Many faces of dogmatism: Prejudice as a way of protecting certainty against value violators among dogmatic believers and atheists

In this article, we suggest that dogmatic beliefs, manifested as strong beliefs that there is no God (i.e., dogmatic atheism) as well as strong beliefs in God (i.e., religious orthodoxy), can serve as a cognitive response to uncertainty. Moreover, we claim that people who dogmatically do not believe in religion and those who dogmatically believe in religion are equally prone to intolerance and prejudice towards groups that violate their important values. That is because prejudice towards these groups may be an efficient strategy to protect the certainty that strong beliefs provide. We tested these assumptions in two studies. In Study 1 and Study 2, we demonstrated that dogmatic beliefs mediate the relationship between intolerance to uncertainty and both, religious orthodoxy and dogmatic atheism. In addition, in Study 2 we showed that both the religiously orthodox and dogmatic atheists become prejudiced towards groups that violate their values and that these effects are especially strong under experimentally induced uncertainty. In this study, we focused on atheists and homosexuals as groups that pose a threat to Christian's religious worldviews, and Catholics and pro‐life supporters as groups that pose a threat to the values of atheists. The results are discussed in relation to past research on dogmatism and religion, as well as with reference to what this means for the study of prejudice.     

Religious Orthodoxy and the Complexity of Thought about Religious and Nonreligious Issues

Two studies examined the relationship between religious orthodoxy and the complexity of thinking about religious and nonreligious issues. In both studies, participants who were high or low in religious orthodoxy wrote a paragraph outlining their thoughts about a religious issue (life after death in Study 1; existence of God in Study 2) and/or a nonreligious issue (capital punishment in Study 1; free trade between Canada and the U.S. in Study 2). The results of both studies indicated that participants who were high in religious orthodoxy were less complex in their thinking about religious issues than those low in religious orthodoxy, but did not differ in the complexity of their thinking about nonreligious issues. These results do not support the notion that orthodoxly religious individuals are dispositionally inclined to think in simpler or more rigid ways overall, but they do suggest a tendency to think less complexly about religious issues.     

The need to belong can motivate belief in God

The need to belong can motivate belief in God. In Study 1, 40 undergraduates read bogus astrophysics articles "proving" God's existence or not offering proof. Participants in the proof-for-God condition reported higher belief in God (compared to control) when they chronically imagined God as accepting but lower belief in God when they imagined God as rejecting. Additionally, in Study 2 (72 undergraduates), these effects did not occur when participants' belongingness need was satisfied by priming close others. Study 3 manipulated 79 Internet participants' image of God. Chronic believers in the God-is-rejecting condition reported lower religious behavioral intentions than chronic believers in the God-is-accepting condition, and this effect was mediated by lower desires for closeness with God. In Study 4 (106 Internet participants), chronic believers with an accepting image of God reported that their belief in God is motivated by belongingness needs.     

Toward an Understanding of Religious Tolerance: Quest Religiousness and Positive Attitudes Toward Religiously Dissimilar Others

We interact frequently with individuals with religious beliefs that vary from our own. Although we may naturally prefer interacting with religiously similar others, individuals vary in their attitudes toward religiously dissimilar others. In the present set of studies, we examined how variability in quest religiousness affects religious tolerance. In Study 1 (N = 159), we found that quest religiousness in Christian undergraduates was associated with positive attitudes toward both non-Christian religious groups and atheists. In Study 2, 118 Christian undergraduates evaluated vignettes regarding a devout moral or an average morality Christian (ingroup) or Muslim (outgroup). Participants preferred moral targets relative to less moral targets. However, when rating moral targets, participants high in quest religiousness preferred the Muslim target (religious outgroup member), whereas those low in quest religiousness preferred the Christian target (religious ingroup member). We discuss implications for the links between quest religiousness and religious tolerance.     

Does religious priming increase the prosocial behaviour of a Japanese sample in an anonymous economic game?

We examined the effect of religious priming on a Japanese sample in an anonymous dictator game whereas previous studies on religious priming on prosociality had mainly been conducted within Western contexts. The current study attempted to examine whether religion increases prosocial behaviour in a Japanese sample through the replication of ‘God is Watching You’ (Shariff & Norenzayan, 2007) where it was found that participants primed with religion‐related words and secular justice‐related words behaved more prosocially than participants primed with neutral words in an anonymous dictator game. The current experiment was conducted with Japanese students (n = 106) to examine whether the results of the original study could be applied to Japanese people. The results showed that among the three priming conditions (control, religion, secular justice), there was no difference in the amount of money participants allocated to anonymous strangers, although in the secular justice priming condition, theists allocated more money than atheists. The results might be due to the fact that the religious priming words used in the original study did not precisely activate the propositional network of religion that Japanese participants have. More culture‐specific studies are necessary to examine how religious priming works for non‐Westerners.     

