A reexamination of mental arithmetic models and data: A reply to Ashcraft

In a review of the chronometric literature, M. Ashcraft (1982, Developmental Review, 2, 213–236) concludes that adults store each basic arithmetic fact in a table-like retrieval network. In my commentary (1983, Developmental Review, 3, 225–230), I argued that procedural knowledge (stored rules, principles, or heuristics) might be a cognitively more economical basis for generating many number combinations. In this paper, I draw an analogy between this alternative model of number fact representation and how computers efficiently reconstruct arithmetic combinations, note that the research findings do not clearly support any one model of mental arithmetic, and attempt to address Ashcraft's (1983, Developmental Review, 3, 231–235) criticisms of my model.     

Chaos theory and the evolution of consciousness and mind: A thermodynamic-holographic resolution to the mind-body problem

This address describes Neurological Positivism's (NP) energetic evolution of consciousness, mind, and the brain-mind relationship within a model that integrates ideas and research from chaos theory, Pribram's holonomic brain theory, evolutionary theory, and the laws of thermodynamics (the energy laws The energetic evolution and encapsulation of space-time consciousness from chaotic-holographic environments is described. Consciousness is described as a natural evolutionary space-time template of continuously generated self-referential energy patterns (algorithms). The energetic evolution of mind is described as a natural self-referential exteriorization of the algorithmic organization of consciousness in the form of culturally shared mental models. It is proposed that the brain-mind energy relationship has historically undergone and continues to undergo change, and that this change is a natural thermodynamic arrow that constitutes the evolution of culture. That is, the evolution of culture proceeds in the direction of progressively more complete and efficient exteriorizations of the algorithmic organization of the brain-thus, for example, the recent evolution of brain-like computing systems and virtual reality systems. Accordingly, an uneven, but closing, central-energy-state identity (self-similarity) between brain and mind is described. It is concluded that NP's conception of mind helps us understand the evolutionary unfoldment of culture, and provides a sense of direction as to its future.     

On resolving conflicting views of cognitive conflict

F. B. Murray's (Developmental Review, 1983, 3, 54–61) conclusion that a theoretically ambiguous relationship exists between cognitive conflict and Piaget's notion of equilibration was considered. It was suggested that theoretical clarity can be achieved if a distinction is drawn between conflict induction (disequilibrium) and conflict resolution (equilibration). Murray's suggestion that in Piaget's theory internal (cognitive) conflict can be mentally created was disputed. G. N. Cantor's (Developmental Review, 1983, 3, 39–53) concerns about the adequacy of the measures of internal conflict in B. J. Zimmerman & D. E. Blom's (Developmental Review, 1983, 3, 18–38) study due to their independence from external conflict manipulations was discussed. We agreed with Cantor that such findings obviate direct disconfirmation of an internal conflict construct; however, we suggested that evidence of conservation learning in the absence of either external or internal conflict renders Piaget's account less tenable.     

Crossed aphasia: analysis of four cases

Data from the Rehabilitation Institute of Chicago was used to contrast a sample of 358 aphasics with data from a Boston aphasia and aging study (L. Obler, M. Albert, H. Goodglass, and F. Benson, Brain and Language, 6, 318–322, 1978). Unlike the females, Chicago males showed remarkable similarity to the Boston male sample for the Broca, Wernicke, and Global groups with ratios of approximately four Broca's to every two Wernicke's and Global aphasics. Similar to the Boston Sample, Wernicke's aphasics were 11.6 years older (p < .001) than Broca's aphasics.     

