Considering Community Psychology Competencies: A Love Letter to Budding Scholar-Activists Who Wonder if They Have What It Takes

Recently, community psychologists have re‐vamped a set of 18 competencies considered important for how we practice community psychology. Three competencies are: (1) ethical, reflexive practice, (2) community inclusion and partnership, and (3) community education, information dissemination, and building public awareness. This paper will outline lessons I—a white working class woman academic—learned about my competency development through my research collaborations, using the lens of affective politics. I describe three lessons, from school‐based research sites (elementary schools serving working class students of color and one elite liberal arts school serving wealthy white students). The first lesson, from an elementary school, concerns ethical, reflective practice. I discuss understanding my affect as a barometer of my ability to conduct research from a place of solidarity. The second lesson, which centers community inclusion and partnership, illustrates how I learned about the importance of “before the beginning” conversations concerning social justice and conflict when working in elementary schools. The third lesson concerns community education, information dissemination, and building public awareness. This lesson, from a college, taught me that I could stand up and speak out against classism in the face of my career trajectory being threatened. With these lessons, I flesh out key aspects of community practice competencies.     

TAKING IN MORE OF LIFE

This is a story not only about my father's death but also about how it has affected me and life as I see it. I believe that the circumstances in my life following my father's death are connected to each other and have become my greatest lessons that I have learned in life.     

Reflections for Clinical Pastoral Education Students in Psychiatric Settings

This article focuses on Donald Capps’s books on mental illness. In doing so I highlight three key insights from Capps that I have applied in my own ministry with persons with mental illness in various psychiatric hospitals. These insights, together with my own experience as a chaplain, lead to three practical lessons for clinical pastoral education students in psychiatric settings. I provide some context for my interest in mental illness and my friendship with Capps, as well as some background regarding how Capps’s writings on mental illness fit with certain broader themes in his own work as a pastoral theologian. This essay is personal throughout.     

In Defence of Direct Realism

In her careful consideration of my book, The Problem of Perception (henceforth, PP), Susanna Siegel highlights what she takes to be a number of shortcomings in the work. First, she suggests that a sense-datum theorist has two options–what she calls the "complex sense-data option" and the "two-factor option"–that survive the argument of my book unscathed. I consider these two options in the first two sections of this reply. Secondly, she criticizes my suggestion that there are three and only three basic and independent sources of perceptual consciousness: an issue I take up in my third section. Thirdly, she expresses reservations about my response to the argument from hallucination. In particular, she argues that the phenomenological considerations on which I put so much weight cannot settle the fundamental issue here. I address this criticism in the fourth section of this reply. Finally, she spends a certain amount of time discussing the notion of a "veridicality-rele-vant property", a topic to which I devote the concluding section of this reply.     

Academic on a mission: Run and run and run

Challenges the distinctions we make between research/scholarship and practice. Recognizes and values the complimentarity of teaching, research, practice, and public policy. Tells how I have tried to approach creating opportunities to integrate those activities in my role as a community psychologist in an academic setting. Describes some of the lessons I have learned from my two decades of practice. This article is a very close approximation to my Distinguished Contribution to Practice in Community Psychology award address at APA in Toronto, August 1996. That talk included numerous overheads, which reason demands I omit. I thank Jim Sorenson and George Albee who, each in their own way, showed me that university professors can be passionate about their work and extend their reach beyond the perimeters of the campus. I thank Heather Barton, Krista Hopkins, Jennifer Heigel, and Anne Salassi for being such good ambassadors and for my most meaningful source of professional satisfaction: turning students on to careers as community psychologists and preventionists. I thank the Virginia prevention community for two decades of working together toward a common mission and the College of William and Mary for supporting my life’s work. Finally I thank John Morgan for his friendship and his affirming introduction, State Michaels for her help with the original talk, and Beverly Peterson for always being there. I am deeply honored.     

Examining how and why to Engage Practitioners from across the Learning Landscape in the Research Enterprise: Proposal for <Emphasis Type="Italic">Phronêtic</Emphasis> Research on Education

Educational practitioners are often reluctant, if not actively resistant, to their participation in production and consumption of educational research. Based on my research experience with educational practitioners, I try to deconstruct this phenomenon using dialogic Bakhtinian and Aristotelian sociocultural frameworks. I consider two major related breakdowns in the educational practice: 1) a lack of self-correcting process in the educational practice, while reliance on accountability policy to achieve the practice quality, and 2) a breakdown between educational research and educational practice. I argue that the first breakdown is caused by viewing teaching as poiesis, aiming at preset curricular endpoints, and not as praxis, critically defining its own values, goals, and virtues. As to the second breakdown, I argue that current mainstream and even innovative research is defined through the technê and epistêmê ways of knowing, which correspond to a poiesic vision of educational practice. I suggest that educational practice primarily involves the phronêtic and sophic ways of knowing, which correspond to a praxis vision of educational practice. I describe phronêtic research of teaching through a case of my students, preservice teachers, working on revisions of their lessons that they conducted at an urban afterschool program. Finally, I consider recommendations for institutional support for phronêtic research on teaching.     

