Cognitive sophistication does not attenuate the bias blind spot

The so-called bias blind spot arises when people report that thinking biases are more prevalent in others than in themselves. Bias turns out to be relatively easy to recognize in the behaviors of others, but often difficult to detect in one's own judgments. Most previous research on the bias blind spot has focused on bias in the social domain. In 2 studies, we found replicable bias blind spots with respect to many of the classic cognitive biases studied in the heuristics and biases literature (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Further, we found that none of these bias blind spots were attenuated by measures of cognitive sophistication such as cognitive ability or thinking dispositions related to bias. If anything, a larger bias blind spot was associated with higher cognitive ability. Additional analyses indicated that being free of the bias blind spot does not help a person avoid the actual classic cognitive biases. We discuss these findings in terms of a generic dual-process theory of cognition. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

Valuing thoughts, ignoring behavior: The introspection illusion as a source of the bias blind spot

People see themselves as less susceptible to bias than others. We show that a source of this bias blind spot involves the value that people place, and believe they should place, on introspective information (relative to behavioral information) when assessing bias in themselves versus others. Participants considered introspective information more than behavioral information for assessing bias in themselves, but not others. This divergence did not arise simply from differences in introspective access. The blind spot persisted when observers had access to the introspections of the actor whose bias they judged. And, participants claimed that they, but not their peers, should rely on introspections when making self-assessments of bias. Only after being educated about the importance of nonconscious processes in guiding judgment and action—and thereby about the fallibility of introspection—did participants cease denying their relative susceptibility to bias.     

Scales measuring people's perception of themselves as origins and pawns

Scales measuring people's perception of themselves as origins (determining their own behavior) or pawns (their behavior being determined by forces beyond their control) were devised using content analysis of verbalizations. Scoring categories were based on the work of Heider (1955). Reliability was satisfactory. Normative data were obtained from 528 people, each experiencing one of nine life situations. Pawn and origin perception differed across situations and these differences were correlated with independent ratings of how people would perceive the situations. Pawn perception was more stable over time than origin perception but both varied over time. Origin scores were relatively independent of measures of negative affect. Pawn scores were associated with hostility directed inward, ambivalent hostility and total anxiety. Associations were found with some forms of Coping behavior and people's reactions to a relative's serious or less serious illness. Origin and pawn scores were not negatively correlated, indicating the inappropriateness of regarding them as opposite ends of a single dimension of causal perception.     

Running from the shadow: psychological distancing from others to deny characteristics people fear in themselves

Four experiments tested the hypothesis that people distance themselves from others who display characteristics they fear in themselves. In Study 1, participants were given false feedback that they were high or low in repressed anger and were given information about a person who became angry and responded in a violent or nonviolent manner. High anger feedback participants distanced themselves only from the violent person. In Study 2, high anger feedback led to distancing from a violent other but not a dishonest other, whereas dishonesty feedback led to distancing from a dishonest other but not a violent other. The results of Studies 3 and 4 replicated and extended the distancing effect with an anger induction: Participants who were insulted distanced themselves from an angry/violent person, and verbalizing their emotions about being insulted eliminated this effect. Implications for understanding defenses against undesirable self-attributions are discussed.     

Appearance of an illusory object in the blind spot

We report a phenomenon showing new aspects of perceptual filling-in at the blind spot. When two and three discs were presented below the blind spot, observers perceived them as three and four discs, respectively, but when they were presented in the nasal visual field as a control, the perceived numbers were veridical. The phenomenon demonstrates that the visual system produces an illusory object in the blind spot even when the inducing objects presented on only one side of the blind spot are clearly discrete and countable.     

