How the mind hurts and heals the body

The author reviews some of the social and behavioral factors acting on the brain that influence health, illness, and death. Supported with data from several areas of research, his proposal for understanding health and illness provides both the concepts and the mechanisms for studying and explaining mind-body relationships. The brain is the body's first line of defense against illness, and the mind is the emergent functioning of the brain. This mind-body approach incorporates ideas, belief systems, and hopes as well as biochemistry, physiology, and anatomy. Changing thoughts imply a changing brain and thus a changing biology and body. Belief systems provide a baseline for the functioning brain upon which other variables act and have their effects.     

Disequilibrium in the mind, disharmony in the body

Although it is generally acknowledged that experiences of frustration, confusion, and anxiety are embodied phenomena, very little is known about how these processes modulate presumably unconscious, but constantly present, subtle bodily movement. We addressed this problem by tracking the low-level dynamics of body movement, using 1/f noise, pink noise, or "fractal scaling", during naturalistic experiences of affect in two studies involving deep learning and effortful problem-solving. Our results indicate that body movement fluctuations of individuals experiencing cognitive equilibrium was characteristic of correlated pink noise, but there was a whitening of the signal when participants experienced states that are diagnostic of cognitive distress such as anxiety, confusion, and frustration. We orient our findings within theories that emphasise the embodied nature of cognition and affect and with perspectives that view affective and cognitive processes as emergent products of a self-organising dynamical system (the brain) that is inextricably coupled to the body.     

Depressive rumination in an analysand after a traumatic treatment

The author attempts to understand the underpinnings of a ruminative depression that occurred in a patient after a troubled first analysis. Negative therapeutic reaction is often assumed to be the result of a patient's unconscious guilt or masochism and thus an intrapsychic phenomenon, but the author asserts that iatrogenic phenomena in the form of persistent misunderstandings and enactments that remain unanalyzed contribute to a destructive treatment experience. The analysand may relive the failed treatment again and again in his or her mind in an attempt to resolve it. The author asserts that a traumatic treatment experience can foster depressive rumination.     

The rooting of the mind in the body: new links between attachment theory and psychoanalytic thought

The relationship between psychoanalysis and attachment theory is complex indeed. A brief review of the psychoanalytic literature as it concerns attachment theory and research, and of the attachment literature as it pertains to psychoanalytic ideas, demonstrates an increasing interest in attachment theory within psychoanalysis. Some of the difficulties that attachment theory faces in relation to psychoanalytic ideas are traced to its links to the now dated cognitive science of the 1960s and 1970s. Today, however, a second-generation cognitive neuroscience seeks neurobiologically plausible accounts in which links with brain and body are seen as shaping mind and consciousness, which increasingly are seen as "embodied", as emerging from or serving the needs of a physical being located in a specific time, place, and social context. This idea has also been at the core of much psychoanalytic thinking, which has historically affirmed the rootedness of symbolic thought in sensory, emotional, and enacted experience with objects. Now neurobiological advances supporting the concept of embodied cognition offer an opportunity to forge powerful links between the hitherto separate domains of attachment theory and psychoanalysis. Speculations about the nature of language are presented that emphasize the origin of internal working models (and of representations in general) in early sensorimotor and emotional experiences with a caregiver. It is argued that language and symbolic thought may be phylogenetically and ontogenetically embodied, built on a foundation of gestures and actions, and are thus profoundly influenced by the experience of early physical interaction with the primary object. Finally, the clinical and research implications of these ideas are discussed.     

More than a body: mind perception and the nature of objectification

According to models of objectification, viewing someone as a body induces de-mentalization, stripping away their psychological traits. Here evidence is presented for an alternative account, where a body focus does not diminish the attribution of all mental capacities but, instead, leads perceivers to infer a different kind of mind. Drawing on the distinction in mind perception between agency and experience, it is found that focusing on someone's body reduces perceptions of agency (self-control and action) but increases perceptions of experience (emotion and sensation). These effects were found when comparing targets represented by both revealing versus nonrevealing pictures (Experiments 1, 3, and 4) or by simply directing attention toward physical characteristics (Experiment 2). The effect of a body focus on mind perception also influenced moral intuitions, with those represented as a body seen to be less morally responsible (i.e., lesser moral agents) but more sensitive to harm (i.e., greater moral patients; Experiments 5 and 6). These effects suggest that a body focus does not cause objectification per se but, instead, leads to a redistribution of perceived mind.     

心安与身安——《论语》“宰我问三年之丧”章疏解

《论语》"宰我问三年之丧"章中安字出现五次,可分为两组:"女安"之安、"居处不安"之安。解释史上有两说:一、两组安字都指"心安";二、女安之安指"心安",居处不安之安指"身安"。但它们都存在一些问题,值得考虑的是第三种解释:两组安字都指"身安",且这是涵盖心安的整个人之安、身心一体之安。而"不安"有两层含义:不会"安"(未安)、会"不安"(不忍安、耻于安)。从身心一体之"身安"角度,可使对此章所说的"仁—礼"关系有一新的认知。     

Putting the mind back into the body a successor scientific medical model

This paper examines today's received scientific medical model with respect to its ability to satisfy two conditions: (1) its explanatory adequacy relative to the full range of findings in the medical literature, including those indicating a correlation between psychosocial variables and disease susceptibility; and (2) the fit between its physicalist patient and disease concepts and what today's basic sciences, so-called sciences of complexity, tell us about the way matter, notably complex systems (e.g. patients), behave and the nature of scientific explanation. I conclude that the received (biomedical) model falls short on both counts and to satisfy these conditions is to articulate a formal successor model. This successor must be guided by premises consistent with the findings and methods of today's basic sciences on which an applied science like medicine depends for its validity. Additionally, the successor model must be able to explain (and predict) the full range of clinical findings, both those that its predecessors explains and at least some of those that it does not. The aim of the paper is to identify such a model.     

