Learning from experience: Bion's concept of reverie and Buddhist meditation: A comparative study

The author argues for a common denominator between Bion's view and the Buddhist view of mental development. In both thought systems, mental growth is synonymous to learning from experience. The author closely examines Bion's concept of attention and compares it to mindfulness, a major factor in Buddhist meditation. In both doctrines, attention must be isolated from other mental processes in order to attain learning from experience. The author compares reverie to the state of mind of equanimity. She argues that enhancement of the ability of reverie, or improving the inner container such that it can hold any content while unmoved by desire, is the purpose of Buddhist practice. Both view the mind as capable of transcending its own restrictions and 'the capacity to know anything' as attainable through disciplined practice.     

Talking about others facilitates theory of mind in Chinese preschoolers

A longitudinal study and a training study were conducted to show that simply referring to others facilitated theory of mind (ToM) development in Chinese children. In Study 1, 3- to 4-year-old Chinese children (N = 52) were tested on ToM and autobiographical memory (AM). One year later, in the group of children who initially failed the false belief tasks, only those who increased their references to others in AM recall passed the tasks. In Study 2, Chinese preschoolers who were trained to talk about others through storytelling showed improvement in their ToM performance. These findings suggest alternative pathways for ToM development in non-Euro-American context.     

Thinking about seeing: Perceptual sources of knowledge are encoded in the theory of mind brain regions of sighted and blind adults

Blind people’s inferences about how other people see provide a window into fundamental questions about the human capacity to think about one another’s thoughts. By working with blind individuals, we can ask both what kinds of representations people form about others’ minds, and how much these representations depend on the observer having had similar mental states themselves. Thinking about others’ mental states depends on a specific group of brain regions, including the right temporo-parietal junction (RTPJ). We investigated the representations of others’ mental states in these brain regions, using multivoxel pattern analyses (MVPA). We found that, first, in the RTPJ of sighted adults, the pattern of neural response distinguished the source of the mental state (did the protagonist see or hear something?) but not the valence (did the protagonist feel good or bad?). Second, these neural representations were preserved in congenitally blind adults. These results suggest that the temporo-parietal junction contains explicit, abstract representations of features of others’ mental states, including the perceptual source. The persistence of these representations in congenitally blind adults, who have no first-person experience with sight, provides evidence that these representations emerge even in the absence of relevant first-person perceptual experiences.     

Stereotyped beliefs about desirability: implications for characterizing the child's theory of mind

A central research issue in the child's theory of mind literature is the question of whether children appreciate the subjectivity of mental phenomena. The typical research paradigm involves researchers creating a discrepancy between children's own mental states and the mental state of a protagonist, and then asking children to predict the protagonist's reaction. A prediction that fits the child's own mental state (rather than the beliefs and desires of the protagonist) is seen as an indication that the child fails to acknowledge the subjectivity of mental phenomena.Here we present two experiments involving the use of desire statements in predicting other people's emotions which demonstrate that even when one does acknowledge the subjectivity of mental states, this does not necessarily leads to ‘correct’ predictions (e.g. predictions based on the protagonist's desires). Other factors, such as cultural knowledge, might influence this process. The first experiment demonstrates that even adults, with a fully operational theory of mind, sometimes choose to disregard information about other people's desires. Their own generalized beliefs about desirability appear to be instrumental in this respect. The second experiment, on sex-stereotyped preferences for toys, demonstrates that even young children already can use generalized beliefs about desirability as a basis for their predictions of others’ emotions, even when these beliefs on desirability do not coincide with their own desires. This strategy results in a response pattern that can be easily misconceived as an indication that the child does not yet appreciate the subjectivity of desires.Two remarks are made on the basis of these experiments. First, even a so-called ‘adult’ theory of mind tends to be affected by normative considerations and is therefore more complex than straightforward desire-belief reasoning. Second, whenever normative considerations come into play, researchers should be cautious that ‘correct’ answers in theory of mind testing may not always have been based on theory of mind reasoning, and that ‘incorrect’ answers do not necessarily imply the absence of an active theory of mind.     

Thinking outside the box: a metacognitive / theory of mind perspective on concrete thinking

Concrete thinking, an extraordinarily difficult condition to treat, has been psychoanalytically theorized to result from failures of symbolization-problems forming, linking, or fathoming the meaning of symbols-and/or failures of differentiation, resulting in difficulties distinguishing symbols from the thing being symbolized, fantasy from reality, self from other. Though difficulties symbolizing and differentiating are clearly evident in patients whose thinking is concrete, these may be a manifestation of concrete thinking rather than a root cause. Childhood thinking is characteristically concrete, and a persistence of such thinking into adulthood can be adequately explained as a failure to develop a more sophisticated theory of mind. Given that patients who exhibit such thinking tend to respond poorly to classic psychoanalytic interpretations, alternative technical approaches have been proposed. One such approach, "metacognitive" in nature, draws on a mode of thought used by gifted individuals that helps them "think outside the box" by dispensing with a typical pattern-recognition search so that novel meanings might be discovered. Metacognition, thoughts about one's thoughts and thought processes, facilitates symbolic thinking by creating sufficient distance from one's thoughts to allow the consideration of alternative meanings.     

An integrated theory of the mind

Adaptive control of thought-rational (ACT-R; J. R. Anderson & C. Lebiere, 1998) has evolved into a theory that consists of multiple modules but also explains how these modules are integrated to produce coherent cognition. The perceptual-motor modules, the goal module, and the declarative memory module are presented as examples of specialized systems in ACT-R. These modules are associated with distinct cortical regions. These modules place chunks in buffers where they can be detected by a production system that responds to patterns of information in the buffers. At any point in time, a single production rule is selected to respond to the current pattern. Subsymbolic processes serve to guide the selection of rules to fire as well as the internal operations of some modules. Much of learning involves tuning of these subsymbolic processes. A number of simple and complex empirical examples are described to illustrate how these modules function singly and in concert.     

