Introspective disputes deflated: the case for phenomenal variation

Sceptics vis-à-vis introspection often base their scepticism on ‘phenomenological disputes’, ‘introspective disagreement’, or ‘introspective disputes’ (ID) (see Kriegel in Phenomenol CognSci 6(1):115–136, 2007; Bayne and Spener in Philos Issues 20(1):1–22, 2010; Schwitzgebel in Perplexities of consciousness, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2011): introspectors massively diverge in their opinions about experiences, and there seems to be no method to resolve these issues. Sceptics take this to show that introspection lacks any epistemic merit. Here, I provide a list of paradigmatic examples, distill necessary and sufficient conditions for IDs, present the sceptical argument encouraged by IDs, and review the two main strategies (resolution and containment) to reject such a scepticism. However, both types of strategies are unsatisfactory. In order to save introspection from the looming sceptical threat, I advocate a deflationary strategy, based on either an ‘Argument from Perceptual Kinship’ or an ‘Argument from Ownership’. In the end, there cannot be any genuine IDs, for nothing can fulfil the reasonable conditions for IDs. What looks like IDs may instead be indicators of phenomenal variation. Debates that look like IDs may then arise even if introspection were a perfect method to know one’s mind. Thus, scepticism vis-à-vis introspection based on IDs rests on shaky grounds.     

Introspection,Anton's Syndrome,and Human Echolocation

Philosophers have recently argued that since there are people who are blind, but don't know it, and people who echolocate, but don't know it, conscious introspection is highly unreliable. I contend that a second look at Anton's syndrome, human echolocation, and ‘facial vision’ suggests otherwise. These examples do not support skepticism about the reliability of introspection.     

A common whore and her relations

This paper engages in a critical discussion of Wouter Hanegraaff's book Western Esotericism and the Academy (2012), acknowledging its importance but also focusing on some points that appear problematic. Particular attention is given to the concept of ‘Platonic Orientalism,’ the concept of ‘form of thought,’ and the theoretical basis for a satisfactory etic definition of ‘Western esotericism.’ Hanegraaff claims that his book offers a solid argument for understanding Western esotericism ‘ultimately’ as a ‘historiographical concept,’ rather than as a ‘form of thought.’ This claim is questioned in the paper.     

心灵如何被感知:从松果体到镜像神经元

文章从笛卡尔的身心交感论开始,探讨了松果体在身心交互中的重要地位,并分心理主义、行为主义、认知主义三个阶段,描述了心理学回答"心灵如何被感知"的两条途径:心灵内省与行为反映。最后,文章特别描述了新近发现的镜像神经元,认为它可能是当代心理学体系内的"笛卡尔式松果体",是沟通身体活动与心理状态、自我与他人心理状态的桥梁。未来,镜像神经元在心理学研究中的地位,可能与松果体在笛卡尔体系内的地位一样重要。     

Dissociation,the true self and the notion of the frozen baby

Abstract

The widespread ‘trauma talk’ that is prevalent in the social sciences, has, in recent years, become increasingly commonplace in psychoanalytic writings, especially in attachment theory and relational psychoanalysis. This paper examines dissociation, a key concept in ‘trauma theory’, in conjunction with the Winnicottian term ‘true self’, in the context of a particular discursive and theoretical combination of the two. This discursive formation is named ‘the frozen baby discourse’, and it is presented and analysed. A critique is offered of the way ‘true self’, understood as a humanistic concept, is often used together with dissociation, in order to create a theoretical construct that is far removed from Winnicottian theory. This paper begins by exploring definitional issues, both around dissociation and ‘true self’. It is subsequently argued that this contemporary usage of ‘true self’ in combination with dissociation has important implications for psychoanalytic practice.     

The objects of bodily awareness

Is it possible to misidentify the object of an episode of bodily awareness? I argue that it is, on the grounds that a person can reasonably be unsure or mistaken as to which part of her body he or she is aware of at a given moment. This requires discussing the phenomenon of body ownership, and defending the claim that the proper parts of one’s body are at least no less ‘principal’ among the objects of bodily awareness than is the body as a whole. I conclude with some reasons why this should lead us to think that bodily awareness, unlike introspection, is a form of perception.     

