How do people know?

To fully understand processes of knowing and knowledge acquisition, it is necessary to examine people's understanding of their own knowing. Individual and developmental differences in what it means to know something, and hence in the criteria for justifying knowledge claims, have potentially wide-ranging implications. In providing support for a claim, young children have difficulty differentiating explanation of why a claim makes sense and evidence that the claim is true. Epistemic understanding progresses developmentally, but substantial variation remains among adults, with few adults achieving understanding of the complementary strengths and weaknesses of evidence and explanation in argument. Epistemic understanding shapes intellectual values and hence the disposition (as opposed to competence) to exercise intellectual skills. Only its most advanced levels support a disposition to engage in the intellectual effort that reasoned argument entails. The sample case of juror reasoning illustrates how epistemic understanding underlies and shapes intellectual performance.     

Why do people self-harm?

The accuracy of perceptions about self-harm that are presented in the psychological and psychiatric literature was assessed with a sample of self-harmers. A list of 20 statements containing ten myths and ten accurate statements about self-harm behaviour was incorporated into an internet-based questionnaire. Respondents (n?=?243) rated their extent of agreement with each statement. Factor analysis confirmed the a priori classification of statements as being accurate. Only one item, regarding the relationship of self-harm to previous sexual abuse, did not confirm a priori classification; this statement was considered by self-harmers to be an accurate perception of self-harm. It was concluded that this questionnaire could be a useful aid for group-work training with professionals who are involved in working with people who engage in self-harm.     

How do people order stimuli?

People may find it easier to construct an order after first representing stimuli on a scale or categorizing them, particularly when the number of stimuli to be ordered is large or when some of them must be remembered. Five experiments tested this hypothesis. In two of these experiments (1 and 3), we asked participants to rank line lengths or to rank photographs by artistic value. The participants provided evidence of how they performed these tasks, and this evidence indicated that they often made use of some preliminary representation—either a metric or a categorization. Two further experiments (2 and 4) indicated that people rarely produced rankings when given a choice of assessment measures for either the length of lines or the artistic value of photographs. In Experiment 5, when the number of lines was larger or lines were only visible one at a time, participants were faster at estimating line lengths as a percentage of the card covered than at rank ordering the lengths. Overall, the results indicate that ordering stimuli is not an easy or natural process when the number of stimuli is large or when the stimuli are not all perceptible at once. An implication is that the psychological measures available to individuals are not likely to be purely ordinal when many of the elements being measured must be recalled.     

Computer problems: are some people jinxed?

To examine the popular notion that some people are 'jinxed' when using computers 111 undergraduate psychology students were 'jinxed' whilst trying to complete a task over the Internet. No evidence was found to support that notion.     

How do people apprehend large numerosities?

People discriminate remarkably well among large numerosities. These discriminations, however, need not entail numerical representation of the quantities being compared. This research evaluated the role of both non-numerical and numerical information in adult judgments of relative numerosity for large-numerosity spatial arrays. Results of Experiment 1 indicated that judgments of relative numerosity were affected by the amount of open space in the arrays being compared. Further, the accuracy of verbal estimates of the numerosities of the arrays made upon completion of the comparison task bore little relation to performance on that task. Experiment 2, however, showed that numerical estimates for individually presented arrays were affected in much the same way by open space within or around the edges of the array as were the comparative judgments examined in Experiment 1. The findings suggest that adults heuristically utilize non-numerical cues as well as numerical information in apprehending large numerosities.     

Why do people remain in abusive relationships?

Increasingly ministers and pastoral counselors are being consulted by people who are in abusive relationships. Consequently, it is important for all ministers and pastoral counselors to develop both an intellectual and an emotional appreciation for the complexities involved in remaining in, or leaving, abusive relationships. This article discusses six basic reasons why people choose to remain in abusive relationships, and concludes with three pastoral implications for ministers who counsel people in such relationships.     

Why do people behave immorally when drunk?

Alcohol intoxication is a major source of antisocial behavior in our society, strongly implicated in various forms of interpersonal aggression. Yet, moral philosophers have paid surprisingly little attention to the literature on alcohol and its effects. In part, this is because philosophers who have adopted a more empirically informed approach to moral psychology have gravitated toward moral sentimentalism, while the literature on alcohol intoxication fits very poorly with the sentimentalist account. Most contemporary research on the psychological effects of alcohol is focused upon variants of the “disinhibition” theory, which suggests that alcohol does not provoke any specific affect, it merely weakens executive control. This research, we argue, lends support to a deontic moral psychology, which identifies our ability to suppress behavioral impulses as a central feature of moral agency.     

What do people mean when speaking of evilness?

The term evilness started to become popular in social psychology after the publication in 1999 of the special issue edited by Arthur G. Miller, "Perspectives on evil and violence". It is usually used to define behaviors that are extremely and strongly harmful. However, the concept is still imprecise and needs to be empirically delineated. This article attempts to answer the following questions. What is evilness? What is the difference between aggression and evilness? We conducted several studies with three goals: to analyze how laypersons and experts define evilness, to verify whether laypeople distinguish between different intensities of evilness, and to determine the dimensions that predict aggression and evilness. The results offer preliminary answers to the three questions.     

