判断与决策中的投射偏差

投射偏差是指个体常常会高估未来偏好与当前偏好的一致性, 从而把当前偏好投射到未来的心理倾向性。本文从情感–认知加工、时间修正和心理模拟等视角对投射偏差的心理机制进行了解释, 并概括出投射偏差的内源性(含内脏感觉、情绪状态和需要)和外源性(含事件相关信息、天气状况和选择情境)影响因素, 还总结归纳出投射偏差的三种应对策略, 最后指出了投射偏差在未来研究的方向。     

Test difficulty and judgment bias

Two experiments tested the hypothesis that overconfidence in performance judgments is due to test- and person-driven errors. In Experiment 1, test difficulty accounted for the vast majority of variation in overconfidence when individuals judged items of varying difficulty within a homogeneous test. In Experiment 2, the severity of overconfidence did not differ between three unrelated tests once test difficulty was controlled. Both experiments supported the view that over-confidence is due largely to test difficulty. Some degree of overconfidence also occurred because individuals adopted a normatively high success criterion for judging their own test performance.     

Perception and misperception of bias in human judgment

Human judgment and decision making is distorted by an array of cognitive, perceptual and motivational biases. Recent evidence suggests that people tend to recognize (and even overestimate) the operation of bias in human judgment - except when that bias is their own. Aside from the general motive to self-enhance, two primary sources of this 'bias blind spot' have been identified. One involves people's heavy weighting of introspective evidence when assessing their own bias, despite the tendency for bias to occur nonconsciously. The other involves people's conviction that their perceptions directly reflect reality, and that those who see things differently are therefore biased. People's tendency to deny their own bias, even while recognizing bias in others, reveals a profound shortcoming in self-awareness, with important consequences for interpersonal and intergroup conflict.     

An availability bias in professional judgment

When branches of a fault tree are pruned, subjects do not fully transfer the probability of those branches to the ‘all other’ category. This underestimation of the catch-all probability has been interpreted as an ‘out of sight, out of mind’ form of the availability bias. The present work replicates this underestimation bias with professional managers. It then demonstrates the effectiveness of a corrective tactic, extending the tree by generating additional causes, and also reveals that more easily retrieved short-term causes dominate the generation process. These results do not differ across managers' culture, education or experience. After evaluating such alternative explanations as category redefinition, we conclude that availability is a major cause, though possibly not the sole cause, of the underestimation bias.     

The pursuit of self-interest: self-interest bias in attitude judgment and persuasion

Self-interest affected the direction of attitudes in 4 studies exploring attitude judgment and persuasion. Experiment 1 showed that both self-interest and symbolic concerns predicted attitudes. The biasing role of self-interest in producing the well-known persuasion effects of personal relevance and argument strength was examined by disentangling the competing effects of personal costs and benefits. Experiment 2 used a standard personal relevance manipulation in the absence of supportive arguments and showed that perceptions of personal costs associated with the advocated policy partially mediated its negative effects on attitudes. Experiments 3 and 4 independently manipulated the onset of personal costs associated with an issue and the onset of issue-related benefits conveyed by supportive arguments. Postmessage attitudes were an additive function of personal costs and argument-specified benefits, and perceived costs and benefits biased information processing in a self-interested manner. A revised conception of personal relevance and argument strength is discussed.     

The interplay of memory and judgment processes in effects of aging on hindsight bias

Hindsight bias is the phenomenon that after people are presented with the correct answer to a question, their judgment regarding their own past answer to this question is biased toward the correct answer. In three experiments, younger and older adults gave numerical responses to general-knowledge questions and later attempted to recall their responses. For some questions, the correct answer was provided during recall (Experiment 1) or before recall (Experiments 2 and 3). Multinomial model-based analyses show age differences in both recollection bias and reconstruction bias when the correct judgment was in working memory during the recall phase. The authors discuss implications for theories of cognitive aging and theories of hindsight bias.     