The roles of body and mind in abstract thought

How are people able to think about things they have never seen or touched? We demonstrate that abstract knowledge can be built analogically from more experience-based knowledge. People's understanding of the abstract domain of time, for example, is so intimately dependent on the more experience-based domain of space that when people make an air journey or wait in a lunch line, they also unwittingly (and dramatically) change their thinking about time. Further, our results suggest that it is not sensorimotor spatial experience per se that influences people's thinking about time, but rather people's representations of and thinking about their spatial experience.     

The ecclesial dimension in the dialogue between theology and science

This article discusses the role of the science–religion dialogue in reaction to modern secularism, atheism and nihilism. It is argued that the only viable way for such a dialogue is along the lines of radical theological commitment implying the ecclesial dimension. It is carefully discussed as to how the ecclesial dimension can enter the dialogue. Ultimately it is concluded that the dialogue between science and theology explicates the para-eucharistic essence of science, thus reconciling it with theology in the sense of the commonality of their experiential origin in humanity made in the image of God.     

Getting Vygotskian about theory of mind: Mediation,dialogue, and the development of social understanding

The ideas of Vygotsky [Vygotsky, L. S. (1987). Thinking and speech. In The collected works of L. S. Vygotsky, (Vol. 1). New York: Plenum. (Original work published 1934.)] have been increasingly influential in accounting for social–environmental influences on the development of social understanding (SU). In the first part of this article, I examine how Vygotskian ideas have to date been recruited to explanations of the development of SU. Next, I present a model of SU development which draws on two implications of Vygotsky’s ideas: the importance of semiotic mediation for mental functioning, and the dialogic nature of the higher mental functions. I then consider the value of the proposed model in accounting for evidence from three areas of enquiry: the typical development of SU in infancy and early childhood, relations between individual differences in SU and social–environmental variables, and atypical development. The model is suggested to be particularly helpful in understanding the transition from intentional-agent to mental-agent understanding, and the role of language in SU. Remaining challenges include a need to specify further the cognitive processes underlying internalization, and to gather more extensive evidence on the roles of typical and atypical social experience in SU development.     

Some observations on the relationship between language and verbal thought in a psychotic adolescent

Abstract

Janine Chasseguet-Smirgel: The Ego Ideal. Free Association Books, 1985. Hardback £18.50; paperback £8.95.

Creativity and Perversion. Free Association Books, 1985. Hardback £11.95; paperback £6.95.

Jerome Kagan: The Nature of the Child. Published by Basic Books, 1984. Hardback, £15.85. Also by Harper and Row. Paperback, £4.95.

Julia Segal: Phantasy in Everyday Life. Published by Pelican, 1985. Paperback £2.95.     

On matters of mind and body: regarding Descartes

In this paper the author considers Descartes’ place in current thinking about the mind‐body dilemma. The premise here is that in the history of ideas, the questions posed can be as significant as the answers acquired. Descartes’ paramount question was ‘How do we determine certainty?’ and his pursuit of an answer led to cogito ergo sum. His discovery simultaneously raised the question whether mind is separate from or unified with the body. Some who currently hold that brain and subjectivity are unified contend that the philosopher ‘split’ mind from body and refer to ‘Descartes’ error’. This paper puts forward that Descartes’ detractors fail to recognise Descartes’ contribution to Western thought, which was to introduce the Enlightenment and to give a place to human subjectivity. Added to this, evidence from Descartes’ correspondence with Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia supports the conclusion that Descartes did in fact believe in the unity of mind and body although he could not reconcile this rationally with the certainty from personal experience that they were separate substances. In this Descartes was engaged in just the same dilemma as that of current thinkers and researchers, a conflict which still is yet to be resolved.     

Substance P at the nexus of mind and body in chronic inflammation and affective disorders

For decades, research has demonstrated that chronic diseases characterized by dysregulation of inflammation are particularly susceptible to exacerbation by stress and emotion. Likewise, rates of depression and anxiety are overrepresented in individuals suffering from chronic inflammatory disease. In recent years, substance P has been implicated in both the pathophysiology of inflammatory disease and the pathophysiology of depression and anxiety by 2 parallel fields of study. This review integrates the literature from these 2 parallel fields and examines the possibility that substance P dysregulation may be a point of convergence underlying the overlap of chronic inflammatory disease and mood and anxiety disorders. First, the involvement of substance P in peripheral inflammation and in the immune events associated with chronic inflammatory disease is discussed, with a focus on inflammatory bowel disease and asthma. Next, the function of substance P in the communication of peripheral inflammation to the brain is considered. Finally, to complete the bidirectional loop of brain-immune interactions, substance P expression in anxiety and depression as well as its potential role in the neural regulation of peripheral inflammation is reviewed.     

On the mind/body problem: The theory of essence

The classical mind/body problem can be approached empirically, using instances of the near-death experience (NDE) as experimental data. The monistic viewpoint, that the mind is the functioning of the brain, finds little support in the NDE data, while dualism, mind and body as separate entities, is consistent with NDE research to date. Comparison of the details of the NDE with predictions from theoretical cosmology shows strong similarities between the two and further strengthens the case for dualism. A theory of human nature is proposed that incorporates these similarities.J. Kenneth Arnette, Ph.D. received a doctorate in Physical Chemistry from Florida State University