Religious Unbelief in Three Western European Countries: Identifying and Characterizing Unbeliever Types Using Latent Class Analysis

The different forms of religious unbelief are still much of an open question. Using data (N = 4,404) from three European countries—Finland, Denmark, and the Netherlands—we sought to identify underlying unbeliever groups among those with the strongest disbelief in God (N = 2,258). Latent class analyses were conducted on the nontheistic supernatural beliefs of this subsection of participants, resulting in the same three unbeliever groups in each country: analytic atheists, spiritual but not religious (SBNR), and uncertain nonbelievers. Next, we explored these groups on a variety of dimensions, especially on the group members’ attitudes to religion, certainty of beliefs, cognitive dispositions, and worldview. One-way analyses of variance (ANOVAs) revealed similarities as well as distinct characters for each of the latent groups. The groups differed most in intuitive thinking style, overmentalizing bias, and other ontological confusions. To compare the latent groups to all other individuals who took part in the study, two discriminant analyses were run with all participants. This resulted in four meaningful dimensions that supported and extended the ANOVAs findings and allowed for the consideration of other (non)believers. Overall, this study supports earlier findings on analytic atheists and SBNR while providing new information about their dispositions. Of interest, the uncertain nonbeliever group has been largely unexplored previously, and it should gain more attention in future studies.     

Disentangling the belief in God and cognitive rigidity/flexibility components of religiosity to predict racial and value-violating prejudice: A Post-Critical Belief Scale analysis

Past research indicates that being religious is associated with prejudice toward racial and value-violating out-groups. However, this past research treated religiosity as a unidimensional construct without taking into account how different components of religiosity—belief in a higher power and the rigidity/flexibility of religious beliefs—are associated with measures of prejudice. Two studies examined the relationship between these two components of religiosity, as measured by the Post-Critical Beliefs Scale, and racial (African Americans, Arabs) and value-violating prejudices (atheists, gay men). As the flexibility of religious beliefs increased (literal vs. symbolic dimension), attitudes toward racial and value-violating out-groups became more positive (Study 1). As belief in God strengthened (exclusion vs. inclusion of transcendence dimension), attitudes toward value-violating out-groups became more negative. Study 2 demonstrated that these two components of religiosity fully mediated the relationship between general religiosity and prejudice toward African Americans, Arabs, and gay men and partially mediated the relationship between religiosity and prejudice toward atheists. Results are discussed in light of reexamining the conclusion that simply being religious is associated with prejudice.     

Hearts Strangely Warmed (and Cooled): Emotional Experience in Religious and Atheistic Individuals

In light of neurophysiological evidence suggesting a link between hemispheric dominance and religious preference, three studies tested whether atheists and religious individuals process emotions differently. Suggestive of right-hemispheric dominance, individuals who identified with religion reported more intense positive emotions associated with a recalled love experience (Study 1), greater sadness in immediate response to reading a tragic news story (Study 2), and more vivid recall of the subjective details of either their most recent birthday or an existential crisis (Study 3). They also reported greater alexithymia compared to atheists. Overall, agnostic/no religion individuals averaged in between these two groups. The results suggest that, relative to atheists, religious individuals have more accessible yet undifferentiated emotions, which may perhaps serve as raw materials for religious experience.     

‘So Help Me God’? Does oath swearing in courtroom scenarios impact trial outcomes?

In countries such as Britain and the US, court witnesses must declare they will provide truthful evidence and are often compelled to publicly choose between religious (“oath”) and secular (“affirmation”) versions of this declaration. Might defendants who opt to swear an oath enjoy more favourable outcomes than those who choose to affirm? Two preliminary, pre-registered survey studies using minimal vignettes (Study 1, N = 443; Study 2, N = 913) indicated that people associate choice of the oath with credible testimony; and that participants, especially religious participants, discriminate against defendants who affirm. In a third, Registered Report study (Study 3, N = 1821), we used a more elaborate audiovisual mock trial paradigm to better estimate the real-world influence of declaration choice. Participants were asked to render a verdict for a defendant who either swore or affirmed, and were themselves required to swear or affirm that they would try the defendant in good faith. Overall, the defendant was not considered guiltier when affirming rather than swearing, nor did mock-juror belief in God moderate this effect. However, jurors who themselves swore an oath did discriminate against the affirming defendant. Exploratory analyses suggest this effect may be driven by authoritarianism, perhaps because high-authoritarian jurors consider the oath the traditional (and therefore correct) declaration to choose. We discuss the real-world implications of these findings and conclude the religious oath is an antiquated legal ritual that needs reform.     