When and why do people avoid unknown probabilities in decisions under uncertainty? Testing some predictions from optimal foraging theory.

When given a choice between two otherwise equivalent options - one in which the probability information is stated and another in which it is missing - most people avoid the option with missing probability information (Camerer & Weber, 1992). This robust, frequently replicated tendency is known as the ambiguity effect. It is unclear, however, why the ambiguity effect occurs. Experiments 1 and 2, which separated effects of the comparison process from those related to missing probability information, demonstrate that the ambiguity effect is elicited by missing probabilities rather than by comparison of options. Experiments 3 and 4 test predictions drawn from the literature on behavioral ecology. It is suggested that choices between two options should reflect three parameters: (1) the need of the organism, (2) the mean expected outcome of each option; and (3) the variance associated with each option's outcome. It is hypothesized that unknown probabilities are avoided because they co-occur with high outcome variability. In Experiment 3 it was found that subjects systematically avoid options with high outcome variability regardless of whether probabilities are explicitly stated or not. In Experiment 4, we reversed the ambiguity effect: when participants' need was greater than the known option's expected mean outcome, subjects preferred the ambiguous (high variance) option. From these experiments we conclude that people do not generally avoid ambiguous options. Instead, they take into account expected outcome, outcome variability, and their need in order to arrive at a decision that is most likely to satisfy this need.     

Why do young people engage in some civic actions and not others? Exploring the roles of individual and collective civic efficacy

Civic actions are behaviours intended to improve conditions for others or help shape a community's future. Such actions vary widely from voting to voluntary helping, from canvassing to community organizing, and attempts have been made to categorize the array of civic actions. However, the question of why young adults engage in some types of civic actions versus others is not well understood. Using data from 598 White, cisgender, heterosexual young adults in the United States, we examined the relations between individual civic efficacy, collective civic efficacy, and seven actions: writing social media posts, voting, buycotting, volunteering, participating in an organization, supporting political candidates, and protesting. We hypothesized that individual efficacy would be positively related to all seven actions, but collective efficacy would be more strongly related to collective or political actions, compared to the individual or civil ones. Logistic regression analyses showed that individual efficacy positively predicted engagement in all seven civic actions. Individual and collective efficacy had a complex curvilinear relation with buycotting and supporting political candidates. Implications for future research and applications aimed at promoting civic engagement amongst young adults are discussed. Please refer to the Supplementary Material section to find this article's Community and Social Impact Statement .     

On the limits of advance preparation for a task switch: do people prepare all the task some of the time or some of the task all the time?

This study investigated the nature of advance preparation for a task switch, testing 2 key assumptions of R. De Jong's (2000) failure-to-engage theory: (a) Task-switch preparation is all-or-none, and (b) preparation failures stem from nonutilization of available control capabilities. In 3 experiments, switch costs varied dramatically across individual stimulus-response (S-R) pairs of the tasks-virtually absent for 1 pair but large for others. These findings indicate that, across trials, task preparation was not all-or-none but, rather, consistently partial (full preparation for some S-R pairs but not others). In other words, people do not prepare all of the task some of the time, they prepare some of the task all of the time. Experiments 2 and 3 produced substantial switch costs even though time deadlines provided strong incentives for optimal advance preparation. Thus, there was no evidence that people have a latent capability to fully prepare for a task switch.     

Why are some people with neurological illness more resilient than others?

The current qualitative study was designed to evaluate the coping strategies of people living with a chronic progressive neurological illness and their carers. The neurological illnesses were Huntington's disease, motor neurone disease, multiple sclerosis and Parkinson's disease. Participants included 15 people who showed high levels of adjustment and 15 who showed low levels of adjustment. Participants were selected from an earlier study, to ensure that they satisfied the inclusion criteria for the current study. Interviews were completed to determine the strategies used to cope with the demands of the illness. Participants who demonstrated good adjustment were more likely to draw on social support to provide them with the resources to deal with the illness. In contrast, those who evidenced poor adjustment were more likely to draw on external supports to complete tasks for them. The implications of these findings for people with chronic neurological illnesses and their families are discussed.     

Why do people change in therapy? A preliminary study

Why do people change in therapy? A preliminary study. This work represents the beginning of a new way to study the processes that can explain the therapeutic change. The method used is the observation and analysis of therapeutic sessions directly recorded and developed inside a behavioural approach. The category system tries to carry out a functional analysis of the therapist-client interaction which enables the identification of learning processes that work in clinical setting and explain success in therapy. Outcomes are provisional but show the utility of this initial trend of investigation to the comprehension of clinical phenomenon. Conclusions also emphasize the importance of associative learning processes on the therapeutic change.     

