Power and deception in ultimatum bargaining

In two experiments we investigated the relation between power and deception in ultimatum bargaining. Results showed that recipients of an ultimatum used deception to obtain better offers and that more recipients did so in a low power position. Further analyses showed that the recipient’s use of deception was mediated by concerns about receiving a low offer. For allocators, being in a low power position did not increase the use of deception. Instead, allocators increased their offer when they were in a low power position. The results are discussed in terms of an instrumental approach to deception. This approach incorporates the notion that bargainers (a) will use deception as a means to reach their goals in bargaining but (b) may refrain from using deception when they have alternative means to reach their goals.     

A confederate's Perspective on Deception

In this article, I outline my position regarding the use of deception in psychology experiments, based on my experience as a confederate. I describe an experiment I participated in and the problems resulting from the study: subjects' differing responses to the deception; angry reactions of some subjects to the experiment; and the general discomfort of both subjects and confederates, in particular, who had their doubts concerning the external validity of the study and the ethics involved in running it. issues of informed consent and debriefing are also addressed; it is argued that the success of deception depends on the subject being misinformed as to the experiment's true nature and that debriefing itself sometimes angers subjects. I encourage a decrease in the use of deception and the reexamination of a system that attempts to balance the pain of experimental participants with anticipated benefit to scientific knowledge.     

Motivational cues: The role of perceived senders' self‐control ability in raters' deception judgements

Previous studies have found that senders' personal traits may be used by others to make judgements about the senders' truthfulness. Two studies were conducted to examine whether perceived self‐control ability has an effect on deception judgement. Perceived self‐control was hypothesized to act as a motivational cue that participants would use to assess the sender's motivation to lie, which in turn would influence their deception judgement. Results revealed that when participants assessed the sender as having higher self‐control ability, they would consider the sender to be less motivated to lie in daily life (Study 1), and judge the sender more truthful in a text‐based deception judgement task (Study 2). However, the effect of perceived self‐control ability disappeared in a video‐based task (Study 2), likely due to the multitude of various cues available in audio‐visual stimuli. The theoretical and applied implications of the results are discussed.     

Deception in Intimate Relationships

This study examined the use of deceptive communication in intimate couple relationships. A total of 80 romantically involved male and female Australian university students read and responded to scenarios depicting men and women perpetrating deceit in couple relationships. Six types of deception were examined, namely: omission, distortion, half-truths, blatant lies, white lies, and failed lies. Respondents rated their own and their partners' use of each type of deception in terms of frequency, morality, and relationship effects. Self-reports of satisfaction with the couple relationship were also obtained. Results indicated that each deceptive strategy apart from the white lie was judged as morally reprehensible on dimensions of blame, guilt, and dishonesty. Respondents used white lies most often, and blatant lies least often, and perceived their partners as behaving similarly. Diminished relationship satisfaction was associated with respondents' frequent use of strategies of blatant lying, partial truthfulness, and attempted deceit and with partners' frequent use of each type of deception apart from the white lie. Frequent use of deception by self and partner was correlated with believing that each type of deception was preferable to having an argument, supporting the suggestion from previous research that couples elect dishonesty as a method of conflict avoidance. However, the strength of a respondent's preference for deception rather than arguing did not independently predict satisfaction once the effects of frequent use of the six deception strategies by self and partner were taken into account.     

No‐self,real self,ignorance and self‐deception: Does self‐deception require a self?

In this paper I dispute Eliot Deutsch's claim [See Deutsch, Eliot (1996) Self‐deception: a comparative study, in: Roger T. Ames and Wimal Dissanayake (Eds) Self and Deception: a cross‐cultural enquiry (Albany, State University of New York Press), pp. 315–326] that examining self‐deception from the perspective of non‐Western traditions (i.e. how it is understood in those cultures) can help us to better understand the nature of the phenomenon in one's own culture. Although the claim appears to be uncontrover‐sial and perhaps even self‐evident, I shall argue that it is fundamentally mistaken. What is important about both the claim and my critical assessment of it is not what it tells us about self‐deception. I shall show that it tells us little about self‐deception; that Deutsch confuses ignorance with self‐deception; and that he straightforwardly equivocates on the concept. Instead, what is interesting is what Deutsch's treatment of self‐deception in comparative perspective can tell us about comparative philosophy. The significance of what follows in this paper is less about self‐deception than it is about comparative philosophy.     

New perspectives in assessing deception: The evolution of the truth machine

In recent years a growing interest has arisen in the development of tools for the detection of deception. Since William M. Marston's first publication (1917) on the use of the polygraph as a lie detector, the application of this tool, commonly known as the truth machine, has evolved. Modern technologies are now trying to push the issue further, investigating brain activity during deception using functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI). The aim of this paper is to summarise the evolution of research from the original use of the polygraph to the use of new technologies in detecting deception, in order to provide an overview of the recent developments on the use of measurements of deception, and promote new research in this highly important domain of applied cognitive psychology.     