Correspondence bias and attitude toward abortion: Effects of information from others

This study investigated the influence of information from others on the correspondence bias in the attribution of attitudes. Participants were presented with an essay either for or against the legalization of abortion. They also received either no information, an argument mentioning the target person’s constraint, or behavior-inconsistent prior information about the target from a “fellow classmate.” Participants then estimated the constrained target person’s actual attitude. Results showed that the correspondence bias (CB) was substantially attenuated by the constraint argument and was reversed by the prior information. These findings demonstrate that arguments from others may prompt perceivers to make an inferential adjustment to take into account the target’s situational constraint, and that behavior-inconsistent prior information from others may lead perceivers to assign greater inferential weight to that information relative to the behavior. An earlier version of this article was presented at the Midwestern Psychological Association conference in Chicago, Illinois, May 1995.     

Being all that you can be: the weighting of potential in assessments of self and others

An accurate assessment of an individual often requires taking their potential into account. Across six studies the authors found that people are more inclined to do so when evaluating themselves than when evaluating others, such that people credit themselves for their perceived potential more than they credit others for theirs. Participants rated potential as a more telling component of the self than of others, and the importance participants placed on their own potential led to attentional biases toward information about their own future potential that did not apply to information about the potential of others. Furthermore, when assessing themselves and other people, participants required more tangible proof that someone else has a given level of potential than they required of themselves, and they relied more on how they would ideally perform in self-assessment but more on how others actually performed in judging them.     

Objectivity in the eye of the beholder: divergent perceptions of bias in self versus others

Important asymmetries between self-perception and social perception arise from the simple fact that other people's actions, judgments, and priorities sometimes differ from one's own. This leads people not only to make more dispositional inferences about others than about themselves (E. E. Jones & R. E. Nisbett, 1972) but also to see others as more susceptible to a host of cognitive and motivational biases. Although this blind spot regarding one's own biases may serve familiar self-enhancement motives, it is also a product of the phenomenological stance of naive realism. It is exacerbated, furthermore, by people's tendency to attach greater credence to their own introspections about potential influences on judgment and behavior than they attach to similar introspections by others. The authors review evidence, new and old, of this asymmetry and its underlying causes and discuss its relation to other psychological phenomena and to interpersonal and intergroup conflict.     

Perceived ingroup entitativity and intergroup bias: an interconnection of self and others

Campbell's (1958) concept of ingroup entitativity is reformulated as a perceived interconnection of self and others. A 2 (intergroup relations: competitive, neutral)×3 (intragroup interaction: low, medium, high) between-subjects design was used to examine (1) the effects of intergroup and intragroup relations on perceived ingroup entitativity and (2) the relation between ingroup entitativity and intergroup bias. Regardless of the relations between groups, members who experienced intragroup interaction had stronger perceptions of ingroup entitativity and stronger representations of the aggregate of ingroup and outgroup members as two separate groups than members who lacked intragroup interaction. Furthermore, perceptions of ingroup entitativity mediated the effect of the salience of the intergroup boundary on behavioral intergroup bias. These results call into question the ‘intergroup’ nature of group based phenomena. An ingroup entitativity framework is presented that locates the source of group-based phenomena (e.g. intergroup bias) in intragroup processes. Copyright © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Young children's (Homo sapiens) understanding of knowledge formation in themselves and others.

Three- and 4-year-old children (Homo sapiens) were tested for comprehension of knowledge formation. In Experiment 1, 34 subjects watched as a surprise was hidden under 1 of 4 obscured cups. The experimenter then pointed to the cup. All children searched under the correct cup, but no 3-year-olds (in contrast to most 4-year-olds) could explain how they knew where to look. Subjects then discriminated between simultaneous pointing by 2 adults, one who had hidden a surprise and one who had left the room before the surprise was hidden. Most 4-year-olds (but no 3-year-olds) showed clear discrimination between the adults. In Experiment 2, 16 subjects were tested with procedures designed to make the source of their own knowledge more obvious, but this had no effect on performance. We conclude that studies using very similar procedures with chimpanzees and rhesus macaques were measuring an ability (or inability) to understand how knowledge states form.     