There is more to mind reading than having theory of mind concepts: new directions in theory of mind research

For more than 30 years, researchers have focused on the important transition that children undergo between the ages of 3 and 5, when they start to solve mind‐reading problems that require reasoning about complex mental states, such as beliefs. The main question for debate has been whether, during that transition, children acquire new concepts about how the mind works (i.e. a more sophisticated ‘theory of mind’) or whether their more general cognitive abilities improve and help them deal with the general task demands. Recently, researchers have started to explore mind‐reading abilities in individuals outside of the classic 3–5 age span, showing early theory of mind abilities in ever‐younger children and infants, but also far from flawless performance in adults. In this article, we show how the results of these two new lines of research converge on the idea that there is more to mind reading than having theory of mind concepts: there are various processes required to efficiently implement theory of mind concepts in our reasoning, and there may be, in fact, multiple mind‐reading routes available. We then highlight the emergent new directions for future research. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Husserl and the representational theory of mind

Husserl has finally begun to be recognized as the precursor of current interest in intentionality — the first to have a general theory of the role of mental representations in the philosophy of language and mind. As the first thinker to put directedness of mental representations at the center of his philosophy, he is also beginning to emerge as the father of current research in cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence.My thanks to David Woodruff Smith and Frank McGuinness for their invaluable help with the issues addressed in this paper.     

Bergson and the holographic theory of mind

Bergson’s model of time (1889) is perhaps the proto-phenomenological theory. It is part of a larger model of mind (1896) which can be seen in modern light as describing the brain as supporting a modulated wave within a holographic field, specifying the external image of the world, and wherein subject and object are differentiated not in terms of space, but of time. Bergson’s very concrete model is developed and deepened with Gibson’s ecological model of perception. It is applied to the problems of consciousness, direct realism, qualia and illusions. The model implies an entirely different basis for memory and cognition, and a brief overview is given for the basis of direct memory, compositionality and systematicity.     

Hermeneutics and theory of mind

In contemporary philosophy and psychology there is an ongoing debate around the concept of theory of mind. Theory of mind concerns our ability to understand another person. The two approaches that dominate the debate are “Theory Theory” (TT) and “Simulation Theory” (ST). This paper explores the connection between theory of mind and hermeneutics. Although both speak of the nature of understanding, and the way we gain and organize our knowledge of others, certain aspects of Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics reflect a theory approach, long before TT itself was developed. In contrast, Dilthey’s hermeneutics reflects a simulation approach. In contrast to both of these approaches, I propose a contextual theory, as a parallel to Gadamer’s work in hermeneutics, and as a view that offers the basis for an important critique of both TT and ST.

Origins of a theory of mind

Twenty-two pairs of typically developing toddlers (M = 24.32 months) and their mothers were observed in a play-room solving puzzles during 30 min. The target of the observations was hand-taking gesture. Researchers have thought that this gesture is rare among typically developing children and is more frequent among autistic children. Ten in 22 children showed this gesture in only 30 min. They should know “I can not do it by myself, but my mother can do it.” When we can assume that children know others’ mental mechanism, it might be the origins of a theory of mind.     

The class that would not read: utilizing Bion's affect theory in group.

While Bion's group theory continues to inspire contemporary group psychotherapists, his theory of human emotion is not as well known. Bion also introduced a system of alphabetical and mathematic symbols to offer a shorthand for his epistemology in order to make his ideas accessible, flexible, and practical for the working clinician. This article presents aspects of Bion's theory and metapsychological shorthand to conceptualize effectual dimensions of group process, thinking operations, and countertransference. The constructs considered include Klein's paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions; manic defenses; basic assumptions; "proto-mental" and "pre-monitory" emotions; instinctive drives L, H, and K (plus or minus); beta elements; and alpha functioning. With these ideas, the author was able to work through aspects of a group experience in which, as leader, he unknowingly found himself at an opposite affective pole from the members.     

Conflicting desire and the child's theory of mind

We contrast the standard representational theory-of-mind approach to the understanding of mental states with an alternative view that theory-of-mind tasks require executive functioning or the inhibition of more “cognitively salient” information. Two experiments test the hypothesis that 3-year-olds' apparent problems on theory-of-mind tasks are not due to an inability to represent the mental contents of another, but rather lie in the informational structure of the task. In Experiment 1, 3- to 5-year-olds were tested on their understanding of desire in others either when they themselves held a strong and conflicting desire or when they had no strong desire. Results showed that under the condition of having a strong and conflicting desire, only 5-year-olds were able to recognize that another person may desire something different. In contrast, when the children themselves held no strong desire, even 3-year-olds were able to judge another's desire correctly. Experiment 2 compared 3-year-olds' performance on a standard false-belief task with an equivalently structured desire task in which participants had again to inhibit their own strong and conflicting desire. Results showed similar performance on the traditional false-belief task and the new conflicting-desire task.     

Sibling conflict and theory of mind

This study examined conflicts between siblings in an attempt to identify variables that are related to false‐belief understanding. The variables investigated were children's use of mental state terms and specific types of arguments (Slomkowski & Dunn, 1992) that occurred during conflict episodes. Twenty‐two children between 3 and 5 years of age were administered eight false‐belief tasks and were also videotaped while playing with an older sibling. Use of other‐oriented arguments by the target child was significantly associated with success on false‐belief tasks after controlling for age and general language ability. No use of argument was negatively related to performance on the false‐belief tasks after controlling for age and general language ability. Neither the use of self‐oriented arguments nor use of mental state terms was found to be associated with false‐belief performance. The findings indicate that specific features of sibling conflicts are related to children's developing false‐belief understanding.