Foundational beliefs and the structure of justification

I argue that our justification for beliefs about the external physical world need not be constituted by any justified beliefs about perceptual experiences. In this way our justification for beliefs about the physical world may be nondoxastic and this differentiates my proposal from traditional foundationalist theories such as those defended by Laurence BonJour, Richard Fumerton, and Timothy McGrew. On the other hand, it differs from certain non-traditional foundationalist theories such as that defended by James Pryor according to which perceptual experience is sufficient to justify beliefs about the external world. I propose that justification for propositions describing our perceptual experiences partially constitutes any justification we may possess for beliefs concerning the external world. In this way, our justification for beliefs about the physical world may only be inferential since it is grounded in any justification we have for at least one other proposition. This theory occupies an intermediate position between the two aforementioned foundationalist accounts, which allows it to sidestep problems that confront each of them.     

Sensibility and understanding in perceptual judgments

The main aim of this paper is to work towards an account of how sensibility and understanding combine in perceptual judgments, with the emphasis on the role of sensibility in both the justification of such judgments and the explanation of how it is possible for them to apply to an objective world. I argue that in the normal course of events sensory intuitions function as (animal-level) beliefs about the objective world; and that these in turn acquire the status of perceptual judgments to the extent that they are imbedded in and engaged with the high-level patterns of consciousness and reasoning characteristic of full-blown human judgment. In terms of this account sensibility is seamlessly integrated with understanding in perceptual judgments. This does not, however, imply that its contribution to perceptual judgments cannot be separated analytically, for in my terms the basic justification and objective reference of perceptual judgments are directly inherited from the sensory intuitions (functioning as sensory beliefs) which constitute those judgments. I conclude by showing how this account can be used to undermine John McDowell's claim that any attempt to assign a separable contribution to sensibility cannot avoid a commitment to the Myth of the Given.     

Internal control beliefs and reference frame concurrently impact early performance monitoring ERPs

This study investigated the impact of criterion-based vs. social reference frames on behavioural and neural correlates of performance monitoring while taking individual differences in control beliefs into account. We conducted two experiments administering a time estimation task in which feedback was either delivered pertaining to participants’ own performance (nonsocial/criterion-based reference) or to the performance of a reference group of previous participants (social reference). In Experiment 1, 34 male volunteers participated. To test generalizability of the observed results to both sexes/genders, we recruited 36 female volunteers for Experiment 2. P2 and P300 amplitudes were generally larger in social than in nonsocial reference trials in the male participants of Experiment 1. ΔFRN amplitudes were larger for social compared to non-social reference trials in Experiment 1. No effects of reference frame were found in the female sample of Experiment 2. Rather, P2 and ΔFRN effects showed opposing patterns for nonsocial versus social reference frames. However, stronger internal control beliefs were accompanied by larger FRN amplitudes of negative social reference trials in both samples, suggesting generalizable effects independent of sex/gender. Enhanced P2 and ΔFRN amplitudes for social versus nonsocial reference trials suggest enhanced attentional capture and higher saliency of socially framed feedback in male participants only. In both sexes/genders, however, the social reference frame possibly challenges internal control beliefs and by this enhances performance monitoring. Our results demonstrate the complex interplay of trait variables and reference frames during performance monitoring influencing our daily lives-reference frames are omnipresent in education and one’s working environment.     

Why Drug Testing in Elite Sport Does Not Work: Perceptual Deterrence Theory and the Role of Personal Moral Beliefs1

Performance‐enhancing drug use by elite athletes is a modern sporting and social concern. We applied a long‐overdue theoretical framework, perceptual deterrence, to predicting the banned drug‐use decisions of 116 elite Australian footballers and soccer players. The strongest influence on athletes' hypothetical decisions to use drugs was their personal moral beliefs and health concerns, each of which also mediated the relationship between drug testing and athletes' decisions to use banned substances. Drug testing had little influence on athletes' imagined drug use decisions, although there are athletes for whom legal sanctions are necessary. The results have important implications for the way in which authorities fund and frame future anti‐drug initiatives; particularly the relationship between drug testing and athletes' personal moral beliefs.     