Who’s in Charge Here?: Reply to Neil Levy

In his response to my essay “Out of Control,” Neil Levy contests my claims that (1) we are often responsible for acts that we do not consciously choose to perform, and that (2) despite the absence of conscious choice, there remains a relevant sense in which these actions are within our control. In this reply to Levy, I concede that claim (2) is linguistically awkward but defend the thought that it expresses, and I clarify my defense of claim (1) by distinguishing my position from attributionism.

Two assessments, by and for the assessor

In this article, I describe 2 assessment experiences, 1 in graduate school and the other more recently, which taught me important personal lessons. Both of the experiences helped me grow as a psychologist and helped me in my own personal life as well. Both experiences dealt with highly personal central issues in my life; the first concerning the development of empathy and the second, important issues centering around aging and death.     

Naturalism Need Not Be "Made Safe": A Response to William Rottschaefer's Misunderstandings

In this article, I respond to William Rottschaefer's analysis of my writings on religion and science, especially my Religion, Science and Naturalism (1996). I show that I am not trying "to make naturalism safe," as Rottschaefer contends, but rather attempting to explore options available when one endorses naturalistic approaches. I also explain why I object to the label "supernaturalistic naturalism" used by Rottschaefer. Possible limitations to naturalistic projects are discussed, not as limitations imposed but rather as features uncovered.     

Descartes on the Dubitability of the Existence of Self

In a number a passages Descartes appears to insist that "I am, I exist" and its variants are wholly indubitable. These passages present an intractable problem of interpretation in the face of passages in which Descartes allows that any result is dubitable, "I am, I exist" included. Here I pull together a number of elements of Descartes' system to show how all of these passages hang together. If my analysis is correct, it tells us something about the perspective that Descartes himself thinks we should take in reading the Meditations.     

Survival

This article describes the trauma and subsequent struggle of surviving a serious car accident. It deals with the physical efforts to keep me alive as well as the emotional impact and suffering. I was an "active sixty-three" when my life changed drastically. The car I drove en route to a vacation unexplainedly swerved, landed in a ditch and rolled over. I became QUADRIPLEGIC in one instant-paralyzed from the neck down, permanently confined to a wheelchair. I spend several unforgettable months in a Florida hospital, hooked up to life supports, hovering between life and death. I was then flown to New York for rehabilitation. A devoted medical team and supportive family taught be to become somewhat independent with the help of high-tech equipment, preparing me to face the world as a "QUAD." Six years have passed and I still mourn my "body beautiful," but I have accepted my limitations and found new challenges in life.     

A Group Journey—to Hell and Back

The process of a therapy group in an inpatient daycare unit¹ became saturated with anger and detachment, ultimately leading to a despairing silence. Based on Ferenczi’s concept of Orpha, I will explain the group silence as indicative of deep trauma and dissociative self-states. I propose that the therapist’s willingness to “hang in” with his group and be part of a seemingly unbearable enactment enhances the possibility for emergence of hope and restoration of positive communication. It is rare in the literature for authors to expose the pitfalls that they and their group members can fall into, leading to despair, shame, and hopelessness. When working in the complex environment of a mental hospital where every level of staff is stressed, therapists often find themselves without support and consultation. My hope is that my colleagues can learn from my challenges, errors, and lessons, as I have.     

Pastoral Theological Implications of the Aging Process

Pastoral care of the aged must deliberately attend to spiritual-theological issues involved in the aging process. As clinical, empirical, and practical pastoral experiences demonstrate, these spiritual-theological problems are as varied as the range of overall problems faced by the elderly. In an attempt to focus on major issues, however, it may be helpful to examine the three epochs of aging i.e., young~ldm, iddle-old, and old-old, in order to determine the spiritual and theological issues which are particularly relevant to each epoch. This paper proposes that each of the three developmental epochs has a main spiritual-theological concem which can be expressed in a question: young-old: "What shall I do with my life?"; middleaid: "What about my dying?"; old-old: "Why must I suffer so?" Pastoral ministry is called to further examine the validity of these assertions and draw practical applications in response to these spiritual-theological issues which face older persons.     

