Revealing Personal Secrets

Both the health benefits and the potential drawbacks of revealing personal secrets (i.e., those that directly involve the secret keeper) are reviewed. Making the decision to reveal personal secrets to others involves a trade-off. On the one hand, secret keepers can feel better by revealing their secrets and gaining new insights into them. On the other hand, secret keepers can avoid looking bad before important audiences (such as their bosses or therapists) by not revealing their secrets. Making a wise decision to reveal a personal secret hinges on finding an appropriate confidantúsomeone who is discreet, who is perceived by the secret keeper to be nonjudgmental, and who is able to offer new insights into the secret.     

Incognito or not? the patient's subjective experience of the analyst's private life

This paper examines the meaning for the patient of the analyst's personal life and personality which are ostensibly banished from the consulting room. The therapist has a not‐always‐so‐secret “secret life”; that the patient is supposed to “not know”; about. Yet, more or less unconscious perceptions, impressions, and fantasies about extratherapeutic aspects of the analyst are omnipresent and significantly color the psychoanalytic enterprise.

Moreover the analyst as a person generally plays a critical and underacknowledged role in the patient's experience of the endeavor. Constructing multiple overlapping images of the analyst and of the analytic relationship, the patient discovers himself or herself in the matrix of these relationships with various images of the analytic other. The analysand is motivated to make sense of the analyst as wholly as possible, the better to place into context the analyst's interventions. The patient's resulting view of the analyst's subjective experience acts as a lens that filters and subtly alters the meaning of the analyst's communications.

I illustrate these points by relating my work with a patient whose dreams uncannily picked up on a (consciously) unknown aspect of my private life—my having a handicapped son. The treatment thereafter centered on the patient's identification with my child (as someone “disabled") and on the meaning of her having dreamt something so personal about her therapist.     

THE TRIPLISM OF PRACTICAL REASON

There can be reasons for belief, for action, and for feeling. In each case, knowledge of such reasons requires non‐empirical knowledge of some truths about them: these will be truths about what there is reason to believe, to feel, or to do – either outright or on condition of certain facts obtaining. Call these a priori truths about reasons, ‘norms’. Norms are a priori true propositions about reasons. It's an epistemic norm that if something's a good explanation that's a reason to believe it. It's an evaluative norm that if someone's cheated you that's a reason to be annoyed with them. There are many evaluative norms, relating to a variety of feelings. Equally, there may be various epistemic norms, even though in this case they all relate to belief. My concern here, however, is with practical norms: a priori truths about what there is reason to do. I have a suggestion about what fundamental practical norms there are, which I would like to describe and explain. It is that there are just three distinct kinds of practical norm governing what there is reason to do – three categories or generic sources of practical normativity, one may say. I call them the Bridge principle, the principle of Good, and the Demand principle – Bridge, Good and Demand for short. I have said more about them in my book, The Domain of Reasons; 1 here my aim is simply to set them out and sketch some questions to which this ‘triplism of practical reason’ 2 gives rise. In particular, since these norms are about practical reasons, not about morality, a question I'll touch on is how moral obligation comes onto the scene.     

The Impact of Insecure Attachment on Mothering: A New Mother’s Story

This article describes the treatment of a first-time mother and her daughter. The mother’s impoverished primary relationships and the fragility of her early attachments contribute to her challenges with motherhood. Through parent-infant treatment she is gradually developing the capacity to reflect upon her experience and beginning to make discoveries about her attitudes toward herself and others. My work with Leslie has deepened my appreciation for Daniel Stern’s notion of “the motherhood constellation” and for the power of insecure attachment to destabilize the parent and consequently the parent-child relationship. During the treatment, I used the Newborn Behavioral Observations system as an adjunct to therapy to help demonstrate to this distressed new mother her infant’s competencies. Later, I also used the Adult Attachment Interview to enhance her curiosity about her own childhood, and in particular her relationship to her mother and the impact of that relationship on her own mothering.     

History’s Ethical Demand: Memory,Denial, and Responsibility in the Wake of the Holocaust

What does it mean to discover an unspoken Nazi past in one’s own family? In a moment defined by chance and circumstance, I discovered that my German grandfather had joined the Nazi Party. Using my family’s struggle with memory as a site of inquiry, I examine the process of remembering, its transmission, and dissociation, particularly as it relates to past and present perpetrator groups. What lurks in the silences that are passed down between generations? How does our collective response to history’s atrocities shape what we what we know and remember as individuals? How do we define the moral obligations of memory, or understand the power of dissociation more than seven decades after the Holocaust? When does complacency in the face of past or present injustice make us complicit? Any answer to these questions points to the complexity of memory and the ethical demands of history. Connections between collective crimes of the past and social injustices in the present are considered and different forms of historical awareness and personal responsibility are discussed. In the face of overt prejudice and racism, “history’s call” and the work of psychoanalysis are inherently related.     