Perception: The interface between cognition and the external world

In contrast to researchers who emphasize the distinction between perception and cognition it is claimed that the perceptual system is closely intertwined with cognition and with our comprehension of the external world. This claim is supported by evidence for two characteristic features of human information processing. One of these features is the use of mental models. If mental models are assumed to be anchored in the perceptual system it will not be necessary to assume a "little man in the head" who reads off the model. Moreover, perceptually based mental models will provide a referential semantics by anchoring mentally represented concepts in the external world. The other feature is the use of perceptually based perspectives in cognition, such as actor or observer perspectives in social cognition. It is concluded that human beings consistently interact within the real world--also when they are just thinking--and that this becomes possible via perceptual processes.     

An objective measurement of the build-up of auditory streaming and of its modulation by attention

Three experiments studied auditory streaming using sequences of alternating "ABA" triplets, where "A" and "B" were 50-ms tones differing in frequency by Δf semitones and separated by 75-ms gaps. Experiment 1 showed that detection of a short increase in the gap between a B tone and the preceding A tone, imposed on one ABA triplet, was better when the delay occurred early versus late in the sequence, and for Δf = 4 vs. Δf = 8. The results of this experiment were consistent with those of a subjective streaming judgment task. Experiment 2 showed that the detection of a delay 12.5 s into a 13.5-s sequence could be improved by requiring participants to perform a task on competing stimuli presented to the other ear for the first 10 s of that sequence. Hence, adding an additional task demand could improve performance via its effect on the perceptual organization of a sound sequence. The results demonstrate that attention affects streaming in an objective task and that the effects of build-up are not completely under voluntary control. In particular, even though build-up can impair performance in an objective task, participants are unable to prevent this from happening.     

“为逐利而追名”：社会观察和社会距离对亲环境行为的影响

考察社会观察对亲环境行为的影响以及社会距离的作用。实验1通过多试次的绿色消费范式探讨有、无互惠的社会观察的对亲环境行为的影响。结果发现无互惠的社会观察并未对亲环境行为产生影响;而在有互惠的社会观察条件下被试的亲环境行为大于无观察条件（控制条件）。实验2通过操纵决策者和环境结果承担者的社会距离进一步探讨社会距离与社会观察对亲环境行为的影响。结果发现,当环境结果的承担者指向熟人和陌生人时,被试在社会观察条件下的亲环境行为大于控制条件;而当环境结果的承担者指向密友时无此差异。这些结果说明,社会观察情境下人们为了将来获益会出于名誉的策略考虑而表现出更加积极的亲环境行为,社会距离可调节社会观察对亲环境行为的影响。     

The eyes and ears of status: how status colors perceptual judgment

To those with high status, abundance is granted. Moving beyond the multitude of objective benefits, the authors explore how status, once conferred, colors the perceptual world people inhabit. In four experiments, participants' status state influenced their judgments of status-relevant features in their environment. Participants in a state of high status reported hearing applause (Experiment 1) and seeing facial expressions (Experiment 2), in reaction to their performance, as louder and more favorable. In addition, expectations of how others will respond--expectations stemming from one's current status state--accounted for this effect (Experiment 3). Finally, differences in judgments between participants experiencing high versus low status were observed only when the target of the evaluation was the self (Experiment 4). These results advance scholars' understanding of the psychological experience of status and contribute to the growing literature on the dominant influence psychological states have on people's judgments of their social world.     