The evolution of mandler's conceptual primitives (image-schemas) as neural mechanisms for space-time simulation structures

The purpose of this article is to describe parallels between Mandler's theory of conceptual development in infancy, and my theory of the maximum-power principle evolution of the neuro-algorithmic organization of the brain and cultural-level mental models. A maximum power principle prey-predator scenario depicts the dynamic selective origins of neuro-algorithms underlying Mandler's various image-schemas (conceptual primitives). It is proposed that (a) image-schemas are inherited space-time simulation structures that originate in cerebellar state estimating functions which spread to the mapping systems of the cerebrum; (b) image-schemas do not come about as the result of perceptual analytic abstractive processes as Mandler has proposed, but undergo refinement in ontogeny through experience-expectant development involving perceptual analysis; (c) Mandler's image-schemas are “state-primitives” fed forward from the cerebellum to provide tracking routines for perceptual analysis, and rapid simulations constituting representation, prediction, and control; and (d) vicarious trial and error (VTE) can be interpreted as pragmatic vector simulation using image-schematic simulation structures. A scenario connecting image-schemas with Pleistocene era auditory-vocal system evolution which supports Mandler's developmental connection between image-schemas and language is proposed. It is concluded that Mandler's theory of conceptual development is essentially correct. However, it is suggested that the further articulation of Mandler's theory would benefit from parallel statement of the evolution of underlying brain mechanisms.     

Refuting the unfolding-argument on the irrelevance of causal structure to consciousness

The unfolding argument (UA) was advanced as a refutation of prominent theories, which posit that phenomenal experience is determined by patterns of neural activation in a recurrent (neural) network (RN) structure. The argument is based on the statement that any input–output function of an RN can be approximated by an “equivalent” feedforward-network (FFN). According to UA, if consciousness depends on causal structure, its presence is unfalsifiable (thus non-scientific), as an equivalent FFN structure is behaviorally indistinguishable with regards to any behavioral test. Here I refute UA by appealing to computational theory and cognitive-neuroscience. I argue that a robust functional equivalence between FFN and RN is not supported by the mathematical work on the Universal Approximator theorem, and is also unlikely to hold, as a conjecture, given data in cognitive neuroscience; I argue that an equivalence of RN and FFN can only apply to static functions between input/output layers and not to the temporal patterns or to the network’s reactions to structural perturbations. Finally, I review data indicating that consciousness has functional characteristics, such as a flexible control of behavior, and that cognitive/brain dynamics reveal interacting top-down and bottom-up processes, which are necessary for the mediation of such control processes.     

Counting and timing models in psychophysics and the conjoint Weber's law

J. C. Falmagne, G. Iverson, and S. Marcovici ((1979). Psychological Review, 86, 25–43) proposed a generalization of Weber's law, which they called the conjoint Weber's law. Empirically, the law sometimes holds. When it fails, the data satisfy a relation that Falmagne et al. identify as the conjoint Weber's inequality. This paper investigates the ability of counting and timing models of psychophysics to predict Weber's law and the conjoint Weber's law. It is shown that although the timing model naturally predicts both laws to hold, all reasonable counting models predict them to fail. Instead, counting models naturally predict Weber's inequality and the conjoint Weber's inequality.     

The case of the disappearing disagreements: A reply to Yussen

S. R. Yussen (1984, Developmental Review, 4, 139–144) and I have few disagreements. The major one seems to be in what the purpose of my article (R. J. Sternberg, 1984, Developmental Review, 4, 113–138) should have been. I believe the article fulfills my own purpose, if not Yussen's.     

Interpolation properties of superintuitionistic logics

A family of prepositional logics is considered to be intermediate between the intuitionistic and classical ones. The generalized interpolation property is defined and proved is the following. Theorem on interpolation. For every intermediate logic L the following statements are equivalent:

1. Craig's interpolation theorem holds in L,
2. L possesses the generalized interpolation property,
3. Robinson's consistency statement is true in L.

There are just 7 intermediate logics in which Craig's theorem holds. Besides, Craig's interpolation theorem holds in L iff all the modal companions of L possess Craig's interpolation property restricted to those formulas in which every variable is proceeded by necessity symbol.     