How Shall We Talk With Our Patients About Mortality? Response to Gerson and Shabad Discussions

In this response I discuss Shabad and Gerson’s viewpoints, not only in relation to my own but also to each other, in an effort to delineate variables at play within analytic subjectivity when we are confronted by issues concerning mortality in treatment. I suggest that our personal relationships with our own mortality, in conjunction with our analytic commitments and clinical sensibilities, determine how we will talk with patients about their having to die and/or if we will talk with them about it at all.     

Autonomy,Vote Buying,and Constraining Options

A common argument used to defend markets in ‘contested commodities’ is based on the value of personal autonomy. (1) Autonomy is of great moral value; (2) removing options from a person's choice set would compromise her ability to exercise her autonomy; (3) hence, there should be a prima facie presumption against removing options from persons’ choice sets; (4) thus, the burden of proof lies with those who wish to prohibit markets in certain goods. Christopher Freiman has developed a version of this argument to defend markets in votes. I argue that Freiman's argument fails, and that its failure illustrates the falsity of the widespread claim that the more options a person has available to her the better able she will be to exercise her autonomy. In Part 1, I outline Freiman's argument from ‘the presumption of voter liberty’ for legalising markets in votes. In Part 2, I argue that the option to sell one's vote in a legal market for them would be a ‘constraining option’ – an option which, if chosen, would be likely to lead to a diminution in a person's future ability to exercise her autonomy. In Part 3, I respond to objections to my arguments.     

Reflections on Hollander’s “Hegemonic Mind” and How to Treat It

This response to Hollander’s consideration of the “hegemonic mind” critiques her social psychoanalytic formulation of man’s inclination to disempower the many to serve the personal, particularly the financial desires of the few. In the spirit of her point of view, I propose that this inclination is a function of active if not always conscious motivation, not a manifestation of “social malaise.” Further, I raise for consideration the fact that hegemonic “fever” is quite contagious, noting that those perpetrating it, and those on its receiving end, are attracted to it. I also consider that hegemony is an important manifest content, the latent determinant of which is a stubborn universal tendency for humans to show ill will toward one another. Through clinical examples I show that hegemonic formulations add to but do not replace other conceptualizations of how to understand and work with our patients’ personal and social dysfunction.     

Coming Home/Coming Out

Abstract

This article is a theological reflection on one Queer Asian American woman’s experience of caring for her mother with Alzheimer’s disease. Using Coming Out/Coming Home as a frame and metaphor, the author explores the complexity of “home” for many Koreans/Korean-Americans whose very lives intersect with and are disrupted by major events in Korean and world history. For them, the act of coming home is complex, textured, and layered with experiences of loss, trauma, dislocation, resilience and hope. Through dis-ordered memories of a mother with Alzheimer’s, this article attempts to re-order what it means to come home. Grace Cho’s “ghostly haunting” provides a methodology. Layering theory with personal narratives, stories and a dream, ot is an experiment in performance—phantomogenic words that become “staged words.” In three parts, “coming home”, “ghostly hauntings”, and “tug-of-war”, this article performs coming home/coming out of one queer family’s experience of caring for a mother with Alzheimer’s.     

Family Secrets: The Case of the Patient Kept in the Dark

The author examines the position of a child from whom important matters in his or her own life or key events in the family have been kept secret, outlines criteria by which the decision whether or not to unveil the secret should be made, and urges colleagues to gather more data and examine further family secrets.     

Doubts about One’s Own Existence

The aim of this paper is to show that it is not irrational to doubt one’s own existence, even in the face of introspective evidence to the effect that one is currently in a certain mental state. For this purpose, I will outline a situation in which I do not exist, but which cannot be ruled out on the basis of any evidence available to me—including introspective evidence about my current mental states. I use this ‘superskeptical scenario,’ as I will call it, to formulate an argument to the conclusion that I do not know that I exist. In order to substantiate my argument, I draw upon Terence Parsons’ theory of non-existent objects. I conclude that, inasmuch as Parsons’ theory is reasonable, doubts about one’s own existence are reasonable as well.     

Korsgaard on Hypothetical Imperatives

I argue that rationalists need not adopt Kant’s method for determining what one has reason to do, where by “Kant’s method” I mean the view that normative guidance comes only from directives imposed on the agent by the agent’s own will. I focus on Kant’s argument for “imperatives of skill,” one sort of hypothetical imperative. I argue, against Korsgaard, that Kant’s argument is neither better nor significantly different than the sort of argument non-Kantian rationalists offer. I close by arguing that Korsgaard is wrong to think that her question “why should I care about performing the means to my ends?” is a serious worry.     

TAKING IN MORE OF LIFE

This is a story not only about my father's death but also about how it has affected me and life as I see it. I believe that the circumstances in my life following my father's death are connected to each other and have become my greatest lessons that I have learned in life.     