第三方惩罚中的规范错觉：基于公正世界信念的解释

惩罚规范在一定程度上会影响个体的惩罚行为, 但个体对惩罚规范的感知与实际规范之间可能存在差异, 这被称为规范错觉。为了更好地从这一角度理解第三方惩罚, 我们需要回答的是：第三方惩罚中是否存在规范错觉?如果存在, 其方向如何?会对个体自身的惩罚行为产生何种影响?实验1 (N = 449)和实验2 (N = 134)的结果表明, 在违规情境中, 人们往往低估了他人的惩罚水平, 这导致自身较低的惩罚行为。实验3 (N = 164)和实验4 (N = 284)进一步发现, 较弱的公正世界信念导致人们对他人惩罚水平的低估, 从而影响了自身的惩罚行为, 而社会距离调节了公正世界信念对规范错觉的影响。上述结果表明, 规范错觉会受到内部(公正世界信念)和外部(社会距离)两个参照点的影响, 同时也在一定程度上说明第三方惩罚是一种注重维护规范的积极行为、而非注重个人收益的策略行为。     

Cold and lonely: does social exclusion literally feel cold?

Metaphors such as icy stare depict social exclusion using cold-related concepts; they are not to be taken literally and certainly do not imply reduced temperature. Two experiments, however, revealed that social exclusion literally feels cold. Experiment 1 found that participants who recalled a social exclusion experience gave lower estimates of room temperature than did participants who recalled an inclusion experience. In Experiment 2, social exclusion was directly induced through an on-line virtual interaction, and participants who were excluded reported greater desire for warm food and drink than did participants who were included. These findings are consistent with the embodied view of cognition and support the notion that social perception involves physical and perceptual content. The psychological experience of coldness not only aids understanding of social interaction, but also is an integral part of the experience of social exclusion.     

Perceptual reasons

The two main theories of perceptual reasons in contemporary epistemology can be called Phenomenalism and Factualism. According to Phenomenalism, perceptual reasons are facts about experiences conceived of as phenomenal states, i.e., states individuated by phenomenal character, by what it’s like to be in them. According to Factualism, perceptual reasons are instead facts about the external objects perceived. The main problem with Factualism is that it struggles with bad cases: cases where perceived objects are not what they appear (illusions, broadly speaking) or where there is no perceived object at all (hallucinations). The main problem with Phenomenalism is that it struggles with good cases: cases where everything is perfectly normal and the external object is correctly perceived, so that one’s perceptual beliefs are knowledge. In this paper we show that there is a theory of perceptual reasons that avoids the problems for Factualism and Phenomenalism. We call this view Propositionalism. We use ‘proposition’ broadly to mean the entities that are contents of beliefs and other doxastic attitudes. The key to finding a middle ground between Phenomenalism and Factualism, we claim, is to allow our reasons to be false in bad cases. Despite being false, they are about the external world, not our phenomenal states.     

An Item specific Locus of Repetition Priming

Two principal types of account of repetition priming postulate either facilitation of activation of perceptual representations used in stimulus recognition, or retrieval of specific processing episodes as possible mechanisms by which the effect occurs; these make different predictions concerning the priming of two stimuli presented simultaneously. In Experiments 1-3, subjects made same/different decisions about picture-word stimulus pairs. Recombining the pairings of a subset of items between training and test encounters did not significantly reduce the benefit in response time from repetition, as compared to pairs repeated intact. Subjects were able to remember the pairings (Experiment 4), but this did not influence repetition priming. Instead, the memory representations underlying the priming of each item in a pair were independent. No priming was found between pictures seen at training and words at test, and vice versa (Experiment 5), indicating that representations underlying the repetition effect were domain-specific. In Experiment 6, stimuli were all from within the domain of object pictures. Again, recombining the pairings of items between training and test did not significantly reduce the benefit in response time from repetition, as compared to pairs repeated intact. These results reveal an item-specific locus for repetition priming, consistent with priming occurring within pre-semantic perceptual representation systems involved in item recognition. The findings pose problems for theories that argue that repetition effects result only from retrieval of entire processing episodes.     