Between ignorance and truth: Partition dependence and learning in judgment under uncertainty

In 3 studies, participants viewed sequences of multiattribute objects (e.g., colored shapes) appearing with varying frequencies and judged the likelihood of the attributes of those objects. Judged probabilities reflected a compromise between (a) the frequency with which each attribute appeared and (b) the ignorance prior probability cued by the number of distinct values that the focal attribute could take on. Thus, judged probabilities were partition dependent, varying with the number of events into which the state space was subjectively divided. This bias was diminished among participants more confident in what they learned, was strong and insensitive to level of confidence when ignorance priors were especially salient, and required ignorance priors to be salient only when probabilities were elicited (not during encoding).     

The temporal-relevance temporal-uncertainty model of prospective duration judgment

A model aimed at explaining prospective duration judgments in real life settings (as well as in the laboratory) is presented. The model is based on the assumption that situational meaning is continuously being extracted by humans’ perceptual and cognitive information processing systems. Time is one of the important dimensions of situational meaning. Based on the situational meaning, a value for Temporal Relevance is set. Temporal Relevance reflects the importance of temporal aspects for enabling adaptive behavior in a specific moment in time. When Temporal Relevance is above a certain threshold a prospective duration judgment process is evoked automatically. In addition, a search for relevant temporal information is taking place and its outcomes determine the level of Temporal Uncertainty which reflects the degree of knowledge one has regarding temporal aspects of the task to be performed. The levels of Temporal Relevance and Temporal Uncertainty determine the amount of attentional resources allocated for timing by the executive system. The merit of the model is in connecting timing processes with the ongoing general information processing stream. The model rests on findings in various domains which indicate that cognitive-relevance and self-relevance are powerful determinants of resource allocation policy. The feasibility of the model is demonstrated by analyzing various temporal phenomena. Suggestions for further empirical validation of the model are presented.     

Reducing bias in frequency judgment by improving source monitoring

A common finding in judgment and decision making is that people's frequency judgments often fail to map onto objective frequencies. The present research examined the possibility that one source of bias in frequency judgment is attributable to people's inability to screen out irrelevant memory traces. We used a two-list source-monitoring paradigm to investigate whether frequency judgments are influenced by "extra-experimental" experiences and whether enhancing source monitoring improves judgment accuracy. Across four experiments we found: (1) frequency judgments regarding one list were biased by the second, (2) manipulating encoding between lists improved source monitoring and resulted in more accurate judgments, (3) manipulating item context between lists improved source monitoring and resulted in more accurate judgments, but only when the context was item specific, and (4) manipulating simple-background context between lists was ineffective at improving source monitoring.     

Initial judgment task and delay of the final validity-rating task moderate the truth effect

Repeatedly seen or heard statements are typically judged to be more valid than statements one has never encountered before. This phenomenon has been referred to as the truth effect. We conducted two experiments to assess the plasticity of the truth effect under different contextual conditions. Surprisingly, we did not find a truth effect in the typical judgment design when using a ten minutes interval between statement repetitions. However, we replicated the truth effect when changing the judgment task at initial statement exposure or when using an interval of one week rather than ten minutes. Because none of the current truth effect theories can fully account for these context effects, we conclude that the cognitive processes underlying truth judgments are more complex than has hitherto been assumed. To close the theoretical gap, we propose a revised fluency attribution hypothesis as a possible explanation of our findings.     

Visual-field bias in the judgment of facial expression of emotion

The left and right hemispheres of the brain are differentially related to the processing of emotions. Although there is little doubt that the right hemisphere is relatively superior for processing negative emotions, controversy exists over the hemispheric role in the processing of positive emotions. Eighty right-handed normal male participants were examined for visual-field (left-right) differences in the perception of facial expressions of emotion. Facial composite (RR, LL) and hemifacial (R, L) sets depicting emotion expressions of happiness and sadness were prepared. Pairs of such photographs were presented bilaterally for 150 ms, and participants were asked to select the photographs that looked more expressive. A left visual-field superiority (a right-hemisphere function) was found for sad facial emotion. A hemispheric advantage in the perception of happy expression was not found.     

The imagination model of implicit bias

Philosophical Studies - We can understand implicit bias as a person’s disposition to evaluate members of a social group in a less (or more) favorable light than members of another social...     

