scores on subscales related to social functions than did non-Indigenous Australians: particularly “Teach/Inform” and “Intimacy Maintenance”. They also scored higher on the “Identity” subscale. In Study 2, 15 Indigenous and 14 non-Indigenous Australians shared three memories from the distant and recent past. While Indigenous and non-Indigenous narratives did not differ in either emotion or elaboration, Indigenous Australians provided more memory context and detail by including a greater proportion of semantic memory content. Taken together, these findings suggest differences in both why and how Australians remember.     

Infantile amnesia reconsidered: a cross-cultural analysis

A number of theories have been offered over the past hundred years to explain the phenomenon of infantile amnesia, the common inability to remember autobiographical experiences from the first years of life. Recent comparative studies that examine autobiographical memories in different populations, particularly populations in North America and East Asia, have yielded intriguing findings that provide a unique opportunity to revisit some of the major theoretical views and to propose new accounts. In light of these findings, this article discusses five theoretical explanations for infantile amnesia, including cognitive and social discontinuity, the emergence of the self, early parent-child memory sharing, functions of autobiographical memory, and the complexity of life experience. The reconsideration of infantile amnesia from a cross-cultural perspective suggests that while the basic mechanisms and contributing factors may be universal, the specific ways in which these mechanisms and factors are manifested differ qualitatively across cultures. A theoretical approach that takes the larger cultural context into account can help us understand this long-standing puzzle.     

On the transition from childhood amnesia to the recall of personal memories

When adults are asked to report and date personal memories of their pasts, they show childhood amnesia, that is, diminished recall of experiences over the childhood years. This way of demonstrating the phenomenon was supplemented in the present study with a more direct approach: Participants reported events of early childhood that they knew they had experienced (because of family stories, photographs, etc.) but did not actually remember. The resulting cumulative relative frequency distributions produced by the two methods were substantially different, with the median age of remembered events being 6.07 years and of known events, 3.20 years. We suggest that the mean of these two ages, 4.64 years, gives a good indication of when childhood amnesia is eclipsed by personal memories in adults' recall of their personal pasts.     

Long-term memory for traumatic events: experiences and emotional reactions during the 2000 flood in Italy

The authors investigated how people remember real-life traumatic events. Adult residents (N = 145) of an Italian community that was flooded in fall of 2000 completed a questionnaire 3 years after the flood. Respondents briefly recounted their personal experiences with the flood and answered questions about emotional reactions to the flood, appraisal processes, and disaster exposure. Results showed that participants tended to recall experiences that occurred during the most critical phases of the disaster. The emotions most strongly experienced by respondents-sadness, fear, and surprise-were associated with specific appraisals. Content and amount of memories about flood experiences did not significantly vary as a function of flood exposure. Moreover, there was no significant relationship between memory quantity and emotional intensity. The authors discuss findings in the context of literature on traumatic memory and emotion.     

Childhood amnesia: Empirical evidence for a two-stage phenomenon

The term childhood amnesia refers to the inability of adults to remember events from their infancy and early childhood. If we plot the number of memories that adults can recall as a function of age during childhood, the number of memories reported increases gradually as a function of age. Typically, this finding has been used to argue that gradual changes in memory development contribute to a gradual decline in childhood amnesia during the preschool period. Alternatively, it is possible that pooling data across participants has obscured more abrupt, stage-like changes in the remission of childhood amnesia. In the present study we examined the number and distribution of childhood memories for individual participants. Six adults were repeatedly interviewed about their childhood memories. We found that the distribution of adults' early childhood memories may be less continuous than pooled data suggest. This finding has important implications for current explanations of childhood amnesia.     

The emergence of autobiographical memory: a social cultural developmental theory

The authors present a multicomponent dynamic developmental theory of human autobiographical memory that emerges gradually across the preschool years. The components that contribute to the process of emergence include basic memory abilities, language and narrative, adult memory talk, temporal understanding, and understanding of self and others. The authors review the empirical developmental evidence within each of these components to show how each contributes to the timing, quantity, and quality of personal memories from the early years of life. The authors then consider the relevance of the theory to explanations of childhood amnesia and how the theory accounts for and predicts the complex findings on adults' earliest memories, including individual, gender, and cultural differences.     

How pleasant was your childhood? Beliefs about memory shape inferences from experienced difficulty of recall

People's beliefs about how memory works can affect their inferences from experienced difficulty of recall. Participants were asked to recall either 4 childhood events (experienced as an easy task) or 12 childhood events (experienced as a difficult task). Subsequently, they were led to believe that either pleasant or unpleasant periods of one's life fade from memory. When the recall task was difficult (12 events), participants who believed that memories from unpleasant periods fade away rated their childhood as less happy than participants who believed that memories from pleasant periods fade away. The opposite pattern was observed when the recall task was easy (4 events). This interplay of recall experiences and memory beliefs suggests that the judgmental impact of subjective experiences is shaped by beliefs about their meaning. It also suggests that the recall difficulty in clinical memory work may lead a person to make negative inferences about his or her childhood, provided the person shares the popular belief that memory represses negative information.     

Memory for the Events of Early Childhood

There has been much recent interest in the phenomenon of childhood amnesia, the difficulty most adults have in recalling at least the first 3 years of life. In contrast, it has been shown that infants 18 months of age or less can retain information over long periods. Although there is no agreed-upon explanation of this paradoxical phenomenon, there are proposed biological, cognitive, and social-cognitive explanations. Distinguishing among these accounts involves investigating both adults' memories for childhood events and the mnemonicabilities of young children. These studies may not only reveal the reason why our earliest years are shrouded from us as adults, but also shed light on the memory processes that allow us a rich representation of the remainder of our personal past.     

Fragment memories mark the end of childhood amnesia

Adults described and dated two kinds of first remembrances: a personal event memory (the recollection of a personal episode that had occurred at some time in some place) and a memory fragment (an isolated memory moment having no event context and remembered, perhaps, as an image, a behavior, or an emotion). First fragment memories were judged to have originated substantially earlier in life than first event memories--approximately 3 1/3 years of age for first fragment memories versus roughly 4 years of age for first event memories. We conclude that the end of childhood amnesia is marked not by our earliest episodic memories, but by the earliest remembered fragments of childhood experiences.     

Memories defining the self in Alzheimer’s disease

ABSTRACT

There is a debate over the extent to which personal identity or the self is preserved in patients with Alzheimer’s disease (AD). Autobiographical memory deficits at early stages of AD could contribute to altering patients’ self. However, the nature of the relationship between autobiographical memory deficits and the self in AD has not been much investigated experimentally. In the present study, we aimed to investigate the integrative meaning of self-defining memories (SDMs) in early stages of AD and to analyse its relationship with the self-concept. The results showed that, when compared to the control group, AD patients less frequently extracted meaning from their SDMs and the meaning was less frequently tied to the self. Patients exhibited some altered aspects of the self-concept (i.e., complexity and strength), though some other components still persisted (i.e., valence and certainty). Correlation analyses showed that the impaired integrative meaning in the AD group was correlated with some changes in self-concept. We suggest that integrative meaning may act as a bridge between autobiographical memories and the self-concept, with reduced integration abilities appearing as a potential mechanism for the deterioration of the self-concept in AD.