黑格尔《世界史哲学讲演录》中文版前言

在黑格尔的体系中,世界史是客观精神发展的最高阶段,它作为世界精神经历了各种民族精神先后相继发展的辩证过程；体现这些民族精神的四个阶段是古代世界、希腊世界、罗马世界与日耳曼世界,第一个世界好比世界史的幼年时代,第二个与第三个世界好比成年时代,第四个世界好比老年时代,只有这个世界的原则才是自为地存在的、自由的精神.     

论当前世界经济与政治格局的变化

20世纪90年代以来,世界经济在生产力和生产关系两方面都发生了某种质的变化.在苏联解体、冷战结束以后,世界政治格局也发生了巨大变化.世界争取和平与发展的任务有了新的内容和特点.发展中国家面临严峻的挑战和新的机遇.     

世界二元分裂的意义与困境--从科西克的《具体辩证法》说起

世界二元分裂是一种比较普遍的批判理论模式,科西克也走入了它的窠臼,阐述他富有存在主义色彩的"马克思主义".从科西克的《具体辩证法》说起,我们发现,世界二元分裂具有久远的历史,它具有重要的批判价值和人性意义,然而也存在着内在的缺陷,在理论上和实践上必然陷入难以自拔的困境.马克思主义对世界二元分裂的成功扬弃,体现了其学说的实践精神和科学精神.     

世界的去远与哲学的进步

若从系统性和典型性两个指标来看,旧形而上学、康德哲学和海德格尔哲学世界理论所阐释的世界形态,可以被看成是西方哲学史上三种最有代表性的世界形态。基于哲学是第一哲学之哲学观的传统分析把这三种世界形态的发展过程看成是世界形态不断主观化、非理性化并且越来越远离真实的原始世界的过程,它意味着哲学(形而上学)的不断衰败。我们赞同康德、海德格尔本人的观点。他们把自己所阐释的世界理论看成是面对传统哲学认识论的挑战且通过方法革命对于更真实的原始世界形态进行的探索,也是对新的哲学定位的探索。其实,三种世界形态的发展历程乃是世界逐步"去远"亦即逐步走向人生存中的生活世界的历程,从"发生"而非"存在"的标准看,它也越来越走向了真实而原始的世界本身,并为哲学如何定位以及哲学如何超越自然科学的探索提供了新的思路。     

作为现象学问题的世界

哲学发端于对世界本源的惊异,可以说,世界问题与哲学本身一样古老.然自19世纪传统哲学接受实证主义方案以来,世界问题已近乎被遗忘.只有到了胡塞尔那里,世界问题才重新被置于哲学运思的核心.在胡塞尔看来,世界起源于意识的成就.世界作为视域总是已预先被给予在我们的经验中,只有澄清了这一普遍视域的起源,现象学从主体性的意向成就出发去揭示世界起源的任务才能被完成,而这只有在实行了现象学还原以后的构造性分析中才能实现.胡塞尔的分析首先着力于澄清前哲学的对世界的理解,这样做的主要目的是要获得先验现象学对世界进行构造分析的主导线索,借以通达现象学意义上的世界概念.     

马克思"世界历史"理论视野中的人--兼论马克思关于人的解放的学说

马克思的"世界历史"理论认为,世界历史的发展进程的最终目标是共产主义的实现,而共产主义又是人的解放和全面发展的社会.因此,马克思的"世界历史"理论与人的解放的学说是一致的.马克思所讲的世界历史形成的两个条件正是人的解放的两个条件,即"生产力的普遍发展和与此有关的世界交往的普遍发展".而这两个条件又是通过人的实践活动实现的.因此,可以说,人的解放是在人的实践活动的基础上,以生产力和交往的普遍发展为条件的、全面占有自己的本质、使自己成为一个自由而全面发展的人的世界历史过程.     