Singularity and consciousness: A neuropsychological contribution

In common sense experience based on introspection, consciousness is singular. There is only one ‘me’ and that is the one that is conscious. This means that ‘singularity’ is a defining aspect of ‘consciousness’. However, the three main theories of consciousness, Integrated Information, Global Workspace and Recurrent Processing theory, are generally not very clear on this issue. These theories have traditionally relied heavily on neuropsychological observations and have interpreted various disorders, such as anosognosia, neglect and split-brain as impairments in conscious awareness without any reference to ‘the singularity’. In this review, we will re-examine the theoretical implications of these impairments in conscious awareness and propose a new way how to conceptualize consciousness of singularity. We will argue that the subjective feeling of singularity can coexist with several disunified conscious experiences. Singularity awareness may only come into existence due to environmental response constraints. That is, perceptual, language, memory, attentional and motor processes may largely proceed unintegrated in parallel, whereas a sense of unity only arises when organisms need to respond coherently constrained by the affordances of the environment. Next, we examine from this perspective psychiatric disorders and psycho-active drugs. Finally, we present a first attempt to test this hypothesis with a resting state imaging experiment in a split-brain patient. The results suggest that there is substantial coherence of activation across the two hemispheres. These data show that a complete lesioning of the corpus callosum does not, in general, alter the resting state networks of the brain. Thus, we propose that we have separate systems in the brain that generate distributed conscious. The sense of singularity, the experience of a ‘Me-ness’, emerges in the interaction between the world and response-planning systems, and this leads to coherent activation in the different functional networks across the cortex.     

Stoicism and Sensation Seeking: Male Vulnerabilities for the Acquired Capability for Suicide

Our aim was to investigate two personality traits (i.e., stoicism and sensation seeking) that may account for well-established gender differences in suicide, within the framework of the interpersonal theory of suicide. This theory proposes that acquired capability for suicide, a construct comprised of pain insensitivity and fearlessness about death, explains gender differences in suicide. Across two samples of undergraduates (N = 185 and N = 363), men demonstrated significantly greater levels of both facets of acquired capability than women. Further, we found that stoicism accounted for the relationship between gender and pain insensitivity, and sensation seeking accounted for the relationship between gender and fearlessness about death. Thus, personality may be one psychological mechanism accounting for gender differences in suicidal behavior.     

The second wave of critical engagement with Stanley Milgram's ‘obedience to authority’ experiments: What did we learn?

The study critically examines contemporary academic engagement with Stanley Milgram's classic ‘obedience to authority’ experiments. It argues that, following what will be termed the ‘first wave of criticism’ (1964 to mid-1980s) and ‘consensus and canonization’ (mid-1980s to mid-2000s), this present-day phase has constituted a veritable ‘second wave of criticism’. The ‘second wave’ is reviewed in terms of, first, a return to fundamental dilemmas around the experiments (i.e., replication, ethics, methodology, and theory); and second, a recourse to novel data sources as well as theoretical and epistemological-methodological developments. Such integration of traditional concerns and new perspectives has resulted in focus being redirected to a forgotten aspect of the experiments: the interactional production of affective dynamics in the lab. Although the ‘second wave’ will be critiqued for selectively focusing on either affective atmosphere or interactional process, the paper will conclude with the suggestion that bringing these two aspects together continues to promise a theoretical contribution to the understanding of the experiments not seen before.     

‘It's not racist. It's common sense’. A critical analysis of political discourse around asylum and immigration in the UK

This paper looks at a political speech given by the leader of the opposition party during the run up to the UK elections in 2005. Using this speech as a starting point, we attempt to trace the path of ‘racism’ within a text that makes explicit claims to being ‘not racist’. Drawing on a number of theoretical and methodological resources, this paper approaches the analysis by focusing on a number of conceptually heterogeneous elements that, in relation with each other, function to produce, re‐produce and stabilize ‘racism’. One of the difficulties commonly encountered in social psychological work, we would suggest, is that an explicit statement of allegiance to a particular methodological and theoretical tradition can also result in a restriction of theorization to a particular ‘level of analysis’. That is to say, a methodological process that constructs a pre‐given category, presets the criteria by which ‘racism’ can be identified and fixes the ‘level of analysis’ at which it can be studied risks ignoring the multiple points of contact at which ‘racism’ can be made visible or made to disappear. The concern here it that such a process can work to reinscribe the very ‘racisms’ we aim to disrupt. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The problem of empty names and Russellian Plenitude

‘Ahab is a whaler’ and ‘Holmes is a whaler’ express different propositions, even though neither ‘Ahab’ nor ‘Holmes’ has a referent. This seems to constitute a theoretical puzzle for the Russellian view of propositions. In this paper, I develop a variant of the Russellian view, Plenitudinous Russellianism. I claim that ‘Ahab is a whaler’ and ‘Holmes is a whaler’ express distinct gappy propositions. I discuss key metaphysical and semantic differences between Plenitudinous Russellianism and Traditional Russellianism and respond to objections that stem from those differences.     