Explaining social contagion in sport applying Heider's balance theory: First experimental results

A sudden collective collapse of an entire sport team is often described in terms of the social contagion of weak performance. Two experiments studied this phenomenon against the backdrop of balance theory. Experiment 1 examined whether false negative feedback on a partner's performance during a team task would lead to compensatory mechanisms as predicted by balance theory. Results showed that perceived negative performance in the partner was compensated by devaluing the relationship to the partner. Experiment 2 replicated Experiment 1 and investigated the impact of physical self-esteem. Results showed that persons with strong physical self-esteem devalued the situational value of the relationship when they perceived their partner's performance to be negative. Experiment 2 also investigated objective performance. Although failing to attain statistical significance, there was a tendency for the perceived sudden decline in the partner's performance to be contagious. It is concluded that balance theory offers promising insights into the interpersonal dynamics of social contagion.     

Beyond smile dynamics: mimicry and beliefs in judgments of smiles

The judgment that a smile is based on "true," usually positive, feelings affects social interaction. However, the processes underlying the interpretation of a smile as being more or less genuine are not well understood. The aim of the present research was to test predictions of the Simulation of Smiles Model (SIMS) proposed by Niedenthal, Mermillod, Maringer, and Hess (2010). In addition to the perceptual features that can guide the judgment of a smile as genuine, the model identifies the conditions that the judgments rely on: (a) the embodiment of the facial expression and its corresponding state, and (b) beliefs about the situations in which genuine smiles are most often expressed. Results of two studies are consistent with the model in that they confirm the hypotheses that facial mimicry provides feedback that is used to judge the meaning of a smile, and that beliefs about the situations in which a smile occurs guides such judgments when mimicry is inhibited.     

Guessing Strategies, Aging, and Bias Effects in Perceptual Identification

In the typical single-stimulus perceptual identification task, accuracy is improved by prior study of test words, a repetition priming benefit. There is also a cost, inasmuch as previously studied words are likely to be produced (incorrectly) as responses if the test word is orthographically similar but not identical to a studied word. In two-alternative forced-choice perceptual identification, a test word is flashed and followed by two alternatives, one of which is the correct response. When the two alternatives are orthographically similar, test words identical to previously studied items are identified more accurately than new words (a benefit) but tests words orthographically similar to studied words are identified less accurately than new words (a cost). Ratcliff and McKoon (in press) argue that these are bias effects that arise in the decision stage of word identification. We report five experiments that examined the alternative hypothesis that these bias effects arise from postperceptual guessing strategies. In single-stimulus perceptual identification, repetition priming benefits were equally great for young and older adults who claimed to use deliberate guessing strategies and those who did not (Experiment 1). In contrast, only groups of young and older people who claimed to deliberately guess studied words in a two-alternative forced-choice task (Experiments 2 and 5) showed reliable benefits and costs. Costs and benefits were abolished in the two-alternative forced-choice task when a very long study list was used, presumably because the increased retrieval burden made the use of deliberate guessing strategies less attractive (Experiment 3). Under conditions similar to those of Experiment 3, repetition priming was observed in single-stimulus perceptual identification (Experiment 4). These results are consistent with the view that costs and benefits in the forced-choice perceptual identification task arise from deliberate guessing strategies but that those in the single-stimulus task do not. The possibility that the observed relationship between strategy reports and priming effects reflects erroneous postexperimental assessments of strategies by participants is also considered.     