Concealing negative evaluations of a romantic partner's physical attractiveness

Two studies provided evidence that people hide their negative evaluations of their romantic partner's physical attractiveness. This pattern was found using self‐reports of concealment (Study 1) and a behavioral observation measure (Study 2). Participants who engaged in this deception also exhibited elevated speech disfluencies, which is a deception cue. Moderators of concealment were examined. Concealment was especially pronounced for participants high in care for the partner's welfare (Studies 1 and 2), low in commitment (Studies 1 and 2), and high in attractiveness ideals (Study 2). Results suggest that people use deception to regulate their romantic partner's feelings, but that long‐term orientation or desire to maintain closeness may curtail use of this strategy.     

Ethical Decision Making and Research Deception in the Behavioral Sciences: An Application of Social Contract Theory

Despite significant ethical advances in recent years, including professional developments in ethical review and codification, research deception continues to be a pervasive practice and contentious focus of debate in the behavioral sciences. Given the disciplines' generally stated ethical standards regarding the use of deceptive procedures, researchers have little practical guidance as to their ethical acceptability in specific research contexts. We use social contract theory to identify the conditions under which deception may or may not be morally permissible and formulate practical recommendations to guide researchers on the ethical employment of deception in behavioral science research.     

Looks like a liar? Beliefs about native and non-native speakers' deception

We examined whether observers' beliefs about deception were affected by a speaker's language proficiency. Laypersons (N = 105) and police officers (N = 75) indicated which nonverbal and verbal behaviors were predictive of native versus non-native speakers' deception. In addition, they provided their beliefs about these speakers' interrogation experiences. Participants believed that native and non-native speakers would exhibit the same cues to deception. However, they did predict that non-native speakers would likely face several challenges during interrogations (e.g., longer interrogations and difficulties understanding the interrogator's questions). Police officers and laypersons also differed in their beliefs about cues to deception and interrogation experiences.     

Addiction and Self‐Deception: A Method for Self‐Control?

Neil Levy argues that while addicts who believe they are not addicts are self‐deceived, addicts who believe they are addicts are just as self‐deceived. Such persons accept a false belief that their addictive behaviour involves a loss of control. This paper examines two implications of Levy's discussion: that accurate self‐knowledge may be particularly difficult for addicts; and that an addict's self‐deceived belief that they cannot control themselves may aid their attempts at self‐control. I argue that the self‐deceived beliefs of addicts in denial and of self‐described addicts differ in kind. Unlike the self‐deception of an addict in denial, that of the self‐described addict allows them to acknowledge their behaviour. As such, it may aid an addict to develop more self‐control. A paradoxical implication is that this self‐deception may allow an addict more self‐knowledge.     

Adults' difficulties in identifying concealment among children interviewed with the putative confession instructions

The putative confession (PC) instructions (“[suspect] told me everything that happened and wants you to tell the truth”) increases children's honesty. However, research has shown that children who maintain secrecy despite the PC are more convincing. We examined whether (a) the PC undermines adults' deception detection abilities or (b) children who conceal despite the PC are better deceivers. Adults evaluated truthful and deceptive children interviewed with the PC where the PC portion of the interview was either present or absent. Adults' deception detection was no worse when the PC was present; in fact, it was slightly better. Rather than negatively affecting adults' ability to detect deception, the PC selects an unusually convincing group of concealers.     

Forgoing Debriefing in Deceptive Research: Is It Ever Ethical?

The use of deception in research is generally permitted so long as participants are debriefed at the conclusion of their participation. Several authoritative research ethics guidelines allow investigators to omit debriefing under certain circumstances, however. Here we examine various justifications for forgoing debriefing in deceptive research, including concerns about subject pool contamination, the risk that revealing the deception will be harmful or distressing to participants, and issues of practicability. We conclude that, contrary to current practice, omitting debriefing is ethically acceptable only when debriefing is impracticable, the deception is innocuous, and no reasonable person would object to involvement in the research.     

PLANNING AND CONTROL OF BEHAVIOR DURING DECEPTION

Few behaviors have been found that consistently differentiate deceivers from truth-tellers. Consequently, recent research has focused upon identifying the factors that impact upon the display of behavioral correlates of deception. Following previous work in this area, four factors held to be important in this regard are reviewed: arousal, emotion, cognitive difficulty, and control. An integrative model that explicates the interrelations of these components is then developed. Finally, a study examining the effects of preparation and control on leakage during deception is presented. Planning of deception was found to relate to response latency and duration of eye contact. In addition, subjects appear to use inhibitory control processes to suppress the display of behavioral cues of deception.     