The ‘Mysterious’ Thomas Manlevelt and Albert of Saxony

The essay casts doubt upon the view that Albert was criticizing or was dependent upon Thomas Manlevelt's logico-philosophical views, and counter argues that it is in fact Manlevelt who knows and cites Albert's views in his recently edited Porphyrian Questions, rather than vice versa. The argument for this conclusion proceeds in two stages. First, it is argued that the brief comment Albert makes about ‘conjunct descent’ (descensus copulatim) in treating the definition of merely confused supposition his Perutilis Logica does not conclusively show that Albert is criticizing the logico-philosophical view of Thomas Manlevelt, as the notion of ‘conjunct descent’ is already present in the work of Heytesbury. Hence, Albert may have been referring to him, since the unique contribution of Thomas Manlevelt to the definition of merely confused personal supposition appears completely unknown to Albert. Second, it is argued that the views in the Porphyrian Questions on the nature of the continuum, quantity, and dispositional vs. actual predication show the author's familiarity with the logico-philosophical views of Albert of Saxony, but not vice versa.     

Finite and infinite state confusion models

A confusion model is defined as a model that decomposes response probabilities in stimulus identification experiments into perceptual parameters and response parameters. Historically, confusion models fall into two groups. Models in Group I, which includes Townsend's (Perception and Psychophysics, 1971, 9, 40–50) overlap model, were developed on the basis of the notion that stimulus identification is mediated by a finite number of internal states. We call the general class of models that have this processing interpretation finite state confusion models. Models in Group II, which includes Luce's (R. O. Luce et al., Eds., Handbook of Mathematical Psychology (Vol. I), New York: Wiley, 1963) biased choice model, were not developed on the basis of an explicit processing interpretation. It is shown here that models in Group II are not finite state confusion models. We prove in addition that except for Falmagne's (Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 1972, 9, 206–224) simply biased model models in Group II belong to a certain class of infinite state confusion models, namely, models asserting that stimulus identification is mediated by a continuous space of vectors representing detector activation levels.     

Progressive changes in articulatory patterns in verbal apraxia: A longitudinal case study

This research reports findings in a 10-year study of an apraxic adult, who was one of five subjects described by Shankweiler and Harris, (Cortex, ,2 277–292, 1966). Confusion matrices and feature analysis were used to compare 1965 and 1975 performances. Results indicate that over the 10-year period, errors of place, manner, and omission were markedly reduced. Voicing errors, however, while reduced in total number, still constituted a significant percentage of the patient's residual errors. Implications of these findings are discussed.     

Young children's free responses to anomalous commands

Twelve children, 21–34 months old, six in R. Brown's Stage I and six in Stages II and III, responded to commands varying in length, grammaticality, and meaning. All of the children responded significantly less often when the commands were situationally anomalous and/or ungrammatical. Results failed to replicate the results of E. Shipley, E. Smith, and L. Gleitman (Language, 1969, 44, 332–342) and J. Wetstone and B. Friedlander (Child Development, 1973, 44, 743–750). The results also suggest that young children rely heavily upon situational cues in their earliest comprehension of adult speech, and this supports arguments made by J. Strohner and K. Nelson (Child Development, 45, 567–576) and R. Chapman and J. Miller (Journal of Speech and Hearing, 1975, 18, 355–371). Since subjects rely upon nonlinguistic cues to respond appropriately, syntactic competence cannot be inferred from apparent comprehension.     

Risky Subjectivity: Antigone,Action, and Universal Trespass

In this paper, I draw on the mutually implicated structures of tragedy and self-formation found in Hegel’s use of Sophocles’ Antigone in the Phenomenology. By emphasizing the apparent distinction between particular and universal in Hegel’s reading of the tragedies in Antigone, I propose that a tragedy of action (which particularizes a universal) is inescapable for subjectivity understood as socially constituted and always already socially engaged. I consider universal/particular relations in three communities: Hegel’s Greek polis, his community of conscience, and my reading of certain feminist communities. The position I propose establishes a ground from which to approach subjects, and implies that all subjects may be understood as the result of relations embodying potential tragedy. This speaks to contemporary concerns about marginalization, identity articulation, and relations of recognition.