Ostracism Reduces Reliance on Poor Advice from Others during Decision Making

Decision making is rarely context‐free, and often, both social information and non‐social information are weighed into one's decisions. Incorporating information into a decision can be influenced by previous experiences. Ostracism has extensive effects, including taxing cognitive resources and increasing social monitoring. In decision making situations, individuals are often faced with both objective and social information and must choose which information to include or filter out. How will ostracism affect the reliance on objective and social information during decision making? Participants (N = 245) in Experiment 1 were randomly assigned to be included or ostracized in a standardized, group task. They then performed a dynamic decision making task that involved the presentation of either non‐social (i.e. biased reward feedback) or social (i.e., poor advice from a previous participant) misleading information. In Experiment 2, participants (N = 105) completed either the ostracism non‐social condition or social misleading information condition with explicit instructions stating that the advice given was from an individual who did not partake in the group task. Ostracized individuals relied more on non‐social misleading information and performed worse than included individuals. However, ostracized individuals discounted misleading social information and outperformed included individuals. Results of Experiment 2 replicated the findings of Experiment 1. Across two experiments, ostracized individuals were more critical of advice from others, both individuals who may have ostracized them and unrelated individuals. In other words, compared with included individuals, ostracized individuals underweighted advice from another individual but overweighed non‐social information during decision making. We conclude that when deceptive objective information is present, ostracism results in disadvantageous decision making. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Explaining Normative Versus Nonnormative Action: The Role of Implicit Theories

The current research investigates what motivates people to engage in normative versus nonnormative action. Prior research has shown that different emotions lead to different types of action. We argue that these differing emotions are determined by a more basic characteristic, namely, implicit theories about whether groups and the world in general can change. We hypothesized that incremental theories (beliefs that groups/the world can change) would predict normative action, and entity theories (beliefs that groups/the world cannot change) as well as group identification would predict nonnormative action. We conducted a pilot in the context of protests against a government plan to relocate Bedouin villages in Israel and a main study during the Israeli social protests of the middle class. Results revealed three distinct pathways to collective action. First, incremental theories about the world predicted hope, which predicted normative action. Second, incremental theories about groups and group identification predicted anger, which also predicted normative collective action. Lastly, entity theories about groups predicted nonnormative collective action through hatred, but only for participants who were highly identified with the group. In sum, people who believed in the possibility of change supported normative action, whereas those who believed change was not possible supported nonnormative action.     

The psychology of meta-ethics: exploring objectivism

How do lay individuals think about the objectivity of their ethical beliefs? Do they regard them as factual and objective, or as more subjective and opinion-based, and what might predict such differences? In three experiments, we set out a methodology for assessing the perceived objectivity of ethical beliefs, and use it to document several novel findings. Experiment 1 showed that individuals tend to regard ethical statements as clearly more objective than social conventions and tastes, and almost as objective as scientific facts. Yet, there was considerable variation in objectivism, both across different ethical statements, and across individuals. The extent to which individuals treat ethical beliefs as objective was predicted by the way they grounded their ethical systems. Groundings which emphasize the religious, pragmatic, and self-identity underpinnings of ethical belief each independently predicted greater ethical objectivity. Experiment 2 replicated and extended these findings with a refined measure of ethical objectivism. Experiment 3 demonstrated the robustness of the religious grounding of ethics, and differentiates it from mere religious belief and from political orientation. The results shed light on the nature of ethical belief, and have implications for the resolution of ethical disputes.     

Social contact,own-group recognition bias and visual attention to faces

The own-group recognition bias (OGRB) has been consistently linked to social contact in theoretical accounts. Indeed, social contact is assumed by most authors to underlie the perceptual expertise of out-groups' faces. However, little is known empirically about how it might impact face-processing strategies. We tested the proposition that social interaction would improve the face recognition performance of another group by modulating visual strategies for different face areas. In Experiment 1, we studied visual processes using an eye tracker during a person's first live encounter with a particular member of their own group (European) or an outgroup (African) to explore how increasing familiarity during a first interaction influences face-processing strategies. In Experiments 2 and 3, we explored the effect of simulated intergroup contact on face recognition accuracy, while simultaneously studying the impact of contact on visual attention strategies that occur during recognition (Experiment 2) and encoding (Experiment 3). The results showed a strong OGRB and a difference in visual processes based on the ethnic group of the targets. Although a single interaction is not sufficient to reduce the OGRB, familiarization during a live interaction (Experiment 1) and virtual social contact (Experiment 2) had an impact on the visual strategies employed.