重建被知觉的世界

胡塞尔的现象学对于梅洛-庞蒂的一项重要启示在于,揭示了世界论题是一个在哲学上先于其他一切论题的首要论题。世界总是一个已然在先不可剥夺的事实,哲学家的一切探索总是处于各种关于世界的原初经验之中,开始于对"世界"现象的回望、发问和最原初的见解,而复归于各种哲学所提供的     

世界的现象学悖谬与还原的彻底性问题——兼论梅洛-庞蒂在《知觉现象学》中对于胡塞尔的质疑

梅洛-庞蒂在《知觉现象学》中认为从世界彻底退回到先验意识的“完全还原”是不可能的，并质疑胡塞尔晚年的“第二次还原”最终导致先验现象学在世界问题上陷入悖谬之中。鉴于此，本文围绕胡塞尔在先验现象学的三个不同时期对于世界问题的基本观点，对梅洛-庞蒂的上述质疑进行了辨析：从胡塞尔的视角来看，梅洛-庞蒂所说的世界悖谬首先建立在人格自我与生活世界的习性关联之上，而胡塞尔晚年则指出对于这一悖谬的彻底澄清需要进一步回溯至这种习性关联本身的发生。在此，胡塞尔所说的“第二次还原”或“彻底还原”的最终旨趣并不是从世界彻底退回到先验意识，而是朝向最原初的被动性领域进行彻底回溯，由此自我与世界之间更原初的关联也得到了揭示。     

康德道德哲学中双重世界的区分

在《道德底形上学之基础》第三章中,为了实践目的,康德提出感性世界与理知世界的区分。根据《道德底形上学之基础》(以下简称GMS),感性世界和理知世界既可以是两个世界,也可以是人看待自身的两种方式。康德的理论哲学与实践哲学都对感性世界和理知世界做出区分。在理论哲学中,除了解决二律背反外,这一区分最重要的作用是为实践哲学腾出位置。通过感性世界和理知世界的区分,康德解决了道德律与自由之间的循环论证问题,并通过这一区分试图论证道德律作为先天综合命题的可能性。尽管最终康德断言我们对理知世界一无所知,因而也对自由一无所知,所以道德律作为一项令式的可理解性仍然是一个问题,但至少在消极的意义上遏制了道德虚无主义的威胁。     

Various concepts of ??supervenience?? and their relations: A comment on Kim??s theory of supervenience

“Supervenience” was first used by Donald Davidson to describe the dependent and independent relationships between the mental and the physical. Jaegwon Kim presented a more precise definition, distinguishing between three types of supervenience: weak, strong and global. Kim further proved that strong and global supervenience are equivalent. However, three years later, Kim argued that strong supervenience is stronger than global supervenience, while weak supervenience and global supervenience are independent of each other. This paper demonstrates that Kim’s conclusion that weak supervenience and global supervenience are independent of each other is wrong. The strength of strong, weak and global supervenience decreases in turn with the latter entailed by the former. This paper also corrects some defects in Kim’s argument and his formulation of strong and weak supervenience, and then further explores the relationship between the three types of supervenience and their philosophical significance. It also classifies other terms of supervenience such as layered supervenience, macro-micro supervenience, and mereological superveniece as relationships of the strong, weak and global.     

Weak and global supervenience are strong

Kim argues that weak and global supervenience are too weak to guarantee any sort of dependency. Of the three original forms of supervenience, strong, weak, and global, each commonly wielded across all branches of philosophy, two are thus cast aside as uninteresting or useless. His arguments, however, fail to appreciate the strength of weak and global supervenience. I investigate what weak and global supervenience relations are functionally and how they relate to strong supervenience. For a large class of properties, weak and global supervenience are equivalent to strong supervenience. I then offer a series of arguments showing that it is precisely because of their strength, not their weakness, that both weak and global supervenience are useless in characterizing any dependencies of interest to philosophers.

Supervenience arguments under relaxed assumptions

When it comes to evaluating reductive hypotheses in metaphysics, supervenience arguments are the tools of the trade. Jaegwon Kim and Frank Jackson have argued, respectively, that strong and global supervenience are sufficient for reduction, and others have argued that supervenience theses stand in need of the kind of explanation that reductive hypotheses are particularly suited to provide. Simon Blackburn’s arguments about what he claims are the specifically problematic features of the supervenience of the moral on the natural have also been influential. But most discussions of these arguments have proceeded under the strong and restrictive assumptions of the S5 modal logic. In this paper we aim to remedy that defect, by illustrating in an accessible way what happens to these arguments under relaxed assumptions and why. The occasion is recent work by Ralph Wedgwood, who seeks to defend non-reductive accounts of moral and mental properties together with strong supervenience, but to evade both the arguments of Kim and Jackson and the explanatory challenge by accepting only the weaker, B, modal logic. In addition to drawing general lessons about what happens to supervenience arguments under relaxed assumptions, our goal is therefore to shed some light on both the virtues and costs of Wedgwood’s proposal.     