‘Ought’ and Control

Ethical theorists often assume that the verb ‘ought’ means roughly ‘has an obligation’; however, this assumption is belied by the diversity of ‘flavours’ of ought-sentences in English. A natural response is that ‘ought’ is ambiguous. However, this response is incompatible with the standard treatment of ‘ought’ by theoretical semanticists, who classify ‘ought’ as a member of the family of modal verbs, which are treated uniformly as operators. To many ethical theorists, however, this popular treatment in linguistics seems to elide an important distinction between agential and non-agential ought-statements. The thought is that ‘ought’ must have at least two senses, one implicating agency and connected to obligations, and another covering other uses. In this paper, I pursue some resolution of this tension between semantic theory and ethical theory with respect to the meaning of ‘ought’. To this end, I consider what I believe to be the most linguistically sophisticated argument for the view that the word ‘ought’ is ambiguous between agential and non-agential senses. This argument, due to Mark Schroeder, is instructive but based on a false claim about the syntax of agential ought-sentences—or so I attempt to show by first situating Schroeder's argument in its proper linguistic background and then discussing some syntactic evidence that he fails to appreciate. Then, I use the failure of this argument to motivate some more general reflections on how the standard treatment of ‘ought’ by theoretical semanticists might be refined in the light of the distinction important to ethical theory between agential and non-agential ought-statements, but also on how ethical theory might benefit from more careful study of the dominant treatment of modals as operators in theoretical semantics.     

Violence as Worship: Religious Wars in the Age of Globalization,by Hans G. Kippenberg,trans. Brian McNeil,Stanford University Press: Stanford,CA, 2011, viii + 286 pp. ISBN 978 0 8047 68726, US$70 (cloth); ISBN 978 0 8047 6873 3, US$21.95 (paperback)

The author argues in this paper that the ‘state effects’ generated by religious movements – even those operating at the margins of societies – require us to consider anew the impact of religious movements on state formation. In Sri Lanka, for instance, evangelicals are a minority. Yet their practice of proselytizing to new audiences was considered ‘unethical,’ generating opposition that was directed not only at them, but also at ruling elites for failing to stem what was seen as an intrusion of incompatible ‘Western’ ideals. Instead of considering how such Christian movements seek to ‘take over’ the functions of the ‘state’ as has been the experience in the United States and parts of Latin America, the author illustrates in this article why it makes more theoretical sense to ask how their activities impinge upon the conceptual frameworks through which the ‘state’ is imagined.     

Two Jungs. Apropos a paper by Mark Saban

Jung's idea of the ‘personal equation’ amounts to the reflection that theoretical differences between the psychologies that people teach are rooted in their personalities, in other words, that they are due to the psychology each one ‘has’. This concept also applies to different interpretations of Jung's work. The serious difficulties that Mark Saban has with my psychology are a case in point. Recourse to the concept of the personal equation reveals that Saban has his Jung and I have mine. With his insistence on his Talmudic methodological principle of dream interpretation, that ‘the dream is its own interpretation’, according to Saban Jung means nothing but a rejection of Freudian free association. My Jung goes far beyond that. Jung understands this methodological principle above all in terms of what he calls ‘circumambulation’. The main part of this paper is devoted to an elucidation of what circumambulation involves as a mode of dream interpretation. The paper concludes with the distinction Jung himself introduced between two types of reading of his work, either as ‘paper’ and ‘dead nostrums’ or as ‘fire and wind’, and pleads for a reconstruction of Jung's psychology as a whole in terms of his most advanced, deepest insights, instead of a dogmatic reading mainly based on the early Jung, a reading for which his later revolutionary insights are at best negligible embellishments.     

Yesterday,today and tomorrow

1260 American subjects were timed as they responded to one of the three questions (‘What day of the week is today?’ (Tod question), ‘What day of the week was yesterday?’ (Y question), and ‘What day of the week will tomorrow be?’ (Tom question)) at one of three times of the day (early morning, mid-day and the late evening). Response times as a function of the day on which the question was posed defined an inverted U-curve for all questions in all three conditions. The Tod question always triggered the fastest responses. In the morning, responses to the Y question were faster than responses to the Tom questions, whereas in the evening the converse was the case. At mid-day responses to the Y question were faster than responses to the Tom question at the beginning of the week and slower than those at its end. The patterns of introspection associated with the responses also defined reversed U-functions. The results are interpreted in the framework of a multi-channel spreading activation model.     

