Situation models,mental simulations,and abstract concepts in discourse comprehension

This article sets out to examine the role of symbolic and sensorimotor representations in discourse comprehension. It starts out with a review of the literature on situation models, showing how mental representations are constrained by linguistic and situational factors. These ideas are then extended to more explicitly include sensorimotor representations. Following Zwaan and Madden (2005), the author argues that sensorimotor and symbolic representations mutually constrain each other in discourse comprehension. These ideas are then developed further to propose two roles for abstract concepts in discourse comprehension. It is argued that they serve as pointers in memory, used (1) cataphorically to integrate upcoming information into a sensorimotor simulation, or (2) anaphorically integrate previously presented information into a sensorimotor simulation. In either case, the sensorimotor representation is a specific instantiation of the abstract concept.     

Aboutness in imagination

I present a formal theory of the logic and aboutness of imagination. Aboutness is understood as the relation between meaningful items and what they concern, as per Yablo and Fine’s works on the notion. Imagination is understood as per Chalmers’ positive conceivability: the intentional state of a subject who conceives that p by imagining a situation—a configuration of objects and properties—verifying p. So far aboutness theory has been developed mainly for linguistic representation, but it is natural to extend it to intentional states. The proposed framework combines a modal semantics with a mereology of contents: imagination operators are understood as variably strict quantifiers over worlds with a content-preservation constraint.     

Linking somatic and symbolic representation in semantic memory: the dynamic multilevel reactivation framework

Biological plausibility is an essential constraint for any viable model of semantic memory. Yet, we have only the most rudimentary understanding of how the human brain conducts abstract symbolic transformations that underlie word and object meaning. Neuroscience has evolved a sophisticated arsenal of techniques for elucidating the architecture of conceptual representation. Nevertheless, theoretical convergence remains elusive. Here we describe several contrastive approaches to the organization of semantic knowledge, and in turn we offer our own perspective on two recurring questions in semantic memory research: (1) to what extent are conceptual representations mediated by sensorimotor knowledge (i.e., to what degree is semantic memory embodied)? (2) How might an embodied semantic system represent abstract concepts such as modularity, symbol, or proposition? To address these questions, we review the merits of sensorimotor (i.e., embodied) and amodal (i.e., disembodied) semantic theories and address the neurobiological constraints underlying each. We conclude that the shortcomings of both perspectives in their extreme forms necessitate a hybrid middle ground. We accordingly propose the Dynamic Multilevel Reactivation Framework—an integrative model predicated upon flexible interplay between sensorimotor and amodal symbolic representations mediated by multiple cortical hubs. We discuss applications of the dynamic multilevel reactivation framework to abstract and concrete concept representation and describe how a multidimensional conceptual topography based on emotion, sensation, and magnitude can successfully frame a semantic space containing meanings for both abstract and concrete words. The consideration of ‘abstract conceptual features’ does not diminish the role of logical and/or executive processing in activating, manipulating and using information stored in conceptual representations. Rather, it proposes that the materials upon which these processes operate necessarily combine pure sensorimotor information and higher-order cognitive dimensions involved in symbolic representation.     

Avoiding the Conflation of Moral and Intellectual Virtues

One of the most pressing challenges facing virtue theorists is the conflation problem. This problem concerns the difficulty of explaining the distinction between different types of virtue, such as the distinction between moral virtues and intellectual virtues. Julia Driver has argued that only an outcomes-based understanding of virtue can provide an adequate solution to the conflation problem. In this paper, I argue against Driver’s outcomes-based account, and propose an alternative motivations-based solution. According to this proposal, intellectual virtues can be identified by the shared motivation for cognitive contact with reality, while moral virtues are identified by appeal to the characteristic motivations of kindness and justice. I defend the proposal by demonstrating that it produces plausible verdicts concerning the virtue status of candidate moral and intellectual virtues.     

