Instrumental Bias in Motivated Reasoning: More When More Is Needed

Decision makers must often make judgments in an environment in which they have a strong motivation to reach a particular conclusion. While normative theory would indicate that they should use available information to make their most accurate judgment without being influenced by the conclusion or outcome it may imply, evidence from the social judgment literature suggests that motivation does bias the judgment process. Specifically, decision makers motivated to support a particular conclusion tend to adopt information processing strategies most likely to yield the desired conclusion. We propose and empirically demonstrate two extensions to the motivation literature. First, we argue that motivated reasoning isinstrumental,meaning motivated decision makers bias their judgments more or less as needed to support the desired conclusion, subject to “reasonableness” constraints. Second, we propose that motivated decision makers exhibitconfidence bolsteringand thereby remain at least as confident as non-motivated decision makers in their biased estimates. We illustrate that motivated subjects even report confidence in utilizing these estimates outside the original motivating context. We investigate motivational effects within a business context involving forecasting, strategic decision making, and new product introductions. We explore the impact of motivation on quantitative forecasts and estimates, rather than on social judgments and perceptions. In addition, we go a step beyond the judgment phase to demonstrate that motivation influences choice.     

Beware of samples! A cognitive-ecological sampling approach to judgment biases

A cognitive-ecological approach to judgment biases is presented and substantiated by recent empirical evidence. Latent properties of the environment are not amenable to direct assessment but have to be inferred from empirical samples that provide the interface between cognition and the environment. The sampling process may draw on the external world or on internal memories. For systematic reasons (proximity, salience, and focus of attention), the resulting samples tend to be biased (selective, skewed, or conditional on information search strategies). Because people lack the metacognitive ability to understand and control for sampling constraints (predictor sampling, criterion sampling, selective-outcome sampling, etc.), the sampling biases carry over to subsequent judgments. Within this framework, alternative accounts are offered for a number of judgment biases, such as base-rate neglect, confirmation bias, illusory correlation, pseudo-contingency, Simpson's paradox, outgroup devaluation, and pragmatic-confusion effects.     

Contextual Influences on Omission Neglect in the Fault Tree Paradigm

Fault trees are used to organize potential causes of a problem to facilitate better judgments about potential problem solutions. However, fault trees can lead to biased judgments because decision makers tend to overestimate the likelihood of problem causes that are explicitly mentioned in the fault tree and underestimate the likelihood of problem causes that are not. In this research, we examined the impact of context information and need for cognitive closure on these estimates. In 2 experiments, participants with a low need for cognitive closure used the informational content of experimenter provided and self‐generated context information as a basis for making likelihood estimates. In contrast, participants with a high need for closure did not use experimenter provided context information at all but used the ease of producing self‐generated context information (rather than informational content) as a basis for their likelihood estimates.     

"Mindless" decision making as a failure of contextual reasoning

People often make decisions without reference to vital information, even when such information is readily available. In the present research, the authors addressed the possibility that this tendency may derive from failure to have pertinent information immediately available in the decision context. Participants rated the utility of decisions in either the presence or absence of simple pertinent information. The information provided required no training and was relatively obvious (e.g., if money is spent on a given item, that money will not be available for other expenditures). Presentation of such information in the immediate context of decisions significantly improved participants' abilities to understand their negative consequences. These results indicate that the presentation of pertinent information in immediate decision contexts, even information that is already available through participants' long-term memory, can improve the understanding of decision situations and reduce "mindlessness" in decision processes.     

Contrast and Rater-Perspective Effects on Judgments of Sexual Harassment Severity: What He Thinks She Thinks,and Vice Versa

We looked at whether ratings biases can influence judgments people make about sexually harassing behaviors. Online participants (N = 176) read and rated the severity of complaint scenarios describing different incidents of alleged harassment. We manipulated: (1) contrast effects, by having people judge other, independent scenarios before judging a target scenario, and (2) rater-perspective effects, by having people judge from both a self- and then an opposite-gender perspective. For the former, we hypothesized that if judgments about harassment are qualitatively similar to judgments made in other areas (e.g., performance appraisal), they too should show contrast effects. For the latter, we hypothesized people would use stereotypes about the other gender, thereby overestimating the true (i.e., self-perspective driven) gender difference. Results supported both hypotheses, suggesting that decision makers should be aware of the possible influence of biases when judging whether behaviors constitute harassment.     

Seeking positive experiences can produce illusory correlations

Individuals tend to select again alternatives about which they have positive impressions and to avoid alternatives about which they have negative impressions. Here we show how this sequential sampling feature of the information acquisition process leads to the emergence of an illusory correlation between estimates of the attributes of multi-attribute alternatives. The sign of the illusory correlation depends on how the decision maker combines estimates in making her sampling decisions. A positive illusory correlation emerges when evaluations are compensatory or disjunctive and a negative illusory correlation can emerge when evaluations are conjunctive. Our theory provides an alternative explanation for illusory correlations that does not rely on biased information processing nor selective attention to different pieces of information. It provides a new perspective on several well-established empirical phenomena such as the ‘Halo’ effect in personality perception, the relation between proximity and attitudes, and the in-group out-group bias in stereotype formation.     