THE DESIRES OF OTHERS

An influential view, defended by Thomas Scanlon and others, holds that desires are almost never reasons. I seek to resist this view and show that someone who desires something does thereby have a reason to satisfy her desire. To show this, I argue, first, that the desires of some others are reasons for us and, second, that our own desires are no less reason‐giving than those of others. In concluding, I emphasize that accepting my view does not commit one to a desire‐based account of reasons. Desires can be simply one kind of reasons alongside many others.     

Comparative Evaluations

My response to Engelmann (2008) will be based on several questions that will allow both its author and the general reader to determine whether the assumptions I make as an interpreter of this complex paper are congruent or incongruent with their own interpretations of the text. The interpretations by the writer, by any commentator, and the diverse interpretations of a general audience together with my own interpretations will, I hope, facilitate some fruitful ‘comparative evaluations.’ I articulate my inferences of the most dense part of the paper, namely the ‘concrete immediate Consciousness and the developing absent outside.’ My hope is to address Engelmann’s question: “Am I in a better disposition to judge modern theories of consciousness?” The last section of my response spells out more personal comments to my all too brief and single encounter with Arno Engelmann. It is there that Arno Engelmann’s fascinating statement “I am a citizen of the world” is addressed through its counterparts in my life.     

Grounding Recognition: A Rejoinder to Critical Questions

It is always great good fortune for an author to have his writings meet with a receptive circle of readers who take them up in their own work and clarify them further. Indeed, it may even be the secret of all theoretical productivity that one reaches an opportune point in one's own creative process when others' queries, suggestions, and criticisms give one no peace, until one has been forced to come up with new answers and solutions. The four essays collected here, in any event, jointly represent an ideal form of such a challenge: I am now compelled to make further theoretical developments and clarifications that lead me to a whole new stage of my own endeavours, well beyond what I initially had in mind in The Struggle for Recognition . For this reason, I will not concentrate here on interpretative issues regarding my earlier work but will instead take up the problems and challenges that have occasioned several revisions on my part. For this reason, it makes sense to begin (in section I) with the points that Carl-Göran Heidegren makes, in terms of a history of social theory, regarding my proposed theory of recognition. The issues that still motivate me today can best be expressed via an engagement with the conscientious interpretations he offers. The core of this rejoinder is based on Heikki Ikäheimo's and Arto Laitinen's suggestions and corrections, which they have used to develop my initial approach further, to the point where the theoretical outlines of a precise and general concept of recognition come into view. It is primarily these two contributions that helped me develop a productive elaboration of my originally vague intuitions (section II). By way of conclusion (in section III), I take up the penetrating questions raised by Antti Kauppinen regarding the use of the concept of recognition in the broader context of social criticism; he has compelled me to take on several extremely helpful clarifications, and they give me the opportunity, in conclusion, to summarize my overarching intentions.     

No explanation of persons,no explanation of resurrection: on Lynne Baker’s constitution view and the resurrection of human persons

I don’t think Lynne Rudder Baker’s constitution view can account for personal identity problems of a synchronic or diachronic nature. As such, it cannot accommodate the Christian’s claim of eschatological bodily resurrection-a principle reason for which she gives this account. In light of this, I press objections against her constitution view in the following ways: First, I critique an analogy she draws between Aristotle’s “accidental sameness” and constitution. Second, I address three problems for Baker’s constitution view [‘Constitution Problems’ (CP)], each more problematic than the next: CP1: Her definition of constitution lacks explanatory power; CP2: If there is a plausible definition of constitution, constitution implies either too many persons or no human persons at all; CP3: Constitution yields no essential distinction between human and divine persons. If my argument(s) go through, her constitution view has neither an explanation for diachronic personal identity nor personal identity through resurrection.     

基于秘密分享的学前儿童对友谊关系的推断

秘密是隐藏在内心深处的东西,人们通常会与亲密的人分享和披露秘密。因此,追踪人们知道彼此的秘密可以作为社会关系的线索。本研究开展两个实验探究秘密分享对学前儿童推断友谊关系的影响。105名和60名幼儿分别参与实验1、实验2。实验1发现5岁以下的儿童大多数认为主角分享物质资源(玩具)的对象是主角的朋友,5～6岁的儿童大多数认为主角分享秘密的对象是主角的朋友,选择被分享秘密的人是分享者更可能的朋友的人数随着年龄的增长而增长; 实验2发现与分享积极的秘密信息和物质资源相比,大部分5～6岁的儿童更倾向于认为分享消极的秘密信息的双方存在友谊关系。研究结果说明至少5～6岁的儿童理解分享秘密的社会意义,并且5～6岁儿童把分享消极的秘密作为友谊关系更有力的标志。     

THE PARADOX OF BENEFICIAL RETIREMENT

Morally, when should one retire from one's job? The surprising answer may be ‘now’. It is commonly assumed that for a person who has acquired professional training at some personal effort, is employed in a task that society considers useful, and is working hard at it, no moral problem arises about whether that person should continue working. I argue that this may be a mistake: within many professions and pursuits, each one among the majority of those positive, productive, hard working people ought to consider leaving his or her job.