The better-than-my-average effect: The relative impact of peak and average performances in assessments of the self and others

We examine whether people call to mind different manifestations of various traits when considering what they are like than when considering what others are like. Specifically, do people think that peak manifestations of their traits and abilities best capture who they are themselves, but that other people are better captured by their average performances or trait expressions? In Studies 1a and 1b, participants were more likely to believe that their own most attractive photographs best represent their typical appearance than others' do. In Study 2, participants' estimates of where they stand on various trait dimensions coincided with their highest possible standing, whereas their estimates of an acquaintance's standing coincided with the midpoint between the latter's highest and lowest possible standing. In Study 3, regression analyses revealed that students' predictions of their own final exam score were based most heavily on their highest score received to that point, but their predictions of someone else's final exam score was based most heavily on that student's average score. We discuss how this tendency fits in the broader literature on self-other differences in evaluation and how it contributes to above-average effect.     

Peering into a Chilean Black Box: Parental Storytelling in Pediatric Genetic Counseling

While genetic counseling has expanded to multiple international settings, research about providing culturally sensitive services to non-U.S. patients is limited. To gain insights, we utilized a process study to explore parental communication in pediatric genetics clinics in Chile. We utilized a phenomenological hermeneutic approach to assess storytelling in six pediatric sessions that were conducted in Spanish, and translated into English. The majority of the sessions focused on information gathering (35 %), and providing medical (20 %) and genetics education (18 %). The 14 instances of storytelling we identified usually emerged during information gathering, genetics education, and the closing of the session. Stories illustrated parental efforts to create a cognitive and emotional context for their child’s genetic diagnosis. Parents emerged as competent caregivers who discussed the role of the child as a social being in the family and the larger community. Our analysis found that genetic counseling sessions in the U.S. and Chile are structured similarly and although communication is not a balanced process, parents use storytelling to participate as active agents in the session. Via storytelling, we learned that parents are working to understand and gain control over their child’s genetic diagnosis by relying on mechanisms that extend beyond the genetics appointment.     

Preattentive and cognitive effects on perceptual completion at the blind spot

Our findings indicate that preattentive processes, such as the filling in of homogeneously colored areas, discrete dots, or bars across the blind spot, take into account both the color and the form that stimulate the retina around the optic disk. Perceptual completion of the “junction” of two opposite colors facing each other on opposite sides of the blind spot was resolved by simultaneous segregation of the two colors at the location of a filled-in perpendicular line that suggested a boundary separating the two colors. Orientation preference and relative salience of one color versus the other determined which color was perceptually completed in a forced-choice situation that involved perceptual completion at the intersection of a cross formed by bars of opposite colors. A 1-min exposure to these stimuli presented an ambiguous situation for perceptual completion of either color within the blind spot, and resulted in a perceptual “flip-flop” from one color to the other, much like the phenomenon that occurs in figure reversal. Instructions to speed up this reversal process led to a fivefold reduction in latency to first reversal.     

The bystander effect and social control behavior: the effect of the presence of others on people's reactions to norm violations

Observers of deviant social behavior sometimes communicate disapproval directly or indirectly to the perpetrator of a deviant act. This reaction has been termed ‘social control’. Three field studies were conducted to explore the influence of the number of bystander‐observers on the likelihood of social control. We predicted that the presence of others would inhibit people's tendency to communicate their disapproval to the deviant but only if personal implication was low. In the first study, we measured participants' perceptions of two fictive situations, one in which a deviant draws graffiti in an elevator of a shopping center and one in which a deviant litters in a small neighborhood park by throwing a plastic bottle in the bushes. As expected, participants considered both behaviors to be equally counternormative but felt personally more implicated by the littering behavior in the park. In Studies 2 and 3, the two situations were enacted with confederates of the experimenter. Naïve bystanders served as participants, and social control was the primary dependent variable. Consistent with our hypothesis, we found evidence for a bystander effect in the low personal implication situation (‘graffiti in the elevator’) but not in the high personal implication situation (‘littering in park’). These results make clear that perceived personal implication moderates the extent to which people are inhibited by the presence of others when they decide whether they should exert social control or not. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.