'My capital secret': Literature and the psychoanalytic agon

Taking as my departure point Freud 's unequivocal claim in The Question of Lay Analysis that psychoanalytic education should include "the history of civilization, mythology, the psychology of religion, and the science of literature" ( Freud, 1926b, p . 246), I advocate for an integration of psychoanalysis with the arts, the humanities, and the social sciences in psychoanalytic training. Foundations in these fields are not only acceptable as preliminary to clinical training but will also provide the diverse intellectual climate that is urgently needed in psychoanalytic institutes whose discursive range is often quite narrow. To provide one example of the salutary effect of such disciplinary integration on clinical practice, I illustrate how the transformative power of literature provides compelling metaphors for the psychoanalytic encounter. Through an example drawn from within my own experience as literary critic and psychoanalyst, I describe the ways that the troubling tensions in Milton's Samson Agonistes functioned to illuminate, for me, an analysand 's 'capital secret'.     

Mongrel Gravity

It was recognized almost from the original formulation of general relativity that the theory was incomplete because it dealt only with classical, rather than quantum, matter. What must be done in order to complete the theory has been a subject of considerable debate over the last century, and here I just mention a few of the various options that have been suggested for a quantum theory of gravity. The aim of what follows is twofold. First, I address worries about the consistency and physical plausibility of hybrid theories of gravity—theories involving a classical gravitational field and quantum matter fields. Such worries are shown to be unfounded. These hybrid theories—mongrel gravity—in fact comprise the only current, actual theories of gravity that incorporate quantum matter, and they also offer legitimate promise as tools for discovering the full theory of gravity. So my second aim is to highlight these theories as providing an interesting example of scientific revolution in action. I begin to try to draw some philosophical lessons from mongrel gravity theories, but more importantly I try to convince philosophers of physics that they should pay more attention to them. QFT in curved space-time, however, is not a unification. It is a mongrel, and as such deserves to be put down.—M. J. Duff

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THE TRANSFIGURATION OF EVERYDAY LIFE

After more than forty years I still warmly recall the edifying conversations that I had in the episcopal palace in Bergamo with my revered bishop. Msgr. Radini Tedeschi. About the persons in the Vatican, from the Holy Father downwards, there was never an expression that was not respectful, no, never. But as for women or their shape or what concerned them, no word was ever spoken. It was as if there were no women in the world. This absolute silence, this lack of any familiarity with regard to the other sex, was one of the most powerful and profound lessons of my young life as a priest, and even today I thankfully keep the excellent and beneficial memory of that man who raised me in this discipline.
Spiritual Diary of John XXIII, quoted in Uta Ranke-Heinemann, Eunuchs for the Kingdom of Heaven: the Catholic Church and Sexuality (1990)     

Lost in Eden: Dementia From Paradise

I look at dementia from an eschatological perspective through personal experience as I supported my husband through his journey into Alzheimer’s disease. Building on the notion of a monastic garden, I draw from the contemplatives to understand my own “kairos” moment that changed my perspective on the way church and other providers offer care. Comparing the church to a garden, I argue that people with dementia are priest-bearing sacraments in whose faces God is seen. Looking into the faces of those with dementia, these priests shepherd us to recognize our illusions about life calling us to greater humility.     

REASONS AND REASON REVISITED: ANOTHER REPLY TO MORRISON

In a previous article, Katherine Morrison (1999) argued that in my book Back to Reality: A Critique of Postmodern Theory in Psychotherapy (Held, 1995) I failed to accept the "strictly epistemological" aim of the narrative therapy movement. In the present article she reiterates the same objections, and adds the new criticism that I perceive epistemological oscillations in the writings of narrative therapists where there are none. In my present response I summarize my prior response to Morrison's (1999) critique (Held, 1999a), and I then respond to her new objections by showing how the conflation between epistemology and ontology that she attributes to me reflects her own confusion rather than mine.     

Wittgenstein, Dreaming and Anti-Realism: A Reply to Richard Scheer

I have argued that Wittgenstein's treatment of dreaming involves a kind of anti-realism about the past: what makes "I dreamed p " true is, roughly, that I wake with the feeling or impression of having dreamed p . Richard Scheer raises three objections. First, that the texts do not support my interpretation. Second, that the anti-realist view of dreaming does not make sense, so cannot be Wittgenstein's view. Third, that the anti-realist view leaves it a mystery why someone who reports having dreamed such-and-such is inclined to report what she does. The Reply defends my reading of Wittgenstein against these objections.