Self-awareness as conscious meta-representation

Citing the phenomenon of transparency, some philosophers argue that we cannot become aware of the intrinsic properties of our experiences. When we introspect, they argue, our experiences always seem as if they are exhausted by their intentional contents. They conclude that introspection does not reveal any properties that seem intrinsic to experience. In order to answer this argument, we must show how it could seem as if we are simultaneously aware of external objects and our experience of those objects. I explain how this is possible by introducing the notion of conscious meta-representation. Conscious meta-representation occurs when we consciously conceive of represented objects as being merely putative. This sort of conceiving sometimes involves a distinctive phenomenology, and it explains how certain features of an experience can simultaneously seem as if they belong to external objects and to our experiences of those objects. We can, I conclude, look ‘at’ our experiences even as we are looking ‘through’ them.     

Taylor,Paul C. 2013. Race: A Philosophical Introduction. 2nd edition. Malden,MA: Polity Press

While supporting radical anti-essentialism and the primacy of practical choices in delineating objects of inquiry, this paper spells out the constellation ‘beliefs-practices-meaning-objects-inquiry-texts-interpretation’ in a manner alternative to that suggested by Rorty's strong textualism based on the conception of ‘inquiry as recontextualisation’. The perspective of hermeneutic phenomenology on the constitution of meaning is applied in the analysis of that constellation. Scientific inquiry is presented as a process of textualising contextualised in configurations of ‘readable technologies’. The approach to the constitution of contextual units in scientific inquiry by reading theoretical objects forges arguments for the position of hermeneutic realism as opposed to epistemological behaviourism.     

Digital lives in psychotherapy: ‘the other in the room’

Within the broader area of digital risk, there has been concern over the phenomena of ‘cyber suicide’, a completed or attempted suicide influenced by the internet. We propose a theoretical explanation of the ‘ambivalent self’ in people who go online searching for suicide, by introducing the concept of an inner split between the ‘suicidal part’ (SP) and ‘non-suicidal part’ (NSP) within the personality structure of the individual which struggle for domination of the inner life and external relationships and decisions of the suicidal person. This is grounded in psychoanalytic theory and draws upon a broader conceptualisation of the psyche of the self as split between rival parts, and differing states of mind, competing for control of the vulnerable individual and their capacity to tolerate and manage emotional pain and reality. The recognition and awareness of an inner split between the SP and NSP of the person who goes online, and how this influences virtual relationships, as well as external relationships, such as in psychotherapy, is an important understanding for contemporary psychotherapy and risk management in the digital age.     

Transcritique versus basho: Framing the debate between Nishida Kitarō’s and Kōjin Karatani’s standpoint of the ‘third’

ABSTRACT

Japanese philosopher and literary critic, Kōjin Karatani, introduces a ‘third position’ that seeks to correct the limitations of post-modern thought and the problems of global capitalism. By restoring Kant’s ‘transcendental’ as the methodological basis for capturing the structural interstice between different theoretical positions, Karatani’s ‘third position’ allows for a re-introduction of Marxism in addressing the circulation of the capital-nation-state trifecta and its relationship to ideological superstructures operating within a closed discursive space. Many years earlier, Nishida Kitarō, the father of the Kyoto School, had also developed a ‘third position,’ except that this standpoint seeks to overcome the cultural-philosophical logics of ‘Eastern’ and ‘Western’ thought. As Nishida claims, Western epistemologies cannot be converted into universal standpoints because they fail to make visible the conditions that both precede and structure contradictory categories. In this paper, I will discuss and evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of Nishida’s and Karatani’s standpoint of the ‘third.’     

Projective identification: A theoretical investigation of the concept starting from ’Notes on some schizoid mechanisms’1

This paper submits passages from four papers‐‘Notes on some schizoid mechanisms’ (Klein); ‘On identification’ (Klein); ‘Analysis of a schizophrenic state with depersonalization’ (Rosenfeld); and ‘Remarks on the relation of male homosexuality to paranoia, paranoid anxiety and narcissism’ (Rosenfeld)‐to a critical reading, enabling the theoretical premises which have produced the current, differing views on projective identification to be traced. These views revolve both around the role assigned to identification in the process and around the meaning of the expression‘to identify oneself with’ which in ‘On identification’ goes from ‘to feel similar to, or identical to the other’ to ‘to take another person as a model’. This legitimizes the inclusion of very different phenomena into the concept of projective identification. The author describes some uses of the term ‘projective identification’ and proposes the hypothesis that the process constitutes a way for managing otherness and the separateness of the object (be it external or internal, real or imaginary) that can compromise its reality to a greater or lesser degree. Covering a large set of phenomena, the author poses the question of whether it is useful to retain the term ‘projective identification’. She proposes an answer in the last part of the paper.