The difference between punishments and rewards in fostering moral concerns in social decision making

In social decision making, punishing non-cooperation and rewarding cooperation may not only affect cooperation because of instrumental reasons. They may also evoke moral concerns regarding cooperation as they signal that cooperation is socially approved of and non-cooperation socially disapproved of. I argue that punishments do this to a greater extent than rewards as punishments communicate an obligatory rule and rewards communicate a voluntary rule. Indeed, the first experiment shows that, in a social dilemma, the concept of punishment increased cooperation and the concept of a reward did not. The second experiment showed that participants showed more disapproval towards an offender when there was a punishment for non-compliance than when there was a reward for compliance. These findings suggest that punishing non-cooperation more strongly foster moral concerns regarding cooperation than rewarding cooperation. Possible implications for internalizations are discussed.     

公共物品困境中惩罚的形式与作用

公共物品困境中对惩罚的操纵表明：惩罚搭便车可以维持群体内的合作行为。早期研究表明, 惩罚的设置有助于建立社会合作规范, 有代价惩罚、利他惩罚和第三方惩罚等惩罚形式为间接互惠提供了合理的解释。随着实证研究的进一步深入, 惩罚表现出新的形式, 如自私惩罚和反社会惩罚, 被惩罚者的威胁报复将使合作者不再继续惩罚搭便车行为, 导致合作行为的减少直至消失。正当性理论、道德情感理论和文化基因协同进化理论表明惩罚的存在具有一定的必要性和价值, 惩罚的作用存在框架效应。本文介绍了一些有关的中介变量, 如利他、信任、声誉、文化、期望等, 可以对惩罚作用的积极面和破坏性予以适当的解释, 也为合作的心理机制研究提供新的视角。     

Intra‐group interaction and the development of norms which promote inter‐group hostility

Research suggests there is more inter‐group discrimination when rewards rather than punishments are distributed between groups (the positive‐negative asymmetry effect). This study investigated whether intra‐group interaction and the obstruction of in‐group advancement moderate this finding. Participants were twice asked to divide monetary resources—individually (pre‐consensus) and in interactive groups (consensus). Results confirmed that there was more discrimination when rewards were allocated. Although this replicates the PNAE overall, there were two moderators. First, there was no asymmetry when the out‐group obstructed in‐group advancement: obstruction was sufficient to legitimise punishment. Second, after group interaction the PNAE reversed so that there was more discrimination when punishments were administered. The severity of discrimination was contingent upon group norms that endorsed inter‐group hostility. It is argued that norms changed as a function of group interaction, and so did patterns of discrimination. The results suggest that the intra‐and inter‐group context combined to cause in‐group favouritism to slide towards inter‐group hostility. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

不同社会情境对儿童奖惩分配公平性的影响

为探讨社会排斥和社会接纳情境下儿童奖惩分配公平性,研究采用个体-偶然排斥范式和第三方奖惩分配范式,对8~9岁儿童奖惩分配公平性行为和奖惩分配公平性判断进行研究,结果发现：（1）社会排斥组被试的奖惩分配公平性行为显著多于社会接纳组,奖惩分配不公平性行为显著少于社会接纳组。9岁组被试的奖惩分配公平性行为显著多于8岁组,奖惩分配不公平性行为显著少于8岁组;（2）社会排斥组被试的奖惩分配公平性判断显著高于社会接纳组,9岁组被试的奖惩分配公平性判断显著高于8岁组,奖惩分配不公平性判断显著低于8岁组。结论：社会情境影响儿童的奖惩分配公平性,在排斥情境下,8~9岁儿童的奖惩分配公平性明显提升;8~9岁儿童的奖惩分配公平性随年龄增长有上升趋势。     