Beyond judgment bias: How students’ ethnicity and academic profile consistency influence teachers’ tracking judgments

Research on school tracking has provided evidence that students with immigrant backgrounds are overrepresented in the lower school tracks. As teachers are the main decision makers when it comes to tracking, we investigated whether teachers’ tracking judgments are biased by the immigrant backgrounds of the students and how teachers’ tracking judgments are affected by inconsistencies in students’ academic profiles. Drawing on dual process models of judgment formation, we conducted two experimental studies to investigate teachers’ judgments. The results of both studies showed less favorable teacher judgments of students with immigrant backgrounds than of students without immigrant backgrounds. Students with inconsistent academic profiles were also judged less favorably than students with consistent profiles. Think aloud data indicated careful processing of all information both for students with immigrant backgrounds and students with inconsistent profiles. Results are discussed with regard to their underlying mechanisms as well as with regard to their implications for teacher training.     

Euclid: Strategic alternative assessment matrix

The vast amount of information that must be considered to solve inherently ill‐structured and complex strategic problems creates a need for tools to help decision makers (DMs) recognize the complexity of this process and develop a rational model for strategy evaluation. Over the last several decades, a philosophy and a body of intuitive and analytical methods have been developed to assist DMs in the evaluation of strategic alternatives. However, the intuitive methods lack a structured framework for the systematic evaluation of strategic alternatives while the analytical methods are not intended to capture intuitive preferences. Euclid is a simple and yet sophisticated multiobjective value analysis model that attempts to uncover some of the complexities inherent in the evaluation of strategic alternatives. The proposed model uses a series of intuitive and analytical methods including environmental scanning, the analytic hierarchy process (AHP), subjective probabilities, and the theory of displaced ideal, to plot strategic alternatives on a matrix based on their Euclidean distance from the ideal alternative. Euclid is further compared to the quantitative strategic planning matrix (QSPM) in a real world application. The information provided by the users shows that Euclid can significantly enhance decision quality and the DM's confidence. Euclid is not intended to replace the DMs, rather, it provides a systematic approach to support, supplement, and ensure the internal consistency of their judgments through a series of logically sound techniques. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Biased information processing in the escalation paradigm: information search and information evaluation as potential mediators of escalating commitment

Escalation of commitment denotes decision makers' increased reinvestment of resources in a losing course of action. Despite the relevance of this topic, little is known about how information is processed in escalation situations, that is, whether decision makers who receive negative outcome feedback on their initial decision search for and/or process information biasedly and whether these biases contribute to escalating commitment. Contrary to a widely cited study by E. J. Conlon and J. M. Parks (1987), in 3 experiments, the authors found that biases do not occur on the level of information search. Neither in a direct replication and extension of the original study with largely increased test power (Experiment 1) nor under methodologically improved conditions (Experiments 2 and 3) did decision makers responsible for failure differ from nonresponsible decision makers with regards to information search, and no selective search for information supporting the initial decision or voting for further reinvestment was observed. However, Experiments 3 and 4 show that the evaluation of the previously sought information is biased among participants who were responsible for initiating the course of action. Mediation analyses show that this evaluation bias in favor of reinvestment partially mediated the responsibility effect on escalation of commitment.     

Working memory and spatial judgments: Cognitive load increases the central tendency bias

Previous work demonstrates that memory for simple stimuli can be biased by information about the distribution of which the stimulus is a member. Specifically, people underestimate values greater than the distribution’s average and overestimate values smaller than the average. This is referred to as the central tendency bias. This bias has been explained as an optimal use of both noisy sensory information and category information. In largely separate literature, cognitive load (CL) experiments attempt to manipulate the available working memory of participants in order to observe the effect on choice or judgments. In two experiments, we demonstrate that participants under high cognitive load exhibit a stronger central tendency bias than when under a low cognitive load. Although not anticipated at the outset, we also find that judgments exhibit an anchoring bias not described previously.     

判断偏差分析的认知-生态取样途径

对判断偏差的研究曾主要侧重于考察个体的动机和认知缺陷,而近期从认知-生态取样角度对判断偏差进行的研究则表明,判断偏差源于人与环境的交互作用。从认知-生态取样角度分析人的判断偏差着重考察以下四方面的问题：基于样本的判断涉及的多个变量,现实环境中刺激的分布,取样过程及其结果,取样过程中的心理预设与限制。认知-生态取样角度的研究对判断偏差产生的原因提供了一种全新的解释,同时,它也存在一些亟待解决的问题     

Time to Death and Cognitive Performance

We review a program of research that examines people's judgments about how they are seen by others. The research indicates that people tend to anchor on their own experience when making such judgments, with the result that their assessments are often egocentrically biased. Our review focuses on two biases in particular, the spotlight effect, or people's tendency to overestimate the extent to which their behavior and appearance are noticed and evaluated by others, and the illusion of transparency, or people's tendency to overestimate the extent to which their internal states "leak out" and are detectable by others.     