Commentary on Vandervert's “from idiots savants to Albert Einstein”

Vandervert believes that his model, Neurological Positivism (NP), not only supports my position on the sources of the remarkable skills of certain calendar calculating idiots savants, but can be extended to the other end of the intellectual scale, to an Albert Einstein for example. In this paper I present further evidence in support of the concepts of NP. In addition, it is proposed that NP incorporate a concept of human variability in many different domains to take into account these extremes of ability. The evolutionary importance of many domains of ability and individual differences and interactions in these domains is discussed.     

The MBR metric

P. H. Schönemann's (1982, Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society, 19, 317–319; 1983, Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 27, 311–324) MBR metric is designed to account for distortion effects in distance estimates caused by upper bounds in the response scales. To test the MBR hypothesis, given data have to be transformed first into the half-open interval [0, 1). This is achieved by defining the greatest distance estimate as the upper bound, and then dividing all values by this bound plus some “small constant” e, which ensures that the interval is open. How e should be picked is left open. It is shown here that very small differences in the value chosen for e have massive effects on the fit of the MBR model. Moreover, if e → 0, then the fit will eventually get bad for all realistic data.     

The effects of interviewers' initial impressions on information gathering

M. Synder and W. B. Swann, Jr. (1978, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 36, 1202–1212) suggest that people adopt information seeking strategies that confirm their hypotheses. To investigate whether or not these findings can be extended to employment interviews, an experiment was conducted examining the effects of interviewers' initial impressions and their decision task on the questions they formulate to assess applicants for a sales position. Twenty-six persons with varied interviewing experience reviewed the paper credentials of three applicants and then stated the questions they would ask each one. In separate sessions, ninety-two persons took the role of interviewee and responded to these questions. Contrary to the findings of P. Sackett (1982, Personnel Psychology, 35, 789–803) and T. McDonald and M. D. Hakel (1985, Personnel Psychology, 38, 321–334), the questions that interviewers asked of an applicant with poor credentials were biased in a more negative direction than the questions that were asked of moderately and highly qualified applicants. Consistent with these studies, however, no evidence was found for the strong confirmatory biases revealed in the Snyder and Swann (1978) research.     

The social dynamics involved in recovery and return to sport following a sport-related concussion: A study of three athlete-teammate-coach triads

An athlete's connection to their team and team members is an important part of their sport experience. However, researchers currently know little about the nature of these social dynamics with respect to concussed athletes. Our study explored athletes' recovery and reintegration into the team environment following a sport-related concussion. We conducted semi-structured interviews with each member of three athlete-teammate-coach triads (N = 9). We analysed the data using thematic narrative analysis and present the results as three stories that focused on each athlete's experience. For Cassie, we found two major plot points in her story: the transition in her role (and shift in identity) from athlete to student assistant coach/team manager and, once recovered, back to an athlete on the team. For Jess, we found that the main plot in her story was “pressure”. Specifically, the interplay between internal (placed on herself) and external (perceived from teammates and coaches) pressures to return to sport. In the third and final story, the main plot point was the tensions that arose from Jaden's preferences for social support and the type of support that his teammates and coaches believed he needed during his recovery. Our results highlight the interplay between athlete's personal and social identities, feelings of pressure to return and readiness, and the challenges of providing the right amount and type of social support. This research contributes to our limited understanding of the social dynamics involved in athletes' return to sport following a concussion.     

Egocentrism redux

This commentary addresses itself to D.K. Lapsley and M.N. Murphy's critique (1985, Developmental Review, 5, 201–217) of my theory of egocentrism (D. Elkind, 1967, Child Development, 38, 1025–1034). These authors argue that the theory of egocentrism is inconsistent, that self-other differentiation occurs earlier than the theory suggests, and that self-consciousness does not require egocentrism. They conclude that perspective taking provides a more consistent and clear explanation of the adolescent phenomena of the imaginary audience and the personal fable than does egocentricism. I disagree and counter their arguments with my own.