道德与关系惩罚对初中生公共物品困境中合作行为的影响

本研究模拟公共物品两难困境范式,以初中生为被试,通过两个实验分别考察道德惩罚和关系惩罚对不同性别和社会价值取向个体合作行为的影响。结果发现:(1)两种惩罚条件下初中生的合作水平均显著高于无惩罚条件,但当惩罚撤除后只有关系惩罚条件下的效应还存在;(2)初中女生在两种惩罚条件下的合作水平均显著高于无惩罚条件,而男生只在关系惩罚条件下出现该情况;(3)亲社会取向与亲自我取向初中生在两种惩罚阶段均表现出更高的合作水平,但在惩罚撤除后,只有亲社会取向者保持了高合作水平。这些结果表明,关系惩罚的作用较为持久,且对男生的影响更为突出,不过两种惩罚在亲社会取向者身上均显现出延后效应。     

实验社会心理学中的社会困境

社会困境是指个体理性会导致集体非理性这样的情境。大量实证研究考察社会困境中合作行为的机制,然而缺乏系统的理论框架。实验室研究中所用的社会困境可以从4个方面来分类：“给-游戏”与“拿-游戏”、两人困境与多人困境、对称与非对称困境以及重复与非重复困境。综合而言,以往实验研究主要从个体差异、任务结构以及知觉与策略等3个方面考察影响社会困境的因素,这些影响因素可以整合在一个概念框架中。未来的研究尚需要联合多个学科,澄清研究变量之间的关系,并继续丰富相关概念和理论     

Relationships between leader reward and punishment behavior and subordinate attitudes,perceptions, and behaviors: A meta-analytic review of existing and new research

Despite decades of research on the relationships between leader reward and punishment behaviors and employee attitudes, perceptions, and performance, no comprehensive examination of these relationships has been reported in the literature. This paper reports the results of two studies that address this issue. In the first study, data from 20 new samples were gathered on the relationships between leader reward and punishment behaviors and some criterion variables that have not been examined extensively in previous research. In the second study, a meta-analytic review was conducted incorporating both the new and existing research in order to provide estimates of the bivariate relationships between these leader behaviors and a variety of employee criterion variables across 78 studies containing 118 independent samples. Results of regression analyses designed to control for the effects of the other leader behaviors showed that: (a) the relationships between leader reward and punishment behaviors and employee attitudes, perceptions, and behaviors were more functional when the rewards or punishments were administered contingently than when they were administered non-contingently, and (b) these leader reward and punishment behaviors were strongly related to two variables (employees’ perceptions of justice and role ambiguity) that were expected to be key mediators of the relationships between these leader behaviors and the employee criterion variables. In addition, meta-analytic evidence from longitudinal studies suggested that the same leader behavior can be a cause of some employee criterion variables, and a consequence of others. Implications of these findings for future research in the area are discussed.     

Equality as a benchmark for third-party punishment and reward: The moderating role of uncertainty in social dilemmas

The present paper focuses on third-parties’ decisions to punish and reward in social dilemmas, and on the moderating role of environmental uncertainty (i.e., uncertainty about the size of the common resource). We argue and demonstrate that in social dilemmas third-parties use the equality rule as a strict benchmark to determine punishments (Study 1) as well as rewards (Study 2), but only under environmental certainty. Under environmental uncertainty, third-parties do not apply such a strict benchmark to distinguish cooperators from defectors. Instead, they appear to use the following rule: the more an individual group member has cooperated the less he/she should be punished (Study 1) and the more he/she should be rewarded (Study 2). As such, these findings are the first to demonstrate that third-party sanctioning decisions are moderated by environmental uncertainty.     

抑郁对社会决策的影响

从社会决策角度出发,依托博弈论的经典范式是研究抑郁症病人人际与社会功能障碍的一个切入点。Ruff和Fehr （2014）提出在社会决策中存在三类情境,即社会反馈、替代性评价、社会原则。我们从这个理论框架出发,发现抑郁症病人在社会反馈加工中存在社会性快感缺失,对社会拒绝的敏感性增强;在替代性评价过程中,共情和心理理论能力减弱;抑郁症病人对决策中的社会原则（公平、合作）存在适应不良现象,如过度利他性。未来的研究一方面可进一步探索抑郁症病人的社会性快感缺失现象,另一方面可采用经颅电/磁刺激与脑成像技术结合或超扫描技术,提高研究结果的解释力和生态效度。     