SELF‐DECEPTION AND THE EXPERIENCE OF FICTION

Sartre's commentary on bad faith is the starting‐point for an exploration of self‐deception: what it is not, what it is, and whether it's always wrong. The proffered analysis of self‐deception parallels a certain theory of our experience of fiction. In essence, it is argued that the self‐deceiver creates a kind of fiction in which he is a character, a fiction that he nonetheless believes to be real.     

Catching the liar as a matter of justice: Effects of belief in a just world on deception detection accuracy and the moderating role of mortality salience

Belief in a just world has been linked to high interpersonal trust and less suspicion of deception. We therefore predicted people with a strong dispositional belief in a just world to have low motivation to accurately detect deception. Accordingly, we hypothesized such a belief to be negatively related to accuracy in deception detection. Furthermore, research on Terror Management Theory has indicated that culturally shared values, such as justice, become more important after mortality salience. Thus, we assumed engaging in justice concerns after a death threat is especially relevant for people with a strong belief in a just world, and further, that accurate deception detection is a matter of justice. Based on this reasoning, we expected people with a strong belief in a just world to have an increased motivation to accurately detect deception after mortality salience. Consequently, we hypothesized dispositional differences in belief in a just world to be unrelated to accuracy in deception detection after mortality salience. In line with these predictions, our study revealed that participants with a strong (vs. weak) belief in a just world were worse in deception detection unless they had first been reminded of their mortality.     

Moral (dis)engagement with anthropogenic climate change in online comments on newspaper articles

Anthropogenic climate change (ACC) is widely acknowledged to be morally significant, but little is known about everyday moralising around ACC. We addressed this gap via quantified thematic analysis of 300 online comments to British newspaper articles on ACC, drawing on Bandura's moral disengagement theory. Moral disengagement through denial of ACC was widespread. Other disengagement strategies, such as palliative comparison and diminishing agency, occurred less often. There was also some moral engagement, most often through assertions of the existence of ACC and/or its harmful effects. Moral disengagement was significantly more common in comments on right wing than left wing newspapers, whereas the opposite was true of moral engagement. Although Bandura's framework provided a useful starting point to make sense of ACC moralising, it did not capture moral concerns that extended beyond its “harm/care” remit. In particular, many “denial” comments included a “dishonesty” discourse, whereby ACC proponents were accused of deception for ulterior motives. To classify this discourse as moral disengagement obscures its engagement with a different set of moral issues around trust and honesty. We suggest that Bandura's theory represents one possible “moral landscape” around ACC and could be extended to encompass a broader range of moral concerns.     

Subjective Cues to Deception/Honesty in a High Stakes Situation: An Exploratory Approach

ABSTRACT. The low ecological validity of much of the research on deception detection is a limitation recognized by researchers in the field. Consequently, the present studies investigated subjective cues to deception using the real life, high stakes situation of people making public appeals for help with missing or murdered relatives. It was expected that cues related to affect would be particularly salient in this context. Study 1 was a qualitative investigation identifying cues to deception reportedly used by people accurate at detecting deception. Studies 2 and 3 were then empirical investigations that mainly employed the cues reported in Study 1. A number of subjective cues were found to discriminate between honest and deceptive appeals, including some previously unidentified cues, and cues likely to be context-specific. Most could be categorized under the themes of authenticity of emotion, and negative and positive affective reactions to the appealer. It is concluded that some cues to deception may emerge only in real life, high stakes situations; however, it is argued that some of these may be influenced by observers’ perceptions of the characteristics of offenders, rather than acts of deception per se.     

Anchoring,Familiarity, and Confidence in the Detection of Deception

Anchoring in judgments is the tendency for the final judgment to be biased toward the initial estimate through insufficient adjustment. In the context of the detection of deception, it has been used to explain phenomena such as negative absolute leakage and the truthfulness bias. We examined the influence of order of judgment type on attitude ratings, accuracy, and the truthfulness bias. Receivers of communications should tend to anchor their judgments on the sender's attitudinal position if asked to make attitude judgments first and on the sender's behavior if asked to make truthfulness judgments first. The results partly support these predictions. Negative absolute leakage, accuracy, and the truthfulness bias were not significantly different for those who made attitude judgments before truthfulness judgments. However, results show that accuracy decreased as the session continued and there was no difference in the confidence with which truth and deception judgments were made, but there was a positive relation between confidence and truthfulness bias.     

The Effect of Electrophysiological Neuroscientific Deception Detection Evidence on Juror Judgments in a Criminal Trial

There are concerns that if neuroscientific deception detection evidence becomes admissible in court, jurors may weigh it inappropriately. We investigated whether mock jurors were influenced more by electrophysiological than behavioral evidence that a defendant in a criminal trial was lying. Participants’ perceptions of evidence quality predicted verdict choice, and quality ratings were higher for neuroscientific than for behavioral evidence. However, both types of evidence increased guilty verdicts similarly, and the inclusion of neuroimages had no additional impact. These findings suggest that neuroscientific evidence may be processed differently than other types of deception evidence, but it is not necessarily more persuasive.