Algebraic Models of Mental Number Axes: Part II

The paper presents a formal model of the system of number representations as a multiplicity of mental number axes with a hierarchical structure. The hierarchy is determined by the mind as it acquires successive types of mental number axes generated by virtue of some algebraic mechanisms. Three types of algebraic structures, responsible for functioning these mechanisms, are distinguished: BASAN-structures, CASAN-structures and CAPPAN-structures. A foundational order holds between these structures. CAPPAN-structures are derivative from CASAN-structures which are extensions of BASAN-structures. The constructed formal model unifies two competitive conceptions of cognitive arithmetic: namely, the conception of the mental number line and the conception of parallel individuation. The paper is the continuation of a paper entitled Representational structures of arithmetical thinking, in which rich empirical evidence supporting the model is presented. The main result achieved in the present paper may be philosophically interpreted as an attempt to formalize the Kantian conception of the pure idea of time, understood as the a priori form of human arithmetical thinking. In this way, our theory may be comprehended as a result of applying the hard method of logical reconstruction of fundamental epistemological categories.     

General and Domain-Specific Effectiveness of Cognitive Remediation after Stroke: Systematic Literature Review and Meta-Analysis

Cognitive remediation (CR) has been shown to improve cognitive abilities following a stroke. However, an updated quantitative literature review is needed to synthesize recent research and build understanding of factors that may optimize training parameters and treatment effects. Randomized controlled trials of CR were retrieved from seven electronic databases. Studies specific to adult stroke populations were included. Treatment effects were estimated using a random effects model, with immediate and longer-term follow-up outcomes, and moderator effects, examined for both overall and domain-specific functioning. Twenty-two studies were identified yielding 1098 patients (583 in CR groups). CR produced a small overall effect (g?=?0.48, 95% CI 0.35–0.60, p?<?0.01) compared with control conditions. This effect was moderated by recovery stage (p?<?0.01), study quality (p?=?0.04), and dose (p?=?0.04), but not CR approach (p?=?0.63). Significant small to medium (g?=?0.25–0.75) post-intervention gains were evident within each individual outcome domain examined. A small overall effect (g?=?0.27, 95% CI 0.04–0.51, p?=?0.02) of CR persisted at follow-up (range 2–52 weeks). CR is effective and efficient at improving cognitive performance after stroke. The degree of efficacy varies across cognitive domains, and further high-quality research is required to enhance and sustain the immediate effects. Increased emphasis on early intervention approaches, brain-behavior relationships, and evaluation of activity and participation outcomes is also recommended.     

Imperfection,Indecision, and Hoarding

Hoarding disorder is a new DSM-5 disorder that causes functional impairment and affects 2 to 6% of the population (Frost and Steketee 2014). The current study evaluated a multiple mediation model with 243 undergraduate women in which indecisiveness (VOCI; Thordarson et al. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 42(11), 1289-1314, 2004) and decisional procrastination (DPS; Mann 1982) mediated the relationship between dimensions of perfectionism (F-MPS-B; Burgess et al. 2016a) and hoarding behavior (SI-R; Frost et al. Behaviour Research And Therapy, 42(10), 1163–1182, 2004) and excessive acquiring (CAS; Frost et al. Annual Review of Clinical Psychology, 8, 219–242, 2012). Multiple mediational analyses indicated a significant indirect effect for decisional procrastination, but not indecisiveness, in mediating evaluative concerns (but not striving) to SI-R Total, SI-R Clutter, SIR Excessive Acquisition, and both CAS subscales. Both mediators were significant pathways between evaluative concerns and SI-R Difficulty Discarding. These findings support a cognitive behavioral model of hoarding, suggesting that evaluative concerns produces problems in decision-making that influence acquisition, discarding, and clutter.     

