FACTORIAL INVARIANCE OF PERSONALITY RATINGS

K uusinen , J. Factorial invariance of personality ratings. Scand. J. Psychol ., 1969, 10 , 33–44—Three studies employing the same set of 33 personality rating scales are described. (I) Five factor structures of the scales, derived from ratings of five groups of stimuli, were compared. (2) One subject rated different personality concepts three times at one week's intervals. (3) 12 individual factor structures were compared to the factor structure computed from peer ratings of a group of 39 subjects. Results: (a) the factor structure of the scales was largely independent of stimuli, (b) the structure for an individual was stable, (c) the group structure represented the individual's structure, ( d ) differences between group and the individual structure and between individuals were negligible.     

FACTORIAL INVARIANCE OF BIOGRAPHICAL FACTORS

A biographical information blank (BIB) was administered to students in grades 7, 9, and 11, and was subsequently analyzed to determine the stability of both its factor pattern and structure. This was done by deriving a single average factor pattern matrix which was rotated to simple structure and then to similarity to each of three factor matrices at each grade level. Of 11 factors extracted, all but three showed reasonably good stability. Those factors that showed the greatest change, in terms of their presence over the three grade levels, were General Appreciation of School Courses, Social Activities, and High Level Literary Activities. Implications of stability in factor pattern and structure for further BIB development and for utilization in the framework of a longitudinal study are discussed.     

ONE-SHOT VIEW INVARIANCE IN A MOVING WORLD

Abstract— How do people recognize an object in a novel orientation? Psychophysical and neurophvsiological studies have suggested that extensive practice is required before observers can recognize an object that has been rotated to a new orientation Because object orientation frequently vanes with object movement, we examined whether observers might more readily recognize a moving object in a new orientation Results from a priming study indicate that motion significantly arid readily enhances the recognition of new object orientations when those orientations fait within the path of the motion That is motion promotes view-invariant object recognition without practice     

DIMENSIONAL INTERPRETATION AND CONFIGURATION INVARIANCE IN MULTIDIMENSIONAL SCALING: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY

This paper is concerned with: a ) the invariance of nonmetric multi- dimensional scaling soludions over changes in stimulus domain; and b) pro- cedures for assisting the researcher in interpreting the axes of multidimen- sional scaling configurations. The stimuli consisted of the names of 17 popular brands of automobiles. Similarities and preference judgments were obtained from 37 subjects, divided into two groups of approximately equal size. Each group received 11 of the 17 stimuli. A core set of 6 stimuli was common over both groups. Each group also rated the 11 car models on 20 semantic differential scales. Results of the study suggested that the interpoint distances of bhe core set of 5 stimuli remained stable over subject groups and differences in stimulus set composition. Semantic differential ratings were used to find directions in the configurational space (obtained from overall similarity judg- ments) whose projections were maximally correlated with the outside (property) vectors. Stimulus configurations developed from the semantic differential space were highly congruent with those found by the analysis of direct similarity judgments. However, attempts to develop stimulus configurations by the "unfolding" of preference data alone did not lead to configurations which closely matched those found by the analysis of direct similarities data.     

THE REGRESS-PROBLEM: A REPLY TO VERMAZEN

This paper is intended to meet some objections that Vermazen has raised about the treatment of the regress-problem in the author's book on the philosophy of action. This problem is shown to involve a skeptical claim about the very existence of actions as distinct from happenings. It is argued, against Vermazen's contention, that only one version of the problem is at work in that book and that, while Danto's basic actions, McCann's volitions and O'Shaughnessy's and Hornsby's tryings do not solve, after analysis, that version of the problem, the author's proposal does in fact provide a solution to it.     

THE SIMULATION ARGUMENT: REPLY TO WEATHERSON

I reply to some recent comments by Brian Weatherson on my 'simulation argument'. I clarify some interpretational matters, and address issues relating to epistemological externalism, the difference from traditional brain-in-a-vat arguments, and a challenge based on grue'-like predicates.     

WONDER SUSTAINED: A REPLY TO CRITICS

A set of science‐inspired cosmic narratives referred to as the Epic of Evolution and the Universe Story or, collectively, the new cosmology, proposes to bring humans closer to nature by placing us into the broader narrative of the cosmos. This article responds to commentary and critique on my book Consecrating Science: Wonder, Knowledge, and the Natural World, which critically examines these science‐based cosmic narratives and their particular and problematic modes and objects of wonder. Themes include the relationship of wonder to science and ethical engagement; the question of whether wonder, grounded in everyday sensory experience, can scale up to the level of global environmental problems; the relevance of wonder to nonideal environments and negative affects like fear or grief; and the importance of humanistic and religious studies scholarship for critiquing grand narratives of science, among other themes. I also respond to claims that my book misdiagnoses and distorts the work of the new cosmology and its claims to wonder.     

PUNISHMENT AS DETERRENCE: REPLY TO SPRAGUE

In my 'A Deterrence Theory of Punishment', I argued that a deterrence system of punishment can avoid the charge that it illegitimately uses offenders if its punishments are carried out 'quasi-automatically': threats are issued by a legislature for deterrent purposes, but those who carry out the punishments have no authority to take deterrent considerations into account. Sprague has objected that under such a system, those who carry out punishments will be unable to justify their actions. I reply that if it is justifiable to set up the system in this way in the first place, then this justification will transmit to all actions carried out under it; and that it is justifiable to set up an institution of punishment in this way.