Conservatism,Feminism, and Elizabeth Fox‐Genovese

This paper is a philosophical reconstruction of Elizabeth Fox‐Genovese's thinking about women and feminism, and an inquiry into whether there is a conservative form of feminism. The paper argues that Fox‐Genovese's endorsement of conventional social forms (like traditional marriage, motherhood, and sexual morality) contrasts strongly with feminism's criticism of these forms, and feminism's claim that they should be transformed. The paper concludes, however, that one need not call Fox‐Genovese's thought “feminist” to recognize it as serious advocacy on behalf of women and to include it in discussions about what is good for women.     

Elizabeth Spelman,Gender Realism,and Women

Elizabeth Spelman has famously argued against gender realism (the view that women have some feature in common that makes them women). By and large, feminist philosophers have embraced Spelman's arguments and deemed gender realist positions counterproductive. To the contrary, Mikkola shows that Spelman's arguments do not in actual fact give good reason to reject gender realism in general. She then suggests a way to understand gender realism that does not have the adverse consequences feminist philosophers commonly think gender realist positions have.     

Stuart,Elizabeth, Gay and Lesbian Theologies: Repetitions with Critical Difference

Abstract

In response to the constructive criticism of four male scholars of religious studies, this piece clarifies some of the arguments of my earlier essay, ‘Who's Afraid of Gay Theology?’. It argues for a cautious approach to identify one's gendered and sexed identity as an author within men's studies since such self-revelation may narrow the range of possible textual readings. The unintended consequence may be lesser rather than the wished-for greater transparency of both text and author. This essay makes a few suggestions of how to navigate the difficult terrain of language, gender, social privilege, and male intimacy.     

Evaluating Elizabeth Grosz's Biological Turn

Elizabeth Grosz's interpretation of Darwinian evolutionary theory to ground a feminist ontology of biology has been particularly controversial. Most critics have understood Grosz as supporting her theory with empirical evidence, and they criticize her for being either inaccurate or uncritical of and overly dependent on science. I argue that Grosz reads Darwin as a philosopher in a Deleuzian and Irigarayan sense, and that Grosz's project is therefore better understood in terms of its ethical and political goals rather than in terms of empirical adequacy. Employing this evaluative framework leads to a novel route for critique of Grosz's ontology in terms of its reliance on the Darwinian distinction between organism and environment. I conclude that Grosz's work is valuable for the way it maintains ethical and political considerations in feminist ontological debates, and that introducing a more sensitive understanding of the organism–environment relation will lead us closer to a truly feminist ontology of biology.