Analogous selection processes in declarative and procedural working memory: N-2 list-repetition and task-repetition costs

Working memory (WM) holds and manipulates representations for ongoing cognition. Oberauer (Psychology of Learning and Motivation, 51, 45–100, 2009) distinguishes between two analogous WM sub-systems: a declarative WM which handles the objects of thought, and a procedural WM which handles the representations of (cognitive) actions. Here, we assessed whether analogous effects are observed when participants switch between memory sets (declarative representations) and when they switch between task sets (procedural representations). One mechanism assumed to facilitate switching in procedural WM is the inhibition of previously used, but currently irrelevant task sets, as indexed by n-2 task-repetition costs (Mayr & Keele, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 129(1), 4–26, 2000). In this study we tested for an analogous effect in declarative WM. We assessed the evidence for n-2 list-repetition costs across eight experiments in which participants switched between memory lists to perform speeded classifications, mental arithmetic, or a local recognition test. N-2 list-repetition costs were obtained consistently in conditions assumed to increase interference between memory lists, and when lists formed chunks in long-term memory. Further analyses across experiments revealed a substantial contribution of episodic memory to n-2 list-repetition costs, thereby questioning the interpretation of n-2 repetition costs as reflecting inhibition. We reanalyzed the data of eight task-switching experiments, and observed that episodic memory also contributes to n-2 task-repetition costs. Taken together, these results show analogous processing principles in declarative and procedural WM, and question the relevance of inhibitory processes for efficient switching between mental sets.     

Assertion and grounding: a theory of assertion for constructive type theory

Taking Per Martin-Löf’s constructive type theory as a starting-point a theory of assertion is developed, which is able to account for the epistemic aspects of the speech act of assertion, and in which it is shown that assertion is not a wide genus. From a constructivist point of view, one is entitled to assert, for example, that a proposition A is true, only if one has constructed a proof object a for A in an act of demonstration. One thereby has grounded the assertion by an act of demonstration, and a grounding account of assertion therefore suits constructive type theory. Because the act of demonstration in which such a proof object is constructed results in knowledge that A is true, the constructivist account of assertion has to ward off some of the criticism directed against knowledge accounts of assertion. It is especially the internal relation between a judgement being grounded and its being known that makes it possible to do so. The grounding account of assertion can be considered as a justification account of assertion, but it also differs from justification accounts recently proposed, namely in the treatment of selfless assertions, that is, assertions which are grounded, but are not accompanied by belief.     

Meta-Analysis of the Effects of Computerized Cognitive Training on Executive Functions: a Cross-Disciplinary Taxonomy for Classifying Outcome Cognitive Factors

The growing prevalence of neurodegenerative disorders associated with aging and cognitive decline has generated increasing cross-disciplinary interest in non-pharmacological interventions, such as computerized cognitive training (CCT), which may prevent or slow cognitive decline. However, inconsistent findings across meta-analytic reviews in the field suggest a lack of cross-disciplinary consensus and on-going debate regarding the benefits of CCT. We posit that a contributing factor is the lack of a theoretically-based taxonomy of constructs and representative tasks typically used. An integration of the Cattell-Horn-Carroll (CHC) taxonomy of broad and narrow cognitive factors and the Miyake unity-diversity theory of executive functions (EF) is proposed (CHC-M) as an attempt to clarify this issue through representing and integrating the disciplines contributing to CCT research. The present study assessed the utility of this taxonomy by reanalyzing the Lampit et al. (2014) meta-analysis of CCT in healthy older adults using the CHC-M framework. Results suggest that: 1) substantively different statistical effects are observed when CHC-M is applied to the Lampit et al. meta-analytic review, leading to importantly different interpretations of the data; 2) typically-used classification practices conflate Executive Function (EF) tasks with fluid reasoning (Gf) and retrieval fluency (Gr), and Attention with sensory perception; and 3) there is theoretical and practical advantage in differentiating attention and working-memory tasks into the narrow shifting, inhibition, and updating EF domains. Implications for clinical practice, particularly for our understanding of EF are discussed.     