Why do people like bicycling? Modeling affect toward bicycling

Studies show that the way an individual feels about bicycling – the degree to which they like bicycling – is an important predictor of whether or not they bicycle. But why do some people like bicycling and others don’t? This study explores factors that may influence an individual’s liking of bicycling, or more formally, their bicycling affect. We analyze a rich dataset from a cross-sectional survey of residents of six small U.S. cities using an ordered logit model. Results show that bicycling behavior has the strongest association with liking bicycling, with bicycling constraints following as the second most important factor. Individual cognitions, including perceptions and normative beliefs, also play important roles in predicting bicycling affect. Individual measures of the physical environment do not correlate with liking of bicycling, but the perception that biking to various destinations is safe does. Social environment factors influence liking of bicycling as well. Longitudinal research is needed to better understand the reciprocal relationship between bicycling affect and bicycling behavior as well as the effect over time of factors such as the physical environment. Nevertheless, this study offers an initial understanding of the potential determinants of bicycling affect that provides a starting point for further research as well as direction for the development of policies for getting more people on bicycles.     

Predictors of time to remission from depression in primary care patients: do some people benefit more from positive life change than others?

The authors examined the role of personality, social support, and coping strategies and their interaction with positive life change (PLC) in influencing time to remission from depression in 86 depressed primary care patients (69% women, mean age = 36.6 years), who were followed for 3.5 years. Diagnostic information was obtained by the Present State Examination (J. K. Wing, J. Cooper, & N. Sartorius, 1974), and life change by the Life Events and Difficulties Schedule (G. W. Brown & T. O. Harris, 1978). The association of PLC and other predictors with the time to remission was studied by means of Cox regression. PLC reduced time to remission in women, but not in men. Other predictors that expedited remission were low severity of premorbid difficulties, high self-esteem, and a tension-reducing coping style. Neuroticism modified the effect of PLC in that the remission forward bringing effect of PLC was stronger for highly neurotic people. The results suggests that women and psychologically vulnerable persons benefit most from PLC.     

Posttraumatic growth: why do people grow from their trauma?

In two experimental studies we found that participants who recalled a highly traumatic autobiographical event (trauma recall) compared with a lesser traumatic event (stress recall) reported having increasingly grown (posttraumatic growth, PTG). Moreover, participants who recalled a traumatic (vs. stressful) event perceived more death-related thoughts (Study 1) and reported coping with this event in a more emotion-focused and in a less problem-focused way (Study 2). Mediation analyzes revealed that the effect of trauma versus stress recall on PTG was mediated by emphasizing the positive, a subscale of emotion-focused coping. These results imply that growth resulting from traumatic events can be traced back to an illusion. No evidence was found that real PTG took place or that the effects shown resulted from death-related thoughts (terror management theory).     

Meta-insight: do people really know how others see them?

Although people can accurately guess how others see them, many studies have suggested that this may only be because people generally assume that others see them as they see themselves. These findings raise the question: In their everyday lives, do people understand the distinction between how they see their own personality and how others see their personality? We examined whether people make this distinction, or whether people possess what we call meta-insight. In 3 studies, we assessed meta-insight for a broad range of traits (e.g., Big Five, intelligent, funny) across several naturalistic social contexts (e.g., first impression, friends). Our findings suggest that people can make valid distinctions between how they see themselves and how others see them. Thus, people seem to have some genuine insight into their reputation and do not achieve meta-accuracy only by capitalizing on the fact that others see them similarly to how they see themselves.     

When do people cooperate? The neuroeconomics of prosocial decision making

Understanding the roots of prosocial behavior is an interdisciplinary research endeavor that has generated an abundance of empirical data across many disciplines. This review integrates research findings from different fields into a novel theoretical framework that can account for when prosocial behavior is likely to occur. Specifically, we propose that the motivation to cooperate (or not), generated by the reward system in the brain (extending from the striatum to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex), is modulated by two neural networks: a cognitive control system (centered on the lateral prefrontal cortex) that processes extrinsic cooperative incentives, and/or a social cognition system (including the temporo-parietal junction, the medial prefrontal cortex and the amygdala) that processes trust and/or threat signals. The independent modulatory influence of incentives and trust on the decision to cooperate is substantiated by a growing body of neuroimaging data and reconciles the apparent paradox between economic versus social rationality in the literature, suggesting that we are in fact wired for both. Furthermore, the theoretical framework can account for substantial behavioral heterogeneity in prosocial behavior. Based on the existing data, we postulate that self-regarding individuals (who are more likely to adopt an economically rational strategy) are more responsive to extrinsic cooperative incentives and therefore rely relatively more on cognitive control to make (un)cooperative decisions, whereas other-regarding individuals (who are more likely to adopt a socially rational strategy) are more sensitive to trust signals to avoid betrayal and recruit relatively more brain activity in the social cognition system. Several additional hypotheses with respect to the neural roots of social preferences are derived from the model and suggested for future research.