Sex differences in the neural underpinnings of social and monetary incentive processing during adolescence

The brain’s reward system undergoes major changes during adolescence, and an increased reactivity to social and nonsocial incentives has been described as a typical feature during this transitional period. Little is known whether there are sex differences in the brain’s responsiveness to social or monetary incentives during adolescence. The aim of this event-related potential (ERP) study was to compare the neurophysiological underpinnings of monetary and social incentive processing in adolescent boys versus girls. During ERP recording, 38 adolescents (21 females, 17 males; 13–18 years) completed an incentive delay task comprising (a) a reward versus punishment condition and (b) social versus monetary incentives. The stimulus-preceding negativity (SPN) was recorded during anticipation of reward and punishment, and the feedback P3 (fP3) along with the feedback-related negativity (FRN) after reward/punishment delivery. During anticipation of social punishment, adolescent boys compared with girls exhibited a reduced SPN. After delivery, male adolescents exhibited higher fP3 amplitudes to monetary compared with social incentives, whereas fP3 amplitudes in girls were comparable across incentive types. Moreover, whereas in boys fP3 responses were higher in rewards than in punishment trials, no such difference was evident in girls. The results indicate that adolescent boys show a reduced neural responsivity in the prospect of social punishment. Moreover, the findings imply that, once the incentive is obtained, adolescent boys attribute a relatively enhanced motivational significance to monetary incentives and show a relative hyposensitivity to punishment. The findings might contribute to our understanding of sex-specific vulnerabilities to problem behaviors related to incentive processing during adolescence.     

“How many bad apples does it take to spoil the whole barrel?”: Social exclusion and toleration for bad apples

In social dilemmas, where personal welfare is in conflict with collective welfare, there are inherent incentives to act non-cooperatively. Moreover, there is evidence that the example of a few uncooperative group members (“bad apples”) is more influential than the example of comparable numbers of cooperative members (a bad apple effect). Two studies are reported that examine the functional relationship between the number of likely bad apples and individual cooperation, and whether and when the threat of social exclusion for uncooperative behavior may effectively counter the temptation to follow the example of such “bad apples”. It is shown that (a) the threat of exclusion is sufficient to counter the temptation to follow a few bad apples’ example, (b) such threats cannot, however, overcome the cooperation-degrading effects of large numbers (e.g., a majority) of bad apples, and (c) the effectiveness of such threats may be greater in relatively smaller groups.     

The cultural dynamics of rewarding honesty and punishing deception

Recent research suggests that individuals reward honesty more than they punish deception. Five experiments showed that different patterns of rewards and punishments emerge for North American and East Asian cultures. Experiment 1 demonstrated that Americans rewarded more than they punished, whereas East Asians rewarded and punished in equivalent amounts. Experiments 2 and 3 revealed that these divergent patterns by culture could be explained by greater social mobility experienced by Americans. Experiments 4 and 5 examined how certain consequences of social mobility, approach-avoidance behavioral motivations and trust and felt obligation, can lead to disparate reward and punishment decisions within the two cultures. Moreover, Experiment 4 revealed that Americans exhibited stronger evaluative reactions toward deception but stronger behavioral intentions toward honesty; East Asians did not exhibit this evaluative-behavioral asymmetry. The cross-cultural implications for understanding rewards and punishments in an increasingly globalized world are discussed.     