Adult Recidivism in United States: A Meta-Analysis 1994–2015

In 2014, adult correctional systems supervised an estimated 6.8 million individuals in the United States with 1 in 36 adults (or 2.8%) being under some form of correctional supervision. Unfortunately, not only are the number of individuals connected to the correctional system and the outlined disparities based on minority status worrisome, there is also the persistent concern of repeat offending. Given the fact that the most recent comprehensive meta-analysis examining predictors of adult offender was published in 1996, a current systematic review and meta-analysis focusing on United States samples of all types of re-offense is necessary for identifying current predictors of adult recidivism with U.S. studies from 1994 through 2015. Specifically, the questions addressed in this meta-analysis include (a) which attributes predict general, sexual, and violent recidivism for adults in the American justice system, and (b) are some characteristics more influential than others? We determined the following domains are statistically significant predictors of recidivism: age (r?=?.02), antisocial personality scales (r?=?.13), criminogenic needs (r?=?.10), distress (r?=?.06), family criminality (r?=?.18), family rearing (r?=?.16), gender (r?=?.19), history of antisocial behavior (r?=?.12), risk scales (r?=?.17), social achievement (r?=?.05), and substance abuse (r?=?.07). Implications are provided.     

Attachment Representations and Maternal Confidence: The Mediating Role of Postnatal Depressive Symptoms and Negative Thoughts

Attachment security can act as an inner resource to promote women’s adjustment to motherhood. However, the mechanisms explaining the relationship between attachment representations and maternal adaptation outcomes are not well understood. This study aimed to examine the direct and indirect effects of attachment representations on maternal confidence, through postpartum negative automatic thoughts and depressive symptoms. The sample consisted of 387 postpartum women who completed a cross-sectional online survey including measures of attachment representations, depressive symptoms, postpartum negative automatic thoughts and maternal confidence. Our results showed a significant relationship between more insecure attachment representations and higher depressive symptoms (p?<?.001), but also with more frequent postpartum negative automatic thoughts (p?<?.001); depressive symptoms and postpartum negative automatic thoughts were also inversely associated with women’s maternal confidence (p?<?.001). Moreover, indirect effects of attachment representations on maternal confidence were found, but only through postpartum negative thoughts [attachment-related anxiety: 95% CI?=??0.03/?0.01; attachment-related avoidance: 95% CI?=??0.05/?0.01]. The results of the present study emphasize the important role of the cognitive component of depressive symptomatology (postpartum negative automatic thoughts) in the relationship between attachment representations and maternal confidence, allowing to draw specific implications. We highlight the implications for clinical practice during the perinatal period to address both negative thoughts and women’s maternal confidence.     

Betting on transitivity in probabilistic causal chains

Causal reasoning is crucial to people’s decision making in probabilistic environments. It may rely directly on data about covariation between variables (correspondence) or on inferences based on reasonable constraints if larger causal models are constructed based on local relations (coherence). For causal chains an often assumed constraint is transitivity. For probabilistic causal relations, mismatches between such transitive inferences and direct empirical evidence may lead to distortions of empirical evidence. Previous work has shown that people may use the generative local causal relations A → B and B → C to infer a positive indirect relation between events A and C, despite data showing that these events are actually independent (von Sydow et al. in Proceedings of the thirty-first annual conference of the cognitive science society. Cognitive Science Society, Austin, 2009, Proceedings of the 32nd annual conference of the cognitive science society. Cognitive Science Society, Austin, 2010, Mem Cogn 44(3):469–487, 2016). Here we used a sequential learning scenario to investigate how transitive reasoning in intransitive situations with negatively related distal events may relate to betting behavior. In three experiments participants bet as if they were influenced by a transitivity assumption, even when the data strongly contradicted transitivity.     