Does Religious Belief Matter for Grief and Death Anxiety? Experimental Philosophy Meets Psychology of Religion

It is commonly reasoned that religious belief moderates death anxiety and aids in coping with loss. However, a philosophical perspective known as meta‐atheism includes the claim that avowed religious believers grieve deaths and experience death anxiety as intensely as avowed atheists. Thus, we report a study comparing religious believers and nonbelievers on measures of death anxiety and grief. We further investigated the relationships between certain religious beliefs (views of God, afterlife belief, religious orientation) and death anxiety, as well as both painful grief reactions and grief‐related growth. We surveyed 101 participants across the United States, ranging in age (19 to 57), education, and ethnicity. Participants avowing some form of religious belief, in comparison to those not, did not demonstrate lower levels of death anxiety. They did, however, display higher levels of a certain type of death acceptance. Additionally, those professing belief reported less grief and greater growth in response to loss. Greater afterlife belief was not associated with less grief; however, it was associated with both greater grief‐related growth and lower death anxiety.     

Bounded by Disbelief: How Atheists in the United States Differentiate themselves from Religious Believers

Recent empirical studies have revealed that religious believers tend to hold atheists and other religious doubters in low regard. This article examines how atheists in turn negotiate and construct the social and symbolic boundaries between atheists and religious believers. I draw on ethnographic and interview data to explore the lenses through which atheists view religion, religious believers, and the boundary between religious believers and non-believers. I find that atheists participate in boundary work to construct difference between religious believers and non-believers. However, atheists see greater social distance between themselves and some groups of religious believers than they do in relation to other groups, constructing religious leaders and devout adherents of particular religions as especially different. Atheists’ constructions of religious believers also vary in response to their individual experiences with religious people. The analysis illuminates the complexity of boundary work among members of a minority group.     

Attributes of God: Conceptual Foundations of a Foundational Belief

Anthropomorphism, or the attribution of human properties to nonhuman entities, is often posited as an explanation for the origin and nature of God concepts, but it remains unclear which human properties we tend to attribute to God and under what conditions. In three studies, participants decided whether two types of human properties—psychological (mind‐dependent) properties and physiological (body‐dependent) properties—could or could not be attributed to God. In Study 1 (n = 1,525), participants made significantly more psychological attributions than physiological attributions, and the frequency of those attributions was correlated both with participants’ religiosity and with their attribution of abstract, theological properties. In Study 2 (n = 99) and Study 3 (n = 138), participants not only showed the same preference for psychological properties but were also significantly faster, more consistent, and more confident when attributing psychological properties to God than when attributing physiological properties. And when denying properties to God, they showed the reverse pattern—that is, they were slower, less consistent, and less confident when denying psychological properties than when denying physiological properties. These patterns were observed both in a predominantly Christian population (Study 2) and a predominantly Hindu population (Study 3). Overall, we argue that God is conceptualized not as a person in general but as an agent in particular, attributed a mind by default but attributed a body only upon further consideration.     

SBNR Identity: The Role of Impersonal God Representations,Individualistic Spirituality,and Dissimilarity With Religious Groups

We conducted two studies investigating the extent to which self-identification as Spiritual but not Religious (SBNR) was associated with (H1) the development of idiosyncratic religious beliefs and exposure to religious diversity and/or (H2) negative attitudes toward organized religion and being hurt by members of a religious group. In Study 1, SBNRs scored higher than religious and nonreligious participants on belief in God as an impersonal cosmic force (but not as a personal being) and individualistic spirituality. Although SBNRs had positive attitudes toward religion, they were less positive than those identifying as religious. Exposure to religious diversity and hurt by religious groups were not significant predictors of SBNR. We replicated these results in Study 2 using a multi-item measure of God representations and also found that SBNRs’ attitudes toward religion were predicted by a perceived dissimilarity with religious groups over and above individualism, secular group participation, perceptions of Christianity as too structured, and liberalism.     

The role of attachment to God in secular and religious/spiritual ways of coping with a serious disease

This study investigated the role of security in one's attachment to God in relation to both secular and religious/spiritual ways of coping with a serious illness. The main objective was to test whether attachment to God and type of disease were related to secular coping strategies, when controlling for the effects of religious/spiritual coping. Study participants (N = 105) had been diagnosed either with cancer (i.e., an acute disease) and were under chemotherapy/awaiting surgery or with renal impairment (i.e., a chronic disease) and were attending dialysis. Results showed that secure attachment to God was uniquely related to fighting spirit, whereas insecure attachment to God was uniquely linked to hopelessness, suggesting that security, unlike insecurity, in one's attachment to God may impact favourably on adjustment to the disease. The only coping strategy related to type of disease was cognitive avoidance, which was linked to chronic disease.     

