LOGICAL TRUTH IN MODAL LOGIC

In this paper, I consider the criticism due to Hartry Field, John Pollack, William Hanson and James Hawthorne that the Kripkean requirement that a logical truth in modal logic be true at all possible worlds in all quantified model structures is unmotivated and misses some logical truths. These authors do not see the basis for making the logical truth of a modal sentence turn on more than the model structure given by one reading of the modal operator(s) which occur in the sentence. The primary goal here is to motivate the Kripkean requirement.     

ON THE LOGICAL UNSOLVABILITY OF THE GETTIER PROBLEM

The tripartite account of propositional, fallibilist knowledge that p as justified true belief can become adequate only if it can solve the Gettier Problem. However, the latter can be solved only if the problem of a successful coordination of the resources (at least truth and justification) necessary and sufficient to deliver propositional, fallibilist knowledge that p can be solved. In this paper, the coordination problem is proved to be insolvable by showing that it is equivalent to the 'coordinated attack' problem, which is demonstrably insolvable in epistemic logic. It follows that the tripartite account is not merely inadequate as it stands, as proved by Gettier-type counterexamples, but demonstrably irreparable in principle, so that efforts to improve it can never succeed.     

关于两项样例学习心理实验研究报告的分析与评论

对两项关于样例学习心理实验研究的报告进行了逻辑分析,指出了Ross的研究设计的合理性以及莫雷等的 “表面概貌对原理运用的影响的实验研究”中的逻辑欠缺,进而给出了莫雷等的结论“样例与作业问题表面概貌的相似性,不仅会影响原理的通达,而且也会影响原理的运用” 尚不足信的断言,所以只能继续维持Ross的“表面概貌是否相似不影响原理的运用”的结论。最后明确了莫雷等实验研究应该采取的正确设计思路和方法。