The Spotlight Effect and the Illusion of Transparency: Egocentric Assessments of How We Are Seen by Others

We review a program of research that examines people's judgments about how they are seen by others. The research indicates that people tend to anchor on their own experience when making such judgments, with the result that their assessments are often egocentrically biased. Our review focuses on two biases in particular, the spotlight effect, or people's tendency tooverestimate the extent to which their behavior and appearance are noticed and evaluated by others, and the illusion of transparency, or people's tendency to overestimate the extent to which their internal states "leak out" and are detectable by others.     

Judgments about Felony‐Murder in Hindsight

The purpose of this research was to investigate the role of hindsight bias in application of the felony‐murder law, a controversial rule stating that felons can be held responsible for any foreseeable deaths that occur as a result of their felony. Some versions of the rule involve notions of proximate cause requiring legal decision makers to determine foreseeability and assess case evidence. Those judgments may be biased by outcome information and the process of cognitive sense‐making. Jury eligible participants read a crime vignette modeled on an actual felony‐murder case manipulated with regard to outcome information and relevant case facts. They made likelihood judgments and rated felons on intent and culpability. Results indicated that outcome information biased death likelihood ratings in hindsight but did not significantly affect assessments of case evidence. Implications for further applied cognitive research regarding the felony‐murder rule are discussed. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

2D location biases depth-from-disparity judgments but not vice versa

Visual cognition in our 3D world requires understanding how we accurately localize objects in 2D and depth, and what influence both types of location information have on visual processing. Spatial location is known to play a special role in visual processing, but most of these findings have focused on the special role of 2D location. One such phenomena is the spatial congruency bias, where 2D location biases judgments of object features but features do not bias location judgments. This paradigm has recently been used to compare different types of location information in terms of how much they bias different types of features. Here we used this paradigm to ask a related question: whether 2D and depth-from-disparity location bias localization judgments for each other. We found that presenting two objects in the same 2D location biased position-in-depth judgments, but presenting two objects at the same depth (disparity) did not bias 2D location judgments. We conclude that an object’s 2D location may be automatically incorporated into perception of its depth location, but not vice versa, which is consistent with a fundamentally special role for 2D location in visual processing.     

The Relationship‐specific Interpretation Bias Mediates the Link between Neuroticism and Satisfaction in Couples

Neuroticism has repeatedly been shown to be a predictor of relationship dissatisfaction in couples. The aim of the current research was to uncover the underlying cognitive processes of this robust effect. We focused on anxiety as one aspect of neuroticism that is associated with different kinds of cognitive biases. On the basis of the assumption that biased information processing will also affect specific interpersonal contexts such as romantic relationships, it was expected that the tendency to interpret ambiguous partner and relationship scenarios in a rather negative way would work as a potential mediator. In Study 1, parallel forms of a new measure to capture the relationship‐specific interpretation bias (RIB) were developed (N = 182). In Study 2, the proposed meditational role of the RIB was investigated in a dyadic sample of 210 couples. Dyadic analysis using the Actor–Partner Interdependence Mediation Model showed mediation of the interpretation bias even when the general interpretation bias and attachment styles were controlled. Results support the assumption that biased relationship‐specific interpretations are one important mechanism for how neuroticism exerts its negative influence on relationship satisfaction. We conclude that personality‐congruent cognitive processing may not only have individual consequences but also affect overall couple functioning. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Stereotypic biases in social decision making and memory: testing process models of stereotype use

Two information-processing mechanisms that could potentially contribute to judgmental discrimination against the members of stereotyped social groups were examined in two experiments, using a mock juror decision-making task. Both postulated mechanisms involve biased processing of judgment-relevant evidence. The interpretation hypothesis asserts that the activation of stereotypic concepts influences the perceived probative implications of other evidence. The selective processing hypothesis asserts that stereotype-consistent evidence is processed more extensively than is inconsistent evidence. Judgment and memory data from the first experiment supported the general notion that stereotype-based discrimination emerges from biased evidence processing. The specific pattern of results supported selective processing rather than interpretation biases as the critical process underlying observed judgmental discrimination. The second experiment corroborated this conclusion by showing that a manipulation that prevents selective processing of the evidence effectively eliminated biases in judgments and recall pertaining to stereotyped targets. Implications for a general understanding of stereotyping and discrimination are discussed.     

Rational or uncommitted? Depression and indecisiveness in interpersonal decision making

Two studies were run which tested the prediction that clinically depressed persons, known for difficulties in making a decision, would process predecisional information relevant to an interpersonal choice in a more impartial, less biased way than non-depressed persons. Both studies provided confirmation for this hypothesis. In each case, the depressed group focused less on specific alternatives, asked more criterion-based questions, and made decisions on the basis of information which was more evenly distributed over alternatives, thus conforming less to biasing, dominance structuring processes, than non-depressed participants. The depressed and non-depressed participants did not differ, however, in evaluative aspects of their decisions, suggesting a relative independence of affective and informational aspects of predecisional processes. The question arises: are depressed patients less biased and hence more rational when making decisions or are they just indifferent and uncommitted? The data have been discussed with reference to research on effortful versus automatic information processing in depression.