Atheists

Atheists represent an inconspicuous minority, identifiable only by their disbelief in God(s). Despite being highly stigmatized and disliked, until recent scientific endeavors, little has been known about this group including why they don't believe, how many people are atheists, and why they trigger intense reactions. Thus, this paper aims to synthesize what is known about atheists (so far) and to help explain the widespread negative attitudes and prejudice towards atheists; the possible cognitive, motivational, and cultural origins of disbelief; and the unique challenges facing the study of religious disbelievers. To do so, we will explore current findings in psychological research on atheism by considering the complex interactions of cultural learning, motivations, and core cognitive processes. Although significant scientific progress has been made in understanding the factors underlying atheism, there remains much to be explored in the domain of religious disbelief.     

Attachment,religiousness, and distress among the religious and spiritual: links between religious syncretism and compensation

Using the Adult Attachment Interview, we explored differences in attachment, distress, and religiousness among groups of traditionally religious, New Age spiritual, and religiously syncretistic (high on both) participants (Ps) (N?=?75). Religiously syncretistic Ps showed a preponderance of insecure attachment and were raised by non-religious parents, who were estimated as relatively insensitive. Moreover, religiously syncretistic Ps perceived a personal relationship with God and had experienced increased religiousness/spirituality during difficult life periods, but did not suffer elevated distress. New Agers often mirrored the religiously syncretistic, but had a more even secure–insecure attachment distribution, typically did not perceive a personal relationship with God, and did suffer elevated distress. Traditionally religious Ps were low on distress and raised by religious parents, estimated as relatively sensitive. We conclude that religious syncretism may often express religion/spirituality as compensation. Finally, we speculate that a perceived relationship with God may attenuate distress among those at risk.     

Gross gods and icky atheism: Disgust responses to rejected religious beliefs

Disgust is an emotional response that helps to maintain and protect physical and spiritual purity by signaling contamination and motivating the restoration of personal cleanliness. In the present research we predicted that disgust may be elicited by contact with outgroup religious beliefs, as these beliefs pose a threat to spiritual purity. Two experiments tested this prediction using a repeated taste-test paradigm in which participants tasted and rated a drink before and after copying a passage from an outgroup religion. In Experiment 1, Christian participants showed increased disgust after writing a passage from the Qur'an or Richard Dawkins' The God Delusion, but not a control text. Experiment 2 replicated this effect, and also showed that contact with an ingroup religious belief (Christians copying from the Bible) did not elicit disgust. Moreover, Experiment 2 showed that disgust to rejected beliefs was eliminated when participants were allowed to wash their hands after copying the passage, symbolically restoring spiritual cleanliness. Together, these results provide evidence that contact with rejected religious beliefs elicits disgust by symbolically violating spiritual purity. Implications for intergroup relations between religious groups is discussed, and the role of disgust in the protection of beliefs that hold moral value.     

Relational Spirituality and Forgiveness of Offenses Committed by Religious Leaders

In the present article, we extend a model of relational spirituality and forgiveness to the context of major offenses by clergy. In Study 1, undergraduate students (N = 208) described a major offense that they had experienced by a religious leader and then completed several questionnaires in relation to the offense and the religious leader. Appraisals of relational spirituality were significantly associated with forgiveness, after controlling for known predictors of forgiveness (i.e., hurtfulness, time since the offense, and commitment to God or another source of spirituality). In Study 2, we replicated and extended the findings from Study 1 using an independent sample of undergraduates (N = 365). In a series of structural equation models, we found that relational engagement of God (or another source of spirituality) partially mediated the relationship between anger toward God (or another source of spirituality) and unforgiving motivations. We conclude by discussing implications for future research.     

Unanswered Prayers: Religiosity and the God-Serving Bias

Two self-report experiments examined how religiosity affects attributions made for a target person’s death. Online adults (Study 1, N = 427) and undergraduate students (Study 2, N = 326) read about Chris who had a heart attack, used religious or health behaviors, and lived or died. Participants made attributions to Chris and God (both studies), and reported their emotions (Study 2). Participants made more attributions to Chris when he lived than when he died, but only when he used health behaviors. The highly religious made more attributions to God, but not when Chris used religious behaviors and died (the God-serving bias); they reported the most positive emotions when Chris lived after using religious behaviors (the Hallelujah effect). Directions for future research in terms of implicit religious beliefs and normative evaluations of religion are discussed.