Strong Global Supervenience is Valuable

It is generally assumed that everything that can be said about dependence with the notion of strong global supervenience can also be said with the notion of strong supervenience. It is argued here, however, that strong global supervenience has a metaphysically distinctive role to play. It is shown that when the relevant sets include relations, strong global supervenience and strong supervenience are distinct. It is then concluded that there are claims about dependence of relations that can be made with the global notion of strong supervenience but not with the “local” (individual) one.     

Global Supervenience, Coincident Entities and Anti-Individualism

Theodore Sider distinguishes two notions of global supervenience: strong global supervenience and weak global supervenience. He then discusses some applications to general metaphysical questions. Most interestingly, Sider employs the weak notion in order to undermine a familiar argument against coincident distinct entities. In what follows, I reexamine the two notions and distinguish them from a third, intermediate, notion (intermediate global supervenience). I argue that (a) weak global supervenience is not an adequate notion of dependence; (b) weak global supervenience does not capture certain assumptions about coincidence relations; (c) these assumptions are better accommodated by the stronger notion of intermediate global supervenience; (d) intermediate global supervenience, however, is also not an adequate notion of dependence; and (e) strong global supervenience is an adequate notion of dependence. It also fits in with anti-individualism about the mental. It does not, however, serve to rebut arguments against coincident entities.     

Causal Closure,Causal Exclusion,and Supervenience Physicalism

This article considers the recent defense of the supervenience approach to physicalism due to Jaegwon Kim. Kim argues that supervenience supports physical causal closure, and that causal closure supports physicalism – indeed, a kind of reductive physicalism – and thus that supervenience suffices for physicalism. After laying out Kim's argument, I ask whether its success would truly vindicate the role of supervenience in defining physicalist positions. I argue that it would not, and that insofar as Kim's defense of supervenience physicalism succeeds, it does so by showing that supervenience physicalism is not a unique, nonredundant way to be a physicalist.     

Global Supervenience and Dependence1

Two versions of global supervenience have recently been distinguished from each other. 1 introduce a third version, which is more likely what people had in mind all along. However, I argue that one of the three versions is equivalent to strong supervenience in every sense that matters, and that neither of the other two versions counts as a genuine determination relation. I conclude that global supervenience has little metaphysically distinctive value.     

Global supervenience and belief

Global supervenience of beliefs about physical states of affairs on such states has strongly counter-intuitive consequences about what beliefs we can nomologically hold. This is an argument against a global supervenience of all mental properties on physical ones, and, since that is implied by strong supervenience, also against that as the preferred materialist thesis.     

The Supervenience Argument Generalizes

In his recent book, Jaegwon Kim argues thatpsychophysical supervenience withoutpsychophysical reduction renders mentalcausation `unintelligible'. He also claimsthat, contrary to popular opinion, his argumentagainst supervenient mental causation cannot begeneralized so as to threaten the causalefficacy of other `higher-level' properties:e.g., the properties of special sciences likebiology. In this paper, I argue that none ofthe considerations Kim advances are sufficientto keep the supervenience argument fromgeneralizing to all higher-level properties,and that Kim's position in fact entails thatonly the properties of fundamental physicalparticles are causally efficacious.     

Why Even Kim-Style Psychophysical Laws Are Impossible

If the mental is subject to indeterminacy, does this rule out the possibility of psychophysical laws? One might think so. However, Jaegwon Kim has argued for the existence of a kind of psychophysical law that is not obviously susceptible to problems posed by indeterminacy. I begin by introducing a weak and relatively uncontroversial indeterminacy thesis. Then, by appealing to constraints on theories of strong supervenience and to general considerations about the nature of indeterminacy, I argue that even Kim’s laws cannot accommodate indeterminacy. The result is an argument against the possibility of Kim-Style psychophysical laws.