The power of the majority: Social conformity in sexual harassment punishment selection

In his famous social conformity experiments in the 1950's, Asch found 75% of participants conformed to confederates’ incorrect answers at least once, with an overall conformity rate of 32%, revealing that humans are highly likely to conform to group behavior even when that behavior is clearly wrong. The purpose of this study was to determine if the social conformity effect generalized to scenarios involving sexual harassment punishment selections in the workplace. Participants read various workplace sexual harassment scenarios and then witnessed four confederates chose one of three types of punishments (verbal warning, 1-week suspension, or termination). The confederates stated aloud punishments that were either appropriate (i.e., similar to normative data) or inappropriate (i.e., deviating either too harshly or leniently to normative data). Participants then provided their punishments selection aloud, and confidentially rated their decision confidence. We found an overall conformity rate of 46%, as 82.67% conformed at least once to harsh or lenient punishment selections. Participants who conformed to incorrect punishment selections exhibited lower levels of decision confidence, indicating that conformity may have been due more to social normative influence. The current results imply the social responses of others (i.e., coworkers, supervisors, or HR) can impact responses to sexual harassment. The results imply that social influence may be a significant contributing factor in mislabeling, misreporting, or inappropriately punishing sexual harassment in some organizations.     

The Advantage of Democratic Peer Punishment in Sustaining Cooperation within Groups

In social dilemma situations, individuals benefit from uncooperative behavior while exploiting resources of the collective. One prominent solution to prevent uncooperative behavior and to increase cooperation is to establish a system of costly peer punishment, that is, the possibility for every individual involved in the dilemma to impose costly punishment on interaction partners. However, recent research revealed that, in contrast to a situation without punishment, peer punishment is inefficient and maladaptive in the sense that the total payoff is reduced and punishment of cooperative individuals (i.e., antisocial punishment) is possible. In the present work, we propose that a system of democratic peer punishment, that is, direct and equal participation of each individual in the punishment decision‐making process with punishment only executed when a majority has voted for its execution, can address the shortcomings of a peer punishment system. Using iterated public goods games, we show higher cooperation levels, higher total payoffs, and reduced executed punishment in the democratic compared with a peer punishment system. Moreover, we document that fairness perceptions, satisfaction, and interpersonal trust are increased in the democratic punishment system. Implications for how cooperation and democratic punishment systems may evolve are discussed. Copyright © 2018 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Relationships Between Leader-Contingent and Non-contingent Reward and Punishment Behaviors and Subordinates’ Perceptions of Justice and Satisfaction, and Evaluation of the Moderating Influence of Trust Propensity, Pay Level, and Role Ambiguity

Purpose

This research evaluates how reward and punishment behaviors are related to employee satisfaction, and how perceptions of justice mediate the effects of these behaviors. This study also seeks to examine the connection between some boundary conditions and the efficacy of reward and punishment behaviors.

Design/Methodology/Approach

Data were collected using questionnaires, and hypotheses were tested using a sample of 3,065 managers from 41 business units.

Findings

We found that contingent financial and social rewards were positively related to fairness and satisfaction, whereas punishment behaviors exert a negative influence. Findings reveal that high-trust propensity and low-pay level strengthen the positive influence of rewards on distributive justice, whereas high role ambiguity increases the positive effect of reward behaviors and the negative influence of non-contingent punishment (NCP) on superior satisfaction.

Implications

This study provided evidence that using contingent rewards is more effective in promoting positive attitudes at work than using contingent punishments. Our findings add to the evidence that organizations would benefit from encouraging their managers to use financial and social rewards and reducing the administration of NCP among performing employees.

Originality/Value

This study represents a first attempt to examine an integrated model of the effects of reward and punishment behaviors. It also contributes to this field by empirically evaluating the impact of individual and situational boundary conditions in the efficacy of these leader behaviors.     

Spill‐over effects of intermittent costs for defection in social dilemmas

This research investigates the role of intermittent monetary costs in restraining individuals from defection in social dilemmas. In Experiment 1, 104 car owners made fictitious choices between a slow and a fast travel mode in the context of a continuous social dilemma. There were four different conditions of monetary costs for choosing the fast mode (defection): no cost, low cost, high cost to self, or high cost to others. Participants defected most when there was no cost and least when they themselves were charged a high cost. A spill‐over effect was obtained such that when others were charged a high cost to defect, defection rates were lower than under no cost. Experiment 2 used 36 undergraduates as participants in an iterated decision task with real groups. The results replicated the major results of Experiment 1. Furthermore, whereas prosocials were strongly affected by intermittent costs for defection (i.e. showed large spill‐over effects), proselfs seemed to be unaffected. Possible explanations of this interaction effect between social value orientation and intermittent punishment for defection are provided. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