Mood acknowledgment and correction for the mood-congruency bias in social judgment

Past research has revealed a mood-congruency bias wherein people evaluate other individuals more positively when they are experiencing good moods than when they are experiencing bad moods. At times, however, people may attempt to prevent their transient mood states from biasing their evaluations of other people. It was proposed that the capacity to attend openly to one’s moods is an important precursor to such mood correction efforts. Two studies supported this hypothesis. People who were encouraged to attend to their feelings (Study 1), as well as people who are naturally inclined to acknowledge their feelings (Study 2), were more likely than their counterparts to prevent their positive and negative moods from biasing their judgments of a target person.     

Sad, thus true: Negativity bias in judgments of truth

An effect observable across many different domains is that negative instances tend to be more influential than comparably positive ones. This phenomenon has been termed the negativity bias. In the current work, it was investigated whether this effect pertains to judgments of truth. That is, it was hypothesized that information valence and perceived validity should be associated such that more negative information is deemed more true. This claim was derived from the findings that negative instances tend to demand more attentional resources and that more elaborate processing can render messages more persuasive. In three experiments, manipulating information valence through framing - and assessing judgments of truth - the hypothesized negativity bias was corroborated. Potential explanations and implications for further research are discussed.     

Aligning Spinoza with Descartes: An informed Cartesian account of the truth bias

There is a bias towards believing information is true rather than false. The Spinozan account claims there is an early, automatic bias towards believing. Only afterwards can people engage in an effortful re‐evaluation and disbelieve the information. Supporting this account, there is a greater bias towards believing information is true when under cognitive load. However, developing on the Adaptive Lie Detector (ALIED) theory, the informed Cartesian can equally explain this data. The account claims the bias under load is not evidence of automatic belief; rather, people are undecided, but if forced to guess they can rely on context information to make an informed judgement. The account predicts, and we found, that if people can explicitly indicate their uncertainty, there should be no bias towards believing because they are no longer required to guess. Thus, we conclude that belief formation can be better explained by an informed Cartesian account – an attempt to make an informed judgment under uncertainty.     

The influence of improper sets of information on judgment: how irrelevant information can bias judged probability

This article introduces 2 new sources of bias in probability judgment, discrimination failure and inhibition failure, which are conceptualized as arising from an interaction between error prone memory processes and a support theory like comparison process. Both sources of bias stem from the influence of irrelevant information on participants' probability judgments, but they postulate different mechanisms for how irrelevant information affects judgment. The authors used an adaptation of the proactive interference (PI) and release from PI paradigm to test the effect of irrelevant information on judgment. The results of 2 experiments support the discrimination failure account of the effect of PI on probability judgment. In addition, the authors show that 2 commonly used measures of judgment accuracy, absolute and relative accuracy, can be dissociated. The results have broad implications for theories of judgment.     

Neuroscientific information bias in metacomprehension: The effect of brain images on metacomprehension judgment of neuroscience research

In the present study, we investigated how brain images affect metacomprehension judgments of neuroscience research. Participants made a prereading judgment of comprehension of the text topic and then read a text about neuroimaging findings. In Experiment 1, participants read text only or text accompanying brain images. In Experiment 2, participants read text accompanying bar graphs or text accompanying brain images. Then participants were asked to rate their comprehension of the text. Finally, they completed comprehension tests. The results of Experiment 1 showed that the text accompanying brain images was associated with higher metacomprehension judgments than was the text only, whereas the performance of the comprehension test did not differ between each condition. The results of Experiment 2 showed that the text accompanying brain images was associated not only with credibility of the text, but also with higher metacomprehension judgments than was the text accompanying the bar graphs, whereas the performance of the comprehension test did not differ between each condition. The findings suggest that the readers’ subjective judgments differ from actual comprehension.     

An economic model of scientific activity and truth acquisition

We wish to thank the following for helpful comments and discussion: Jim Cox, Hartry Field, David Hull, Mark Isaac, Isaac Levi, Vann McGee, Mike Phillips, Holly Smith, Meredith Williams, Michael Williams, and other audience members at Northwestern University and Western Washington University.