Recall is not necessary for verbal sequence learning

The question of whether overt recall of to-be-remembered material accelerates learning is important in a wide range of real-world learning settings. In the case of verbal sequence learning, previous research has proposed that recall either is necessary for verbal sequence learning (Cohen & Johansson Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 6, 139–143, 1967; Cunningham, Healy, & Williams Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 10, 575–597, 1984), or at least contributes significantly to it (Glass, Krejci, & Goldman Journal of Memory and Language, 28, 189–199, 1989; Oberauer & Meyer Memory, 17, 774–781, 2009). In contrast, here we show that the amount of previous spoken recall does not predict learning and is not necessary for it. We suggest that previous research may have underestimated participants’ learning by using suboptimal performance measures, or by using manual or written recall. However, we show that the amount of spoken recall predicted how much interference from other to-be-remembered sequences would be observed. In fact, spoken recall mediated most of the error learning observed in the task. Our data support the view that the learning of overlapping auditory–verbal sequences is driven by learning the phonological representations and not the articulatory motor responses. However, spoken recall seems to reinforce already learned representations, whether they are correct or incorrect, thus contributing to a participant identifying a specific stimulus as either “learned” or “new” during the presentation phase.     

The Carnival’s Edge: <Emphasis Type="Italic">Charlie Hebdo</Emphasis> and Theories of Comedy

This article reexamines the satire of Charlie Hebdo through the lens of comedy theory and cultural studies. Drawing upon Mikhail Bakhtin’s notion of “the carnivalesque” and Linda Hutcheon’s concept of “irony’s edge,” it considers the wide variety of potential meanings that are encoded within Hebdo’s highly controversial comedy and religious representations. Introducing the notion of the “ambigramic carnival,” I argue that competing notions of hegemony in French culture encourage radically different understandings of the ethical and political implications of Hebdo’s content. Ultimately, I contend that while Hebdo’s approach to satire is in no way responsible for the terroristic violence visited upon the magazine, the publication nonetheless crafted a style intended to evoke a range of responses, including profound anger. As an empirical companion to this theoretical approach, the article then turns to coverage of the Hebdo massacre in the Jewish press, arguing that in the United States the Forward used the Hebdo story to represent Jewish empowerment and disempowerment simultaneously.     

Just one look: Direct gaze briefly disrupts visual working memory

Direct gaze is a salient social cue that affords rapid detection. A body of research suggests that direct gaze enhances performance on memory tasks (e.g., Hood, Macrae, Cole-Davies, & Dias, Developmental Science, 1, 67–71, 2003). Nonetheless, other studies highlight the disruptive effect direct gaze has on concurrent cognitive processes (e.g., Conty, Gimmig, Belletier, George, & Huguet, Cognition, 115(1), 133–139, 2010). This discrepancy raises questions about the effects direct gaze may have on concurrent memory tasks. We addressed this topic by employing a change detection paradigm, where participants retained information about the color of small sets of agents. Experiment 1 revealed that, despite the irrelevance of the agents’ eye gaze to the memory task at hand, participants were worse at detecting changes when the agents looked directly at them compared to when the agents looked away. Experiment 2 showed that the disruptive effect was relatively short-lived. Prolonged presentation of direct gaze led to recovery from the initial disruption, rather than a sustained disruption on change detection performance. The present study provides the first evidence that direct gaze impairs visual working memory with a rapidly-developing yet short-lived effect even when there is no need to attend to agents’ gaze.     