In the lab and the field: punishment is rare in equilibrium

I argue that field (experimental) studies on (costly) peer punishment in social dilemmas face the problem that in equilibrium punishment will be rare and therefore may be hard to observe in the field. I also argue that the behavioral logic uncovered by lab experiments is not fundamentally different from the behavioral logic of cooperation in the field.     

Neurophysiological differences in reward processing in anhedonics

Anhedonia is characterized by a reduced capacity to experience pleasure in response to rewarding stimuli and has been considered a possible candidate endophenotype in depression and schizophrenia. However, it is still not well understood whether these reward deficits are confined to anticipatory and/or to consummatory experiences of pleasure. In the present study, we recorded electrophysiological responses (event-related brain potentials [ERPs] and oscillatory activity) to monetary gains and losses in extreme groups of anhedonic and nonanhedonic participants. The anhedonic participants showed reduced motivation to incur risky decisions, especially after monetary rewards. These sequential behavioral effects were correlated with an increased sensitivity to punishment, which psychometrically characterized the anhedonic group. In contrast, both electrophysiological measures associated with the impacts of monetary losses and gains—the feedback-related negativity (FRN) and the beta–gamma oscillatory component—clearly revealed preserved consummatory responses in anhedonic participants. However, anhedonics showed a drastic increase in frontal medial theta power after receiving the maximum monetary gain. This increase in theta oscillatory activity could be associated with an increase in conflict and cognitive control for unexpected large positive rewards, thus indexing the violation of default negative expectations built up across the task in anhedonic participants. Thus, the present results showed that participants with elevated scores on Chapman’s Physical Anhedonia Scale were more sensitive to possible punishments, showed deficits in the correct integration of response outcomes in their actions, and evidenced deficits in sustaining positive expectations of future rewards. This overall pattern suggests an effect of anhedonia in the motivational aspects of approach behavior rather than in consummatory processes.     

父母物质惩罚对儿童睡眠质量的影响：主观幸福感的中介作用及友谊质量的调节作用

摘 要：为探讨父母物质惩罚与儿童睡眠质量的关系及其作用机制,采用问卷法对438名小学生进行调查。结果发现：（1）父母物质惩罚与儿童主观幸福感、睡眠质量之间呈现显著相关;（2）物质惩罚既能直接预测儿童睡眠质量,也能通过主观幸福感的中介作用预测睡眠质量;（3）友谊质量能在物质惩罚对儿童睡眠质量的中介中起到调节,对高友谊质量的儿童来说,物质惩罚对幸福感的作用不显著。研究结果揭示了作为物质型教养行为之一的物质惩罚对儿童睡眠质量的影响及其作用机制,能为提高儿童的幸福感及睡眠质量提供有效启示。     

Social Value Orientation,Expectations, and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: A Meta‐analysis

Interdependent situations are pervasive in human life. In these situations, it is essential to form expectations about the others' behaviour to adapt one's own behaviour to increase mutual outcomes and avoid exploitation. Social value orientation, which describes the dispositional weights individuals attach to their own and to another person's outcome, predicts these expectations of cooperation in social dilemmas—an interdependent situation involving a conflict of interests. Yet, scientific evidence is inconclusive about the exact differences in expectations between prosocials, individualists, and competitors. The present meta‐analytic results show that, relative to proselfs (individualists and competitors), prosocials expect more cooperation from others in social dilemmas, whereas individualists and competitors do not significantly differ in their expectations. The importance of these expectations in the decision process is further highlighted by the finding that they partially mediate the well‐established relation between social value orientation and cooperative behaviour in social dilemmas. In fact, even proselfs are more likely to cooperate when they expect their partner to cooperate. Copyright © 2018 European Association of Personality Psychology