Reasoning defeasibly about probabilities

In concrete applications of probability, statistical investigation gives us knowledge of some probabilities, but we generally want to know many others that are not directly revealed by our data. For instance, we may know prob(P/Q) (the probability of P given Q) and prob(P/R), but what we really want is prob(P/Q&;R), and we may not have the data required to assess that directly. The probability calculus is of no help here. Given prob(P/Q) and prob(P/R), it is consistent with the probability calculus for prob(P/Q&;R) to have any value between 0 and 1. Is there any way to make a reasonable estimate of the value of prob(P/Q&;R)? A related problem occurs when probability practitioners adopt undefended assumptions of statistical independence simply on the basis of not seeing any connection between two propositions. This is common practice, but its justification has eluded probability theorists, and researchers are typically apologetic about making such assumptions. Is there any way to defend the practice? This paper shows that on a certain conception of probability—nomic probability—there are principles of “probable probabilities” that license inferences of the above sort. These are principles telling us that although certain inferences from probabilities to probabilities are not deductively valid, nevertheless the second-order probability of their yielding correct results is 1. This makes it defeasibly reasonable to make the inferences. Thus I argue that it is defeasibly reasonable to assume statistical independence when we have no information to the contrary. And I show that there is a function Y(r, s, a) such that if prob(P/Q) = r, prob(P/R) = s, and prob(P/U) = a (where U is our background knowledge) then it is defeasibly reasonable to expect that prob(P/Q&;R) = Y(r, s, a). Numerous other defeasible inferences are licensed by similar principles of probable probabilities. This has the potential to greatly enhance the usefulness of probabilities in practical application.     

Rethinking social cognition in means-ends terms: A tale of two surprises

The resurgence of motivation science in recent decades ushers in a new functionalism whereby behavior, cognition and emotion are viewed as means to specific goals. Two classic social psychological issues are analyzed from the means-ends perspective: (1) humans’ alleged need (or drive) for cognitive consistency, and (2) the notion that attitudes drive behavior. A careful conceptual analysis yields, contrary to received views, that cognitive consistency, rather than constituting a general need or goal, represents instead a means of knowledge validation. Consequently, the degree to which inconsistency is experienced as aversive depends on the desirability of the knowledge that is being invalidated. Furthermore, the notion that attitudes directly drive behavior is contested on the grounds that attitudes (i.e., liking) must transmute into wanting and wanting must transmute into a (dominant) goal for behavior to be initiated. Major theories of attitude-behavior relations are discussed from this perspective and their supportive evidence is reinterpreted in the present means-ends terms.     

Hypothesis Testing of the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Q</Emphasis>-matrix

The recent surge of interests in cognitive assessment has led to the development of cognitive diagnosis models. Central to many such models is a specification of the Q-matrix, which relates items to latent attributes that have natural interpretations. In practice, the Q-matrix is usually constructed subjectively by the test designers. This could lead to misspecification, which could result in lack of fit of the underlying statistical model. To test possible misspecification of the Q-matrix, traditional goodness of fit tests, such as the Chi-square test and the likelihood ratio test, may not be applied straightforwardly due to the large number of possible response patterns. To address this problem, this paper proposes a new statistical method to test the goodness fit of the Q-matrix, by constructing test statistics that measure the consistency between a provisional Q-matrix and the observed data for a general family of cognitive diagnosis models. Limiting distributions of the test statistics are derived under the null hypothesis that can be used for obtaining the test p-values. Simulation studies as well as a real data example are presented to demonstrate the usefulness of the proposed method.     

Gesture as representational action: A paper about function

A great deal of attention has recently been paid to gesture and its effects on thinking and learning. It is well established that the hand movements that accompany speech are an integral part of communication, ubiquitous across cultures, and a unique feature of human behavior. In an attempt to understand this intriguing phenomenon, researchers have focused on pinpointing the mechanisms that underlie gesture production. One proposal––that gesture arises from simulated action (Hostetter & Alibali Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 15, 495–514, 2008)––has opened up discussions about action, gesture, and the relation between the two. However, there is another side to understanding a phenomenon and that is to understand its function. A phenomenon’s function is its purpose rather than its precipitating cause––the why rather than the how. This paper sets forth a theoretical framework for exploring why gesture serves the functions that it does, and reviews where the current literature fits, and fails to fit, this proposal. Our framework proposes that whether or not gesture is simulated action in terms of its mechanism––it is clearly not reducible to action in terms of its function. Most notably, because gestures are abstracted representations and are not actions tied to particular events and objects, they can play a powerful role in thinking and learning beyond the particular, specifically, in supporting generalization and transfer of knowledge.